The Application and Interpretation of the EU Charter in the Context of Cross-Border Movement of Patients


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THE APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE EU CHARTER IN THE CONTEXT OF CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT OF PATIENTS

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The Application and Interpretation of the EU Charter in the Context of Cross-Border Movement of Patients

Clemens M Rieder

Cross-border movement of patients in the EU has been traditionally linked to and analyzed from the perspective of the internal market. This article seeks to introduce human rights, namely the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, into the discourse about the cross-border movement of patients. The aim of this article is to address—now that the EU Charter has become binding—whether the application of human rights law in the context of cross-border movement of patients has the potential to deepen integration in this emerging area of law. For patients, this could mean that it becomes easier to exit their home system and receive health care in another Member State. For Member States, it would amount to a (further) reduction of their sovereignty in a sensitive field.

Key words: health care, human rights, EU Charter, solidarity

It does not come as a surprise that one strategy used by Member States in order to fend off European integration involves citing the needs of the Welfare State. The welfare state needs boundaries in order to “[gate] access to the resources and opportunities of both the in-space and

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1 A first preliminary draft of this article was written during my stay at the Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies (Austria) in 2013. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 45th UACES Annual Conference in Bilbao 2015; I gratefully acknowledge the comments I received there. I am also grateful to Professor Chris Hilson, Professor David Sugarman and Lisa Warren for their comments on an earlier draft. All errors remain mine.

the out-space, and [facilitate] bonding dynamics among insiders.”

Concerning boundaries, “[v]irtually no pre-modern societies were as clearly bounded as modern nation-states.” Consequently, a perceived threat to the composition of the nation-state—be that either European integration or globalization—seems to be almost automatically considered (rightly or wrongly) a danger to the welfare state. After all, European integration “can be understood as a large-scale operation of boundary redrawing.”

This article focuses on one important aspect of the welfare state: providing public health care. So far, jurisprudence has addressed cross-border movement of patients exclusively in the context of the internal market. Regarding the relationship between health care and free movement law, Hatzopoulos and Hervey conclude that “[t]he revolution is over” after evaluating the existing case law on the cross-border movement of patients. While it is arguable whether a revolution ever took place in the field of cross-border movement of patients, this article explores if the application of human rights law, most notably the European Charter of Fundamental Rights ("EU Charter"), has the potential of either triggering or continuing the revolution. The article thereby addresses a gap that exists in the current literature by analyzing

5 Ferrera, supra note 3, at 3.
6 E.g. WOLF SAUTER AND HARM SCHEPPEL, STATE AND MARKET IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW. THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPHERES OF THE INTERNAL MARKET BEFORE THE EU COURTS 37 (2009)
7 Vassilis Hatzopoulos and Tamara Hervey, Coming into line: the EU’s Court softens on cross-border health care 8 HEALTH ECONOMICS, POLICY AND LAW 1, 4 (2013).
whether the EU Charter has—as argued by some—potential that remains “yet unrealised in Union law.”

In the legal history of the cross-border movement of patients, human rights law neither played a prominent role in the scholarly discussion nor featured at all in case law of the European Court of Justice ("ECJ" or “Court”) on cross-border movement of patients. This absence of human rights law is somewhat surprising because the link between human rights and health care is by no means unusual in international law. While this article focuses on the potential role of the EU Charter in the cross-border movement of patients, the article will also discuss provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR" or “Convention”) and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR"). This seeming diversion results from Article 52.3 of the EU Charter, which stipulates that “[i]n so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention.”

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10 Among the few exceptions are Tamara Hervey, The ‘Right to Health’ in European Union Law in Economic and Social Rights. A Legal Perspective 193 (Tamara Hervey and Jeff Kenner eds., 2003); Sabine Michalowski, Health Care Law in The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights 287 (Steve Peers and A Wards eds., 2004); Hervey and McHale, id.; Jean McHale, Fundamental Rights and Health Care in Health Systems Governance in Europe. The Role of European Union Law and Policy 282 (Elias Mossialos et al. eds., 2010)

11 The special case of Stamatelaki (Stamatelaki v NPDD Organismos Asfaliseos Eleftheron Epanangelmation, Case C-444/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-3185) will be addressed later in this article.

12 For a more detailed account on international law, human rights and health see Thérèse Murphy, Health and Human Rights Chapter 1 (2013).

13 Rome, 5 Nov 1950.

14 EU Charter, supra note 8, art 52.3.
Explanatory Note\textsuperscript{15} on Article 52.3 specifically point out that the provisions of the EU Charter are also “determined”\textsuperscript{16} by the case law of the ECtHR.

The conceptual approach chosen in this article is based on Dworkin’s understanding of law as integrity, which is a plausible point of departure.\textsuperscript{17} It is well known that Dworkin’s proverbial Hercules interprets not only the text of a statute “but [also] its life, the process that begins before it becomes law and extends far beyond that moment.”\textsuperscript{18} Yet, if we aim for integrity in law, then it becomes necessary—to the extent the ECJ has not adjudicated on specific rights of the EU Charter—to draw on the case law of the ECtHR. The ECtHR and Convention provide some interpretative guidance, since the Convention constitutes the forerunner and linkage to various provisions of the EU Charter.\textsuperscript{19}

ECtHR jurisprudence cites the following provisions in the context of health care. First, Article 2 of the Convention,\textsuperscript{20} containing the “right to life,” corresponds to Article 2 of the EU Charter.\textsuperscript{21} Article 3 of the Convention\textsuperscript{22} prohibits “inhumane and degrading treatment,” and it

\textsuperscript{15} Explanations to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2007 O.J. C303/17 (hereinafter Explanatory Note); on the nature of these Explanatory Notes cf. Sacha Prechal, Rights v Principles, or how to Remove Fundamentals Rights from the Jurisdiction of the Courts in THE EUROPEAN UNION. AN ONGOING PROCESS OF INTERGRATION. LIBER AMICORUM AFRED E KELLERMANN 177, 181-183 (Jaap W d Zwaan et al eds., 2006).

\textsuperscript{16} Explanatory Note, supra note 15, art 52.3.

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 30 (2007).

\textsuperscript{18} RONALD DWORPIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 348 (1998); see also Scott Hershovitz, Integrity and Stare Decisis in EXPLORING LAW’S EMPIRE. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORPIN 103 (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2012).

\textsuperscript{19} EU Charter, supra note 8, art 52.3; see also for a detailed analysis of the link Stephen Brittain, The Relationship Between the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights: an Originalist Analysis (11) EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW 482, 495-504.

\textsuperscript{20} Convention, supra note 13, art 2

\textsuperscript{21} EU Charter, supra note 8, art 2.

\textsuperscript{22} Convention, supra note 13, art 3.
has a mirroring provision in Article 4 of the EU Charter.\textsuperscript{23} In addition, there is Article 8 of the European Convention\textsuperscript{24} (the “right to private and family life”), which the EU Charter also protects under Article 7 of the EU Charter.\textsuperscript{25} Finally, Article 35 of the EU Charter (“health care”) is relevant but different from the other provisions because no corresponding right exists in the Convention.\textsuperscript{26}

While the primary aim of ECJ is to deal with “economic matters” and to foster integration to facilitate movement across borders,\textsuperscript{27} the ECtHR seeks to protect individuals against the abuse of authority by the state.\textsuperscript{28} Therefore, the ECJ in contrast to the ECtHR, has only a modest record of human rights case law.\textsuperscript{29} While over the years the ECtHR ruled on some high profile cases in the field of health law,\textsuperscript{30} this article's exclusive focus on the cross-border movement of patients considerably reduces the amount of relevant case law to analyze.

Before addressing whether applying the EU Charter to the cross-border movement of patients changes the character of the existing EU health care framework by deepening integration,\textsuperscript{31} it is useful to briefly introduce the current legal framework.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} EU Charter, supra note 8, art 4.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Convention, supra note 13, art 8.
\item \textsuperscript{25} EU Charter, supra note 8, art 7.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Id., art 35.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Gráinne de Búrca, After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: the Court of Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator, 20 MAASTRICHT JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE LAW 168, 171 (2013)
\item \textsuperscript{28} CHARLES R BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 14-27 (2009)
\item \textsuperscript{29} de Búrca, supra note 28, 171.
\item \textsuperscript{30} E.g. Pretty v the United Kingdom, App No 2346/02 (ECtHR, 29 April 2002); and also cf. Jean McHale, Fundamental Rights and Health Care in HEALTH SYSTEMS GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE. THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW AND POLICY Chapter 6 (Elias Mossialos et al eds., 2010).
\item \textsuperscript{31} Haas defined political integration to be a ‘process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions
\end{itemize}
1. A Brief Overview of the Framework Regulating Cross-Border Movement of Patients

"Cross-border movement of patients," for the purposes of this article, refers to a specific type of situation in which patients decide to exit their Member State of affiliation in order to receive planned treatment in another Member State. What makes cross-border movement of patients in the EU context rather unique is the fact that patients want their Member State of affiliation to pay for treatment received in another Member State.\(^3\) However, “there is little globalization of public healthcare, which tends to stop at national borders.”\(^3\) The issue of the cross-border movement of patients is very sensitive for Member States because EU health care law may have a direct impact on the organization of their health care systems.\(^3\)

The matter of health care in the context of European Union integration has been traditionally linked to the internal market.\(^3\) Verordnung 3\(^3\) and 4\(^3\) belonged to the first laws ever passed by what was then the European Economic Community (“EEC”).\(^3\) Their legal basis

\(^3\) I GLENN COHEN, PATIENTS WITH PASSPORTS. MEDICAL TOURISM, LAW, AND ETHICS 36 (2014).

\(^3\) Id.


\(^3\) THORSTEN KINGREEN, SOZIALE RECHTE UND MIGRATION 23-24 (2010).

\(^3\) Verordnung Nr 3/58 (EWG) vom 16. Dezember 1958 über die Soziale Sicherheit von Wanderarbeitnehmern, 1958 ABl. 30/561 (text only available in DE, FR, IT, NL).

\(^3\) Verordnung Nr 4/58 (EWG) vom 16. Dezember 1958 zur Durchführung und Ergänzung der Verordnung Nr. 3 über die Soziale Sicherheit der Wanderarbeitnehmer, 1958 ABl. 30/597 (text only available in DE, FR, IT, NL).

\(^3\) TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Rome 25 March 1957.
was Article 51 of the EEC (now Article 48 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU")), which allowed Member States “[to] adopt such measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers.” Regulation 1408/71 and its implementing Regulation 574/72 superseded these two early Regulations. Under this framework, patients seeking treatment in another Member State needed permission from their Member State of affiliation, which was ultimately expected to pay their bill, from which they wished to exit. Article 22.2 of Regulation 1408/71, which dealt with the matter of authorization, stipulated that “[t]he authorisation required . . . may not be refused where the treatment in question cannot be provided for the person concerned within the territory of the Member State in which he resides.”

Interpreting the meaning of Article 22.2 in Pierik, the ECJ held that it “covers both cases where the treatment provided in another Member State is more effective than that which the person concerned can receive in the Member State where he resides and those in which the treatment in question cannot be provided on the territory of the latter State.” Effectively, the Court’s ruling gave patients access to the best treatment available in Europe. This ruling had

39 Id.
44 Id., art 22.2.
45 Id.
far reaching consequences for national health care systems. Member States lost direct control over whom could exit their systems, in turn making planning difficult, and possibly augmenting the cost of national health care systems.\(^47\) Nevertheless, the Court was of the opinion “that it was the intention of the regulation to give medical requirements a decisive role in the decision . . . to grant or refuse” (prior) authorization.\(^48\)

In a rare direct reaction to the Court’s rulings in Pierik, the European legislator added two amendments to the original version of Article 22.2.\(^49\) The purpose of the amendments, arguably, was to operate as a safeguard against the undesired result of the Pierik rulings and to re-emphasize the coordination character of the Regulation.\(^50\) The amending clause inserted into Article 22’s text stipulated that the “treatment in question is among the benefits provided for by the legislation of the Member State on whose territory the person concerned resides.”\(^51\) The amendment’s first part undermined the Court’s jurisprudence by no longer obliging Member States to offer the most effective treatment since it prevented access under EU law to treatments unavailable to patients under national law. At the same time, these amendments made Member

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\(^49\) Cf. generally Gareth Davies, *Legislative Control of the European Court of Justice*, 51 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 1579 (2014).


States (once again) the ultimate decision-maker on what treatments to offer and pay for. Thus, Member States regained authority to control the allocation of resources.52

The amendment added a second element, which referenced the factor of time.53 While the original version of Article 22 did not address timing, the amended provision made clear that authorization must be granted if treatment could not be provided “within the time normally necessary for obtaining the treatment in question in the Member State of residence, taking account of his current state of health and the probable course of the disease.”54 The amendment clarified the maximum waiting time for a patient before a Member State needed to authorize the requested treatment. Eventually, Regulation 883/200455 and its implementing Regulation 987/200956 replaced Regulation 1408/71.57 The structure of Article 22, with its above-mentioned limitations on waiting times as well as the range of treatment, still exists in Article 20.2 of Regulation 883/2004.58

Therefore, if patients wish to receive planned treatment in another Member State at the expense of their Member State of affiliation—according to Article 20 of Regulation 883/2004—then patients must seek authorization.59 The competent national institution must grant this authorization to a patient when “the treatment in question is among the benefits

52 Jonathan Montgomery, Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine, 26 LEGAL STUDIES 185, 196 (2006).

53 Regulation No 2793/81, supra note 51, art 22. 2.

54 Id.


57 Regulation 1408/71, supra note 41.


59 Id., art 20.2.
provided for by the legislation in the Member State where the person concerned resides” and if the patient “cannot be given such treatment within a time limit which is medically justifiable, taking into account his/her current state of health and the probable course of his/her illness.”60 The level of reimbursement corresponds to the tariffs of the Member State in which the treatment took place.61

In addition to the secondary EU law framework, around 15 years ago—beginning with the early case of Luisi and Carbone62 and more prominently with Kohll63—the Court linked health care with the free movement of services Articles of the TFEU. Article 56 of the TFEU stipulates that “restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.”64 Health care based on the Treaty, as acknowledged by General Advocate Sharpston in the recent case of Commission v France, has been rather “controversial.”65

In the prominent case of Kohll, Mr. Kohll’s daughter, who was insured in Luxembourg, received dental treatment by an orthodontist established in Germany. In line with Luxembourg national law and Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71, Mr. Kohll asked for prior authorization from the competent national authority.66 But, the competent national authority denied Mr. Kohll's

60 Emphasis added.
64 TFEU, supra note 40, art 56.
authorization on the grounds that his daughter’s dental treatment was neither urgent nor unavailable in Luxembourg. When the case reached the ECJ, it simply held “[t]hat service [treatment by a German dentist], provided for remuneration, must be regarded as a service within the meaning of Article 60 of the Treaty [now Article 57 TFEU], which expressly refers to activities of the professions.”

The Court also held that the requirement of prior authorization in national laws, such as the one in existence in Luxembourg, “[deters] insured persons from approaching providers of medical services established in another Member State and [constitutes], for them and their patients, a barrier to freedom to provide services.” As a consequence of this ruling, national laws requiring prior authorization—but surprisingly not Regulation 883/2004 itself, which required the same authorization—violated free movement law. The amount reimbursed to a patient under Kohll, in contrast to Regulation 883/2004, was no greater than the amount to which a patient would have been entitled in the Member State of affiliation. Thus, arguably, the framework developed by the Court, at least prima facie, does not have any impact on the overall costs of the national health care systems. Yet in Kohll, the Court acknowledged that derogation from the free movement of services provision was possible in order to pursue “the

67 Id.
68 Kohll, supra note 63, ¶ 29.
69 Id., ¶ 35.
70 The Court justified this anomaly by arguing that Article 42 EC Treaty (now Article 48 TFEU), which is the legal basis for Regulation 883/2004, ‘does not prohibit the Community legislature from attaching conditions to the rights and advantages which it accords in order to ensure freedom of movement for workers.’ (Patricia Inizan v Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie des Hauts-de-Seine, Case 56/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-12403, ¶ 23).
72 Kohll, supra note 63, ¶ 54.
objective of maintaining a balanced medical and hospital service open to all, 
[...], in so far as it contributes to the attainment of a high level of health protection.”73

A different category of treatment, hospital care, was at stake in the case of Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms in which the two applicants were insured in one Member State (the Netherlands) but received treatment in another.74 Ms. Geraets-Smits obtained specific and multi-disciplinary treatment in a hospital in Kassel, Germany, for Parkinson’s disease.75 The second applicant, Mr. Peerbooms, fell into a coma after a traffic accident and was taken to Innsbruck, Austria, for special treatment at the local University Clinic.76 The pivotal question in both cases was whether the Court would follow its reasoning in Kohll and abolish the authorization required by national law, even for hospital treatment.77

The Court focused on whether abolishing the need for authorization would have any impact on the allocation of health care resources and ultimately, the costs of a health care system.78 As in Kohll, the Court found that the requirement of prior authorization under national law restricts the free movement of services.79 Yet, with regard to hospital treatment, the Court accepted the planning argument made by various intervening states, without demanding any

73 Id., ¶ 50.
75 Opinion of AG Colomer, id., ¶ 3.
76 Id., ¶ 7.
77 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, supra note 74, ¶ 43.
78 Id., ¶¶ 76-82 and 86.
79 Id., ¶ 69; also Gareth Davies, Welfare as a Service, 29 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 27, 37 (2002).
It simply agreed with their concerns that “the number of hospitals, their geographical distribution, the mode of their organisation and the equipment with which they are provided, and even the nature of the medical services which they are able to offer, are all matters for which planning must be possible.” So, the Court permitted (prior) authorization as an instrument “to control costs and to prevent, as far as possible, any wastage of financial, technical and human resources.” The Court believed that as a costs control mechanism, prior authorization allowed “sufficient and permanent access to a balanced range of high-quality hospital treatment in the State concerned.”

The Court’s case law thus required distinguishing between hospital care and non-hospital care in order to establish whether a national law could legitimately prescribe an authorization requirement. The Court acknowledged that “the distinction between hospital services and non-hospital services may sometimes prove difficult to draw.” Nevertheless, the Court offered a guiding principle: if a specific treatment is capable of being provided both in and outside a hospital environment, then it should be treated as a non-hospital treatment irrespective of the treatment’s actual location. In other words, the decisive criterion regarding hospital treatment is not where the treatment took place but where the treatment could have taken place, which—as a result—amounted to a rather expansive reading of Kohll.

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81 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, supra note 74, ¶ 76.

82 Id., ¶ 79.

83 Id., ¶ 78.


85 Id.
The new Directive 2011/24\textsuperscript{86} on patients’ rights in cross-border health care, which consolidates the Court’s treaty-based case law, continues to distinguish between treatments for which prior authorization is imperative and those for which it is not in Article 8.2.\textsuperscript{87} Article 8.2 limits prior authorization to treatment which “involves overnight hospital accommodation of the patient in question for at least one night” or which “requires use of highly specialised and cost-intensive medical infrastructure or medical equipment.”\textsuperscript{88} To what extent this second limitation leaves room for interpretation is exemplified by the differing interpretations in the Opinions of the Advocate Generals in \textit{Hartlauer}\textsuperscript{89} and in \textit{Commission v. France}.\textsuperscript{90}

In \textit{Hartlauer}, Advocate General Bot chose a rather expansive interpretation of the provision.\textsuperscript{91} He argued that even in the context of dental care, authorization may be required if the treatment goes beyond “basic services, such as radiography or preventive care (plaque control, polishing), but . . . takes the form of actual surgery, such as extractions, the elimination of aesthetic deformations or certain orthodontic care, which requires qualified staff.”\textsuperscript{92} In contrast, Advocate General Sharpston argued in \textit{Commission v France} that prior authorization is not justified for treatment that involves “standard, relatively inexpensive, equipment” such as an x-ray machine.\textsuperscript{93} According to her reasoning, expensive equipment includes, for example,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{87} Id., art 8.2.
\textsuperscript{88} Id.
\textsuperscript{89} Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Wiener Landesregierung and Oberösterreichische Landesregierung, Case C-169/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-01721.
\textsuperscript{90} European Commission v French Republic, Case C-512/08, [2010] E.C.R. I-08833.
\textsuperscript{91} He made reference to the provision which was then still non-binding: Opinion of AG Bot, Hartlauer, \textit{supra} note 89, ¶ 92 (FN 44)
\textsuperscript{92} Id..
\textsuperscript{93} Opinion of AG Sharpston, Commission v France, \textit{supra} note 90, ¶ 73.
\end{flushleft}
a nuclear magnetic resonance imaging or spectrometry apparatus for clinical use or hyperbaric chamber.⁹⁴ Advocate General Sharpston prefers a more limited interpretation of the provision than Advocate General Bot—the latter expands the Article to require prior authorization for more treatments. In spite of Advocate General’s reading of the provision, one can identify a tendency to limit the circumstances which allow patients to exit their system of affiliation without prior authorization to receive treatment in another Member State.⁹⁵ Notably, the shift in reasoning no longer focuses as much on “the location where the medical service is received” as on costs.⁹⁶ This reasoning indicates the health care framework's goal to be cost-neutral in its effects on national health care systems. In its judgment, the Court appears to favor Advocate General Sharpston’s more limited interpretation of the provision.⁹⁷ Both the novelty of the Directive and the scarcity of case law make it difficult to provide a final judgment on the matter.

In conclusion, the EU health care framework regulating the cross-border movement of patients (originally Regulation 1408/71⁹⁸ and now Regulation 883/2004⁹⁹) requires patients seeking treatment in another Member State to request authorization under all circumstances.¹⁰⁰ Authorization must be granted if the treatment is covered by the system of the Member State of affiliation and cannot be provided within a particular time-frame.¹⁰¹ Simultaneously, the

⁹⁴ Id.; cf. also Commission v France, supra note 90, para 40.

⁹⁵ Cf. also Hatzopoulos and Hervey, supra note 2, at 4.

⁹⁶ Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Commission v France, supra note 90, ¶ 69.

⁹⁷ Commission v France, supra note 90, ¶¶ 37-40.

⁹⁸ Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, supra note 41, art 22.2


¹⁰⁰ Id., art 20.2.

¹⁰¹ Id.
Court began to use the Treaty to further develop the then-existing EU health care framework.\textsuperscript{102} Patients no longer need to receive an authorization by the competent national authority when they want to undergo treatment in another Member State.\textsuperscript{103} Yet, the Court somewhat limits this judicially-created exception to non-hospital treatment, and since its inception, the distinction between hospital and non-hospital treatment has been unclear.

The more recent case law of the Court suggests that this exception from prior authorization for non-hospital treatment is losing relevance. Arguably, one explanation for this development is that the cross-border movement of patients may make planning for Member States more difficult and it has the potential to undermine their protected prerogative to allocate resources.\textsuperscript{104} Yet, does the EU Charter have the authority to alter the character of the current EU health care framework? To address this question, it is necessary to establish whether the EU Charter is applicable to the cross-border movement of patients, and if so, to determine to what extent.

\textbf{2. The Scope of the EU Charter}

The founding Treaties—the Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community\textsuperscript{105} and the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community\textsuperscript{106}—were economic in nature, so

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\textsuperscript{102} TFEU, \textit{supra} note 40, art 56.
\textsuperscript{103} E.g. Kohll, \textit{supra} note 63, ¶¶ 33-34.
\textsuperscript{104} TFEU, \textit{supra} note 40, art 168.7.
\textsuperscript{105} Treaty of Paris, 1951.
\textsuperscript{106} Treaty of Rome, 1957.
it seemed unnecessary to put a human rights regime in place.\footnote{Paul Gragl, The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights 51 (2013).} In the early days of European integration, however, the Court in \textit{Stauder}\footnote{Erich Stauder v City of Ulm, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419.} and \textit{Internationale Handelsgeellschaft}\footnote{Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125.} found “fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law.”\footnote{Id., ¶ 4; Stauder, supra note 108, ¶ 7.} With \textit{Nold}, the European Convention on Human Rights made its appearance in EU law.\footnote{Siemens AG v Henry Nold, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, ¶ 13.} The ECJ held that “international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of community law.”\footnote{Id.}

Finally, in 2000, the EU adopted its own human rights framework. At the European Council of Nice, the EU Charter was “solemnly proclaimed.”\footnote{Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. C 364/5.} Yet only under the Lisbon Treaty did it become a binding instrument.\footnote{Article 6.1 TEU: ‘The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties. The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions.’} One of the most contentious issues in the drafting process of the EU Charter was the role of social rights.\footnote{Koen Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ 8 European Constitutional Law Review 375, 399 (2012).} While some delegates considered social rights necessary to absorb the side-effects of “negative integration” propelled by the
internal market, others—such as the UK and the Netherlands—found it unimaginable that the EU Charter would provide enforceable social rights. Given these tensions among the delegates, the scope of the Charter unsurprisingly became a contentious issue.

Article 51.1 establishes the scope of the EU Charter by stipulating that “[t]he provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law.” Because the EU does not have exclusive competence in the area of health care, the analysis focuses on Member States. To what extent are Member States “implementing” EU law in the specific context of cross-border movement of patients? This much is clear: even the most generous reading of the phrase “implementing Union law” excludes using the EU Charter on a stand-alone basis in the process of judicial review. Instead, “[t]here must be a provision or a principle of Union primary or secondary law that is directly relevant to the case.”

Both a narrow and a wide understanding of the phrase “implementing Union law” are possible. The narrow interpretation refers to Member States which “act as agents of the


117 Lenaerts, supra note 115, 399.

118 EU Charter, supra note 8, art 51.1.

119 Tamara Hervey and Bart Vanhercke, ‘Health Care and the EU: the Law and Policy Patchwork’ in HEALTH SYSTEMS GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE. THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW AND POLICY 84-133 (Elias Mossialos et al. eds., 2010).

120 Allan Rosas, When is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Applicable at National Level?, 19 JURISPRUDENCE 1271, 1277 (2012).

Union, enforcing EU rules.”122 Two acts of secondary EU law, Regulation 883/2004123 and Directive 2011/24,124 play an important role when it comes to the cross-border movement of patients. First, Regulation 883/2004 stipulates that patients who wish to receive treatment in another Member State need to obtain authorization from their Member State's competent national authority.125 According to Article 20.2 of Regulation 883/2004, authorization must be granted if the treatment cannot be provided “within a time-limit which is medically justifiable, taking into account his current state of health and the probable course of his illness benefits.”126 In addition, the treatment in question needs to be “among the benefits provided for by the legislation in the Member State where the person concerned resides.”127

Second, Article 9.3 of Directive 2011/24 requires Member States—when they consider requests for cross-border health care—to “take into account: (a) the specific medical condition; (b) the urgency and individual circumstances.”128 In the light of the EU Charter, Directive 2011/24—whose main purpose has been to consolidate, clarify, and maybe legitimize the existing case law of the ECJ129—receives some added (doctrinal) value. As a consequence of the EU-level codification process, any national law transposing the Directive “implements” EU

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123 Regulation 883/2004, supra note 55, art 20.2


126 Id.


law, even when reading the phrase narrowly.\footnote{Steve Peers and Sacha Prechal, \textit{Article 52 – Scope of Guaranteed Rights}, in \textsc{The Eu Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Commentary}, ¶ 52.193 (Steve Peers \textit{et al} eds., 2014).} While the Regulation provides a rather detailed account regarding the conditions under which authorization has to be granted, the Directive is vaguer in its word choice. This is in line with the general purpose of Directives which are \textquotedblleft binding, as to the result to be achieved, . . . , but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.	extquotedblright\footnote{TFEU, \textit{supra} note 40, art 288.} When Member States transpose Directive 2011/24 into national law,\footnote{Directive 2011/24, \textit{supra} note 86.} this needs to be in accordance with the EU Charter.

Yet, the Court also held that national laws, which require patients to request authorization before receiving health care in another Member State, amount to a limitation of the free movement of services principle.\footnote{Kohll, \textit{supra} note 63, ¶ 35.} The question then becomes whether Member States are still \textquotedblleft implementing Union law\textquotedblright\ even when they derogate from EU law.\footnote{\textit{Cf} Leonard F M Besselink, \textit{The Member States, the National Constitutions, and the Scope of the Charter}, 8 \textsc{Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law} 68, 78 (2001).} This constitutes the wide interpretation of the phrase \textquotedblleft implementing Union law.\textquotedblright\footnote{Angela Ward, \textit{Article 51 – Scope}, in \textsc{The Eu Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Commentary}, ¶ 51.39 (Steve Peers \textit{et al} eds., 2014).} In the \textit{ERT} case, the Court held that \textquotedblleft where a Member State relies on the combined provisions of Articles 56 and 66 [now 52 and 62 of the TFEU] in order to justify rules which are likely to obstruct the exercise of the freedom to provide services, such justification, provided for by Community law, \textit{must be interpreted in the light of the general principles of law and in particular of fundamental rights}.\textquotedblright\footnote{Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE and Panellinia Omopondia Sylllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others, Case C-260/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-2925, ¶ 43 (emphasis added).} The \textit{ERT} line of case law, however, predated the EU Charter, leaving unclear at the
time of adoption of the EU Charter whether the case law would still be good law once the EU Charter became binding law.137 The use of the word “only” in Article 51.1138 appears to limit its applicability to situations in which Member States “implement” EU law in the narrow sense of the phrase.139 The phrasing of the Article presumably reflects the concerns of some Member States that the Charter could be (ab)used as a “federalising device.”140

In Pfleger, after the EU Charter was already in force, the Court addressed whether the EU Charter also applies—in the wide sense—whenever national law derogates from EU law.141 It needs to be noted that the case of Pfleger was not about health care but rather addressed the legality of restrictions in the Austrian law on gambling.142 However, some of the findings are of relevance for the discussion in this article. The Court in Pfleger held that “the national rules in question can fall under the exceptions provided for only if they are compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of which is ensured by the Court.”143 Therefore, if a Member State runs a national health care framework that regulates the terms and conditions of when patients may exit their system of affiliation, then the national framework must also meet the standards of the EU Charter.

137 But see Explanatory Note, supra note 15, art 51.1.
138 EU Charter, supra note 8, art 51.1: “The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties” (emphasis added).
139 Ward, supra note 135, ¶ 51.28.
141 Robert Pfleger and Others, Case C-390/12, Judgment of 30 April 2014, ¶¶ 31-36. [nyr]
142 Id., ¶¶ 2-8.
143 Id., ¶ 35.
Yet, in *Pfleger*, Advocate General Sharpston argued, regarding the Freedom to Choose an Occupation (Article 15 of the EU Charter) and the Right to Property (Article 17 of the EU Charter), that “the Charter impose[s] no greater obligations to be satisfied for a restriction on the freedom to provide services to be permitted than is already established by the case law of the Court in relation to Article 56 TFEU.”\(^{144}\) Van der Mei rightly points out that there exists a “substantive overlap between the TFEU’s economic freedoms, [on] the one hand, and the freedoms to choose an occupation and conduct a business and the right to property, on the other hand, [which] are so great that it is hard to see why a separate review under the Charter is necessary or why the outcomes of a review under the TFEU and the Charter would (have to) differ.”\(^{145}\) The same, however, cannot be concluded about the EU Charter provisions relevant to health care.\(^{146}\)

To conclude, the fulcrum controlling whether the EU Charter is applicable is the word “implementing.”\(^{147}\) For secondary EU law—Regulation 883/2004 and Directive 2011/24—a narrow understanding of the word is sufficient in order for the EU Charter to become operative. For national law that derogates from EU free movement law, however, a wider understanding of the word “implementing” is needed. The recent case law seems to indicate that the Court considers the word “implementing” to also cover this somewhat wider meaning.\(^{148}\) Therefore, the EU Charter applies when the Court reviews a Member State's derogation from the Treaty,

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\(^{146}\) See, *supra*, at 5-6.

\(^{147}\) EU Charter, *supra* note 8, art 51.1.

\(^{148}\) *Pfleger*, *supra* note 141, ¶¶ 31-36
which, as shown, is often a contentious issue in the context of cross-border movement of patients.

Thus, there exists legal space to apply the EU Charter in the context of cross-border movement of patients. Whether the application of the EU Charter makes any significant difference in comparison to the status quo, however, depends on the substantive interpretation of the provisions defining the standard applied through judicial review. Therefore, the Article shifts away from considerations about scope to a substantive discussion regarding the provisions of the EU Charter that are relevant to the cross-border movement of patients. Only then is it possible to better understand whether applying the EU Charter would make any significant changes to the current legal framework regulating the free movement of patients. As already suggested earlier, the European Convention and its interpretation through the ECtHR will play an important role in the discussion to follow.

3. The Right to Life

Among the rights protected in the EU Charter, “the right to life” has considerable potential in the context of cross-border movement of patients.149 So far, the ECJ has no developed case law on the cross-border movement of patients based on Article 2 of the EU Charter. But, the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 2 of the ECHR is important because Article 2 of the EU Charter has “the same meaning and scope as Article 2 ECHR.”150 In the health care context,

149 Elizabeth Wicks, Article 2 – Right to Life, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. A COMMENTARY, ¶ 2.02 (Steve Peers et al eds., 2014).
150 Id., ¶ 2.15.
the case law on the "right to life" is of interest in particular when it addresses either of two scenarios, which are recurring themes in the field of the cross-border movement of patients. First, patients cross borders in order to reduce waiting times for treatment.151 Second, patients seek to gain access to treatment which would not normally be covered by their system of affiliation.152 In the case law of the ECtHR, three cases are particularly noteworthy because they all address the rather sensitive issue of access to treatment.

In the first case, Scialacqua v Italy, the applicant received a herbal treatment for his deteriorating hepatitis B, which—in the end—was cured by the treatment.153 Unfortunately for the patient, the Italian public health care system, to which the patient was affiliated, did not recognize and did not cover the treatment.154 In his submission to the ECtHR, the applicant invoked Article 2 of the ECHR, which stipulates that “[e]veryone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”155

The now-abolished European Commission of Human Rights,156 however, rejected the submission based on Article 2 of the ECHR and considered it to be “manifestly ill-founded.”157 This may hardly come as a surprise since hepatitis B normally does not constitute a life

151 For example: The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for Health, Case C-372/04, [2006] E.C.R I-4325, ¶¶ 24-31.

152 For example: Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, supra note 74, ¶¶ 25-39.


154 Id.

155 ECHR, supra note 13, art 2.


157 Scialacqua, supra note 153.
threatening illness. According to the World Health Organization, “more than 90% of healthy adults who are infected with the hepatitis B virus will recover naturally from the virus within the first year.”\footnote{WHO, ‘Hepatitis B’, available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs204/en/ (last visited 10 February 2016).} Yet, the Commission provided some general guidance regarding the interpretation of Article 2 of the ECHR particularly relevant in relation to the cross-border movement of patients. In the eyes of the Commission, the Convention “cannot be interpreted as requiring States to provide financial covering for medicines which are not listed as officially recognised medicines.”\footnote{Scialacqua, supra note 153.}

More recently the ECtHR endorsed the core findings of the European Commission of Human Rights. In \textit{Wiater}, the applicant suffered from a chronic sleep disorder.\footnote{Wiater v Poland, Appl. No. 42290/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 15 May 2012) ¶ 3.} Originally, the applicant’s doctor provided him the only successful medical treatment free of charge.\footnote{Id. ¶ 4.} Yet, when the drug became readily available in pharmacies, it was no longer on the list of covered drugs.\footnote{Id.,} The applicant invoked Article 2 of the ECHR, but given the non-life-threatening nature of his illness, the ECtHR unsurprisingly rejected the claim to be “manifestly ill-founded.”\footnote{Id., ¶ 43.} In line with \textit{Scialacqua v Italy},\footnote{Scialacqua, supra note 153.} the judges simply noted that no case law existed which required “funding for a particular type of treatment.”\footnote{Wiater, supra note 160, ¶ 39.}
The ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 2 of the ECHR in relation to health care can be described as deferential to the preferences of the State Parties to the Convention.\textsuperscript{166} The ECtHR appears reluctant to interfere in \textit{Scialacqua} and \textit{Wiater} with the management of national health care systems. The ECtHR justifies its approach because, in its words, “[it] is for the competent authorities of the Member States to consider and decide how their limited resources should be allocated. . . . Those authorities are after all better placed than the Court to evaluate the relevant demands in view of the scarce resources and to take responsibilities for the difficult choices which have to be made between worthy needs.”\textsuperscript{167} The article revisits this point, which is an expression of the margin of appreciation.\textsuperscript{168} The cases above, however, do not answer whether the ECtHR's interpretation of Article 2 of the ECHR would substantially change if the applicants suffered from any life threatening illnesses.

The case of \textit{Hristozov and others v Bulgaria} gave the ECtHR an opportunity to address this variation of facts.\textsuperscript{169} All of the applicants had terminal cancer and unsuccessfully received conventional treatment.\textsuperscript{170} They considered their only hope to be getting access to a scheme called “compassionate use”\textsuperscript{171} of drugs.\textsuperscript{172} However, Bulgarian law banned the use of such drugs in order to protect vulnerable patients.\textsuperscript{173} Since the drug was offered free of charge by the

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\textsuperscript{166} Cf. LETSAS, supra note 17, 81.
\textsuperscript{167} Wiater, \textit{supra} note 160, ¶ 39; Newdick has made a similar point in relation to the ECJ in Newdick, \textit{supra} note 127, at 1652.
\textsuperscript{168} “Respect for Private and Family Life”.
\textsuperscript{169} Hristozov and Others v Bulgaria, App. No. 47039/11 and 358/12 (Eur. Ct. H.R 29 April, 2013).
\textsuperscript{170} Id., ¶ 8.
\textsuperscript{171} This means that patients can gain access to unauthorised drugs outside trials which was not possible under Bulgarian law.
\textsuperscript{172} Hristozov, \textit{supra} note 169, ¶ 9.
\textsuperscript{173} Id., ¶ 99.
\end{flushleft}
pharmaceutical company, financial concerns of the state were not relevant here. The applicants argued that a complete ban on the use of “compassionate drugs”—a factual submission questioned by the findings of the Court—would amount to a violation of their right to life. The ECtHR again was deferential and found that the Convention “cannot be interpreted as requiring access to unauthorised medicinal products for the terminally ill to be regulated in a particular way.”

Invoking the ECtHR’s Article 2 case law in the EU or before the ECJ—by virtue of EU Charter Article 2—is unlikely to help applicants expand the list of treatments Member States must provide. This result seems to coincide with the current status quo in EU law, summarized recently by the ECJ in Elchinov: “European Union law . . . cannot, in principle, have the effect of requiring a Member State to extend such lists of medical benefits.” The analysis shifts now to another provision frequently invoked in the context of health care: the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

4. Prohibition of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

174 Dissenting Opinion of Judge De Gaetano joined by Judge Vučinić in id., ¶ 3.

175 Hristozov, supra note 169, ¶ 108

176 Id., ¶ 107.

177 Id., ¶ 108 (emphasis added).

Article 3 of the ECHR is identical in wording to Article 4 of the EU Charter and reads, “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”\textsuperscript{179} Nowak and Charbord argue “the rich case law of the ECtHR and the former European Commission of Human Rights shall be the primary source of interpretation of the rights contained in Article 4 EUCR.”\textsuperscript{180} In the health care context, the ECtHR held that a violation of Article 3 occurs when the “suffering which flows from a naturally occurring illness . . . is, or risks being, exacerbated by treatment stemming from measures for which authorities can be held \textit{responsible}.”\textsuperscript{181} Arguably, allowing a health care system to have extensive waiting times or to deny a specific health care treatment to a patient may constitute a measure for which the state “can be held responsible” according to Article 3.

At the same time, the ECtHR made clear that the Convention “does not place an obligation on the Contracting States to alleviate the disparities between the levels of health care available in various countries.”\textsuperscript{182} Analogously, the ECJ in \textit{Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms} held that “the fact that a particular type of medical treatment is covered or not covered by the sickness insurance schemes of other Member States is irrelevant in this regard.”\textsuperscript{183} Thus, considerable similarities exist between the ECJ’s approach, which is based on the free movement of services (Article 56 of the TFEU), and the ECtHR's approach based on Article 3 of the ECHR. Neither of the two courts appear to impose a positive obligation on the state.

\textsuperscript{179} ECHR, \textit{supra} note 13, art 3.


\textsuperscript{181} Id.

\textsuperscript{182} Hristozov, \textit{supra} note 169, ¶ 113.

\textsuperscript{183} Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, \textit{supra} note 74, ¶ 87.
Yet, before reaching a final conclusion on Article 3’s applicability, the case of *D v the United Kingdom*\(^{184}\) needs mentioning because it shows Article 3’s potential to change the quality of the cross-border movement of patients through the introduction of supranational solidarity. A person from St. Kitts entered the UK as a visitor, but at the airport he was arrested for drug possession.\(^ {185}\) He received a six-year jail sentence.\(^ {186}\) In prison, he was diagnosed as HIV-positive and suffering from AIDS.\(^ {187}\) Before releasing him, the UK immigration authorities wanted to deport him to St. Kitts.\(^ {188}\) The applicant challenged his deportation on the grounds that given his health condition, deporting him violates, among other provisions, Article 3.\(^ {189}\) While Article 3, according to the case law of the ECtHR, constitutes a negative right, its drafting history also suggests that it is absolute in its nature.\(^ {190}\) A prohibition which is absolute in nature “operates on a strictly binary mode: it is either respected or it is not – there is no grey area. In the context of the Convention, either the state has refrained from doing what is prohibited or it has done it – there is no proportionality test to be applied.”\(^ {191}\)

It was undisputed that if the UK deported *D* to St. Kitts, it would considerably shorten his life expectancy.\(^ {192}\) In an unanimous judgment, the ECtHR ruled that the UK had “assumed responsibility for treating the applicant’s condition,” but the judges also hastened to add that


\(^{185}\) *Id.*, ¶ 7.

\(^{186}\) *Id.*

\(^{187}\) *Id.*, ¶ 8.

\(^{188}\) *Id.*, ¶ 10.

\(^{189}\) *Id.*, ¶ 37.

\(^{190}\) JEREMY WALDRON, TORTURE, TERROR AND TRADE-OFFS. PHILOSOPHY FOR THE WHITE HOUSE 214 (2010).

\(^{191}\) Dembour, *supra* note 156, at 83.

\(^{192}\) *D v UK*, *supra* note 184, ¶¶ 16-17.
this was a case of “very exceptional circumstances.”\textsuperscript{193} An interpretation of the judgment is that the UK has special responsibilities in relation to $D$ because it “assumed” them.\textsuperscript{194} It seems that the ECtHR tried to avoid making an argument based on impartialism, which is too elusive and morally demanding.\textsuperscript{195} The ECtHR—implicitly at least—suggested that special obligations exist between $D$ and the UK as if they were in a social contract situation. In a contract, “[a] promissor, through a voluntary act of will, imposes upon himself an obligation that is peculiarly his own, not shared by the world at large, and his obligation is owed to a specific individual, the promise, rather than to the world at large.”\textsuperscript{196} If a special relationship exists, then the floodgate argument, to be outlined subsequently, is no longer of any concern. But it also means that there is in existence a strong duty which correlates with a strong right.\textsuperscript{197} Both considerations influence the application of Article 3 ECHR.

Given the facts of the case, however, it remains questionable whether the UK really had “assumed responsibility” for $D$ in any meaningful way. The ECtHR failed to offer a convincing argument in order to demonstrate how the UK made that voluntary promise, which in turn created special obligations in relation to others.\textsuperscript{198} That the applicant became “reliant on the medical and palliative care”\textsuperscript{199} may be an account of his “vulnerability” but cannot substitute as a promise. There may be normative arguments based on impartialism, such as parable of the

\textsuperscript{193} Id., ¶ 54 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{194} Id., ¶ 53.


\textsuperscript{198} H L A Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’ (64) THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 175, 183-184 (1955).

\textsuperscript{199} D v UK, supra note 184, ¶ 53.
Good Samaritan, as to why the UK should take care of D. Yet the approach chosen by the ECtHR is unconvincing. The situation would have been entirely different if D had contracted HIV and AIDS during his stay in a UK prison. This would have amounted to a violation of the “no-harm principle,” which constitutes the strongest moral obligation for help.

About ten years later, the ECtHR decided N v the United Kingdom, which is factually similar to D v the United Kingdom. Once again the question was whether solidarity should be exercised with a non-citizen in a show of supranational solidarity. The UK wished to deport a Ugandan woman who entered the UK seriously ill and suffering from HIV. She applied for asylum in the UK. Receiving asylum would have allowed her to gain access to the required treatment, which would have been more difficult to obtain in Uganda. Lord Hope made the argument in the House of Lords that if the UK permitted her to stay and to receive treatment, it would open the floodgates to medical immigration. Other people suffering from HIV would come to the UK and hope to be granted indefinite leave, overburdening the available resources. The consequential reasoning applied by the House of Lords contrasts with the ECtHR’s deontological interpretation of Article 3 of the ECHR in D.

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203 D v UK, supra note 184, ¶¶ 6-21.
204 N v UK, supra note 202, ¶ 9.
205 Id., ¶ 10.
206 Id., ¶¶ 18-19.
207 N v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] 2 W.L.R. 1124, 1141.
208 Id.
When deciding *N v the United Kingdom*, the ECtHR no longer found a violation of Article 3.\(^{210}\) The majority provided three grounds of reasoning in support of their finding. The first ground emphasized the exceptional character of *D v the United Kingdom*, and pointed out that *D* was factually distinguishable from *N v the United Kingdom.*\(^{211}\) The judges highlighted that in *D*, “the applicant was critically ill and appeared to be close to death, could not be guaranteed any nursing or medical care in his country of origin and had no family there willing or able to care for him or provide him with even a basic level of food, shelter or social support.”\(^{212}\) The judges in *N* also acknowledged that the “quality of the applicant’s life, and her life expectancy, would be affected if she were returned to Uganda.”\(^{213}\) They argued, though, that “[t]he applicant is not, however, at the present time critically ill. The rapidity of the deterioration which she would suffer and the extent to which she would be able to obtain access to medical treatment, support and care, including help from relatives, must involve a certain degree of speculation.”\(^{214}\)

Second, the judges reasoned that “[a]lthough many of the rights it [the Convention] contains have implications of a social or economic nature, the Convention is essentially directed at the protection of civil and political rights.”\(^{215}\) Following this distinction, the ECtHR held that “Article 3 does not place an obligation on the Contracting State to alleviate such disparities through the provision of free and unlimited health care to all aliens without a right to stay within

\(^{210}\) *N v UK*, *supra* note 202, ¶ 51.

\(^{211}\) *Id.*, ¶¶ 46-51.

\(^{212}\) *Id.*, ¶ 42.

\(^{213}\) *Id.*, ¶ 50.

\(^{214}\) *Id*.

\(^{215}\) *Id.*, ¶ 44.
its jurisdiction.” Finally, the ECtHR invoked a consequential argument by highlighting the need to balance “the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.”

In the context of EU health care, Advocate General Tesauro in Kohll also made a consequentialist argument, stating, “The only effect I can conceive of is that one optician established in Luxembourg will have sold one less pair of spectacles and the only orthodontist established in the same State will have lost one patient.” It would appear that both the ECHR as a human rights instrument and Article 56 of the TFEU, which is economic in its nature, now follow a form of consequentialism that seeks to protect the inviolacy of national health care systems. Hence the structure of the legal argument under human rights and free movement law seems rather similar in nature.

N v the United Kingdom was controversial among the judges themselves, triggering a joint dissenting opinion of Judges Tulkens, Boneelo, and Spielmann. All three judges considered the factual distinction between N v the United Kingdom and D v the United Kingdom to be “misconceived.” They criticized the “high-threshold” requirement in the context of health care and suggested instead the “Pretty threshold.” A violation of Article 3 of the ECHR occurs under the Pretty threshold when the suffering “is or risks being, exacerbated by treatment, whether flowing from conditions of the detention, expulsion or other measures, for

216 Id.
217 Id.
220 Id., ¶ 5.
which the authorities can be held responsible.”221 The dissenting judges also criticized the majority's statement that the Convention ought to be about civil and political rights for ignoring the “social dimension of the integrated approach adopted by the Court” in its case law. 222 Finally, the minority also drew attention to the nature of Article 3 as an absolute right, which prohibits any “balancing exercise.”223

After *N v the United Kingdom*, it appears that Article 3 does not have the authority to change the nature of health care systems by making boundaries for outsiders more permeable and introducing a notion of supranational solidarity.224 Yet, even following the deontological interpretation of Article 3 developed by the ECtHR in *D v the United Kingdom*, which introduces supranational solidarity, cases within the EU context would most likely fail on the facts. *D v the United Kingdom* was rather exceptional and had a “high threshold,” according to *N v the United Kingdom*.225 If Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 4 of the EU Charter are closely similar, then it would appear that Article 4 of the EU Charter does not have the authority to change the current character of the framework regulating the cross-border movement of patients.

### 5. Respect for Private and Family Life


223 *Id.*, ¶ 7.

224 See also infra ‘6. Health Care’.

225 *N v UK*, supra note 202, ¶ 43.
Article 7 of the EU Charter\textsuperscript{226} guarantees respect for private and family life and corresponds to Article 8 of the ECHR\textsuperscript{227}. Article 8 of the Convention stipulates that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”\textsuperscript{228} Given the identical wording of Article 7 of the EU Charter and Article 8 of the ECHR, the “rich and substantive amount of case law [that] has been built up by the European Court of Human Rights regarding the scope and application of Article 8 . . . can be drawn on with regard to the interpretation of Article 7 of the Charter.”\textsuperscript{229} In the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, this provision received the greatest attention in the context of health care.\textsuperscript{230} To be relevant to health care, the case law needs to cover problems which are of pivotal importance in the cross-border movement of patients, either that of reducing the wait times or that of accessing treatments not available in the patient’s state of affiliation.

In \textit{Passannante v Italy}, the issue of long wait times was reviewed under Article 8 of the ECHR.\textsuperscript{231} The European Commission of Human Rights declared the case inadmissible, but it nevertheless acknowledged that “while the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State from such interference: in addition to this negative undertaking, there may be \textit{positive obligations} inherent in effective respect for private life.”\textsuperscript{232} This language on positive

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{226} EU Charter, \textit{supra} note 8, art 7
\textsuperscript{227} ECHR, \textit{supra} note 13, art 8.
\textsuperscript{228} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{229} Shazia Choudry, \textit{Article 7 – Family Life Aspects}, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. A COMMENTARY, ¶ 7.11B (Steve Peers et al eds., 2014).
\textsuperscript{231} \textit{Passannante v Italy}, App. No. 32647/96 (Eur Comm’n H.R. 1 July, 1998).
\textsuperscript{232} \textit{Id.} (emphasis added).
\end{flushleft}
obligations echoes the identical wording of the ECtHR in *Marckx*,\(^\text{233}\) which first established the link between Article 8 and positive rights.\(^\text{234}\) Yet, the substance of any positive duty in the context of health care appears to be limited, as exemplified by *Hristozov and Others v Bulgaria*.\(^\text{235}\)

As mentioned above, in *Hristozov and others*, Bulgaria denied the applicants access to the compassionate use of drugs.\(^\text{236}\) When the case reached the ECtHR, the judges referred to the “margin of appreciation.”\(^\text{237}\) They argued “that matters of health-care policy are in principle within the margin of appreciation of the domestic authorities.”\(^\text{238}\) The margin of appreciation is narrow for a state “[w]here a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake.”\(^\text{239}\) By contrast, “where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the margin will be wider” as well as “if the State is required to strike a balance between competing private and public interests or Convention rights.”\(^\text{240}\)

The majority in *Hristozov and others* applied the above-outlined criteria and believed that the national authorities should be granted a wide margin.\(^\text{241}\) The majority argued that not only does no consensus exist among Convention states on the compassionate use of drugs, but


\(^{235}\) *Hristozov*, *supra* note 169, ¶¶ 117-127.

\(^{236}\) *Id.*, ¶ 9.

\(^{237}\) *Id.*, ¶ 117.

\(^{238}\) *Hristozov*, *supra* note 169, ¶ 119 (emphasis added); specifically on the doctrine about the margin of appreciation: LETSAS, *supra* note 17, Chapter 4.


\(^{240}\) *Id.*

\(^{241}\) *Hristozov*, *supra* note 169, ¶ 124.
also public health care systems need to balance private and public interests. 242 The ECtHR has a long tradition of assigning considerable importance to the question of whether there exists consensus, or a common ground, on a specific matter within the European Council when it comes to determining the width of the margin of appreciation. 243 At the same time, the dissenting judges mainly criticized—unsurprisingly—the broad margin of appreciation granted by the majority to Convention states in the field of health care. 244

For dissenting Judge De Gaetano, joined by Judge Vučinić, the majority did not adequately account for the “obvious life-or-death implications” 245 of the case when balancing the competing private and public interests. 246 The dissenting judges underlined that the balancing test in the judgment “should have given more weight to the value of life,” which—among the various Convention rights—is “chief.” 247 Partly dissenting, Judge Kalaydjieva went as far as arguing that the majority used the doctrine in this judgment “as an instrument to justify the national authorities’ complete failure to demonstrate any appreciation whatsoever of the applicants’ right to personal life, or to strike the requisite balance between this right and presumed counterbalancing public interests.” 248

242 Hristozov, supra note 169, ¶¶ 121-124.


244 See to that effect partly dissenting Opinion of Judge Kalaydjieva in Hristozov supra note supra note 169 [no para provided??] and Dissenting Opinion of Judge De Gaetano joined by Judge Vučinić in Hristozov, supra note 169, ¶¶ 3-4. [not sure how to reference this properly]

245 Dissenting Opinion of Judge De Gaetano joined by Judge Vučinić in Hristozov, supra note 169, ¶ 5.

246 Id., ¶ 9.

247 Id., ¶ 4.

248 Partly dissenting Opinion of Judge Kalaydjieva in Hristozov, supra note 107 [re pincite see above-no para in the opinion]
Studying *Hristozov and others*, it appears as if the majority\(^{249}\) and the dissent\(^{250}\) were discussing different facets of the margin of appreciation. The dissenting judges referred to a “substantive” margin that addresses the relationship “between individual freedoms and collective goals.”\(^{251}\) The majority applied, though, a “structural” margin of appreciation that focuses on “the limits or intensity of the review of the European Court of Human Rights in view of its status as an international tribunal.”\(^{252}\) This interchangeable use of the concept is unsurprising since “[t]he Court uses the same term (margin of appreciation) both for saying that the applicant did not, as a matter of human rights, have the right he or she claimed, and for saying that it will not substantively review the decision of national authorities as to whether there has been a violation.”\(^{253}\)

The criteria developed by Letsas\(^{254}\) help distinguish the substantive margin from the structural margin of appreciation. The ECtHR in the field of health care, seems to apply a structural margin of appreciation. The judges referred to public morals, highlighted the lack of consensus on how to deal with the compassionate use of drugs, and pointed out that an international court ought not to replace the competent national authority.\(^{255}\) In *Wiater* the ECtHR also seemed to apply the structural concept of the margin of appreciation to Article 2 of the ECHR. The Court argued—particularly due to the lack of European common ground on the issue—that national authorities are better positioned to decide how resources should be

\(^{249}\) Hristozov, *supra* note 169, ¶ 125


\(^{251}\) LETSAS, *supra* note 17, 80-81.

\(^{252}\) *Id.*, 81.

\(^{253}\) *Id.*

\(^{254}\) *Id.*, 90-92.

\(^{255}\) Hristozov, *supra* note 169, ¶¶ 122-127.
spent.\textsuperscript{256} To the extent the ECtHR applies a structural margin of appreciation it will not even create “a (patrolled) state space.”\textsuperscript{257} This constitutes a problem because the ECtHR and the ECJ operate in “different context[s],”\textsuperscript{258} and the transferal of meaning from the Convention, in order to interpret the EU Charter, is not necessarily compelling.

So far in this Article, the EU Charter mirrored the respective provisions of the ECHR. Article 35 of the EU Charter is different because it has no “twin-norm” in the ECHR. At the same time, Article 35 is the only health care provision of the EU Charter that played a (modest) role in the cross-border context, even if only by reference in the Opinion of the Advocate General.

\textbf{6. Health Care}

In this article, “general” human rights provisions have been adopted in the particular context of health care. However, EU Charter Article 35 constitutes a \textit{lex specialis} in relation to health care.\textsuperscript{259} According to this provision, “[e]veryone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices.”\textsuperscript{260} The question is whether Article 35 has the potential to influence the terms and conditions under which patients may exit their system of affiliation. In particular,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{256} Wiater, \textit{supra} note 160, ¶ 39
  \item \textsuperscript{257} Niamh Nic Shuibhne, \textit{Margins of appreciation: national values, fundamental rights and EC free movement}, 34 \textit{EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW} 230, 231 (2009).
  \item \textsuperscript{258} Gerards, \textit{supra} note 243, at 104
  \item \textsuperscript{259} EU Charter, \textit{supra} note 8, art 35.
  \item \textsuperscript{260} \textit{Id.}
\end{itemize}
does Article 35 have the doctrinal authority to change the current legal framework that regulates free movement of patients in a way that allows patients to shorten their waiting times or increase the scope of treatment available to them?

Article 35’s interpretation is difficult because in contrast to the Articles discussed so far, there exists no mirroring Article in the ECHR. Since there is “so little jurisprudence to go on, it is difficult to be certain of the scope of the application of Article 35.” At least one EU case, Stamatelaki, references Article 35 of the EU Charter in relation to the cross-border movement of patients. Mr. Stamatelaki suffered from bladder cancer. Though publicly insured in Greece, he received treatment on two occasions in the UK, in a private hospital. When Mr. Stamatelaki asked for a reimbursement from the Greek public funds, the funds rejected his request because his treatment in the UK was performed in a private hospital. According to Greek legislation, treatment undertaken in private hospitals abroad would only be reimbursed if an agreement existed between the private hospital and the public fund, or if the patient was under 14 years of age. For Advocate General Colomer, albeit not for the ECJ, it was beyond a doubt that the EU Charter played a role in the cross-border movement scenario.

In Stamatelaki, the Court upheld its reasoning developed in the earlier case law, that health care is covered by the law on free movement of services in accordance with Article 56

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261 Hervey and McHale, supra note 9, ¶ 35.20.
262 Opinion of AG Colomer, Stamatelaki, supra note 11, ¶ 40.
263 Id., ¶ 15.
264 Stamatelaki, supra note 11, ¶ 9.
265 Id., ¶ 11.
266 Id., ¶¶ 7-8.
267 Opinion of AG Colomer, Stamatelaki, supra note 11, ¶ 40.
One possible explanation for the Court’s refusal to follow the Opinion of the Advocate General is the doctrinal argument based on *ratione temporis*. When the ECJ decided *Stamatelaki*, the EU Charter still was a non-binding instrument that had only been “solemnly proclaimed” by the Commission, the Council, and Parliament. This argument is no longer convincing after the Lisbon Treaty changed the legal status of the EU Charter. Yet, even in subsequent cases, such as *Commission v Spain*, *Commission v France*, or *Elchinov*—all decided after the Charter gained legal force—the Court referred neither to the EU Charter nor any other human rights law.

The Advocate General in *Stamatelaki* acknowledged the earlier cases and argued that “although the case-law takes as the main point of reference the *fundamental freedoms* established in the Treaty, there is another aspect which is becoming more and more important in the Community sphere, namely the right of citizens to health care, proclaimed in Article 35 of the Charter.” Advocate General Colomer provided a sketch of how Article 35 of the EU Charter should be interpreted. Referring to the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on “Healthcare,” the Advocate General pointed out that “being a fundamental asset, health cannot be considered solely in terms of *social expenditure and latent economic*

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268 *Stamatelaki*, *supra* note 11, ¶ 38.


273 *Elchinov*, *supra* note 178.


275 *Id.*
difficulties.”276 In his Opinion, Advocate General Colomer pushed the envelope even further by stating that “[t]his right is perceived as a personal entitlement, unconnected to a person’s relationship with social security, and the Court of Justice cannot overlook that aspect.”277

With this last point in particular, the Advocate General suggests that Article 35 has the potential to introduce supranational solidarity. As noted earlier, the ECtHR flirted with the idea of supranational solidarity in D v the United Kingdom.278 Yet, in N v the United Kingdom, the ECtHR made clear that D v the United Kingdom only applies under the most limited circumstances, namely that there is no treatment available in the patient’s home country.279 The ECHR, then, obliges the State Parties to the Convention only exceptionally to supranational solidarity. In the EU context, it appears that there is no room left, mutatis mutandis, for the application of the notion of supranational solidarity developed in D v the United Kingdom.280

Many important aspects play a critical role in the interpretation of Article 35, but the Advocate General did not discuss them in his Opinion. Most notably among them is the role of limitations. Peers argues that “[t]he rules on limitation of rights in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will likely become increasingly relevant as the Charter gains a larger role as a source for the human rights.”281 Without understanding the scope of the limitation clauses,

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277 Opinion of AG Colomer, Stamatelaki, supra note 11, ¶ 40 (emphasis added)

278 D v UK, supra note 117, ¶ 54.

279 N v UK, supra note 125, ¶ 42.

280 D v UK, supra note 117, ¶ 54.

it is impossible to identify the substance of a right.\footnote{ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 178-181 (Julian Rivers tr, 2010).} One of these limitations is in Article 35 itself,\footnote{EU Charter, supra note 8, art 35.} and the others are in Article 52.\footnote{Id., art 52.}

The right to health care in Article 35 is granted “under the conditions established by national laws and practices.”\footnote{Id., art 35.} Similarly worded, Article 52.6 of the EU Charter demands that “[f]ull account shall be taken of national laws and practices as specified in this Charter,”\footnote{Id., art 52.6.} endorsing the limitation outlined in Article 35 itself. Article 52.1 of the EU Charter contains another limitation, stipulating that:

\begin{quote}
[a]ny limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.\footnote{Id., art 52.1.}
\end{quote}

What is the relationship between Articles 52.1 and 52.6 of the EU Charter? Addressing this question is essential because Article 35 seemingly belongs to those provisions of the Charter that trigger Article 52.6.\footnote{Id., art 52.6.} The Explanatory Note on Article 52.6 do not provide much substantive clarification, only referencing “the spirit of subsidiarity” and emphasizing that the limitation needs to be “national.”\footnote{Id., ¶ 52.193.} This could, for example, mean either “that any national limitations must always automatically be accepted as valid, no matter how much they restrict
the right in question,” or that national laws only “control” the exercise of the right.\textsuperscript{290} The literal interpretation of Article 52.6 seems to support the former conclusion because, by its wording, “full account shall be taken of national laws and practices.”\textsuperscript{291} If this view is correct, the EU Charter may not be able to alter a national authorization regime, even if the regime is extremely restrictive in its nature.

Yet, Peers and Prechal argue that this extreme literal reading of the provision, which permits national laws to fully abolish a Charter right, is “incompatible with the nature of a human rights text.”\textsuperscript{292} The argument they seem to make is that there exists a “guarantee of an inalienable core as a limit to limits” (\textit{Wesensgehaltsgarantie}).\textsuperscript{293} This point may also be supported by drawing on the statutory interpretation principle \textit{lex specialis derogate legi generali}.\textsuperscript{294} The aim of this principle is that it helps in solving conflicts of norms (antinomies).\textsuperscript{295} While Article 52.6 of the EU Charter stipulates that ‘full account shall be taken of national laws and practices as specified in this Charter,’\textsuperscript{296} Article 52.1 requires limitations to “respect the essence of those rights and freedoms” guaranteed in the EU Charter.\textsuperscript{297} Arguably, it is Article 52.1 which specifies the reach of “[a]ny limitation” of the EU Charter.\textsuperscript{298}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{290} \textit{Id.}, ¶ 52.198.
\item \textsuperscript{291} Emphasis added.
\item \textsuperscript{292} Peers and Prechal, \textit{supra} note 130, ¶ 52.198.
\item \textsuperscript{293} ALEXY, \textit{supra} note 282, 192.
\item \textsuperscript{294} FRANZ BYDLINSKI, JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE 465 (2 ed. 2011)
\item \textsuperscript{295} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{296} EU Charter, \textit{supra} note 8, art 52.6
\item \textsuperscript{297} \textit{Id.}, art 52.1.
\item \textsuperscript{298} \textit{Id.}
\end{itemize}
Finally, Article 52.2 of the EU Charter is also a limitation clause, which stipulates that “[r]ights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties.” This Article is particularly relevant to Article 35. The Explanatory Note on Article 35 of the EU Charter reference Article 168 of the TFEU, which addresses the issue of “public health.” Article 168 may be an example of a “right . . . for which provision is made in the Treaties.” However, applying Article 168 of the TFEU, in particular its paragraph 7, does not provide much interpretative guidance regarding possible conditions and limitations. The Article reads that “Union action shall respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of their health policy and for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care.” Yet, in health care, Member States' responsibilities are not only determined by national but also international law. So, the responsibilities of Member States are not only shaped but also determined by supranational obligations. The argument becomes circular because the international (or supranational) law influences the Member States' responsibilities.

Another pivotal aspect important to establishing the relevance of Article 35 is whether it constitutes a “right” or a “principle.” Distinguishing between rights and principles is necessary because Article 51.1 of the EU Charter stipulates that rights need to be “respected,” whereas principles only need to be “observed.” While criticizable as an exercise in

300 Id., art 35.
301 TFEU, supra note 40, art 168.
302 EU Charter, supra note 8, art 52.2
303 TFEU, supra note 40, art 168.7.
304 See for an overview on international human rights law and health (care) law MURPHY, supra note 12, Chapter 1.
305 Explanatory Note, supra note 15, art 52.5.
semantics, Article 52.5 of the Charter considers only “rights” to be “judicially cognisable.” The Explanatory Note on Article 52.5 elaborate that principles “become significant for the Courts only when such acts [of the Member States which are implementing EU law] are interpreted or reviewed. They do not however give rise to direct claims for positive action by the Union’s institutions or Member States authorities.” The ECJ so far has not given any guidance on the distinction between rights and principles and the consequences for an Article that falls into one or the other camp.

For the time being, the only guidance comes from Advocate General Villalón's Opinion. In AMS, the Advocate General examined whether Article 27 of the EU Charter, which protects the workers’ right to information and consultation within the undertaking, constitutes a right or a principle. The Advocate General concluded that Article 27 amounts to a principle because its “content is so indeterminate that it can be interpreted only as an obligation to act, requiring the public authorities to take the necessary measures to guarantee a right.” Given the constitutional character of the EU Charter in general, this is not surprising. Yet, linguistic indeterminacy is something that Article 27 shares with other

306 EU Charter, supra note 8, art 52.5 (emphasis added).
307 Explanatory Note, supra note 15, art 52.5.
308 Opinion of AG Villalón, AMS, in Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT and Others., Case C-176/12, 15 January 2014 [nry], ¶¶ 28-80.
309 “Workers’ right to information and consultation within the undertaking:
Workers or their representatives must, at the appropriate levels, be guaranteed information and consultation in good time in the cases and under the conditions provided for by Union law and national laws and practices.”
310 Opinion of AG Villalón, AMS, supra note 308, ¶ 54.
provisions of the Charter, such as Article 35. The second similarity Article 35 shares with Article 27 is its inclusion in the chapter on “Solidarity” in the Charter. This chapter “incorporates mainly rights regarded as social rights with respect to their substance, for the content of which a form of wording such as that in Article 27 is preferred.” Both Articles 27 and 35 of the EU Charter share considerable similarities. Systematic consistency provides a strong argument that they should also be treated alike.

Yet categorizing “principles” and “rights” convincingly remains troubling. Advocate General Villalón finds it “striking that the Charter does not assign the fundamental rights to either of the two groups, as is usual in comparative law.” Hilson attempts to distinguish principles from rights based on abstract criteria. In doing so, Hilson references the autonomous nature of rights, the double-sidedness of principles, and the different legal impacts and accountability that rights have in comparison to principles. But, he concludes that “one is left with the need to make ad hoc arguments based on each Article as to its precise justiciability. It is simply not possible – as the Charter Explanations try to do – to make generalisations based on arguments that all principles act in this or that particular way.”

Even if it is difficult or impossible to distinguish rights from principles in the context of the Charter, does it matter in the specific context of health care? In other words, would it still

312 Cf. also Michalowski, supra note 10, at 291.
313 EU Charter, supra note 8, art 27.
314 Opinion of AG Villalón, AMS, supra note 308, ¶ 55.
315 Id., ¶ 43.
317 Id.
318 Id., at 215.
be possible to invoke Article 35 if it were a principle, which seems more plausible in light of
the above? To address this point, it is necessary to return to Article 52.5 of the EU Charter,
which stipulates that “[t]he provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be
implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies
of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the
exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation
of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.”

The Court in Glatzel made clear that a principle “cannot by itself confer on individuals
a subjective right which they may invoke as such.” The wording of Article 52.5 also makes
clear that principles are either “implemented by legislative or executive acts” of the Union or
when Member States “are implementing Union law.” The former covers secondary EU
law—such as Regulation 883/2004 and Directive 24/2011—that operates in the context of the
cross-border movement of patients. In relation to the latter, as argued above, Member States
implement Union law even when they derogate from free movement law by means of national
law. Thus, the current legal framework could still be read in the light of Article 35.

To conclude, among the various Articles of the EU Charter it is safe to say that Article
35 has the most potential in relation to the cross-border movement of patients. So far, the Court
has not applied the provision in the context of the cross-border movement of patients, so there
remains considerable uncertainty about how the Court might use Article 35. First, the provision
operates with three limitations, and the Court will need to establish clearly the substance of
Article 35. Whether the substance of Article 35, in the end, provides deeper integration than the

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319 EU Charter, supra note 8, art 52.5 (emphasis added).
320 Wolfgang Glatzel v Freistaat Bayern, Case C-356/12, 22 May 2014 [nyr], ¶ 78.
321 EU Charter, supra note 8, art 52.5.
322 See supra note ,
current free-movement law is an open question. Second, while the ECJ still needs to clarify whether Article 35 constitutes a right or a principle, it seems plausible to argue that patients will not be given a subjective right that they can invoke. Nevertheless, Article 35 of the EU Charter, even as a principle, could still be invoked in the process of judicial review. After all, principles can be taken into account when it comes to “the interpretation of secondary legislation and Member State legislation that is implementing EU law.”

7. Conclusion

The aim of this article was to analyze whether the EU Charter has the authority to change the character of the current cross-border movement regime significantly by deepening the level of integration. The analysis of the relevant ECHR provisions revealed that no substantive change should be expected in the legal framework regulating the cross-border movement of patients, even if the ECJ decided to apply the EU Charter. Given the closeness of the relationship between the ECHR and the EU Charter, Dworkin’s judge Hercules would closely consider the findings of the ECtHR in relation to the Convention. Leaving theoretical and doctrinal considerations aside, given the sensitivity of the policy area, the Court will carefully and strategically depart from existing case law only when there are persuasive, doctrinal reasons for doing so.


324 EU Charter, supra note 8, art 52.3.


Of particular interest is the role that Article 35 might play in the cross-border movement of patients, since the Article specifically covers health care and was cited by the Advocate General in a case on the free movement of patients. Because this provision does not have a corresponding right in the ECHR, it is difficult to judge its substance. Two areas of controversy arise regarding Article 35’s interpretation. First, it is unclear how the applicable limitations in relation to Article 35 ought to be understood, which crucially impact the interpretation of the provision. Second, it is also difficult to establish whether Article 35 of the EU Charter is a right or a principle. Given sparse guidance from the Court, the tentative conclusion is that Article 35 probably amounts to a principle. This still permits examination of the current EU health care framework in light of the Charter, but an individual does not have a subjective right based on Article 35.

Though one might therefore argue that the EU Charter does not offer much added value to the health care framework, which is currently driven by the internal market and the free movement of services, it appears that the law on the free movement of services has reached its outer limits when it comes to health care. The saga of the Services Directive\(^3\) has made it very obvious that free movement of services has developed a notoriously bad reputation.\(^4\) Instead I suggest that the relationship between human rights and public health care appears to be far more tenable and offers considerably greater potential. Beitz aptly points out that “the public discourse of peacetime global society can be said to have a common moral language, it is that of human rights.”\(^5\)


\(^5\) BEITZ, *supra* note 28, 1.
Human rights offer a more solid grounding for health care, even if EU health care law would not change substantially. If the EU and, in particular, the Court seek to make inroads into this stronghold of Member States, the EU and ECJ will unsurprisingly meet resistance on the way because the redistribution of resources—at least for the time being—is in the hands of Member States. If the Court adopted the language of human rights, it could serve as a reference point for new forms of governance.\footnote{Sandra Fredman, \textit{Transformation or Dilution: Fundamental Rights in the EU Social Space}, 12 \textit{European Law Journal} 41, 58 (2006).} The Open Method of Coordination, for example, “uploads”\footnote{Kenneth A Armstrong, \textit{Governing Social Inclusion: Europeanization through Policy Coordination} (Oxford University Press 2010) 13.} only ideas but not the policy making process itself, which offers a certain amount of freedom from the legitimacy, competence, and democracy discourse. The Court could make its contribution to the further development of EU health care law beyond the application of rights.