Emotion as Power: Capital and Strategy in the Field of Power

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Abstract:
Recent work across the social sciences have converged on the issue of emotion. In the vanguard of these advances has been the sociology of emotions, broadly defined, which, in various guises – structural, cultural, critical, social psychological, positivist and so on – has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the emotional dimensions of social life, and its centrality to the explanation and understanding of social action. In this paper, and building on previous work (Heaney, 2011), I wish to make a contribution to an increasingly important interdisciplinary sub-field – the political sociology of emotion – and to reconsider and explain the increasingly important role of emotional practice, understood as the strategic deployment of emotional capital, in contemporary party politics.

Key words: Emotion, power, party politics, emotional capital, political capital, Bourdieu
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**Introduction:**

We are living in an age of emotional politics. From Brexit to Trump, to the rise of both left and right populism across the globe, but also in the more mundane politics of parliaments and parties, emotions, emotional expression, and emotionally expressive politicians appear to dominate political social spaces once thought to be bastions of reason and rational decision making. How are we to account for, analyze, and explain this emotionalization of public life and the new emotional logic of the political field? Recent work across the social sciences have converged on the emotions, from a variety of theoretical and disciplinary perspectives. In the vanguard of these advances has been the sociology of emotions, broadly defined, which, in various guises – structural, cultural, critical, social psychological, positivist, and so on – has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the emotional dimensions of social life, and the central role that emotions play in the formation, maintenance, transformation, and destruction of a wide array of social bonds, and at different levels of analysis (Barbalet, 1998; Burkitt, 2014; Flam, 1990; Turner, 2007; Turner & Stets, 2005). In this paper, and building on previous work (Heaney, 2011; 2013), I wish to make a contribution to an increasingly important interdisciplinary sub-field – the political sociology of emotion – and to reconsider and explain the increasingly important role of emotional practice, understood as the strategic deployment of emotional capital, in contemporary party politics. Assessing and contributing to contemporary issues and debates, the overall argument of the paper that is that emotions themselves have become a new and increasingly important resource for, and source of, political power in the 21st century. The contribution will be to offer a new theoretical explanation for this process from the perspective of relational sociology and the sociology of emotions.

The paper is also part of a larger, ongoing project that aims to understand and explain the relationship(s) between the state, emotions, and power – the emergence and dynamics of what I am calling the ‘emotional state’. This term refers to the various ways in which the nation-state has been directly and indirectly involved in the construction and deconstruction of the emotional life of the polity; the degree to which it reflects (and constructs) dominant emotional regime(s) and norms; and how these processes change through time. This wider work, along with this paper, continue a critical consideration of the relationship between emotions and
power as an ongoing research agenda (Heaney, 2011; 2013). The more limited aim of this paper here is to theorize and clarify a number of key concepts from relational sociology, especially that of emotional capital, and apply them to one specific aspect of the wider field of power, that is, politics, parties, politicians, and political leadership more generally.

Before I outline the central argument of this article – explaining how and why emotions should be considered as a form of political power – there is a need to provide some context in terms of both the literature and in relation to some recent developments. This is not, I stress, intended to contribute to the dehistoricization of sociology, and the problematic retreat of sociologists into the present (Elias, 1987), but rather to use recent developments to illustrate and articulate more long term trends. While there are distinctive aspects to the contemporary rise of emotional politics and the salience of political emotions in late modernity (or late capitalism) more generally, political power and emotion have been linked for all of human history (e.g. Aristotle, 2007). This point is reiterated in the (by now) vast interdisciplinary literature on affective or emotional politics in political science, psychology, neuroscience, history, and beyond (Marcus, 2002; Frevert, 2011; Lakoff, 2008). Within sociology, in addition to the rise of the sociology of emotion (or emotions sociology), there has been some recent work focusing specifically on the political in various ways – what might be called the political sociology of emotion (Berezin, 2002; Clarke et al, 2006; Demertzis, 2006; Demertzis, 2013; Flam & King, 2005; Goodwin et al, 2001; Heaney & Flam, 2013; Hoggett & Thompson, 2012; Holmes, 2004; Holmes & Manning, 2013; Ost, 2004). Key topics of interest here have included social movements (Jaspers, 2011), nationalism (Heaney, 2013), populism (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017); and citizenship (Johnson, 2010) all of which relate to wider conceptions of the ‘politics-emotion nexus’ in world politics and International Relations (Hutchinson & Bleiker, 2014).

While aspects of this work touch on and relate to questions of the state, political parties, once a core concern of the discipline, and politicians themselves, have garnered less theoretical and critical attention. This might be seen as part of the decline in the study of parties and party politics in sociology more generally, which have been largely hived off to political science, despite their importance for classical sociologists such as Marx and Weber (1972). This process has accelerated since the apogee of a distinctly sociological approach to parties and party systems in the 1960’s, associated with Lipset and others, after which, the study of parties and
politicians became the domain of political science (Mudge & Chen, 2014). There are, of course, a number of exceptions, such as the ‘articulation school’ (De Leon et al., 2009) and, perhaps of more relevance here, the work of Jeffery Alexander and others operating within the (more or less strong) culturalist approach to social performance in relation to power (Alexander, 2011). Relatedly, there has been some work on the rise of ‘celebrity politicians’ more generally (Street, 2004). Nevertheless, it remains the case that core aspects of political life that were once seen are core to the sociological analysis of politics like parties, party systems, elections, political leadership, candidate selection and so on became increasingly residual over the 20th century. Yet, I wish to suggest that such seemingly ‘old fashioned’, nuts and bolts aspects of parties and political life should be seen as key components of an explanation for the emergence and endurance of an increasingly emotional politics in the 21st century.

The point here is that, if the political sociology of emotion is to fulfil its potential, it will need to go beyond its current focus on movement and protest – on what might be considered ‘exceptional’ politics, important as these are – to (re)address these core components of political life that were so central to the concerns of the founding fathers, including, and especially, the relationship between emotions and ‘the state’, political parties, and embodied politicians. Some moves in this direction have already begun, especially in relation to the rise of populism in Europe and in world politics more generally. While much of the focus here has also been on movements, more recently, there has been an upsurge in work linking populism, and populist parties (especially of the right), to emotions and emotional dynamics (Demertzis, 2006). A key recent contribution by Salmela and von Scheve (2017) makes this connection explicit. They argue that individual-level emotional dynamics mediate between macro-level social and cultural transformations (such as globalization, modernization), and micro-level support for right wing parties via two ‘emotional mechanisms’ (the first concerning ressentiment and the transmutation of insecurity into (repressed) shame, and from there to anger and resentment, the second concerns a shift from shamed or shameful social identities towards what are perceived to be more ‘stable’ identities, such as nationality or sex (Salmela and von Scheve, 2017). Yet, even here in certain respects, the arguments made by Daid Ost (2004) are still germane in that emotions remain a ‘problem that power has to deal with, not something with which power is itself intimately involved’ (Ost, 2004, p.229). When emotion meets politics, in much of the scientific analysis, it continues to be treated as something ‘other’ to mainstream, elite, and everyday political power, as something deployed in various ways by
social movements, or protestors, or populists, or demagogues, rather than the embodied men and women, formally attired and firmly ensconced in formal party politics.

In what follows this paper will attempt to make a contribution to this endeavour in the following way. In seeking to address some of these gaps, we will critically engage with the concept of emotional capital, drawing on Bourdieu and relational sociology, giving an account of its rise from the end of the 20th century, associated with processes of emotionalization more generally. In section two I will turn to the political context to discuss processes within the political field that have facilitated the increased salience of emotions within that particular social space, drawing especially on the work of Peter Mair. In section three I will lay out the core contribution and argument of the paper, explaining the new emotional logic of the political field as being bounded up with the ‘strategic’ (in the particular sense in which Bourdieu uses this term) deployment of emotional capital and its conversion into political capital. Such an argument has not been made to date. In section four I discuss the implications of this analysis, with illustrative examples, before briefly outlining steps towards a research agenda. Thus, while the paper is primarily conceptual and theoretical, it will point the way towards future empirical work.

1: The Rise of Emotional Capital

How, then, should a political sociology of emotions account for the increased salience of emotionality in contemporary party politics, and (what I will call) the new emotional logical of the political field? In what follows I offer one account from the broad perspective of relational sociology, and especially that associated with the work of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu himself, of course, wrote substantially on politics and the political in general, though his specific contribution to political sociology has not yet been fully acknowledged (Swartz, 2013). In addition to his recently published lectures on the state (2014), and especially from the mid-1980s, we see increased attention being focused on the relationship between symbolic power, the field of politics, and political representation (Bourdieu, 1991; 1994; 2000; 2014). However, in this analysis, as elsewhere, there is a lack of attention to affect and emotion. The political field, as one key field within the field of power, is the key arena in the struggle for political power (and, ultimately, the control of the state), associated with one key resource or form of capital, political capital. The central contention and contribution here will be to argue that this
new logic of the field of politics is increasingly predicated on the conversion of emotional capital into political capital. Before turning to this, we must clarify the concept of emotional capital, and account for the rise of emotions within society before turning to the political field.

The concept of emotional capital has received increased attention across a diverse range of scholarly arenas such as the sociology of education (Reay, 2004; Zembylas, 2007), the sociology of professions (Cahill, 1999), care work (Virkki, 2007), families (Gillies, 2006) and in many other others. Primarily rooted (if not directly discussed) in the work of Bourdieu, it has emerged as a key conceptual tool used to analyse emotional expression and management in a host of personal and public situations. Recently, much of this work has been reviewed and critiqued by Cottingham (2016), who defines it as: ‘one’s trans-situational, emotion based knowledge, emotion management skills, and feeling capacities, which are both socially emergent and critical to the maintenance of power…emotional capital is a form of embodied cultural capital that emerges from the cultural socialization of the “mindful body” where “bodily capacities and cultural requirements meet’’ (Cottingham, 2016, p.454). In offering this definition, which draws on the work of Scheer (2012), Cottingham usefully identifies some problems with earlier approaches, such as the lack of definitional clarity, an essentializing tendency to associate it (more or less exclusively) with the feminine, and a lack of attention to the transformation of emotional capital via secondary socialization (Cottingham, 2016). Of these, the lack of definitional clarity is perhaps the most significant in that, like many of Bourdieu’s concepts, it has become a victim of its own symbolic success and is variously and inconsistently defined (when it is defined at all), and often treated as a synonym for ‘emotional intelligence’ or something like it. For Cottingham, one key confusion here is the conflation of emotional capital with emotional practice – the latter referring to the ‘enactment/embodiment of emotional capital’, while the former is ‘trans-situationally available regardless of its use in practice’ (Cottingham, 2016, p. 461). Failure to make this distinction, which she associates with both Gilles (2006) and Reay (2004), results in the loss of analytical purchase and reduces the explanatory power of the concept.

These are useful interventions, especially for those operating within a practice-approach to emotion (Scheer, 2012), and Cottingham’s empirical work with male nurses helps to illustrate her case well – her male nurses suggest that they may have the capacity for
compassion in a given situation, but may not express or manifest that capacity or capital as practice because of their gender, for instance. However, there is more to be done to contextualize and account for both the rise, and appreciation (in the economic sense), of this particular form of capital at the end of the 20th century, and to better relate it to other aspects of Bourdieu’s conceptual scheme, such as habitus, field, and strategy. In this, both the concept itself, and the context, require further elaboration and clarification. Regarding the former, it may be illuminative to go back to the source, as it were, to clarify the concept of capital, especially as it relates to power. As is well known, for Bourdieu (1986), cultural capital exists in three distinct forms – the objectified state (for instance as books or works of art), the institutionalized state (such as educational credentials), and in the embodied state. In this latter state, capital exists ‘in the form of long lasting dispositions of the mind and body’ (Bourdieu, 1986, p.243). This is, he says, the ‘fundamental state’ of cultural capital, with its own distinctive patterns of acquisition and transmission. The accumulation of this form of capital is bound up with processes of acculturation, incorporation, and embodiment, and involves either some form of self-work or self-improvement (such as attending ‘emotional intelligence’ classes) or can occur more implicitly and unconsciously (such as acquiring emotional norms within a middle class family). Because of this embodiment, such capital is linked to the ‘biological singularity’ of the individual, and, more so than other forms, blurs the distinction between inherited and acquired properties, thus combining the ‘prestige of innate property with the merits of acquisition’ (Bourdieu, 1986, p.245). As such, because the social conditions governing its transmission and acquisition are so occluded, more than other species of capital it can function as a form of symbolic capital, and thereby go ‘unrecognized as capital and recognized as legitimate competence, as authority exerting an effect of (mis)recognition’ (ibid). This is also why the manifestation of this form of capital in practice tends to be viewed as sign of ‘authenticity’, a point I return to later. Emotional capital, then, as ‘the most embodied part of the embodied forms of cultural capital’ (Illouz, 2007, p. 64) can be seen as the most ‘naturalized’ and misrecognized forms of acquired cultural competence, rooted in habitus, and functioning as capital, a ‘social power relation’ or form of power operating within specific fields (Bourdieu, 1996, p.264; Swartz, 2013). Such emotional competence – seen above all as the contextually and normatively ‘appropriate’ expression of emotional practice – is status enhancing, convertible into other forms of capital, and results in increased power within and across different social fields.
However, we must tread carefully here. Throughout the vast literature discussing the various forms of capital, there is a widespread tendency to define the concept as both capacity and resource, simultaneously. This conflation raises conceptual questions, especially in relation to the notion of capital-as-power, and particularly for embodied forms of cultural capital, such as emotional capital. Capital as capacity of course evokes notions of ‘power to’, a dispositional concept (Morriss, 2012; Lukes, 2005; Haugaard, 2012; Heaney, 2011). As such, capital, and especially embodied capital, should not be confused or conflated with the exercise of that power, what Morriss (2012) calls the ‘exercise fallacy’. Rather, embodied (and culturally legitimized and valorised) emotional competence is better seen from the perspective of the ‘ability’ approach to power (Morriss, 2012) – as a trans-situational, dispositional, embodied, and learned capacity, fundamentally associated with habitus, which is distinct from its exercise or manifestation. You may have an ability (to read German, to express empathy), but may not be ‘able’ to manifest that ability at a specific time or context, for various reasons. Additionally, it can be problematic to conflate or identify capacities with resources, what Morriss again calls the ‘vehicle fallacy’ (Morriss, 2012). Embodied capacities should not be considered to be resources directly, which occurs frequently both in Bourdieu and in the secondary literature, but only in a secondary sense, at a different level of analysis or abstraction. We must remember that ‘embodied capital’ is a fiction, a metaphor. What is embodied as habitus is not ‘capital’, but a learned capacity for doing, thinking, saying and feeling; a relationally, socially, and culturally acquired mode or modes of becoming. These modes are acquired, via socialization, through the relational experiencing of others and the culture of the network of interdependence within which we relationally become. To claim that embodied capital is a capacity is to make an ontological claim about bodies; to claim that this can be viewed as a resource is a theoretical claim, pitched at a different level of abstraction, and should be associated with particular, abstract fields. To conflate them is to reify a capacity into a thing, which Whitehead called the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’ (Whitehead, 1978).

Yet, we must also be clear that the definition of what is or is not a ‘competent’ form of emotional practice is both normative, and culturally and historically variable, and this has changed quite radically over the 20th century. This rise in the salience in value of emotions and emotional expression has been widely discussed in the literature. The work of Norbert Elias (2000) is, of course, the classic example, but in the history of emotions there have been a number of concepts deployed to capture such changes in emotional culture,
such as Reddy’s (2001) ‘emotional regimes’, Rosenwein’s (2006) ‘emotional communities’ and Gammerl’s (2012) ‘emotional styles’. Within the sociology of emotions the work of Illouz (2007, 2008), also drawing on Bourdieu, has attempted to account for the rise of ‘emotional capitalism’ over this same period, associated with a rise in notions of ‘emotional competence’, primarily defined by, what she calls, the dominant ‘therapeutic ethos’. This account explains how the emergence of a new ‘emotional style’, based on this therapeutic ethos, gradually spreads from the universities and institutions into the corporate world of 1920s America, and from there via advertising, Hollywood, media, and the state, into the homes and bodies of individuals. The process is fundamentally bound up with capitalism and its transformation over the same period, especially as capitalism and the world of work become increasingly based on communication and (human) relationality and connection. This emotional capitalism is ‘a culture in which emotional and economic discourses and practices mutually shape each other, thus producing…a broad, sweeping movement in which affect is made an essential aspect of economic behaviour and in which emotional life – especially that of the middle classes – follows the logic of economic relations and exchange’ (Illouz, 2007, p.5; 2008, p.60). In this sense, as the 20th century progresses, emotions, now raised to a ‘category of value’, become increasingly commoditized, and seen as an embodied form of cultural capital to be rationally deployed as resources in both intimate and public relations (Illouz, 2008, p.142). Within such accounts, the expression (rather than the repression) of emotion in practice becomes highly prized, yet it is also highly regulated and rationalized. Emotional practice, and the capacity to deploy emotional capital in line with the dominant, therapeutic ethos or style bring positive sanctions of various sorts, while failures to do so, or a lack of such capacity, as seen from that dominant perspective, bring negative sanctions. Indeed, because of the symbolic and material power of the middle classes, which Skeggs (2009), following Savage (2003), calls the new ‘particular-universal’ class, it is their particular (and historically contingent) emotional style or culture that has been ‘universalized’ and legitimized, especially in Western democracies. The capacity to be emotionally ‘in tune’ with that normative style ultimately determines what counts as emotional capital from the end of the 20th century.

Adding such historical and institutional context to our understanding of the concept, then, allows us to see how new emotionally-based forms of hierarchy and stratification can emerge. Emotional capital, as with all other forms, is a scarce, and unequally distributed, trans-situational, and embodied capacity, operating as a resource when competed for and deployed
in various ways within and across specific fields, and transformable into other species of capital. The value of this capital – and its ‘exchange rate’ into other forms of capital – is on the rise because of these historical changes in emotional culture, and this has particular effects as the ‘emotionalization’ of social life, including politics, continues. As an embodied capacity, it may be linked to ‘power to’, viewed as a resource, it may be linked to ‘power over’. As Swartz argues, while Bourdieu has been somewhat neglected in political sociology, and, indeed, I would add, the power literature more broadly, the analysis of power ‘stands at the core’ of his work (Swartz, 2013, p.30). Yet, there is a tendency to view this work as only making a contribution to the ‘power as domination’ perspective, which occludes the ‘power to’ and empowerment dimension that undergird the concepts of (embodied) capital, and especially habitus (Heaney, 2011; Haugaard, 2008). In what follows, I wish to engage in a Bourdieu-inspired analysis of the changes that have occurred in the political field, while retaining this wider focus on both the concept of power, and of emotion.

2. Changes in the political field: Mair’s ‘void’:

Before we turn to that, we need to briefly address some structural changes in party politics and the political field that, I will argue, have facilitated its increased emotionalization. While the suggestion that contemporary politics has become increasingly emotional might be widely accepted, or even considered banal in the age of Trump and Brexit, more needs to be done to account for the processes and mechanisms that have given rise to this reality. The rise in the salience of emotional capital, previously discussed, can only be seen as the necessary and general background condition for what we observe in the world of politics, which has its own specific dynamics and developments – linked to but going beyond mediatization and personalization – that need to be accounted. Here, the focus will be placed on the arguments of Irish political scientist Peter Mair and his seminal analysis of the ‘hollowing out’ of Western democracy from the 1970’s. From at least 2007, and more comprehensively (and posthumously) in 2013, Mair provides a series of arguments and evidence of processes that, I

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1 Swartz is of course correct to say that Bourdieu himself does not think in terms of this power to/power over distinction (Swartz, 2013, p.43), but I think it underplays the potential in Bourdieu’s conceptual tool kit to limit it to the study of the three types of power he suggests (p.45), i.e. power as resource (capitals), power concentrated in fields (fields of power), and a version close to 3D power (symbolic power and violence) -- though Lukes has issues with the scope of ‘embodiment’ as well as a perceived lack of reflexivity in Bourdieu’s work (Lukes, 2005, p.143). Yet, as Haugaard has argued, ‘the most basic way in which habitus relates to power is relative to empowerment or power to’ (Haugaard, 2008, p.194), and a fuller treatment of Bourdieu and the concept of power remains to be completed.
Mair begins his book *Ruling the Void* with a rather stark assessment of the state of democracy and party government. He writes: ‘The age of party democracy has passed. Although the parties themselves remain, they have become so disconnected from the society, and pursue a form of competition that is so lacking in meaning, that they no longer seem capable of sustaining democracy in its present form’ (Mair, 2013, p.1). In what follows, Mair constructs a compelling argument concerning the gradual depoliticization of decision making and party politics in Europe and elsewhere, coupled with a rising indifference towards politics and politicians within electorates. This rise in, what Mair calls, ‘anti-political sentiment’, was not only a problem with apathetic citizens, but is also in evidence within the rhetoric of politicians, and in the specialist policy and political theory literature from the 1990s. This trend is predicated on a number of key, interrelated processes.

The first of these concerns the ‘withdrawal of the voter’, in terms of both interest and involvement, in popular democratic practice and conventional party politics. Here, Mair deploys a raft of wide-ranging evidence in support of his thesis of disengagement from (what he calls, following Beck) ‘capital P’ politics (Mair, 2013, p.18; Beck, 1992). These include data on voter turnout in Western Europe from 1950-2010, electoral volatility, party identification, and formal party membership (Mair, 2013, pp.22-42). For each of these variables, the pattern unequivocally suggests that, especially since the 1990s, citizens became increasingly disengaged from conventional party politics while electorates became ‘progressively destructured, affording more scope to the media to play the role of agenda-setter, and requiring a much greater campaign effort from parties and candidates’ (Mair, 2013, p.42).

The second process outlined concerns the withdrawal of the elites. Echoing an established view within political science that much of the 20th century can be viewed as the century of mass democracy and the mass party, Mair suggests that a number of key features that were core to the establishment and maintenance of party government have fundamentally changed. During this ‘golden age’ of parties, voters felt a very strong level of identification
with ‘their’ parties, and the widespread social closure (based on, for instance, social class, religious identity or other forms of shared social experience) was reflected the political closure, which constituted the political communities that specific parties represented. In addition to this social closure, a related process of organizational encapsulation, through which parties themselves actively intervened to construct, maintain, and stabilize networks of support and loyalty, and which thereby stabilized party systems and the dominance of parties during this period (Mair, 2013, pp.77-83). Parties were, furthermore, marked by a ‘mutual distinctiveness’, with distinct policies and programmes that aimed to reflect the preferences of their distinct, ‘natural’ constituencies. In short, parties both represented members, and communicated with party members, often via their own or another partisan press. For Mair, because of this close relationship between the mass party and its members, the key principles of constitutional democracy – representation and legitimacy – were enshrined, especially in the European context.

This ‘golden age’ was relatively short lived. From the 1960s and especially the 1970s, fundamental and rapid social changes being to alter the cohesion of electorates and the stability of parties and party systems. Globalization, individualization, deindustrialization, secularization, and wider processes associated with a general shift from ‘solid’ to ‘liquid’ modernity result in a fragmentation of identities and preferences on the demand side of citizens and electorates making them less cohesive (Bauman, 2000). There have been related changes on the supply side, with shifts in the forms and orientation of parties, away from voters and civil society, and increasingly toward the state. Mair cites a number of key developments in support of this, for example, that parties are increasingly funded not from membership contributions or donations, but either directly or indirectly by state or public funds or subventions; that they are increasingly regulated by the state, making them more like ‘public service agencies’ than autonomous ‘private’ and voluntary organizations; and that they are increasingly office-seeking, prioritizing their governing role over their representative roles (Mair, 2013, pp.83-89). In sum, the focus and organizational attention of parties has

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2 The ‘freezing’ of many party systems across the world, especially in Europe in the middle of the 20th century, both reflects and maintains the ‘freezing’ of collective political identities around the same period (see for instance Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).

3 He writes: ‘Within one agency or one institution, party guaranteed the two constitutive elements of democracy: representation, on the one hand, and hence government by the people; and procedural legitimacy, on the other hand, or government for the people’ Mair, 2013, p.81).
increasingly turned away from voters and civil society and more towards the state and the offices of the state, such that the representative functions that parties once performed have diminished relative to their procedural and governing functions. These processes are also linked to the rise of both the ‘cartel party’, and non-majoritarian decision making, both of which have been related to processes of depoliticization and ‘anti-politics’ (Mair, 2011, 2013).4

This, then, is the ‘void’ of Mair’s title, born from the mutual withdrawal of both the voters, toward individual life and the various ‘cloakroom communities’ (Bauman, 2000) they may participate in from time to time, and the parties and politicians, toward the state itself, and its increasingly professional and technocratic governance. These processes represent a profound transformation of the political field, and a corresponding change in the ‘rules’ of the political game.

The argument I wish to make here is that emotions increasingly rush in to fill this ‘void’. His analysis is compelling, and there is strong evidence to support it, at least in the European context.5 Yet, if we are to take this ‘gap’ seriously, we can ask what might the implications of these processes be? One suggestive answer from Mair himself is that there is a shift from party democracy to ‘audience democracy’ (Mair, 2013, p.44). Though this particular phrase comes from Manin (1997, pp.218-235), it resonates with many other notions concerned to capture the

4 The cartel party is a type of party that is ‘postulated to emerge in democratic polities that are characterized by the interpenetration of party and state and by a tendency towards inter-party colluson. With the development of the cartel party, the goals of politics become self-referential, professional and technocratic, and what substantive inter-party competition remains becomes focused on the efficient and effective management of the polity’, thus hastening the development of ‘audience democracy’ (Katz & Mair, 2018, cited in Mair, 2013, p.83, fn5).

5 A critic might suggest that, while this might all have held until recently, where the impact of the global financial crisis off 2007-8 may be seen in terms of a re-politicization process and a potential reversal of at least aspects of the processes discussed here, especially in the European context. However, I would suggest that the rise of right-wing populism is already accounted for within Mair’s analysis. He writes that these very processes give rise to a decline in opposition with party systems, that, when coupled with the gap between voters and parties, and the growing gap between popular responsiveness and professional or governance responsibility within mainstream parties, this makes for ‘fertile breeding grounds for populism’ (Mair, 2013, p.140). Elsewhere he writes of the ‘new form of opposition’ that is emerging, and the ‘growing divide in European party systems between parties which claim to represent, but don’t deliver, and those which deliver, but are no longer seen to represent’ (Mair, 2011, p.164). The argument I am making here, that emotions flow in to the void created by the mutual withdrawal of voter and party, whether in populist or mainstream, system or anti-system varieties, remains valid.
conversion of politics into an image-based form of spectacle or theatre in which ‘personalities are favoured over the party, performance over the programme, and authenticity over competence’ (de Beus, 2011, p.20). In such a context, the confluence of audience democracy and emotional politics are suggested, though not, I think, explained. While there is work on both the mediatization (e.g. Esser & Strömbäck, 2014) and the personalization of politics (e.g. McAllister, 2007), in what follows I wish to argue for and explain the mechanism through which emotion itself has become a key form of power in contemporary politics.

3. The New Emotional Logic of the Field of Politics:

Mair’s analysis suggests reasons why the emotionalization of politics may have accelerated from the end of the 20th century, giving the contextual political particularities operating in tandem with of what appears to be a more widespread trend surrounding the rise of emotional capital within Western cultures more generally. Yet, there is more to be said about the specific mechanisms through which this process comes about within the political field. Here, I wish to offer one account, drawing on two Bourdieusian concepts that have been somewhat neglected in the literature. The first of these is ‘political capital’, and the second is the concept of ‘strategy’, as Bourdieu understands it. The aim is to bring these together to explain the new emotional logic of the contemporary field of politics.

While the phrase ‘political capital’ is quite commonplace in everyday and media discourses, the concept in Bourdieu’s political sociology requires some unpacking. For him, it represents the primary form of capital competed for within the political field, itself a subset of the wider meta-field of power. The concept of field, one of the well-known ‘open concepts’ deployed by Bourdieu, refers to a ‘network or configuration of objective relations between positions’, operating both as (abstract) force field and battlefield at once (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.97; Bourdieu, 1991; see also Swartz, 1997, pp.117-142). Different fields are associated with different, specific species of capital – religious, artistic, literary, and so on – and there is struggle or competition over both the distribution and definition of these (scarce and valued) resources within these specific fields (Swartz, 1997, 2013). Dominant or

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6 Citizen’s become, as Sennett wrote a long time ago, ‘the passive spectators to a political personage who offers them his intentions, his sentiments, rather than his acts, for their consumption’ (Sennett, [1977]2002, p.261).
subordinate positions within these relational matrices are determined by the various amounts and types of capital available to the agents occupying these positions. Political capital is the key competed for resource within the political field. Bourdieu describes it variously as a form of social capital, and of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1991; Swartz, 2013, pp.64-68). As a form of social capital it is fundamentally bound up with the ‘power of mobilization’, a capacity to move people, to activate networks and their resources, in support of a cause, or candidate, or party; as a form of symbolic capital, it is fundamentally bound up with credit, recognition, and trust (Bourdieu, 1991, Swartz, 2013).⁷ It exists in two broad types, that of personal political capital (linked to personal fame and popularity), and delegated political capital (derived and attached to organizational position, rather than the person themselves). Moreover, political capital can exist in objectified forms, such as enduring political parties. He writes: ‘The delegation of political capital presupposes the objectification of this kind of capital in permanent institutions, its materialization in political ‘machines’, in jobs and instruments of mobilization and its continual reproduction by mechanisms and strategies’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p.196).

Social and symbolic capital only become political capital within the political field (Swartz, 2013). The political field is the arena of competition or struggle for political power, where other forms of capital are transmuted into political capital in pursuit of that central objective (Swartz, 2013, p.68). Political power is itself bound up with symbolic power, the power of legitimate definition, classification, and domination, and the control of political power ultimately leads to control of the state, which becomes, for Bourdieu, the ‘central bank of symbolic credit’ and symbolic power, with a monopoly over both legitimate violence and symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1991; 1994; 2014).⁸ While there are overlaps, the political field is relatively autonomous from other fields (such as the economic, the juridical), and has its own

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⁷ Political capital is a ‘form of symbolic capital, credit founded on credence or belief and recognition or, more precisely, on the innumerable operations of credit by which agents confer on a person (or on an object) the very powers that they recognize in him (or it)… the politician derives his political power from the trust that a group places in him (Bourdieu, 1991, p.192, original emphasis).

⁸ Elsewhere Bourdieu writes: ‘The political field is the field par excellence for the exercise of symbolic capital; it is a place where to exist, to be, is to be perceived. A man (sic) of politics is in large part a man known and recognized; it is no accident that political men should be particularly vulnerable to scandal, scandal being the generator of discredit and discredit being the opposite of the accumulation of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 2014, p.192).
internal, relational logic and dynamic (Bourdieu, 1991).\(^9\) Indeed, Bourdieu argues, with striking similarities to Mair (2013), that, as the field becomes increasingly autonomous and professionalized, and political capital becomes increasingly institutionalized, the ‘double game’ of agents operating within the field – the dual balance between the interests of the represented and the interest of the representatives – tilts toward the internal dynamics of the political field, and the professional interests of politicians and parties, aimed at the control of the state, and away from their representative function (Bourdieu, 1991).\(^10\)

The argument I wish to make here is to suggest that, within advanced liberal democracies, there is a new emotional logic operating within the field of politics, and that this is based upon the transformation or conversion of emotional capital into political capital. This conversion is one key mechanism driving the emotionalization of politics. Drawing together the three strands of the argument presented thus far, we can suggest, firstly, following Illouz and others working within the sociology of emotions, that the rise of emotional capital and a shift from more repressive to more expressive emotional regimes is a key aspect of the cultural transformation characteristic of late or liquid modernity more generally (Illouz, 2008; Ready, 2001). Secondly that, following Mair and others in political science, and Bourdieu’s relational-political sociology, that there has been a concomitant transformation of politics, understood either as party systems or political fields, that has opened a gap between the represented and their representatives, voters/citizens and their politicians/parties, within liberal democracies, resulting in the rise of an increasingly mediatized, personalized, presidentialized, and theatricalized form of hollowed-out, ‘audience democracy’. The third strand suggests that both of these processes, working independently but in tandem, has transformed the value and ‘exchange rate’ of emotional capital, relative to political capital, within the field of politics. Emotional capital should thus be viewed as an increasingly important resource within this specific field, given the current state of the political game.

\(^9\) As Swartz (2013, p.68) and others have noted, the influence of both Cassirer’s relationism and Weber’s ‘social spheres’ is clear here. Indeed, for Weber, the political sphere, within which action is ‘oriented toward the acquisition of social power’ is very close to Bourdieu’s definition of the political field (Weber, 1978, p.938).

\(^10\) He writes: ‘the more advanced the process of institutionalization of political capital is, the more the winning of ‘hearts and minds’ tends to become subordinated to the winning of jobs...It is thus easy to understand how political parties can be brought in this way to sacrifice their programmes so as to keep themselves in power or simply in existence’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p.197).
While Bourdieu’s political sociology is not fully developed, and despite the fact that, in this area and elsewhere in his work, the emotions are not really given explicit treatment, we can construct this emotional logic in more detail by drawing further on his conceptual scheme. How does emotional capital relate and convert to political capital? Here, we must recall the specific properties associated with each concept outlined earlier. Emotional capital is an *embodied* form of cultural capital, understood as a trans-situational *capacity* to express, manage, and feel emotions in a manner that is ‘in tune’ with dominant emotion norms and cultures. This capacity for emotional ‘competence’ is embedded within the wider system of dispositions or habitus that is at the centre of Bourdieu’s embodied and dispositional sociology. It is distinct from, but is what is enacted or activated in, emotional practice (Scheer, 2012; Cottingham, 2016). As an embodied capacity, it is more likely to be misrecognized in practice as a ‘natural’, legitimate and ‘authentic’ competence, rather than the socially acquired, inherited, or learned, unequally distributed form of capital that it is. As such, it links especially with the personalized forms of political capital. Its reconversion into personal political capital is often interpreted in terms of ‘likability’, ‘openness’, ‘authenticity’ or ‘affinity’, and this operates whether ‘in the flesh’ in face to face encounters, or via more mediatized means on television, radio, or online. This later concept of affinity, for instance, in a different theoretical context, is discuss by Holmes and Manning (2013), where to ‘have an affinity for someone or something is to have a spontaneous liking for them or it, usually based on some feeling of connection and commonality’ (Holmes & Manning, 2013, p.5). Here, the activation of emotional capital in emotional practice by politicians (in a speech in parliament, in a media interview) transmutes that capital into political capital, a form of power that both moves and mobilizes, while also adding to the symbolic power or prestige, reputation, and status of the politician, and thereby improving their standing or position within the political field.

How is the deployment of emotional capital as emotional practice to be understood in the political context? Within the sociology of emotions there are a number of conceptual schemes that could potentially use to investigate the emotional practice of politicians, such as Hochschild’s emotional labour and feeling rules (Hochschild, 1983). However, within the relational sociology being advanced here, a vocabulary of rules and management is problematic. For Bourdieu, social behaviour is ordered and regulated ‘without it being the product of obedience to rules’ (Bourdieu, 1990, pp.64-5). Against this, he posits a concept of ‘strategy’, but one that is quite distinct from how ‘strategic’ action is usually understood.
Rather than a form of rational calculation, strategy is here understood as a form of ‘practical sense’ (*sens pratique*) and, using a sporting metaphor, as the ‘feel for the game’ or the ‘practical mastery of the logic or the immanent necessity of the game’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p.61). The basis of such strategic action is the habitus, or the set of bodily and mental dispositions that result from both primary and secondary socialization. As such, strategies are both regulated and improvised. He writes that the ‘good player, who is so to speak the game incarnate, does at every moment what the game requires. That presupposes a permanent capacity for invention, indispensable if one is to be able to adapt to indefinitely varied and never completely identical situations. This is not endured by mechanical obedience to the explicit, codified rule’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p.63).

In this context, the ‘good politician’, who has embodied the new emotional ‘rules’ of the political game, strategically deploys emotional capital, as emotional practice, in the pursuit of power and political capital within the political field. Emotional competence becomes one more, and increasingly important, cluster of specific competences, embodied in the habitus of professional politicians in late modernity, and emotion can be viewed as a form of power operating within the political field.

**Discussion: Towards a research strategy.**

Now that the basic conceptual argument has been outlined, in what follows I wish to briefly develop some the implications of this analysis for empirical work, especially for approaches operating within the emergent political sociology of emotions framework. The focus and contribution remain conceptual and theoretical, but I will draw on some illustrative examples to support the overall position concerning the operation of emotional capital within the political field. The focus here will mainly remain on the ‘supply side’ of politicians and parties, rather than the ‘demand side’ of voters and citizens, and their reception and reactions,

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11 ‘The habitus as the feel for the game is the social game embodied and turned into a second nature. Nothing is simultaneously freer and more constrained than the action of the good player. He quite naturally materializes at just the place the ball is about to fall, as if the ball were in command of him – but by that very fact, he is in command of the ball. The habitus, as society written into the body, into the biological individual, enables the infinite number of acts of the game – written into the game as possibilities and objective demands – to be produced’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p.63).
as I believe that this is where future work should begin. What follows should be seen as steps towards a research agenda suggested by the theoretical scheme.

And there are a number of different implications to note from this analysis, both for the operation and status of liberal democracies and party government, and their sociological examination. How are we to investigate and analyse emotional capital and practice within political fields? Either implicitly or explicitly, even if not named as such, the management of political parties and politicians is bound up with question of emotional capital. Indeed, the position adumbrated here suggests that the question of when or if the deployment of emotions-as-practice is deemed felicitous or infelicitous hinges on the conversion of emotional to political capital. This feeds into the very structure and dynamics of the late modern political field, especially in times of ‘audience democracy’. Questions of candidate selection, who is chosen to go forward for election, or to hold cabinet office, or to become party leader, are in-part determined by the perceived emotional competence of the individuals in question. The debate and division within and beyond the British Labour Party over Blair and Brown, to take one well-documented example, often hinged upon such issues. Indeed, Brown, in his recent autobiography, interprets his own political failures, especially his loss of the 2010 election, to his personal lack of emotional capital. He writes of how he was brought up to ‘contain, even suppress, my inner feelings in public, and to view the expression of them as self-indulgence’ (Brown, 2017, p.5). He also suggests, in line with the argument here, that in ‘recent years “connecting” seems to increasingly include the public display of emotion, with the latter – authentic or not – seen as evidence of a sincerity required for political success. In a more touchy-feely era, our leaders speak of public issues in intensely personal ways, and assume they can win votes by telling their electors that they ‘feel their pain’. For me, being conspicuously demonstrative is uncomfortable…’ (Brown, 2017, p.4). In this, we might also interpret Brown in terms of what Bourdieu called the ‘hysteresis effect’. This key but little-researched concept refers to the inertia of the habitus, and a mismatch between a system of dispositions orientated to an environment that no longer pertains. Here the habitus, which

12 Bourdieu writes: ‘Thus as a result of the hysteresis effect necessarily implied in the logic of the constitution of habitus, practices are always liable to incur negative sanctions when the environment with which they are actually confronted is too distant from that to which they are objectively fitted. This is why generation conflicts oppose not age-classes separated by natural properties, but habitus which have been produced by different modes of generation, that is, by conditions of existence which, in imposing different definitions of the impossible, the possible, and the probable, cause one group to experience as natural or reasonable practices or aspirations which another group finds unthinkable or scandalous, and vice versa’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p.78).
tends to structure practices, including emotional practices, in line with the conditions of their production, has become (emotionally) ‘out of tune’ with the dominant (emotional) logic of the field (Bourdieu, 2000, pp.160-161; 1977, p.78; see also Strand & Lizardo, 2016). In this, I think, Brown is not alone, and a good number of politicians have found themselves side-lined or deselected either for emotional ‘gaffs’ or the (perceived) lack of emotional *nous*, but the concept of hysteresis in relation to emotional capital requires further empirical study. It does, though, open the question of the relationship between both primary socialization and secondary, political socialization. However, more work is required to determine how parties and party machines manage, appoint, promote, and demote individual politicians on the basis of emotional capacity.

This question of the emotional socialization of politicians points us further toward how the empirical investigation of these issues should be constructed and designed on the basis of the conceptual scheme outlined here. If ‘social aging’ and the hysteresis effect can account for some dynamics, and thereby one ‘variable’ to be examined within the political field in relation to emotional capital, then so too can gender, and social class.

Emotional capital and its activation is highly gendered, perhaps more so that other forms of cultural capital, as it is both embodied, and because of the gendered history of emotions (Cottingham, 2016; Reay, 2004). Within that history, as is well known, women, their bodies, and emotion, shared losing sides in the binary oppositions that structured Western thought, relative to the rational male mind (Heaney, 2011). Indeed, the mode of acquisition of emotional capital reflects and inculcates the dominant emotional norms and culture that are themselves highly gendered. Even now, the deployment of that capital by male and female politicians is often very differently and normatively judged in late modernity. For male politicians with high emotional capital, the ‘conversion rate’ to political and symbolic capital is far greater. Even a little emotional competence can be significantly status-enhancing within the field, given the different expectations and associations surrounding men, masculinity, and emotions. When deployed ‘properly’, by which I mean in line with normative standards, it can signal and be read as an indicator of ‘sensitivity’, ‘authenticity’, ‘empathy’, helping to build affinity, connection, and identification with a male politician (even if there is a vast social, economic or material distance between, say, a wealthy professional politician and a young,
working class voter). The situation for women is much more complex. If their emotional practice tends towards more restraint, they are often negatively labelled as ‘cold’, ‘distant’, ‘stilted’, even ‘masculine’; if their emotional practice tends towards move expressivity, they can be dismissed as ‘sentimental’, ‘irrational’, or ‘hysterical’. There are also different dynamics surrounding gender and the valance of displayed emotion, i.e. whether they are positive (happiness, joy) or negative (anger, fear, sadness). For instance, appropriately attuned anger from a male politician is often read as ‘passionate’; angry female politicians are often coded as ‘aggressive’, ‘out of control’, or ‘shrill’. One well know example here is Hilary Clinton, whose emotional practice has been subject to an unenviable level of global scrutiny, and who is often negatively perceived as being ‘unemotional’. In her book, written after her failed bid for the presidency of the United States in 2006, he recalls the second debate with Donald Trump in which he followed her around the stage in what appeared to be an effort to intimidate or distract her as she was speaking. Of this, she writes:

It was incredibly uncomfortable. He was literally breathing down my neck. My skin crawled. It was one of those moments where you wish you could hit Pause and ask everyone watching, “Well? What would you do?” Do you stay calm, keep smiling, and carry on as if he weren’t repeatedly invading your space? Or do you turn, look him in the eye, and say loudly and clearly, “Back up, you creep, get away from me...Maybe I have overlearned the lesson of staying calm – biting my tongue, digging my fingernails into a clenched fist, smiling all the while, determined to present a composed face to the world (Clinton, 2017, p.136).

While this textual reflection on past events has both political and personal motivation, we can actually watch this scene ourselves and observe the discomfort she is feeling, the clinched microphone, and so on. Had she chosen to confront Trump, what she calls ‘option B’, she would likely have been judged by many to be ‘hysterical’ or ‘over emotional’.

The conceptual scheme of emotional capital, strategy, and political capital put forward here allows us to gain critical distance and ‘de-naturalize’ these questions as they relate to gender. Such questions of direction, valance, and intensity – the ‘what’, ‘how’, and ‘how much’— of emotions are enacted in a given situation are afford by emotional capital. The

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13 She has written in the past that ‘I know that I can be perceived as aloof or cold or unemotional. But I had to learn as a young woman to control my emotions. And that’s a hard path to walk. Because you need to protect yourself, you need to keep steady, but at the same time you don’t want to seem ’walled off.’ And sometimes I think I come across more in the ‘walled off’ arena. And if I create that perception, then I take responsibility. I don’t view myself as cold or unemotional. And neither do my friends. And neither does my family. But if that sometimes is the perception I create, then I can’t blame people for thinking that’ (Crocket, 2016).
empirical study of this capital operating within the political field, and the dynamics of its conversion will require an analysis of gender, but also of social class, and the relationships between cultural capital more generally, such as education, with emotional capital, as well as race and ethnicity. In this, I agree with Wetherell that the study of emotional capital, in politics and elsewhere, needs to ‘go intersectional’ (2012, p.118). Yet, these (categorical) markers of social position and identity are primarily bound up with, what is sometimes called, the primary habitus and primary socialization processes. We will need to also attend to the secondary socialization and secondary habitus formation that is particular to the professional politician. As Bourdieu notes, ‘nothing is less natural than the mode of thought and action demanded by participation in the political field: like the religious, artistic, or scientific habitus, the habitus of the politician depends on a special training’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p.176). Such training today, often beginning explicitly for some in student politics, increasingly includes, not only explicit media training, but other forms of coaching, often framed in terms of ‘emotional intelligence’ training or ‘creative leadership’. These processes of secondary socialization need to be critically studied from the perspective of the political sociology of emotions perspective. Furthermore, these dynamics, it should be stressed, are not and should not be limited only to the public and mediated forums of the political field, but are, perhaps even more importantly, at work behind the scenes, in unrecorded cabinet meetings, in private meetings with advisors, civil servants, and colleagues, in constituency offices, and so on.

All of this suggests that a methodological shift towards a more ethnographic approach in the study of emotional capital and the practice approach to emotions and power more generally, but especially within the political field. Some interesting steps in this direction are already taking place within the field of ‘political ethnography’ (Auyero & Benzecry, 2017; Benzecry & Baiocchi, 2017; Joseph etal, 2007), and such an approach would help to re-centre a number of key issues vital to the approach recommended here. These include a primary focus on the body of the politicians, which suggests a ‘carnal sociology’ of the political field and the flesh and blood foundation of emotional practice (Wacquant, 2014). Within such a perspective, the biases and blind spots of an exclusively representationalist focus on the discursive – on texts and talk – are ameliorated by the observation of lived emotional practice as it is actively

enacted. Additionally, such ethnographically-sensitized observation (triangulated with other forms of data) would also allow for the exploration of a number of analytical distinctions that may attend to the enactment of emotional capital, such as performance vs performativity, and authenticity vs inauthenticity, as it is deployed in emotional practice.

Conclusion:

The aim of this paper was to make a theoretical contribution to the emerging political sociology of emotions sub-field from a relational perspective concerned especially with the ‘twin’ concepts of power and emotion (Heaney, 2011). These two concepts, and their relation and dynamics, remain central to the understanding of social life in its myriad forms, including its political forms. The argument rests on the contention that, despite the excellent work taking place within this arena, emotion-orientated sociology could benefit from returning to core questions and topics of political sociology that have been largely hived off to political science and other disciplines, such as the state, political parties and their ‘machinery’, party systems, party competition, and, above all, political power. The specific problem here was to explain the mechanisms and processes surrounding the emotionalization of contemporary party politics. The argument had three basic moves. The first was to introduce and refine the concept of emotional capital, and to give an account of its rise over the 20th century, drawing on Illouz and others. The second, drawing on Mair, offered an account of some of the structural changes that took place in party systems and the political field over the same basic period. Here, we suggested that mutual disengagement and the growing ‘gap’ between citizens/voters and parties/politicians, in evidence across Europe and elsewhere, was resulting in the hollowing out of liberal and popular democracy, and that this helps to account for the emergence of an increasingly mediatized ‘audience’ democracy. This in-part helps to explain why, and how, the emotionalization processes seen in other spheres of social life took place the political sphere. The third move was to offer a new conceptual argument and explanation, drawing on Bourdieu, of how this process actually takes place within the field of politics. The argument here is that a new emotional logic has emerged within this field, in which emotional capital, that socially acquired and most embodied form of cultural capital, manifested as ‘competent’ emotional practice, is transformed into political capital, the specific species of capital operating within this particular field, and consisting of a particular combination of both social capital (a power of mobilization), and symbolic capital (prestige). Due to the structural and cultural reasons
previously discussed, including the need to connect across the gap separating politicians and voters and the general appreciation of emotional capital more generally, the ‘exchange rate’ between these forms of capital has increased dramatically in the political sphere. The deployment of emotional capital is ‘strategic’ in Bourdieu’s sense of that term – not based on rational calculation, but an embodied ‘feel for the game’ and practical sense that good players of the game possess, which poor players do not.

With this conceptual model in place, I went on to point towards how the operation of emotional capital within the field of power might proceed empirically. Pointing towards a research strategy, key considerations included the gendered nature of emotional capital, and the extent to which its deployment intersects with and cuts across dominant gender norms. Yet, perhaps the key empirical insight emerging from the scheme concerns the central place of the bodies of politics in the analysis of the emotional practice. Much may be missed if we are methodologically confined to the analysis of emotional practice through discourse, exclusively, after the event, rather than also observing and attending to the lived, embodied, ‘live’ event itself. Future work, operating with the tools of a carnal political ethnography, will help to develop these ideas further.
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