Multilevel party organizations in a fragmented presidential system: the case of Brazil


Published in:
Regional and Federal Studies

Document Version:
Peer reviewed version

Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal

Publisher rights
© 2019 Informa trading as Taylor and Francis. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher's policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.

General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.

Download date:04. Mar. 2021
Multilevel party organizations in a fragmented presidential system: the case of Brazil

Pedro Floriano Ribeiro - pfribeiro@ufscar.br
Elodie Fabre - e.fabre@qub.ac.uk

Introduction

The way parties organize in multilevel settings (federal states or devolved unitary states) has broad consequences for the stability of federations, intergovernmental relations, and the functioning of democracy (Riker 1975; Deschouwer 2006). At the same time, the organization of statewide parties (i.e. parties that organize and compete at national and regional levels across a country) is highly influenced by the type of federalism implemented in a specific country (Renzsch 2001; Swenden 2006; Fabre 2008). The literature has shown that other macro-institutional variables as well as party-specific variables such as party leadership agency (and strategy) should also be considered when analyzing multilevel party organizations (Thorlakson 2009; van Houten 2009). Using Brazil as a case study, this article analyzes the combined impact of some of these factors - presidentialism, party system fragmentation, and party agency - on the vertical integration of multilevel party organizations.

Party organizations are still ‘black boxes’ in Latin America (Levitsky 2001).2 Despite a growing interest in issues such as territorial electoral coordination, subnational politics, and the congruence between national and subnational party systems (Falleti 2010; Freidenberg and Suárez-Cao 2014; Borges et al. 2017; Suárez-Cao et al. 2017), little is known about the models of multilevel party organization and the factors that produce variations in such models in the region.3 Among the most decentralized countries in Latin America – Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina (Niedzwiecki et al. 2018), – Brazil is a privileged case for the study of multilevel party organizations. Unlike Argentina and Mexico, a strict legal framework prohibits regionalist parties and obliges all the political parties to organize as statewide parties in the country. At the same time as presenting opportunities, federalism creates specific challenges for these parties, as tensions may arise over the organization across levels, the provision of

---

1 The research was funded by the Queen’s University Belfast and the Sao Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP/QUB Sprint grant n. 2014/50740-3). Previous versions were presented at the 2016 ECPR General Conference (Prague) and at the 66th Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association (Brighton). We thank the participants of these panels and the reviewers and editors of RFS for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Contact: Pedro Floriano Ribeiro – pfribeiro@ufscar.br. Address: Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política, Universidade Federal de São Carlos, Rod. Washington Luís km 235, São Carlos - SP, Brazil, 13565-905.


3 The focus of this article is on the vertical integration of multilevel party organizations, taking each organization as a unit of analysis (Deschouwer 2006). This approach should not be confused with other discussions, such as party nationalization (Jones and Mainwaring 2003), horizontal nationalization of party systems (Borges et al. 2017), electoral coordination (Hicken and Stoll 2011), or the congruence between national and subnational party systems (Schakel 2013). Besides, this discussion is analytically distinguishable from the debate on intra-party democracy (Bolleyer 2011, footnote 5).
resources and functions to state party branches, and the electoral coordination between levels. This is particularly true when national and subnational elections happen at the same time (Deschouwer 2006; Swenden and Maddens 2009). In this sense, Brazil is also the only federation in the region where elections occur simultaneously, both vertically (national-regional elections) and horizontally (all the states vote on the same day).

Research has found that parties in presidential systems as those in Brazil may become presidentialized themselves, by adopting nationally integrated strategies to pursue the biggest prize represented by the presidency (Samuels and Shugart 2010). However, not all parties in an extremely fragmented party system are necessarily presidentialized. Without a viable presidential candidate, some of them may emphasize the competition over subnational offices (Samuels 2002, 468; Borges et al. 2017). Therefore, while the macro-institutions should produce the same organizational patterns across the entire party system, different electoral strategies regarding presidential and subnational races may have different impacts on the ways political parties organize in the country. The analysis of this combined effect of macro-institutions and party agency is the focus of this article.

We analyze the vertical integration of the nine most traditional party organizations in Brazil, which represented roughly 70% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 84% in the Senate (2018): PT, PSB, PDT, MDB (former PMDB), PSDB, PR, PTB, PP and DEM (former PFL). It is a first attempt to look beyond the usual suspects of studies on multilevel party organizations (e.g. Spain, Germany, Canada, and the UK) and to see whether concepts and models developed in other scenarios can travel to a presidential democracy with a fragmented party system. We use an adapted version of Fabre’s (2011) coding scheme to describe the multilevel party organizations in Brazil and to test two sets of hypotheses regarding the involvement of regional branches in national decisions (shared rule) and the autonomy of state parties in their own processes (self-rule). The hypotheses combine macro-institutional features and the way Brazilian parties strategically respond to them.

The next section presents the framework for analysis of statewide parties in multilevel systems and brings the case-specific hypotheses. The second section evaluates Brazilian parties in terms of involvement of regional branches in national decisions and autonomy of state branches. The following section summarizes and discusses the findings, and evaluates the hypotheses. We argue that despite some level of organizational convergence, there are important differences among Brazilian parties that can be attributed to party agency (different strategies regarding the presidential race) and to other party-specific variables. The final section argues that Brazilian parties adopt an organizational model that suits the contradictory incentives under which they operate. The findings have theoretical and empirical implications beyond the case, as we add three factors (underdeveloped in the literature so far) that need to be considered when assessing multilevel party organizations elsewhere: party agency, the presidential system, and party system fragmentation.

---

4 A list of party acronyms is presented at the end of the text.
Explaining multilevel party organizations

The territorial organization of statewide parties can be studied along two dimensions: the vertical integration of statewide parties and the level of autonomy of the lower level (Thorlakson 2009; Fabre 2011). The former relates to the degree to which central and regional levels cooperate and are organizationally linked to each other. This looks at the presence of a common governance structure and the involvement of lower party levels in these structures (shared rule). The latter (self-rule) refers to the extent to which lower levels of organization, and more specifically regional, state or provincial parties, are able to make decisions within their own areas over issues such as membership, leadership and candidate selection, party policy, and party resources (Thorlakson 2009).

Within this multilevel approach, parties are said to mimic the constitutional structure of the state in their organization, mainly in terms of the territorial distribution of powers between levels of government (Riker 1975; Deschouwer 2006). Besides federalism, other macro-institutions have been considered to explain how parties organize in federations, including electoral cycles (the timing of national and regional elections), electoral system, and party laws (Swenden and Maddens 2009).

However, state structure cannot fully explain party organization. Political parties, unless forced by legislation, are free to choose their organization, and we do indeed regularly observe organizational differences between parties in the same country. Although party agency may be limited by previous organizational choices (Panebianco 1988; Thorlakson 2009), research on statewide parties has found evidence that forms of multilevel organization are also the result of party preferences and strategic decisions (Hopkin and Bradbury 2006; Fabre and Méndez Lago 2009; Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010). Therefore, while the next paragraphs explore the main macro-institutional features that shape multilevel party organizations in Brazil, they also take into account the way Brazilian parties strategically respond to those institutional incentives.

Federalism

The type and the scope of federalism have been shown to have an effect on the territorial organization of statewide parties in countries such as Canada, Spain, and the UK (Renzsch 2001; Swenden 2006; Fabre 2008; Thorlakson 2009). Three main dimensions of multilevel government are expected to have an impact on party organization.

The first refers to the way legislative and executive functions are shared across levels. When the federal and regional governments have exclusive legislative and executive competence over separate issue areas, the system is said to be dual. When the federal and regional levels have to cooperate over functional areas, the federal system is cooperative (Swenden 2006, 49-51). A dual form of federalism is expected to produce parties that resemble more stratarchies, that is, parties in which the central level has autonomy over party policy whereas the lower levels have decisional autonomy over areas that directly affect them like candidate selection (Carty 2004; 5

---

5 The same dimensions (shared rule and self-rule) can be used to measure the level of territorial decentralization across countries and over time (Niedzwiecki et al. 2018).
Thorlakson 2009). Cooperative federalism, on the other hand, is expected to lead to parties in which the central party is more involved in regional affairs and the regional branches are more involved in central decision-making organs (Renzsch 2001). The second dimension refers to the range of competencies for which regional governments are responsible: parties should be more decentralized in more decentralized federations. A final dimension refers to the (a)symmetry of the federation. If some regions have more powers than others, their regional party branches are expected to have more autonomy or have more influence than the others (Fabre 2008, 310).

The 1988 Federal Constitution defined the institutional arrangement of contemporary Brazil: federalism, separation of powers and presidentialism, symmetrical bicameralism, open-list PR voting for legislatures, multiparty system, and an independent judiciary. Since the late 19th century, Brazilian federalism has faced periodic oscillations between centralization of powers in the federal government and decentralization to the states. The 1988 Constitution created a strong and complex federal system, with substantial powers to the 27 states (in a symmetric way) and the decentralization of taxes and policy making. In most policy areas, implementation is shared. The Constitution designed a cooperative system between federal government, states, and municipalities. However, legislative powers over most policy areas are concentrated in federal hands, and the cooperative model suffers from a lack of mechanisms and incentives for interstate and intergovernmental (federal government-state governments) cooperation (Samuels and Abrucio 2000; Arretche 2010).

Since 1995, the states have lost revenues and autonomy and the federal government has become stronger; it increasingly dictates to states and cities compulsory proportions of public spending in specific areas (mostly education and health). The federal government has implemented its own policies, even in areas where states were traditionally in charge of implementation. As party loyalty consistently prevails over the representation of regional interests in the National Congress (Desposato 2004, 279; Arretche 2010), the states have not been able to resist these changes. Overall, Brazil has become less regionalized in the last decades (Niedzwiecki et al. 2018, 10).

Based on this discussion, our first hypothesis is:

\[ H1: \text{The major Brazilian political parties present similar multilevel arrangements, with low levels of both self-rule (regional autonomy) and shared rule (subnational involvement in national processes).} \]

**Party law**

Brazilian parties have always been strongly regulated by the state. Until 1995, party organizations were regulated in detail by the *Lei Orgânica dos Partidos Políticos*, an authoritarian holdover implemented in 1971 by the military dictatorship (1964-1985). During democratization, the 1979 Party Reform Act dissolved the existing parties (ARENA and MDB) and relaxed the requisites that had prohibited the creation of other parties during the dictatorship. However, the reform kept almost intact the regulations about party functioning and organization. Party structure reflected the federal arrangement of the country, with a federal/central party, state party branches with broad autonomy concerning their specific (regional) issues, and municipal branches. At
each of the three levels, the party convention (convenção) is the highest deliberative body; it normally happens every three or four years. The conventions are composed on a territorial basis, with local conventions sending delegates to state conventions, which elect delegates to the national convention. Each convention elects a directorate (diretório), a deliberative organ that chooses the executive committee. Formally, the directorate is the highest body between conventions. However, the National Executive Committee (NEC) runs the party and makes day-to-day decisions (Nunes and Melo 2015). The NEC, elected by the National Directorate (ND), is therefore the most powerful organ in each party.

This legal framework restricted the options that parties could choose for their organization and led them to have very similar statutes and formal rules (Nunes and Melo 2015). Among the parties discussed here, only the PT has had a distinct and more complex institutional arrangement, with nationally integrated decision-making and more representative meetings at the three levels (Ribeiro 2014).

The 1995 party law granted organizational autonomy to Brazilian parties. However, most parties have not fundamentally changed their organizational features since then (Nunes and Melo 2015). In most parties, the conventions are still controlled by public office holders (mostly legislators), who are ex officio members. The PT is an exception: only elected delegates participate in the party meetings because of a statute reform introduced in 2001 that required direct ballots for the selection of party officials at all levels (Samuels 2004; Ribeiro 2014). Public office holders dominate the central organs in most parties: federal deputies and senators normally control executive committees as elected or ex officio members (Ribeiro 2013b; Nunes and Melo 2015).

While candidate selection is decentralized under Brazil’s electoral rules (see below), party laws have always guaranteed extensive powers of intervention and veto in a downward direction. A branch can intervene in the hierarchically inferior units to ensure discipline or to preserve party rules, ethics, or the party line. Interventions can involve the cancellation of decisions made by regular or electoral conventions (which select the candidates), or can lead to the full removal of members of directorates and executive committees and their replacement with temporary commissions appointed by the upper level. Originally, temporary commissions were a mechanism designed to provide new parties with a speedy way to select and establish their bodies. Since the late nineties, they also became a weapon to enforce internal party discipline, punish subnational branches for weak electoral performance, and arbitrate conflicts between factions (Guarnieri 2011).

Electoral rules, presidential system and party strategies

Forms of proportional representation tend to increase the power of central party executives, as the size of constituencies tends to be large. The larger the constituency, the stronger the influence of the central party on candidate selection. In contrast, majoritarian systems have smaller constituencies, which often provides constituency associations with a significant say over who represents them (Swenden and Maddens 2009, 21-22).

---

6 In all the major parties, the leaders in Senate and Chamber are ex officio members of ND and NEC.
In Brazil, federal deputies are elected in state constituencies, in an open-list PR system; each of the 27 districts elects a minimum of eight to a maximum of 70 deputies (São Paulo). Senators are also elected in the states (three senators each). The electoral law obliges parties to organize specific conventions to select candidates and approve electoral coalitions: national, state, and municipal electoral conventions take the decisions regarding the elections at their respective levels. State-level conventions constitute the central locus of candidate selection processes in Brazil, as they choose candidates and coalitions for Senate, Chamber of Deputies, state legislatures, and governorship. The only national election is for the presidency, which means that political recruitment, careers, and campaigns are state-centred for most parties. Therefore, the open-list system and the decentralized rules on candidate selection tend to cancel out the possible centralizing effects of proportional representation in Brazil (Samuels and Abrucio 2000; Santos and Pegurier 2011).

The effects of presidential system on party organizations are more complex. Samuels and Shugart (2010) argue that presidential systems produce presidentialized parties. Separate origin (voting) and separate survival (term in office) of executive and legislative branches lead to the ‘separation of purposes’ within the parties, as they provide different (and sometimes conflicting) incentives for the presidential candidate and for legislative candidates. When comparing parliamentary and presidential systems, the separation of powers leads to the choice of presidential candidates with weaker ties to their parties (less internally accountable), in order to appeal to wide sections of the electorate. The competition for the biggest prize leads parties to concentrate their resources on the presidential race and creates tensions in the electoral coordination (of strategies, programmes, resources, etc.) between executive and legislative races (Samuels and Shugart 2010).

In a multilevel setting, presidentialization would produce nationally integrated strategies within the parties, by subordinating regional elections to the presidential race. The incentives towards this vertical integration can be more pronounced when regional and federal elections take place at the same time. The electoral simultaneity has a centralizing effect on party organizations, with low levels of regional-branch autonomy and a strong coordinating role for the central party (Deschouwer 2006; Swenden and Maddens 2009, 20-21; Fabre and Méndez Lago 2009).

In Brazil, elections to the presidency, Chamber of Deputies, Senate, state governorships and state legislatures have occurred simultaneously since 1994, every four years, in both vertical (national-regional levels) and horizontal terms (all the state elections at the same time). The party system is extremely fragmented. Therefore, building large pre-electoral coalitions is a widespread strategy among the major players in executive and legislative elections, at both national and state levels. In this context, multilevel electoral coordination would be a major challenge for Brazilian parties (Limonogi and Cortez 2010; Melo and Câmara 2012; Borges et al. 2017).

If all parties were presidentialized in Brazil, subnational strategies would be subordinated to the national decisions regarding the presidential race. Therefore, we should expect high levels of centralization in terms of the territorial distribution of intra-party powers, with weak state-branch autonomy. However, recent research has shown a process of electoral specialization of parties in Brazil since 1994 (Limonogi and

---

7 Effective number of parliamentary parties (Chamber) in the elections from 1990 to 2018: 8.7, 8.2, 7.1, 8.5, 9.3, 10.4, 13.2, and 16.5 (Gallagher 2017; updated by the authors).
Cortez 2010; Melo and Câmara 2012; Borges et al. 2017). Only a few parties have competitive presidential candidates, and most parties focus their efforts and resources on state elections (legislative and state governorships). PT and PSDB normally present the most competitive presidential candidates (they elected all the presidents from 1994 to 2014), and they are usually supported by PSB and DEM respectively. These four parties tend to ‘presidentialize’ their resources and strategies. They negotiate the support of strong gubernatorial candidates, withdraw less competitive candidates in favour of their partners, and exchange support across the states (horizontal coordination), always to benefit the presidential candidate.

This multilevel electoral coordination is not a central problem for the other parties. Although some of them may file a presidential candidate or enter the presidential coalition as a secondary partner, they do not adopt a vertically integrated strategy, and each state branch maintains autonomy to follow the most appropriate strategy for regional peculiarities. By prioritizing subnational elections, those parties seek to maximize their lists votes in the legislative election (also through gubernatorial coattail effects), which makes them more ‘provincialized’ than presidentialized (Borges et al. 2017).

Consequently, not all parties in Brazil are expected to be presidentialized, as party organizations do not respond identically to the challenges posed by the combination of presidentialism, federalism, and party system fragmentation. As few parties actively participate in the presidential race (with their own candidates or supporting one), few parties need to consider presidential coalitions in their decisions about federal and state elections. In fact, the literature shows that this is the dominant pattern only for PT, PSDB, PSB and DEM (Melo and Câmara 2012; Borges et al. 2017). We expect that these parties will have lower levels of state-branch organizational autonomy when compared to the other parties. As the presidential candidate tries to coordinate campaigns and expand the electoral coalition, the federal level will maintain some form of oversight over state-level processes (during and after the election period), such as state leadership selection, funding of state branches, and candidate selection. As van Houten (2009, 144-148) pointed out, the ‘potential agency control mechanisms’ cannot be ignored in the distribution of intra-party power. By resorting to the threat of top-down interventions, the national leadership in those Brazilian parties can limit the autonomy of state branches in candidate selection processes (particularly for state governorships). Most of the other parties in Brazil tend to focus their strategies on the federal legislatures and the state level, and the central party may encourage regional autonomy to maximize electoral returns in the state constituencies (which means maximizing the seats at the federal legislature) (Melo and Câmara 2012; Borges et al. 2017). On the other hand, we expect that both groups of parties will have low levels of shared rule, either because national decisions about the presidential race are insulated from state interests (presidentialized parties) or because there is no relevant national strategy with which the state branches should be concerned (non-presidentialized parties).

---

8 Effective number of presidential candidates, 1989 to 2018: 5.7, 2.7, 2.5, 3.2, 2.4, 2.7, 3.0, and 3.1 (calculated by the authors).

9 Of course, parties may adopt more or less presidentialized strategies depending on the circumstances. As a rule, however, it is reasonable to assume that parties that can file competitive presidential contenders are the most likely to adopt presidentialized strategies (Samuels 2002, 468).
Based on this discussion, we can state our second set of hypotheses:

**H2a:** The more presidentialized parties (PT, PSDB, PSB, and DEM), which normally adopt vertically integrated strategies, will have organizations with lower levels of self-rule (autonomy of state branches) when compared to the other parties (PDT, MDB, PTB, PR, and PP).

**H2b:** In terms of the involvement of regional branches in the national party, there will be no substantial differences between the two groups of parties: all of them will have equally low levels of shared rule.

The Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses. Federalism (H1) should exert a homogenizing pressure over political parties in Brazil: the nine parties would exhibit similar organizational patterns, with low levels of both shared rule and self-rule. On the other hand, parties’ behaviour concerning presidential races may act as a differentiating factor between party organizations (H2), as we have different expectations regarding presidentialized and non-presidentialized parties (Melo and Câmara 2012; Borges et al. 2017). We expect the former group to be more centralized than the latter (i.e. lower levels of regional self-rule), because of the need to coordinate campaigns and strategy between national and subnational levels. Overall, the combination of macro institutions (federalism, presidential system, electoral and party laws) and the parties’ strategic responses to them converges towards an expectation of low shared rule across the entire party system. Things can be different with respect to self-rule. If strategic decisions matter to shape party organizations over time, we will find that non-presidentialized parties grant wider autonomy to their state branches.

**Table 1.** Hypotheses regarding multilevel party organizations in Brazil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Expected impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federalism (H1)</td>
<td>Low for all parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party strategy in a context of presidentialism, electoral simultaneity, and party system fragmentation (H2)</td>
<td>Low for presidentialized parties (PT, PSDB, PSB, DEM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High for non-presidentialized parties (PDT, MDB, PTB, PR, PP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: elaborated by the authors.*

It is worth noting that it is difficult to disentangle the reciprocal causality between party strategies and party organization. Besides party strategies and choices, the way a party organizes is also dependent upon several other macro-institutional and party-related variables – and some of them are analyzed here (Panebianco 1988; Thorlakson 2009). For instance, the MDB, one of the major Brazilian parties, was ‘born and raised’ as a federation of strong regional leaders who have always sought to ensure high levels of state-branch autonomy. This model, while guaranteeing the
electoral success in the legislative races, has always inhibited the party from adopting nationally centralized strategies around the presidential election (Kinzo 1988; Ferreira 2002). We are aware of this interdependence between organization and strategy. However, while there is a growing literature on the electoral strategies pursued by Brazilian parties, this is a first attempt to systematically analyze party organizations in the country with a multilevel approach. The justification for using party strategy as an independent variable is therefore solid.

**Measuring integration and autonomy in Brazilian parties**

Recent literature provides some useful conceptual models and empirical frameworks for assessing the multilevel organization of statewide parties (Carty 2004; Fabre 2011; Bolleyer 2011; Thorlakson 2009; 2013; van Houten 2009; Pruysers 2014). Among them, Fabre’s coding scheme (2011) is the most suitable to our case, as it provides detailed and adaptable empirical indicators that facilitate cross-party comparisons. It relies on the collection of official documents and party statutes and does not rely on the potentially subjective assessment of intra-party relations by experts or party officials. As Thorlakson (2013, 718) notes, party officials may be reluctant to advertise intra-party tensions. Another difficulty with elite surveys is their low response rate (Walgrave and Joly 2018, 2225).11

We rely mostly on official data from party statutes, which tell the ‘official story’ of party organizations. This official story matters (Katz and Mair 1992, 7): party statutes are written contracts that define rights and obligations that structure the relationship between the central organization and its subnational units (Carty 2004). Nevertheless, informal practices should also be taken into account when analyzing the distribution of power between party organs and echelons (van Houten 2009; Thorlakson 2013). This is even more important if one considers that the gap between formal rules and party practices can be wider in less advanced democracies (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006). We moved beyond the official story when the data were available; particularly, we employ secondary literature and original data on party funding and intra-party interventions to obtain a more complete picture of party organizations.

We assigned codes to a set of indicators within the shared-rule and self-rule dimensions. As we included an extra variable related to presidentialism (the nomination of the presidential candidate), the first dimension has six variables instead of five of the original scheme. Each of the 11 indicators represents a key party process. For each indicator, parties receive a code between 0 and 4. As party constitutions do not allow state branches to organize differently, there is no need to assign distinct codes for different state branches of the same party. For the shared-rule dimension, a score of 0 means the total exclusion of state parties from federal decisions. As the score increases, the involvement of state branches in central processes also increases, until a situation where state parties fully control central decisions (score 4). The same

---

10 See Detterbeck and Hepburn (2010) for a discussion about this issue.
11 This coding system proved to be more efficient to measure the distribution of powers within Brazilian parties than that employed by Wills-Otero (2016, 766), for example. In her analysis (based on surveys with experts and party leaders), most Latin American parties (and all parties in Brazil) are characterized as highly hierarchical.
rationale applies to the autonomy dimension. A score 0 reflects a situation of full control of the central party over state branches; as the score increases, the autonomy of state parties increases (Fabre 2011).

What follows explains the codes assigned, based on the analysis of party documents, original party data, and secondary literature. The scores reflect the situation of parties in 2017 and do not account for changes over time (unless otherwise stated). These results are summarized in Table 4, in the next section. Full details behind each score are presented in the Appendix.

Involvement of state branches in the central party (shared rule)

1- Selection of central party president (selection of party leader). In parliamentary systems, the selection of the party leader is one of the most critical internal party processes. The leaders of parliamentary groups in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies and Senate are elected exclusively by federal deputies and senators, with broad autonomy in relation to party organs. However, as these leaders do not have the same importance as they have in parliamentary systems, the indicator had to be adapted.

The position of party president and chair of the National Executive Committee (NEC) is a key post in intra-party conflicts over nomination and over the decision to run a candidate in the presidential election. The future presidential candidate is the party president in many occasions (Samuels and Shugart 2010); or at least she/he needs to have an ally in the post to guarantee the nomination, as the NEC president has strong powers in all parties (Nunes and Melo 2015). The PT’s national president is elected by direct ballot of the grassroots. In the other parties, the president (and the whole NEC) is selected by the National Directorate (ND). MDB, PSDB, and PTB guarantee an ex officio regional representation in their NDs; but these representatives represent a small minority of ND members (see the Appendix for full details).

In addition to the ex officio regional participation in the ND, other studies have shown that MDB’s NEC is informally composed on a territorial basis and includes the main party ‘baron’ of each state (usually a federal legislator). The federalization of central leadership includes mechanisms such as the rotation of key positions (e.g., president and treasurer) between state branches or their regular assignment to the same branch over successive administrations (Kinzo 1988; Ferreira 2002). Because of that, MDB receives a score of 2. PTB and PSDB receive a score of 1, while the other parties received a 0.

2- Involvement of regional branches in central party executive. For most parties there is no ex officio representation granted to state branches in executive committees. However, federal deputies and senators fully dominate such organs in most parties (Ribeiro 2013a). Their position in public office and internal legitimacy (and, consequently, the presence in NEC) derive from their leadership in states, so they have many incentives to defend the regional interests. Indeed, the central organs of most Brazilian parties function as a locus of negotiation and conciliation between regional party elites. The NEC of the MDB, with its territorial-based composition, is the extreme case (Ferreira 2002). On the opposite side, the central leadership of PT is historically less controlled by public office holders. The direct ballot for the selection of president and ND members (who will select the NEC) is based on national factions that cross
regional cleavages and leave less space for the representation of regional issues. Therefore, the internal legitimacy of office holders in PT’s NEC is more faction-based than region-based (Samuels 2004; Ribeiro 2014). The PDT guarantees the representation of the five macro-regions in the NEC (each of which aggregates several states), while the PTB grants the participation of the 27 state branches presidents. The MDB receives a score of 3 in this indicator, PDT and PTB receive a code 2, PT receives a 0, and the other parties receive a code 1.

3 - Selection of candidates: federal parliamentary elections (Chamber of Deputies and Senate). Candidates are selected in state party conventions, composed by local delegates and state leaders (party officials and public office holders). There is no need of central party approval or consultation during the selection processes, and national interventions over parliamentary lists are quite rare (Mainwaring 1999; Ribeiro 2013b). All parties receive a score of 3.

4 - Selection of presidential candidate and coalition. With the vertical simultaneity between national and state elections, presidential coalitions need strong support in the states, mainly from gubernatorial candidates. The nominations entail strategic considerations about electoral coordination between levels, as well as about the freedom state branches will have in their decisions regarding state elections (Borges et al. 2017). Electoral law requires that decisions about presidential nomination and coalition must be taken by national conventions. In practice, the process is concentrated on parties’ NECs, which make a decision that will be ratified by the national convention (Ribeiro 2013b). Considering their own electoral strategies, state branches have to press for particular decisions within the NEC. Therefore, we replicate here the scores assigned in the second indicator: MDB receives a score of 3, PDT and PTB receive a code 2, PT receives a 0, and the other parties receive a 1 on this variable.

5 - Adoption of party platform (presidential race). Decisions about manifestos / policies are centralized around the candidate and her/his personal entourage and experts, with no substantial participation of state branches. Formally, the NEC and the ND have the final word over these matters; but once the candidate is nominated, those organs lose their power of influence. All parties receive a score of 0.

6 - Amending the party constitution. In all parties, only the national convention can amend the statutes, and subnational branches do not have a veto power over these changes. However, the national convention is composed of state delegates, party officials, and (state-elected) public office holders; most of whom have their power linked to regional interests (Ribeiro 2013b; Nunes and Melo 2015). As some level of regional influence exists, all parties receive a score of 1.

Autonomy of state party branches (self-rule)

7 - Organization of the regional branch. In Brazil, state (and local) party branches do not have their own constitutions. They follow the national statutes, which stipulate the bodies, criteria of composition, and responsibilities of each subnational party body. As a result, subnational organizations mimic the structure of the national level in terms of
their basic organs (conventions, directorate, and committee). However, state branches have some degree of freedom to create different party sections (e.g. women and youth) and to organize micro-regional units that function as intermediary levels between the state party and several local branches. All parties receive a score of 1.

8 - Selection of state party president (regional leader). Brazil’s state governments replicate the presidential system, but with a unicameral legislature. The same adaptation of variable 1 is required: the state party president is a key figure in the decisions about the gubernatorial election and she/he is more important than the leader of the parliamentary party in the State Assembly. The president is elected by the state directorate, which is elected in a state convention. In the PT, the state president is elected by direct ballot of party members. None of the parties has formal mechanisms of involvement, ratification, or consultation of the central party during that process. However, the national organs (ND and NEC) have extensive statutory powers to intervene *ex post facto*. As a potential consequence of such interventions, they can depose all the members of either state directorates or executive committees at any time, replacing them with provisional commissions (Guarnieri 2011). The practice is widespread among major Brazilian parties. There were dozens of interventions by national organs (ND or NEC) in state branches over the 2006-2017 period (Table 2). The parties that have more interventions also have more temporary commissions ($r = 0.27$). In 2017, PTB, PSB, and the PR were predominantly organized through temporary commissions at the state level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PT</th>
<th>PSB</th>
<th>PSDB</th>
<th>DEM</th>
<th>PDT</th>
<th>MDB</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>PTB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of interventions in state branches (2006-2017)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State branches with elected directorate in 2017</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State branches with temporary commissions in 2017</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE).

Based on the number of interventions over the last decade and on the snapshot of the situation in 2017, PT and MDB receive a code 3 on this variable (a few interventions and no temporary commissions): their state presidents are less subject to this kind of threat. As an intermediary case, the PSDB receives a score of 2. As the extreme cases of lack of regional autonomy, PSB, PDT, and PR receive a code 0, while the other parties receive a score of 1.

9 - Selection of candidates for regional elections. Parliamentary candidates are selected in autonomous state party conventions, formed by local delegates and state leaders (party officials and public office holders). The same event deliberates about coalitions and the nomination for state governor (the delegates can decide to support the candidate of another party). Although party statutes do not require central approval or consultation during the selection process, central party organs have statutory powers
to review and intervene after the selection. This kind of intervention is not as common as the deposition of state party leaders. The parties that are normally more involved in the presidential election (PT, PSDB, PSB, and DEM) may require their state branches to withdraw candidates for governorship in favour of another party’s candidate, or to choose the same allies of presidential coalition (Limongi and Cortez 2010; Melo and Câmara 2012; Borges et al. 2017). Therefore, those four parties receive a score of 2, while the others receive a code 3; their central organs concede greater autonomy to state branches because they are less presidentialized parties.

10 - Adoption of platform for state elections (governor). Like for the presidential race, the process is very candidate-centred. Formally, the final word about policies and programme belongs to state party organs, with no need of central approval. The national organs preserve a formal power of intervention, which is however barely used. There is a weak policy convergence/coordination between federal and state levels and between state branches of the same party, which creates a scenario of high heterogeneity in terms of policy and ideology. The PT is an exception, as it places a much higher value to ideological cohesion (Mainwaring 1999; Samuels 2004). With less regional autonomy, the PT receives a code 2, while the other parties receive a score of 3.

11 - Financing the regional branch. Until 2015, state branches (as well as central party, local branches, and candidates) could receive private donations from individuals and companies. In 2015, the Supreme Court banned all corporate donations. Since then, public funding has become the most important financial resource for all parties (donations from individuals were never significant). Public funds are given only to the central party, which can pass them along to the lower levels according to criteria freely defined in the statutes. The MDB is the most decentralized party in this matter: its constitution grants 60% of the public funds (fundo partidário) to state branches. The PSDB and the PP grant 40%, while PT and PSB should transfer 32% to state parties. The NECs of PDT, PTB and DEM retain a discretionary power to decide the amounts to be allocated, while the PR links the amounts to the state performance in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies. Data on party funding show that most parties transfer less than the amounts established by the statutes (Table 3). PT, PDT, and PTB are the most centralized parties (averages around 20%), while the MDB is the most decentralized (average about 54%); the other parties transfer around one third to their state branches. As less money means less state autonomy, the parties receive scores of 1, 3 and 2, respectively.
Table 3. Public subsidies transferred from central party to state branches, 2007-2016 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSB</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDB</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDB</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL/PR</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTB</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data from the TSE.

Discussion

Our findings (summarized in Table 4 and in Figure 1 below) point to some level of organizational convergence between Brazilian parties. In all cases, state branches receive more autonomy to deal with their own regional matters (average = 9.4) than formalized powers to participate in central/federal decisions (av. = 7.1) – taking into account that there are five indicators in the former dimension, and six in the latter. As discussed above, there are many incentives (e.g. the type of federalism) towards low levels of shared rule within Brazilian parties, while the incentives regarding the autonomy of regional branches are contradictory and mixed. Most of the regional autonomy comes from the ability to select candidates in state/federal elections (a legal provision) and to choose their own policies for state elections. On the other hand, the generally low levels of involvement (except for MDB) suggest a strong ability of the federal parties and their leaders to insulate themselves from the influence of lower party levels. Yet, as we are measuring the institutional participation of regional branches in central decisions, the coding scheme does not allow us to take fully into account the presence of politicians with strong state-level interests in central organs of all parties, which may constitute an important mechanism of internal cohesion and conflict-resolution (Van Houten 2009).

The data do not support entirely H1 (the homogenizing impact of macro-institutions), as there are clear differences across the party system both in terms of shared rule (SD = 2.3) and self-rule (SD = 1.5). These differences may be attributed to the structural/behavioural factors. Somewhat supporting H2a, the state branches of presidentialized parties have slightly lower levels of autonomy when compared to their counterparts in the non-presidentialized parties (av. = 9.0 and 9.8 respectively). The central organs of those parties have more incentives to maintain mechanisms of oversight over state-level processes, as they face the challenge of articulating resources and strategies around some competitive presidential candidate. It is worth
noting, though, that the level of regional autonomy is high even in the presidentialized parties.

The largest differences are found in the shared-rule dimension, which runs counter the hypothesis H2b (the expectation of no substantial differences between the two groups of parties). The parties that do not engage in presidential races grant much higher levels of participation to subnational branches in central party decisions, when compared to the other group (av. = 8.2 and 5.8 respectively). The explanation behind this finding may be connected to the reciprocal causality between organization and strategy. Although we are using party strategy primarily as an independent variable (with focus on the presidential race), one can reasonably argue that the strong (and previous) organizational influence of state branches on central decisions prevents PP, PR, PDT, PTB, and MDB from adopting nationally integrated strategies, in order to preserve the regional interests around legislative and gubernatorial races. As the literature on party organization has shown, the relationship between organization and strategy is complex and it is hard to establish a more precise direction of causality (Panebianco 1988; Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010). The focus on party change over a period of time, in case studies with longitudinal data, would be a possible solution to address this issue (Harmel and Janda 1994; Gauja 2017).

Some differences between Brazilian party organizations are party-related: genetic models and ideological preferences matter (Panebianco 1988; Thorlakson 2009). The PT and especially the MDB are outliers in terms of multilevel arrangement (see the Figure 1). The MDB has the highest levels of both shared rule and self-rule, which indicates a one-way upwards vertical integration (Thorlakson 2013): state branches have extensive formal powers to influence national decisions, while preserving high levels of autonomy. Created as a federation of regional barons (Kinzo 1988; Ferreira 2002), this feature of decentralization still shapes the party today.
### Table 4. Codes for the vertical organization of Brazilian parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Presidentialized parties</th>
<th>Non-presidentialized parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>PSB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Selection of central party president</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Involvement of state branches in central party executive</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Selection of candidates: federal parliamentary elections</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Selection of presidential candidate and coalition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Adoption of party platform (presidential)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Amending the party constitution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shared-rule score</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Organization of the regional branch</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Selection of state party president</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Selection of candidates for regional elections</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Adoption of platform for state elections (governor)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Financing the regional branch</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-rule score</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* elaborated by the authors.
With the lowest score regarding shared rule, the opposite happens in PT. More ideological parties tend to be more hierarchical, in the basic choice between concentration and dispersion of powers (Bolleyer 2011). An externally created party, the PT is the more ideological amongst the major Brazilian parties, and it puts most of its efforts in the presidential race. In this sense, PT’s central organs have been able to insulate themselves from the organized influence of state branches. Nevertheless, its state branches have today a similar level of self-rule when compared to the other parties, which contradicts the general view about the PT as the most nationally centralized among the major competitors in Brazil (Samuels 2004, 1000-1; Nunes and Melo 2015). The PT was probably more centralized in the 1980s, and the current situation can be seen as the result of decades of ideological moderation, incremental change, and adaptation to the institutional environment and the governmental arenas (Ribeiro 2014)12. Centralized hierarchies are more durable and suitable for simple (unitary) contexts. In the long run, multilevel settings push parties towards power-dispersing models of organization (Carty 2004; Bolleyer 2011, 331).

**Conclusion**

Overall, there are many similarities in the way parties organize in Brazil, in part due to legal obligations. There are differences between them, however. Some of the differences (notably the situation of the MDB) result from party-level factors. Others are associated to strategic choices regarding the presidential race: the parties that usually engage in the competition for the presidency grant slightly lower levels of autonomy to state branches and face considerably fewer pressures from regional

---

12 The PT ran the federal government from 2003 to 2016.
elites. When taken together, the findings suggest that party agency and other party-related variables exert a differentiating effect on party organizations, which may mitigate the homogenizing incentives from the institutional setting.

Although high, regional autonomy in Brazilian parties is overall lower when compared to the other countries for which we have similar data, such as Spain and the UK (Fabre 2011). Federal parties have retained significant control mechanisms in Brazil. The two most important are the use of temporary commissions to select state leaders and the power to veto all subnational decisions. The extent of the power to appoint temporary commissions and its wide use suggest that we should question the authenticity of the autonomy given to the state branches, and the general view (Mainwaring 1999) about Brazilian parties as weakly integrated organizations.13

This particular arrangement can be seen as the organizational solution to deal with contradictory incentives. On the one hand, the federal arrangement, the high levels of regional socioeconomic heterogeneity, and the electoral system push Brazilian parties towards decentralization. On the other hand, party law forces parties to build national organizations, and the simultaneity between presidential race and state elections requires at least a minimum level of electoral coordination.

This article shows that factors that are considered important in other cases (type of federalism, electoral institutions, and party origins) also influence party organization in Brazil. It also adds three factors that should be further studied in the field of multilevel parties, in both theoretical and empirical terms: party strategy, the presidential system, and party system fragmentation. A presidential system with electoral simultaneity between national and subnational elections, combined with a multiparty system (which normally demands the formation of party coalitions across the territorial levels), may soften the predicted centrifugal impact of a multilevel setting on party organizations. The way parties strategically respond matters as well, and it can mitigate the homogenizing effects of the institutional setting. In this sense, the findings suggest important connections between party organization, institutions, and party strategies.

References


13 Future research may investigate whether there is an actual symmetry between state branches within each party. Are the party branches of the richer and/or more populous states more autonomous (e.g. less subject to top-down interventions) and more capable of influencing national party decisions? Our methodological approach led us to assign the same score to all regional branches. An analysis of power asymmetry across regional branches would require different methods, such as interviews with local politicians (Fabre 2008) or elite surveys (Thorlakson 2013). The analysis of hierarchical relationships at the next level, between state and municipal branches, is another suggestion for further research.


---

**Political parties and acronyms**

PT - Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party)

PSB - Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party)

PDT - Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Democratic Labour Party)
PSDB - Partido da Social-Democracia Brasileira (Party of Brazilian Social Democracy)
MDB - Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement)
PR - Partido da República (Party of the Republic)
DEM - Democratas (Democrats).
PTB - Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labour Party)
PP - Partido Progressista (Progressive Party)