



**QUEEN'S  
UNIVERSITY  
BELFAST**

## **Party rules, party resources and the politics of parliamentary democracies How parties organize in the 21st century**

Poguntke, T., Scarrow, S. E., Webb, P. D., Allern, E., Aylott, N., Bardi, L., Costa-Lobo, M., Cross, W. P., Deschouwer, K., Eneydi, Z., Fabre, E., Farrell, D., Gauja, A., Kopeký, P., Koole, R., Verge Mestre, T., Müller, W., Pedersen, K., Rahat, G., ... van Haute, E. (2016). Party rules, party resources and the politics of parliamentary democracies How parties organize in the 21st century. *Party Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068816662493>

**Published in:**  
Party Politics

**Document Version:**  
Peer reviewed version

**Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:**  
[Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal](#)

**Publisher rights**  
Copyright the author 2016.

**General rights**  
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

**Take down policy**  
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact [openaccess@qub.ac.uk](mailto:openaccess@qub.ac.uk).

# **Party Rules, Party Resources, and the Politics of Parliamentary Democracies: How Parties Organize in the 21st Century<sup>1</sup>**

Thomas Poguntke, Heinrich-Heine University, Germany

Susan Scarrow, University of Houston, USA

Paul D. Webb, Sussex University, UK

and Elin Allern, Nicholas Aylott, Luciano Bardi, Marina Costa-Lobo, William P. Cross, Kris Deschouwer, Zsolt Eneydi, Elodie Fabre, David Farrell, Anika Gauja, Petr Kopeký, Ruud Koole, Tania Verge Mestre, Wolfgang Müller, Karina Pedersen, Gideon Rahat, Aleks Szczerbiak, Emilie van Haute.

## **ABSTRACT**

This article introduces the first findings of the Political Party Database (PPDB) project, a major survey of party organizations in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies. The project's first round of data covers 122 parties in 19 countries. In this paper we describe the scope of the database, then investigate what it tells us about contemporary party organization in these countries, focussing on parties' resources, structures and internal decision-making. We examine party-family and within country organizational patterns, and where possible we make temporal comparisons with older datasets. Our analyses suggest a remarkable coexistence of uniformity and diversity. In terms of the major organizational resources on which parties can draw, such as members, staff and finance, the new evidence largely confirms the continuation of trends identified in previous research: ie, declining membership, but enhanced financial resources and

more paid staff. We also find remarkable uniformity regarding the core architecture of party organizations. At the same time, however, we find substantial variation between countries and party families in terms of their internal processes, with particular regard to how internally democratic they are, and in the forms that this democratization takes.

## **Introduction**

How do parties organize, and how much do parties' organizational differences matter? The aim of the Political Party Database Project (PPDB) is to provide systematic answers to the first question so that we can better answer the second one, the crucial "so what?" question about party organizational variations. Other questions we seek to answer are to what extent, and why, do parties retain certain structural features despite changes in their competitive environments? For instance, are some traditional organizational features of parties in parliamentary democracies outmoded, such as party conferences and party membership, merely quaint relics and nostalgic remnants? To use Bagehot's terminology (1963/1867), have parties' extra-parliamentary organizations become the "dignified" elements of party constitutions, with the real work of party politics being done by the "efficient" parts of the organization, be these the professionalized party staffs or the party officeholders? Bagehot wrote that the dignified elements were theatrical and often old elements which helped "to excite and preserve the reverence of the population" (61); similarly, some party practices might be remnants of earlier conditions which nevertheless contribute to the legitimacy of party government.

Generating legitimacy is not a small thing, as Bagehot himself noted, but is this all that parties voluntary organizations contribute to contemporary politics? Or do parties retain these institutions because they continue to contribute in other ways? We do not expect to find simple or universal answers to any of these questions, but we do expect to gain traction in answering them by using systematic data to test posited relationships. This conviction has inspired the establishment of the PPDB. In the remainder of this article we introduce this database, and present some of our initial findings regarding the state of contemporary party organizations in 19 democracies.

### **I. The Long Tradition of Comparative Party Scholarship: Concepts, Categories and Data**

The comparative study of political parties' extra-legislative organizations and activities is more than 150 years old, having arisen alongside the emergence of electoral politics. In the middle

third of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the comparative study of political parties was stimulated and re-defined by authors who ambitiously constructed new categories and new causal theories to explain organizational differences between political parties in multiple democracies, and to explain changes over time (including Neumann 1954; Duverger 1954; Heidenheimer 1963; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Kirchheimer 1966; Epstein 1968; Sartori 1976). More recent contributors have continued to develop this approach (cf. Ware 1987; von Beyme 1988; Panebianco 1988; Schlesinger 1994). A common feature of these multi-country studies is their reliance on thick description to buttress their arguments. Some of their most enduring contributions are now-familiar labels (e.g., mass, catch-all, electoral professional, etc.) Much of the theoretical speculation in these classic studies treats parties and party organizations as dependent variables, explaining how contemporary parties bear the marks of their origins, and how organizational differences reflect institutional contexts and ideological (party family) similarities.

Echoing more general trends in political science, recent decades have witnessed the rise of more systematic and more quantitative studies of political parties' organizations and activities outside the legislative arena. Much of this research relies on party statutes and documents for evidence about party structures, sometimes combined with expert judgments about how parties actually work. One notable investigation that combined both approaches was Kenneth Janda's pioneering study of party organization and practices in 53 countries (1980). Janda and his colleague Robert Harmel later proposed a different framework for collecting and interpreting data about party organizational change, one aimed more squarely at understanding practices in democratic regimes (1994). The 1980s also brought the start of another ambitious effort to gather cross-party and longitudinal data on party organizational development, what became the 12-country *Party Organizations: a Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western Democracies, 1960-90* (Katz and Mair 1992). This effort focused on what the editors dubbed the "official story" approach, primarily reporting published data and formal rules. Data collected in this *Handbook* have been used for a variety of studies, including ones that update parts of its data (for instance Caul 1999; Poguntke 2000; Bille 2001).

## **II. Introducing the PPDB<sup>2</sup>**

The PPDB project falls squarely within this tradition of evidence-driven approaches to the comparative study of political parties. It deliberately builds on and extends past efforts, while aiming to complement, not duplicate, other contemporary efforts to gather data on elections and representation. Thus, in some cases it replicates questions that have been used in earlier studies, making it easier to use some of PPDB's snapshot data for longitudinal comparisons. Our dataset also includes match keys to facilitate integration with several other major data sources.

In forming what was essentially a data-gathering collaborative endeavour, members of this project agreed to pool their efforts and standardize variables in order to maximize the utility of our individual data gathering efforts. In building our initial team, we deliberately sought out members with varied theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of political parties. This diversity is reflected in the data that we chose to gather. (A full list of those involved in this data collection effort is included in Appendix 2.)

We decided early on to focus on the “official story”, in order to facilitate future replication; this decision also constrained our choice of variables.<sup>3</sup> We also prioritized gathering data that would be useful for studying parties and their resources as independent variables – in other words, that would help us answer the questions of why and how organizational variations matter.

Another priority from the outset has been to facilitate the more general study of political parties. To this end our team has worked to make the data available to others as quickly as possible, with the aim of stimulating research in this field. We particularly hope that it will be of interest to researchers who might otherwise have ignored party agency and party organizational capacity because of the difficulty of finding good cross-national party data.

The PPDB Round 1 data provides information on 122 parties in 19 countries during the 2010-2014 period. The four modules of the database include over 300 variables that collectively describe some of the most important aspects of party structures and practices. For some parties and some variables we have readings for more than one year; for most, however, we have just

one data point for each party and variable. We have deliberately included most countries included in the Katz/Mair *Data Handbook* to maximize the value of the data. Overall, we have selected (mostly) parliamentary regimes which differ in many theoretically relevant ways. For instance, they have different electoral systems, different electoral thresholds, use both federal and unitary structures, have varied lengths of democratic experience, varied population sizes, and disparate levels of state funding for political parties. In short, this data set offers multiple opportunities to test questions about how institutional settings can affect the ways that parties organize, and about when and how this matters. Taken as a whole, this collection provides an extraordinarily detailed current snapshot of extra-parliamentary parties in both established and newer democracies.

The conceptual roadmap that guided our choice of indicators was the view that party organizations can usefully be described in terms of their structures, their resources, and their linkages. We further subdivided each of these dimensions with the aim of answering specific questions. For instance, a recurring question for scholars is the extent to which parties should be viewed as unitary actors. In order to better answer this question, we incorporated indicators derived from four structural sub-dimensions which illuminate the formal location of decision-making within the party, and at what level (if at all) these decisions are enforced (leadership autonomy, centralization, coordination, and territorial dispersion). Similarly, we sub-divided the resource dimension into three categories of resources (money, members and staff) in order to better identify dependency relationships and resource control (for more details see Scarrow and Webb forthcoming). We assume that these three aspects of party organizational development are related, and indeed, that some measures may have multiple meanings. This conceptual foundation helped to ensure that we have gathered sufficient data to test the predictions of the many theories of party organizational change, including those which posit links between parties' internal power dynamics and their resource bases. In a nutshell, we have collected data on, among others, party membership, party staff, party finance, basic party units, party executive composition, formal links to collateral organizations, women's representation, leadership selection, candidate selection, manifesto construction and approval, and intra-party referendums (for a detailed documentation of our data see [insert webpage address here](#)).

### **III. Extra-Parliamentary Parties in Contemporary Democracies: Structural Similarities, Resource Differences?**

In other publications the many authors of this paper will use PPDB data to study the impact and origins of party organizational differences (see, for instance, the chapters in *Organizing Representation*, forthcoming). Our aim in the current paper is more straightforwardly descriptive: we want to highlight some important similarities between - and key differences across - party organizations in established party democracies. In what follows we present a few of the key findings from the PPDB, pointing out important patterns of practice in terms of resources, structures, and linkages.

In the sections below, we describe organizational differences across countries, and across party families. Previous studies give us mixed messages about what patterns we should expect to find. We know that parties are moulded by their social and institutional environments as well as by their ideological heritage (Harmel 2002, Harmel and Janda 1994), but when looking at parties from various parliamentary systems we are uncertain about whether ideological leanings (party family) will outweigh the effects of country-specific institutions. Major contributions towards the literature on party types have drawn attention to organizational contagion across geographic and ideological boundaries, identifying a developmental trajectory leading from cadre to mass to catch-all to cartel parties as the dominant pattern (Neumann 1956, Duverger 1951; Kirchheimer 1966; Epstein 1968; Katz and Mair 1995). These approaches tend to downplay the impact of country-specific institutional and social factors. If they are right, we should expect our cross-sectional data set to show a large degree of similarity in the way parties organize, while ideological or national factors should not be very important. With our comprehensive cross-national data, we are now in a position to test how well the idea of a modal party type holds empirically.



#### **IV. Resources: Money, Staff, Members**

We begin our assessment of contemporary party organizations by examining three types of resource conventionally associated with organizational strength: money, staff and members. All are potentially important resources that can help parties to win elections.<sup>4</sup>

##### *A. Money*

Money is the first – and perhaps most important - resource on which parties rely. In this section we review what the PPDB tells us about the incomes of national parties' head offices. To facilitate comparison, Table 1 reports national patterns in four ways: average party income, average party income relative to the size of national economy, average income relative to the size of the electorate, and the financial dependence of parties on the state (i.e. percentage of income from public subsidies). The first of these indicators tells us which countries have the richest and poorest parties in absolute terms; inevitably, however, these things can be expected to reflect to a considerable extent the relative size and wealth of each country, and indeed, the generosity of the state, which is why it is also interesting to examine the other indicators. For parties for which we have more than one year's worth of data (which is most of the dataset), we use the mean score of all available measures; for others we are only able to draw on a single year of data.

**[Table 1 about here]**

In terms of absolute levels of income, it is plain from the first column in Table 1 that the German, French and Spanish parties are much wealthier than those of any other country on average, while the Italians also receive well above the overall average of 14.2 million euros per year. In saying this, we should take note of the fact that we only have data for the two largest parties in France, which probably inflates the country's position relative to others in this table.<sup>5</sup> The Israeli, Hungarian, Irish and Danish parties feature among the poorest in these terms. When we control for the size of the national economy, we see that a rather different pattern emerges, in that the Czech, Spanish, Portuguese and Austrian parties enjoy most income relative to GDP, while the British and Dutch are poorest. However, if we additionally correct for the number of

registered electors – the size of the body politic, as it were – we find that the Poles, British and Hungarians are the most impecunious, with their parties only attracting 17, 28, and 29 cents per registered elector, respectively (see Table 1, column 3). At the other end of the scale, the Norwegians and Austrians stand out as being in a league of their own, with the former country's parties earning 2.77 euros and the latter's slightly under 2 euros per elector. Germany, which is at the top of the table for the first measure, is only in the middle of the pack when income is standardized by the size of the national economy or the number of voters. While countries vary widely in the per-voter sums available to their parties, we might reasonably reflect that even two or three euros per elector is not such a high price to pay for one's democracy: arguably, the world's parliamentary democracies get their party politics on the cheap. Finally, the fourth column in Table 1 reveals the extraordinary extent to which the parties in contemporary democracies have become financially dependent on the state. In 11 of the 18 countries for which we have data, the mean dependency ratio is over 50 percent, and in five countries (Hungary, Israel, Belgium, Austria and Portugal) it is in the range of three-quarters or more. At the other end of the scale, the UK is a stark outlier, with its parties only deriving an average of 9 percent of their income from the state.

What of the different party families? Table 2 reveals a straightforward and not particularly surprising story when the data are broken down this way.<sup>6</sup> The wealthiest parties are the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats. These well-established party families have dominated much of Europe's post-war history as governing parties. All other party families have lower, but relatively similar, average income levels. The 'big two' are well above the overall mean income of 15 million euros per year, while all others are considerably below it. This pattern remains broadly true, no matter how you look at it – in raw currency values, relative to national income, or per elector. The Social Democrats do best in each of these regards, while the Green parties fare poorest. There is relatively little variation around the mean in terms of dependence on state funding, except that the small number of far right parties seem especially well served by state support. Analysis of variance suggests that differences between countries explain more of the variance in party income than differences between party families, in so far as eta-squared is always higher for the inter-country variations in Table 1 than for the inter-family variations in Table 2. This is, of course, only preliminary evidence: multivariate modelling

would be required to draw more definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, it points to the likelihood that patterns of party funding converge around national models more than they do around typical party family models. Furthermore, the fact that *both* inter-country and inter-party family differences are statistically significant across all of these indicators undermines the notion that there is any generally 'typical' model of party organisation.

**[Table 2 about here]**

### *B. Staff*

One of the most under-researched fields in the study of political parties is that of party employees. This is a significant oversight, which leaves us with a deficient understanding of an important aspect of party organizational development. This is particularly so since it seems likely that payroll staff are more important than ever before. In part this is because modern election campaigning and political marketing depend on professional expertise. In addition (and relatedly), it is likely that parties have come to rely increasingly on paid professionals in the context of party membership decline and 'de-energization' around the democratic world (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Whiteley et al, 1994; see also below).

What evidence does our database provide about current levels of party staff? In investigating this issue, we are reminded of one of the main reasons for the relative lack of research into party employees: the sheer difficulty of getting the relevant data. For whatever reason, many parties tend to be reluctant to provide data on the number of payroll employees that they have. The PPDB also suffers from the same reluctance. That said, we believe that we have sufficient information to generate a meaningful picture. We have central party staffing data for 15 countries, and legislative party staffing data for 12 countries, giving us a total of 60-63 parties for the various staffing measures we report here.<sup>7</sup> A further complication is that snapshot comparisons of party payroll figures could be misleading if the data come from different points in the electoral cycle, because many parties hire more staff in election than non-election years. As it happens, most of the PPDB staffing data comes from non-election years, with the exception being the parties in Denmark, Ireland (for Fine Gael and Fianna Fail) and Portugal. This means that the particular snapshot we have can be regarded as largely representative of parties' 'normal' mode of operation in non-election years.

**[Table 3 about here]**

What do we find, then? Table 3 shows that the Spanish and British parties have the most head office staff, whether measured in absolute or relative terms. (This also appears true of Germany, but we have head office staffing data for only one German party, so cannot be sure if this is representative). We should perhaps be wary of taking some of the very low national averages too literally, because they are either based on very few cases (eg, Portugal, Hungary, Israel) or key data are missing for large parties (eg, the Danish Social Democrats). Table 3's figures on legislative party staff are distorted by an obvious outlier – Germany, whose parties appear to employ quite extraordinarily high numbers of parliamentary staff. These party staff are in fact formally employees of the state; however, they have a number of functions, some of which are party-related, so we think that it is justified to regard them as a party resource.<sup>8</sup> Excluding the German parties, the average number of legislative party employees is just 26.2, which is perhaps a more generally representative figure of the database countries as a whole. Comparing the figures in the first and third columns of Table 3, we see that parties in countries such as Hungary, Portugal, Israel and Ireland apparently place their human resources more in Parliament than in the national headquarters, while parties in other countries (including Spain, Britain and the Czech Republic) tend to opt for the opposite approach. Of course, the number of staff that parties employ to assist their MPs might reasonably be expected to reflect the number of legislators that they return to Parliament, so it is also useful to control for the size of parliamentary parties in assessing staffing establishments. Hence, Table 3 also reports the mean number of legislative employees per MP that parties maintain in each country. Overall, this produces a rather modest figure: the German parties are, of course, substantially higher than any others, being able to call on the support of nearly 7 staff members for each MP, but in most other the countries the norm is only about 1 or 2. By a similar logic, when evaluating the number of central party staff as a resource it is interesting to control for the numbers of party members whom they might need to serve. This shows relatively little variation across country, there being only slightly more than 1 employee for every hundred members across the dataset as a whole; the Danish, Hungarian and Israeli parties would appear to enjoy the highest central staff/member ratios, but the latter two in particular are based on very few cases, so should be regarded with great caution.

What of patterns by party family? The figures Table 4 report these, but deliberately exclude German parties, which are such outliers on legislative party staffing that they tend to distort general patterns that would otherwise be apparent. We see a pattern that is broadly familiar from the analysis of financial data in so far as the major parties of the Christian Democratic/Conservative and Social Democratic families predominate in terms of absolute staffing establishments, both inside and outside parliament. That said, the Greens and Left Socialists employ high quantities of staff relative to their individual memberships and numbers of MPs. Again, we should note that the eta-squared coefficients generally suggest stronger country effects than party family effects in respect of party staffing.

**[Table 4 about here]**

### *C. Parties and members*

The literature on party members has grown considerably over the past two decades, seemingly in inverse relationship to the numbers of the subject under investigation (including Heidar 1994; Katz, Mair et al 1992; Mair and Van Biezen 2001; Scarrow 1996; Scarrow 2000; Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Van Haute 2011; Van Haute and Carty 2012; Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2012; Weldon 2006; Whiteley 2011; Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson 1994; Widfeldt 1999, to mention only a few). The evidence on the decline of party membership numbers across the democratic world is overwhelming. In Table 5, we update the story of individual party membership trends by reporting a number of things: the aggregate membership across all parties for each country is noted, along with the size of the registered national electorate at the nearest national election, and the consequent membership/electorate ratio.

The downward trend which has so often been observed remains apparent in our data. The mean aggregate membership figure for the 15 countries for which we have longitudinal data since the 1980s was 886,850 per country at the start of the time-series; by the mid-to-late 2000s when van Biezen et al (2012) reported their figures the average had fallen to 633,425 for the same countries; and in the PPDB data for the years 2011-2014, it has dropped to 549,360. Indeed, if we include the three further countries that are part of the PPDB but were not in the van Biezen et al study (Australia, Canada and Israel), the national average falls to just 501,337. Not surprisingly, the picture is similar even after controlling for the size of electorates; the average membership/electorate ratio (ME) for the original 15 countries was 7.50 in the early 1980s (or

1990 in the case of Hungary), but had declined to 4.14 by the mid-2000s. The PPDB shows that it now stands at 3.53 (or 3.45 if you include Australia, Canada and Israel). The only country in which the ME ratio has not declined in recent years is Ireland, which appears to have experienced a modest increase from 2.03 to 2.15 in the 5 years following 2008.

**[Table 5 about here]**

What is the picture if we break down the analysis by party family? Table 6 sheds some light on this question. The pattern revealed is familiar: as usual, the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats have the largest average memberships of any party family, and the highest average ME ratios. Some of the smaller parties (far right and Left Socialists) have surprisingly high ME ratios where they are successful, but this is only in a limited number of countries. In summary, then, the Christian Democrats, Socialists and Conservatives continue to have the highest ratios of members to electors in their countries. Once again, the eta squared statistics in Tables 5 and 6 suggest greater variation by country than by party family.

**[Table 6 about here]**

To summarise: in examining the organizational resources at the disposal of the 122 parties in our database, we have found that ME ratios continue to fall in almost all the PPDB countries, such that little more than 3 percent voters now join political parties in these disparate countries; that German, Spanish and French parties seem to be the richest in terms of funding and staff; and that party staffing levels are relatively modest in most countries, although extraordinarily high in Germany. While the data seem to confirm the perception that overall party membership and party staffing levels are moving in different directions, we need more robust longitudinal analyses to confirm this. Moreover, even if there is some effect of parties substituting professional staff for member volunteers, the net effect has been small, with most parties having remarkably lean staffing in their national headquarters.

For many parties the focus of their paid human resources is the national party head office, although for some it is more likely to be the party in parliament. However, it has also become apparent that if there are any general trends, they have certainly not wiped out considerable differences that remain between countries and ideological families. It seems likely to us that those differences are usually better explained by country rather than party family.

## **V. Structures: Surprising Uniformity?**

Extra-parliamentary organizations first developed in late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, stimulated by the organizational efforts of opposition parties, including Socialists and workers in Germany, Austria and the UK, Liberals in the UK, farmers' parties in Scandinavia, and religious parties in Belgium and the Netherlands. These parties had widely differing aims, but many of them adopted very similar organizational structures: they operated as clubs with statutes, membership procedures and annual dues, local branches, annual or biennial national congresses as the nominally highest party organ, and smaller executive committees holding broad authority between meetings of the national conference. This "subscriber democracy" model was particularly well-suited to parties which began as extra-parliamentary organizations, or which had small legislative delegations; in such parties there was less chance for conflict between a party's legislative delegation and the party congress (Morris 2000; Scarrow 2015: ch. 2.).

By the middle of the twentieth century, parties in most parliamentary democracies had adopted some variant of the subscriber democracy model of party organization. Of course, similarity in structures can accommodate multiple practices, and in political parties (as in many other organizations) informal channels can be at least as important as the formal decision-making process. Nevertheless, the adoption and spread of the individual member/congress model may be politically consequential. Its use signals acceptance of the norm of parties as micro-polities: parties and their leaders gain legitimacy from their relationships with a self-defined *polis*. This relationship is said to complement and strengthen their relationship with a wider electorate. Adopting this model also signals recognition of the utility of permanent organization for policy and mobilization, as opposed to relying exclusively on elected representatives and *ad hoc* campaign organizations.

The extent to which extra-parliamentary organizations contribute to legitimacy, or help electoral mobilization, are empirical questions. In both areas we would expect that some

arrangements are more effective than others, and that their impact may vary by circumstances, and according to fashion. Indeed, parties may have different metrics for judging effectiveness, depending on which goals they prioritize (office, votes, or policy?), and how their priorities change over time. As a result, even if many parties adhere to a basically similar model, we would expect to find cross-party organizational variation, and experimentation within single parties over time. After all, we know that a string of parties have made headlines in recent years by claiming that they are going to do politics in a new way, and therefore will have different kinds of party structures and organizational practices. (These are sometimes given poetic names, like the “liquid democracy” of the German Pirates Party, or the “Operating System” software of the Italian Five Star Movement.) If novel party organization can increase a party’s election prospects, we would expect organizational experimentation to flourish, as parties compete for marginal advantages.

Partly confounding this prediction is one striking finding from our survey of contemporary party organizations in parliamentary democracies: the sheer *uniformity* in basic organizational structures and rules. Old parties and new continue to adhere to a subscriber democracy organizational model in which dues-paying members are the *polis* for most or all important decisions, and in which the party conference is (formally) the party’s highest organ. Thus, not only do all but one of the PPDB parties seek to enrol dues paying members (with the exception being the Dutch right-populist Freedom Party, led by Geert Wilders). In addition, many parties are experimenting with new enrolment rules, and some have introduced new types of membership (see Pedersen, Scarrow, van Haute forthcoming). However, for the most part they maintain the distinction between supporters who enrol with the party, and those that do not.

#### *A. Representative Assemblies*

Almost all the party statutes establish representative internal decision-making structures, with the party congress at the formal apex. The following section will say more about the actual distribution of power among party levels; for now, what we want to emphasize is that the member/congress template still plays a prominent role in party claims to be internally democratic. Most party statutes stipulate that the party congresses will meet regularly, with 75 percent of parties requiring these assemblies to be held more than once every three years (see Table 7). Across party families there is a modest amount of variation in the frequency with



which these need to be held. Most notably, three quarters of Green Parties require their congress to meet at least once a year. In contrast, the “old left” Left Socialists are most likely to set loose requirements, with 40 percent of them stipulating that party congresses must be held at least once every 4 or 5 years.

**[Table 7 about here]**

Most parties have a smaller executive committee at the top of their extra-parliamentary organizations. Because these bodies have different names across parties, we asked our respondents to tell us about the highest executive body that is recognized in the party statutes. In other words, we are not interested in cabinet meetings or informal meetings between party leaders and their trusted advisors. As a rough rule of thumb, we suggest that the smaller these bodies are, the more likely it is that they are conducting some of the real business of leading the party. About half the parties have executive committees with 20 or fewer members; these are small enough to be effective governing bodies. When we compare this to analyses based on the data documented in the Katz/Mair Handbook, we see a remarkable stability in the configuration of the essential intra-party bodies. In other words, organizational innovation has been very limited over time (Poguntke 2000: ch 6).

In the majority of parties (56 percent), these executive committees report directly to the party congress. Most of the remaining parties have an additional medium-sized committee between the party congress and the executive. The incidence of such intermediate-level committees is inversely related to the frequency of the required meetings of party congresses: the more committee layers, the greater the time span between required meetings of the party congress ( $r=.259$ ). In terms of the relation between different “faces” of the party within the party organs, it is interesting to note that the party executives do not solely represent the extra-parliamentary parties. In half the parties, at least 20 percent of the members of the party’s executive committee are also members of the national legislature.

*B. Leadership Powers*

Despite the widespread adherence to the subscriber-democracy organizational model, party statutes vary widely in the powers and responsibilities they grant to their party leaders. These

differences affect both the extent to which leaders' roles are explicitly specified, and the specified relationship between the party leader and the extra-parliamentary party. For instance, as Table 8 reveals, a fifth of the party statutes give the party leader the right to help select his or her deputy, and to summon the party congress, while nearly a third give the leader the right to summon the party officials.<sup>9</sup> More than 90 percent of the statutes explicitly mention that the party leader could or should attend the party congress or party executive. A small number (5 percent) formally give their leaders the right to approving or veto coalition agreements; similarly, only 7 percent of the parties give the party leader a statutory right to appoint one or more members of the party executive. In addition to these rights, some party statutes explicitly address certainly roles that the leaders should take up. Thus, two-fifths refer to the leader's position as external representative of the party; interestingly, however, just over a quarter make the leader formally accountable to the party congress.

**[Table 8 about here]**

These nine items in Table 8 (setting out leaders' autonomy and rights) can be combined to produce an additive index of leadership power. As Table 9 shows, parties are widely dispersed on this index, approximately following a normal distribution, but no party earns the top possible score for leadership autonomy.

**[Table 9 about here]**

What, if anything, do these statutes tell us about how parties distribute decision-making authority between the party leader, the extra-parliamentary party, and the parliamentary party? Although structures seldom or never provide the complete story about who holds power and influence within a party, intra-party conflicts are undoubtedly shaped by the formal rules, and by the norms these rules embody. The correlations in Table 10 point towards an interesting and consistent pattern: the larger the party (whether in terms of members, seats held in the legislature or number of people sitting on the national executive), the greater the leader's power. It is also noteworthy that the leader appears to have more rights the more frequently parties hold

congresses. On the face of it, this is a more counter-intuitive finding, although it might simply be a function of party size, in that larger parties generally hold more frequent congresses.

**[Table 10 about here]**

To the extent that party statutes contain an element of rhetoric, we would expect that ideological (as in party family) preferences would affect the arrangements outlined by statutes, including the roles ascribed to leaders. Our data show traces of this (Table 11). As we would expect, Green and Left Socialist parties have the lowest mean scores, and the Far Right parties have the highest mean scores. Yet these averages also disguise some within group variation, and all the averages are relatively low. In other words, although party family seems to play some role in determining these arrangements, the impact is far from overwhelming.

**[Table 11 about here]**

To conclude: the predominant finding of this section is the striking similarity in what might be termed the organizational skeletons of the parties. Whereas the previous section showed considerable cross-national variation in the distribution of resources, this section shows the continued dominance of the subscriber democracy model across established and newer democracies, and across party families. This enduring similarity is seldom remarked upon, but we find it notable, not least because it has survived several waves of populist challenges over the past four decades. Parties that proudly deviate from this basic model, and which claim to pursue a new brand of democracy, tend to receive a great deal of attention from the media and scholars alike. In fact, however, few of those parties have gained enough traction to join and stay in a legislature for more than one or two terms. Those that do tend to change their organizations in ways that make them more similar to the organizations of their older peers. Such organizational convergence is undoubtedly encouraged by national regulations and statutes that dictate some of the fundamental organizational options for parties and/or voluntary organizations. Yet that is not the whole explanation, because in some cases party structures pre-date the laws, and in any case

parties themselves are in a position to alter the regulations if they wished to do so. If the organizational convergence is not driven by ideology, perhaps it has been driven by the utility of the model (cf. Poguntke 1998), and/or by its perceived legitimacy.

## **VI. Parties as Democratic Linkage**

### *A. Measuring Intra-Party Democracy*

We have seen in the previous section that political parties largely resemble each other when it comes to the configuration of their core party bodies. However, when we take a closer look at how their organizations provide for linkage to the citizenry, we find remarkable variation which questions a prevailing narrative in the literature that assumes a succession of dominant party types.

The membership organization of political parties is one of their principal ways of generating linkage to society (Poguntke 2000). While adherents of a Schumpeterian view of democracy would argue that democracy does not necessarily require democratic linkage through parties, others maintain that it is virtually unthinkable except in these terms. Obviously, we cannot decide this debate here. However, our data allows us to investigate the empirical realities irrespective of normative desirability. We have collected data on a considerable number of variables that are related to the democratic quality of political parties' internal politics. While many of them are not very interesting individually, they can be combined in a meaningful way to create valid measures of intra-party democracy (IPD).<sup>10</sup>

As defined here, the benchmark of IPD is that it should facilitate the involvement of as many party members as possible in the decisions that are central to a party's political life, including programme writing, personnel selection and other intra-organizational decision-making.<sup>11</sup> From this perspective, it seems plausible to argue that the degree of organizational *decentralization* represents an independent component of IPD that should be measured independently of general *inclusiveness*, a point several of us have made elsewhere (Hazan and Rahat 2010; Scarrow 2005: 6; von dem Berge et al. 2013). For the sake of parsimony, in this examination we will focus solely on the degree of inclusiveness to measure IPD, because empirically these concepts overlap. For instance, a higher degree of decentralization

automatically leads to a higher degree of inclusiveness because more party bodies (like the German *Land* parties or the British constituency parties) play a role in certain crucial decisions, each of which represents a different approach to realizing inclusiveness.<sup>12</sup>

### *B. Two Variants of Intra-Party Democracy*

Although we do not distinguish between inclusiveness and decentralization, we do make a different theoretically-based distinction in our measurement of IPD, constructing separate indices for assembly-based and plebiscitary variants of IPD.<sup>13</sup> Each of these represents a different approach to discerning the will of the group. Assembly-based IPD assigns decision-making to meetings, whose participants debate propositions and then take a decision. Plebiscitary IPD separates the stages of debate and decision-making. Both types may be more or less inclusive. While assembly-based IPD is often associated with decisions made by a meeting of party delegates, it also includes decisions made at town-hall type assemblies in which all attendees are eligible to debate and vote. We contend that plebiscitary decision-making embodies a fundamentally different logic as it provides no way to deliberate and reach compromise (frequently through repeated rounds of voting). It is the politics of ‘either/or’, which arguably gives a lot of power to the leaders (Katz and Mair 1995: 21). It may, however, also be used as a leadership-challenging device. This is an empirical question. What counts for us now is that it follows an inherently different logic (Cross and Katz 2013).

Following this logic our assembly-based IPD-index (AIPD) measures the inclusiveness of decision-making inside parties that is based on discussions within party bodies and assemblies, including assemblies of all members (e.g., at the constituency level). It covers the three essential components of intra-party democracy, namely programme writing, personnel selection (leaders and candidates) and organizational structure (referring to the relative strength of party bodies like congress and executive). A higher index score indicates that a more inclusive party body has the final say in this area.

Our plebiscitary IPD index (PIPD) measures the degree to which parties allow for non-assembly decisions based on one member, one vote. These decisions are made by the lone party member at home on a computer screen, or casting a ballot in a party-run polling station. It covers only programme writing and personnel selection. A higher index score means that a party has more opportunities for ballots on these aspects. The PIPD index assigns a positive value to all

parties which incorporate such procedures in their rules, even if they are optional or apply only in certain situations or are complemented by assembly-based procedures. It is difficult to envisage a large party organization which is exclusively based on plebiscitary decision-making (even though the Italian Five Star Movement may come close), but we found a surprisingly high number of parties which mix these two decision styles. Over 55 percent of the parties in our study provide for some plebiscitary decision-making.

Conceptually, our AIPD index is a formative index (Diamantopoulos et al. 2008; Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001) consisting of three logically independent components: programme writing, personnel selection and organizational structure. Unfortunately, for many of our cases we have incomplete information about all three components. However, because testing shows that these components are highly correlated, we have decided to include all cases with valid data for at least 2 of our 3 components.<sup>14</sup> Our calculations are based on data for the years 2011 to 2014 using the most recent available measurement point.

We start by asking whether our conceptual distinction between assembly-based and plebiscitary intra-party democracy holds empirically. First, the relatively weak correlation coefficient of 0.37 (Pearson) indicates that both indices are related, yet most likely measure separate dimensions. This supports our contention that it makes sense to look at both dimensions when trying to assess the extent to which parties are internally democratic, because some parties are inclusive with one type of procedure, but not with the other.

### *C. Patterns of Intra-party Democracy: Divergence rather than Uniformity*

When we turn to simple descriptive statistics, we also see substantial differences between our two measures. Both indices have a theoretical minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1. The mid-point of 0.5 indicates a neutral position vis-à-vis our two IPD measures: such a party is neither particularly inclusive nor elitist in its intra-party politics (von dem Berge/Poguntke 2016 for details). The results for the assembly-based IPD index show that all but one of the 122 parties included in our study have internal structures that satisfy a minimum level of internal democracy. The exception is the one-man Dutch Freedom Party of Geert Wilders which has no party members and hence no internal structure to speak of. It has therefore been coded missing for our IPD indices.

**[Table 12 about here]**

Our data show that the AIPD index, which measures intra-party democracy based on meetings and exchange of arguments within party bodies, represents the essential core of intra-party democracy. We have a valid measurement for all parties, and none of the parties comes close to the minimum value of our index (the lowest value is .26) while some parties go all the way towards almost perfectly democratic internal procedures (see Table 12 and Figure 1). Whereas most parties cluster in the middle range of the AIPD index, the pattern changes substantially for the plebiscitary variant of IPD. More than 40 per cent of the parties in our study have not institutionalized any plebiscitary mechanisms, but some parties reach our maximum value of 1.0.

**[Figure 1 about here]**

For both indices, we find substantial variation between parties. Do we find evidence of systematic patterns in the ways in which the two variants of IPD are combined in different party families and countries? It is easy to imagine how such patterns might arise. For instance, highly inclusive plebiscitary procedures might be a substitute for less inclusive assembly-based procedures. Think, for example, of a populist party which uses plebiscites to legitimate the policies of its leadership while providing little space for genuine internal discussion. Such substitution strategies are not necessarily confined to populist parties. A key element of the cartel party argument is the suggestion that leaders of established parties may seek to enhance their autonomy by promoting plebiscitary modes of decision-making which by-pass middle level elites (Katz and Mair 1995: 21). Yet inclusive plebiscitary procedures could also be additive, if parties with a strong tradition of assembly-based internal democracy feel compelled to adapt to the pressure of a public discourse which regards plebiscitary decision-making as inherently superior to assembly-based modes of democracy (Fuchs 2007; Pappi 2015: 224-25; Zittel 2006). In the populist case, we would expect a very low AIPD score to go together with a high PIPD value, while in the latter (“pan-democratic”) case we would expect a positive correlation. As reported above, the relatively weak correlation between our indices suggests that no single pattern dominates.

A closer look at the main party families shows clear differences between them in terms of IPD usage. They do not, however, always meet the obvious theoretical expectations. For instance, while the Greens are associated with calls for democratization of public life, overall they have only a mid-range score on our plebiscitary index, although they are the most democratic party family when comes to assembly-based intra-party politics. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, come closest to our pan-democratic model, with comparatively high scores for both types of practices (see Table 13). Christian Democrats/Conservatives conform to the conventional wisdom in that they register average discursive IPD scores and fairly low plebiscitary values.

**[Table 13 about here]**

Surprisingly, the Far Right does not score high on the plebiscitary index even though this category encompasses populist right-wing parties. To a degree, this may be due to the fact that we have lumped together two party groups which analytically belong to separate categories, namely extreme right and populist right-wing parties. We have chosen to do so because this distinction, even though theoretically meaningful, is frequently empirically fuzzy as many parties meander between extreme right-wing and more ‘acceptable’ right-wing populist appeals. If we look at the two groups separately, we can see that populists record higher PIPD values (.32 and .14). However, they are still not conspicuously high and we must read these results with some care as the number of cases is fairly low. Finally, the most notable result is that Left Socialist parties are by far the most reluctant party family when it comes to plebiscitary measures. It seems plausible to speculate that this may reflect the influence of traditional left-wing organizational thinking, with its considerable emphasis on party discipline.

In sum, our data show stronger party family differences in terms of plebiscitary practices than assembly-based ones. Although plebiscitary politics have often been linked with political extremism, our evidence suggests that parties on the far left or right of the spectrum have been most hesitant to embrace plebiscitary measures. These variations also become apparent when we simply add both index values. Here we find that the Social Democrats narrowly lead because they have most enthusiastically embraced plebiscitary measures while the parties on the radical



fringes are least democratic. However, there are considerable differences regarding the balance between assembly-based and plebiscitary forms of IPD, which reminds us that we should not too readily generalize about one dominant organizational model of party organization.

When we break down our data by country, we clearly find that nation-specific factors also play also an important role, a finding which further weakens the notion of any overarching tendency among parties. Table 14 reports the assembly-based and plebiscitary IPD indices, by country. Let us first focus on the assembly-based intra-party democracy. There is some spread within countries – and this is to be expected – but in 11 of the 129 countries the difference between the highest and lowest AIPD score is less than 34 points , and in some countries, it is considerably less ( e.g. Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Norway, Portugal, and Spain ). There are greater differences of the general levels of AIPD between countries. Austria, France, Poland, Portugal and Spain stand out for having relatively low AIPD values, while Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway and Britain are characterized by generally high levels of AIPD.

#### **Table 14 ABOUT HERE**

The picture changes entirely when we focus on the plebiscitary variant of IPD. Here we see two patterns. There is considerably more spread within countries: in some countries, there is complete uniformity because of the absence of plebiscitary practices (Austria, Czech Republic, Poland), in 14 countries one or more parties have not introduced any plebiscitary measures, while a few of the other countries stand out because most or all parties register fairly high PIPD values (Belgium, Canada, Italy, Britain). In the latter three countries, it seems reasonable to speculate that we are seeing the effect of institutional diffusion. In the remaining countries, parties vary widely in the extent to which they have adopted plebiscitary mechanisms. If diffusion pressures are strong, we would expect that coming years will bring an upward convergence on the PIPD indices, at least in countries where at least one party has already adopted such measures. Finally, when looking at the eta-squared values in tables 13 and 14 we see again a much stronger effect by country than by ideological family.

## **VII. Connecting resources, structures and linkages**

After presenting this descriptive overview of the main findings of the PPDB Round 1 data, it is time to begin examining how our three analytical dimensions relate to one another empirically. This is not the place to investigate and test causal hypotheses, but we can at least provide the grounds for developing such hypotheses by exploring some basic statistical relationships within the data. We do this here by reporting the partial bivariate correlation coefficients for a number of indicators that are drawn from across the three dimensions. The key indicators include AIPD as a measure of democratic linkage, leadership strength as a measure of organizational structure, and three measures of party resources: membership/electorate ratio, party income/GDP ratio, and percentage of party income that comes from state subsidies. These resource measures are as ratios that control for potential country effects; in addition, we deploy party family as a general control variable for all reported correlations.<sup>15</sup> Thus, party family and country effects are held constant.

The results reveal a number of interesting relationships across the three dimensions of analysis. First, in terms of association between AIPD and the other dimensions, we find that the less internally democratic parties are, the more members they have relative to electors, the richer and the more dependent on state funding they are, and the stronger their leaders are. Each of these relationships except that between ME ratio and AIPD is statistically significant at the 10 percent significance level or better. Second, there are also politically noteworthy associations between organizational structure and resources, in that the stronger leaders are within their parties, the more members they have, and the richer and the more dependent on state funding they tend to be; again, only the last two are statistically significant relationships. The relevant details are reported in Table 15.

**[Table 15 about here]**

These correlations point to areas for further investigation. For instance, they suggest different categories of parties that might exist. The first is a group of parties that are (in national terms) large, rich and heavily dependent on state subsidies; these will also tend to be relatively ‘top-

down', leader-dominated organizations. By contrast, the second group is the opposite of all these things: it consists of parties that are (in the own national contexts) relatively small, poor, and not so well supported by the state, but which are more internally democratic and less leadership-dominated. Whether we can actually distinguish such clusters of parties is a task for future research.

Our preliminary findings also invite researchers to address some of the major 'so what?' questions of this field of political science: For instance, what are the consequences of these organizational patterns for the legitimacy of party and political systems? If a country has a preponderance of large, leader-dominated and state-dependent parties, does this lead to higher levels of public dissatisfaction with the parties and/or political systems as a whole? And what of the consequences for public policy? Are such countries more or less likely to generate policy outcomes that represent the views of a majority of electors? Here, we can only raise such questions rather than attempt to answer them. However, we suggest that the PPDB data and measures not only point the way for politically important lines of future research, but also provide some tools that should help researchers who want to tackle these research puzzles.

## **VI. Conclusions**

Our analyses of the PPDB data have demonstrated a remarkable coexistence of uniformity and diversity. When it comes to some of the main indicators of party organizational capacity such as party members, staff and finance, all evidence points in the direction of continuing trends that have been diagnosed for many years. Comparisons with previous studies clearly show that in most cases party membership has continued to decline, while financial resources and paid labour have continued to grow. Yet, substantial differences persist between party families and, more importantly, between countries.

On the other hand, we find truly remarkable uniformity regarding the core architecture of party organizations. Despite the enormous attention some groups of new parties have attracted in the media and in scholarly literature, the evidence is clear: if they survive, they adapt their organizational skeleton to a common template. Virtually all have regular party conferences

which function as supreme ‘law making’ intra-party bodies; they normally have one (some two) party leaders with clearly defined powers, and they tend to have a supreme executive body. This convergence occurs even where laws do not require it, suggesting that in these countries this organizational style has become a normative imperative or a functional necessity – or both.

This image of overwhelming uniformity changes again when we combine a large number of detailed rules on the functioning of these seemingly similar organisations into indices for two variants of intra-party democracy, namely IPD based on meetings and discussions and IPD based on ballots outside the context of assemblies. Here, we find substantial variation between countries and party families. While assembly-based IPD is the standard model of intra-party decision-making, at greater or lesser degrees of inclusiveness, the provisions for plebiscitary IPD vary substantially. They are simply non-existent in a considerable number of parties, and in some countries altogether. Overall, we see rather wide variation in how parties combine these different types of practices, and in the extent to which they have expanded the locus of decision-making.

In sum, one clear message from this preliminary examination of the first round PPDB data is that there is still a lot of mileage in closer examination of the details of party organization. Uniformity, which is all too often in the limelight, is clearly only part of the story. While scholars have a tendency to look for organizational trends, individual parties often seek to gain electoral advantage through organizational innovation. Thus, while party organizations across modern democracies have much in common now, there is more diversity, particularly between countries, than many classics of the party literature imply. If parties and their popular organizations can play crucial roles in integrating citizens and their political demands into the political process, as much literature on representative democracy asserts, then these organizational differences deserve continued scrutiny, because they can have important political consequences.

## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1

#### Project Supporters

This project has been supported by funding from the following institutions and associations, listed in alphabetical order. We are grateful for their support, which was essential to the success of this multi-national collaboration.

#### Main grant:

Open Research Area Project (ORA) funded by:

Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft (Germany) PO 370/11-1  
Economic and Social Research Council (UK) ES/L016613/1  
National Science Foundation (USA) 106498

#### Additional support provided by:

Düsseldorf Party Research Institute (PRuF), Heinrich Heine University, Düsseldorf (Germany)  
European Consortium for Political Research (Research Sessions 2011)  
Fritz-Thyssen-Foundation (Germany)  
Israel Studies Collaborative (ISC) at the Schusterman Center for Jewish Studies, University of Texas at Austin (USA)  
Levi Eshkol Institute for Social, Economic and Political Research (Israel)  
University of Houston Small Grants Fund (USA)  
University of Oslo Småforsk (Norway)  
University of Leiden (Netherlands)  
University of Sydney – International Program Development Fund (Australia)

## Appendix 2

### PPDB Round 1 Country Teams

(Coordinators listed in boldface type)

<b>Australia</b>	<b>Anika Gauja</b>
<b>Austria</b>	<b>Wolfgang Mueller</b> , Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik
<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Kris Deschouwer, Emilie van Haute</b>
<b>Canada</b>	<b>William Cross</b> , Scott Pruyzers
<b>Czech Republic</b>	<b>Petr Kopecký</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	<b>Karina Pedersen</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>Elodie Fabre</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>Thomas Poguntke</b> , Sophie Karow, Jan Kette
<b>Hungary</b>	<b>Zsolt Eneydi</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	<b>David M. Farrell</b> , Connor Little
<b>Israel</b>	<b>Gideon Rahat</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>Luciano Bardi</b> , Enrico Calossi, Eugenio Pizzimenti
<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>Ruud Koole</b> , Marijn Nagtzaam
<b>Norway</b>	<b>Elin Allern</b>
<b>Poland</b>	<b>Aleks Szczerbiak</b> , Anna Mikulska
<b>Portugal</b>	<b>Marina Costa-Lobo</b> , Isabella Razuolli
<b>Spain</b>	<b>Tania Verge Mestre</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	<b>Nicholas Aylott</b> , Niklas Bolin
<b>United Kingdom</b>	<b>Paul Webb</b> , Annika Hennl, Dan Keith

<b>Database Editor</b>	Susan Scarrow
<b>Data Manager</b>	Benjamin Danforth
<b>Project Directors</b>	Thomas Poguntke, Susan Scarrow, Paul Webb

**Advisory Board:** Ingrid van Biezen, Kenneth Janda, Richard Katz, Miki Caul Kittilson

### **Appendix 3**

#### **Parties included in PPDB Round 1**

#### **Australia**

Labor Party  
Liberal Party  
National Party  
The Greens

#### **Austria**

Alliance for the Future  
Freedom Party  
People's Party  
Social Democratic Party  
The Greens

#### **Belgium**

Christian-Democrat and Flemish  
Democrat Humanist Centre  
Ecolo  
Federalists, Democrats, Francophone  
Flemish Interest  
Green  
Libertarian, Direct, Democratic  
New Flemish Alliance  
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats  
Reform Movement  
Socialist Party  
Socialist Party Alternative

#### **Canada**

Bloc Québécois  
Conservative Party  
Green Party  
Liberal Party  
New Democratic Party

#### **Czech Republic**

Christian Democratic Union  
Civic Democratic Party  
Communist Party  
Social Democratic Party  
TOP 09

#### **Denmark**

Conservatives  
Danish People's Party  
Liberal Alliance  
Liberals  
Red-Green Alliance  
Social Democrats  
Social Liberal Party  
Socialist People's Party

#### **France**

Socialist Party  
Union for a Popular Movement

#### **Germany**

Alliance '90/The Greens  
Christian Democratic Union  
Christian Social Union  
Free Democratic Party  
Pirate Party  
Social Democratic Party  
The Left

#### **Hungary**

Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Alliance  
Jobbik  
Politics Can Be Different  
Socialist Party

#### **Ireland**

Fianna Fáil  
Fine Gael  
Green Party  
Labour Party  
Sinn Fein

**Israel**

Agudat Yisrael  
Balad  
Hadash  
Kadima  
Labor Party  
Likud  
Meretz  
National Religious Party  
Shas  
Yisrael Beiteinu

**Italy**

Democratic Party  
Italy of Values  
Northern League  
The People of Freedom  
Union of the Centre

**Netherlands**

50PLUS  
Christian Democratic Appeal  
Christian Union  
Democrats 66  
Green Left  
Labour Party  
Party for Freedom  
Party for the Animals  
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy  
Reformed Political Party  
Socialist Party

**Norway**

Centre Party  
Christian Democratic Party  
Conservative Party  
Labour Party  
Liberal Party  
Progress Party  
Socialist Left Party

**Poland**

Civic Platform  
Democratic Left Alliance  
Law and Justice  
Palikot's Movement  
Polish People's Party  
United Poland

**Portugal**

Communist Party  
Ecologist Party "The Greens"  
Left Bloc  
People's Party  
Social Democratic Party  
Socialist Party

**Spain**

Basque Nationalist Party  
Democratic Convergence of Catalonia  
People's Party  
Socialist Party  
United Left

**Sweden**

Centre Party  
Christian Democrats  
Green Party  
Left Party  
Liberal People's Party  
Moderate Party  
Social Democrats  
Sweden Democrats

**United Kingdom**

Conservative Party  
Green Party  
Labour Party  
Liberal Democrats  
Plaid Cymru  
Scottish National Party  
UK Independence Party



### **Appendix: The Intra-Party Democracy Indices**

The applied logic of quantification is largely based on von dem Berge et al. (2013: 31ff.). There are two different modes of assigning IPD-values to PPDB-items: (1) Closed or open answers to questions (PPDB-items) are attributed the values 0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 or 1.00. All answers which affect IPD adversely are attributed the values 0.00 or 0.25, and answers which affect IPD favourably are attributed the values 0.75 or 1.00. The value 0.50 is allocated to an answer when no specific effects on IPD can be identified. (2) Furthermore, some variables are generated on the basis of ‘rankings’ of individual PPDB-items. Table A1 illustrates how these theoretically-grounded codings are applied to party statutes.

**Table A1: Example of ‘ranking’ of party levels**

*PPDB-Question: Who has the final vote on the manifesto?*

<b>PPDB-answer-option</b>	<b>DIPD-Value</b>	<b>Effect on DIPD</b>
Party Congress	1.00 (max IPD; most ‘inclusive‘)	Pro IPD
Party Sub-Units	0.75	
Party Legislators	0.50	Not explicitly pro/contra IPD
Executive Committee	0.25	Contra IPD
Party Leader	0.00 (min IPD; least ‘inclusive‘)	

**Table A2: Composition of Discursive IPD-Index**

IPD-Component	Decision-Making: <i>Programme</i>	Decision-Making: <i>Personnel</i>	Organizational Structure	
IPD-Variables (PPDB-items)	Who has the final vote on the manifesto?	(1a) Are rules for the selection of the party leader existent?	ARITHMETIC MEAN of all “party leader variables”	Who is eligible to vote at the party congress?
		(1b) Who has the final vote in the party leader selection process? <sup>1</sup>		How frequently must a party congress be held?
		(1c) Was there a vote at the most inclusive stage of the party leader selection process?		Who has <i>ex officio</i> seats with full voting rights in the party’s highest executive body?
		(1d) Who was eligible to participate in this vote (referring to previous question)?		Prerogatives and accountability of the party leader?
		(2) Who has the final vote in the candidate selection process?		
IPD-score Component	Variable-Score = Component-Score	ARITHMETIC MEAN of (1) “party leader variables” and (2) “candidate selection variable”	ARITHMETIC MEAN of all “organizational structure variables”	
IPD-score Final	ARITHMETIC MEAN of the components “DM: programme”, “DM: personnel” and “organizational structure”			

**Table A3: Composition of Plebiscitary IPD-Index**

IPD-Component	IPD-Variables (PPDB-items)
Decision-Making: <i>Programme and issues</i>	Do all party members have a vote on the manifesto?
	Are there intra-party policy ballots in which all party members decide on policy issues?
Decision-Making: <i>Personnel</i>	Do all party members have a vote in the party leader selection process?
	Do all party members have the final vote in the candidate selection process?
Organizational Structure	--- no items/variables ---
IPD-PD-Scale Score	ARITHMETIC MEAN of all variables

<sup>1</sup> 1b and d partially overlap. We have decided to keep both variables to improve precision.

## Notes

---

<sup>1</sup> We are grateful to all funders, especially our national funding bodies (the NSF, the ESRC and the DFG), and our universities who have supported primary research, travel and meetings for all project members. A full listing of funders to date is included in Appendix 1.

<sup>2</sup> Those using PPDB Round 1 data should reference this article for a full introduction to the data set and to those who contributed to it.

<sup>3</sup> We consciously violated this rule in a few places, for instance when we ask team members to not only give the official rules for candidate selection, but to also give an expert opinion about which levels of the party had the most influence in the most recent round of candidate selections. In these places, those who distrust the judgment of a single expert can ignore these variables and rely solely on the official stories.

<sup>4</sup> This is not to overlook the obvious fact that party members might also be considered a form of linkage between parties and society, but here they will be examined from the perspective of organizational resources.

<sup>5</sup> In addition, our results may be distorted somewhat that it includes data on election years for 7 of our 19 countries.

<sup>6</sup> The parties have been categorized on the basis of their membership in supranational party bodies and expert judgments. Details can be obtained from the authors.

<sup>7</sup> Unfortunately, there are rather fewer cases for which we have both central and legislative party staffing data - only approximately one-third of the total number of parties, which we feel is too few from which to gain a clear picture, so we do not report those figures here.

<sup>8</sup> The extraordinary number of staff employed by parliamentary parties in Germany owes something to the difficulty of attracting state funding beyond a fixed ‘absolute ceiling’ which limits the overall sum of money that can go from the state to political parties. This ceiling did not change for many years until the Bundestag introduced indexation in 2013. The way around this for the parties was to increase the number of their parliamentary staff, all of whom are paid for by the state. According to German legal doctrine, their work pertains to the sphere of the state rather than the parties, since formally the parliamentary parties are not supposed to do things that directly benefit the extra-parliamentary party. The reality, however, is that these personnel split their time between working for MPs as personal assistants and working for the parliamentary (and sometimes extra-parliamentary) parties. In this way they clearly constitute a resource of the party, then; however, it does render the German situation somewhat unique, so readers may prefer to exclude the German figures when reflecting on the overall averages for parliamentary party staff.

<sup>9</sup> Perhaps unexpectedly, there are no large differences between party families in terms of the leader’s accountability to the party conference. Green parties were slightly more likely to specify this, but all party families were in the range from 25-37 percent.

<sup>10</sup> See von dem Berge and Poguntke 2016 for details of index construction.

<sup>11</sup> Our indices include only rights for full members, and do not take account of whether similar rights are offered to registered supporters or other kinds of party affiliates. Thus, the indices do not rate parties more highly if they open participation to non-members. Our theoretical justification is that including open procedures strains the theoretical notion of “intra” party democracy, which is our primary interest here. Within the current PPDB universe, these situations are empirically rare, though some have been high profile cases, such as the UK Labour Party election in 2015 which allowed participation by ‘registered supporters’ who were not full members.

<sup>12</sup> The indices used in this section are based on von dem Berge and Poguntke 2016. Other members of the PPDB team have constructed different indices of IPD for other articles. We do not suggest that this coding scheme is the only way to analyse differences in intra-party governance, but we think it is plausible one. Different coding schemes would affect the details of relationships reported in the following sections, but probably would not change their major conclusions.

<sup>13</sup> See Appendix and von dem Berge and Poguntke 2016 for details on how the indices were constructed.

<sup>14</sup> The situation is different for the plebiscitary index which includes only two components. Here we have simply used all available data.

<sup>15</sup> Note that this is a modified variant of our standard party family variable that takes into account the mean position of each family in left-right terms, using CMP data. In effect, this converts a categorical variable into an interval-level scale. The mean scores for each party family, running from left to right, are as follows: Left socialist (-29.2), Green (-20.3), social democrat (-13.2), Liberal (6.2), Christian Democrat/Conservative (10.9), far right (11.9). N=68 for all of the partial bivariate correlations reported here.

