RESOLVING CONFLICT IN BIPOLAR SOCIETIES:
POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS IN FIJI AND NORTHERN IRELAND

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ABSTRACT. Ethnically divided societies that might be described as ‘balanced bicommmunal’ (where there are two communities, each of which comes close to representing half of the population) pose a particular challenge to conventional principles of collective decision-making, and commonly threaten political stability. This paper analyses the experience of two such societies, Northern Ireland and Fiji, with a view to exploring whether there are common processes in the route by which political stability has been pursued. We assess the manner in which a distinctive relationship with Great Britain and its political culture has interacted with local conditions to produce a highly competitive, bipolar party system. This leads to consideration of the devices that have been adopted in an effort to bridge the gap between the communities: the Fiji constitution as amended in 1997, and Northern Ireland’s Good Friday agreement of 1998. We focus in particular on the use of unusual (preferential) formulas for the election of parliamentarians and of an inclusive principle in the selection of ministers, and consider the contribution of these institutional devices to the attainment of political stability. We find that in both cases the intervention of forces from outside the political system had a decisive impact, though in very different ways. In addition to being underpinned by solid institutional design, for political settlements to work effectively some minimal level of trust between rival elites was required.

Key words: Fiji; Northern Ireland; electoral systems; power sharing; ethnic conflict.

Introduction

The capacity of institutional reform to deliver stable and balanced settlements to long-standing conflicts has been endorsed in a substantial literature (Horowitz, 1985, 1990; Reilly, 2001; Reynolds, 2002; Lijphart, 2004; Wolff and Yakinthou, 2012). Yet, in many cases the pursuit of durable settlement through such reform has turned out to be ineffective, as the recent history of the Basque Country, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, and many other cases implies. This begs an important question: to what extent is institutional design sufficient to resolve complex problems of government, especially in the case of highly polarised societies, or are there other considerations that need to be borne in mind? This is the question that we address in this article, confronting the evidence provided by a pair of states in which we can detect structural similarities, socio-economic contrasts and cultural differences. These states have
been selected as ones where the challenge of finding a political solution to conflict was particularly demanding, since the stakes were extremely high: the two sides have had mutually incompatible goals, but each has potentially had sufficient demographic strength to perceive itself as having ‘majority’ status.

When states are ethnically divided, one group or coalition frequently enjoys a position of dominance so clear that the incentive for rebellion against it is low, and its own capacity to resist minority demands rests on very considerable political, economic and cultural resources. The recent history of ethnic minority protest movements illustrates just how common this pattern is. But what happens when the two groups in conflict are finely balanced, or where two groups of approximately equal size compete for power? This narrow focus dramatically reduces the range of available evidence. Early writing in this area identified a modest set of cases. Thus, for example, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972: 88-91) identified a category of ‘balanced competition’, in which two to three major groups were juxtaposed but none had a clear advantage, and cited the cases of Guyana, Belgium, Trinidad and Malaysia, noting that Northern Ireland might also eventually fall into this category. Milne (1981: 1-14) identified a category that he labelled ‘ethnically bipolar’, defined as having two major ethnic blocs of approximately equal size; in this he placed Guyana, Malaysia and Fiji (see also Fraenkel 2006b), while excluding other cases that might be considered as borderline (Suriname, Belgium, Belize, Trinidad and Lebanon). Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) identified ethnic polarisation—and not just ethnic diversity—as an important driver of conflict, and their measure permits a ranking of states according to the degree to which they are marked by tension between two groups of more or less equal size; the top 10 cases of ethnic polarisation they identify are, in order of magnitude, Jordan, Kuwait, St Lucia, Guatemala, Grenada, Fiji, Morocco, Belgium, Guinea, and Trinidad and Tobago.

In the present paper, we select two of the cases mentioned above—Northern Ireland in the Northwest Atlantic and Fiji in the Southwest Pacific—which at first sight bear little similarity to each other, but which further analysis suggests might form an intriguing paired comparison. Ireland was Britain’s closest colony, made part of the United Kingdom by the Act of Union in 1800, with Northern Ireland’s relationship to Britain redefined after partition in 1921. Fiji was one of Britain’s most distant and most remote outposts. Yet the colonial experience left both as ‘bipolar’ or ‘bicommunal’ polities, with electoral loyalties that centred strongly on entrenched communal divisions. Both reached landmark political settlements in the late 1990s. Fiji’s 1997 constitution was designed to bring an end to an era of discord between indigenous Fijian and Fiji Indian leaders which had been exacerbated by a military coup in
May 1987. Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement brought together unionist and nationalist politicians in an attempt to put a seal on the relative peace that had had been in place since 1994, following a prolonged triangular civil conflict between rival paramilitary groups and the security forces. Both agreements entailed use of preferential voting systems, which are often thought to ameliorate ethnic divisions and encourage moderates in deeply divided societies. Both also included provisions for mandatory power-sharing, aimed at bringing former rivals together in cabinet.

There are also important distinctions between these cases, at the levels of both electoral law and power sharing arrangements, and in practise outcomes differed considerably. Whereas political violence in Northern Ireland fell sharply in intensity after 1998, Fiji experienced coups in the wake of both the 1999 and 2006 elections, paving the way for a period of protracted military rule and the abrogation of the constitution in 2009. How are we to explain these contrasting outcomes—relative success in Northern Ireland, but a less favourable result in Fiji?

In pursuing an explanation, our starting point is essentially a ‘political architecture’ one: we examine the process of political compromise and institutional reform devised to provide an appropriate constitutional basis for peace. But we will argue that well-designed political architecture is insufficient: account needs to be taken of other cultural, geopolitical and economic factors. The next two sections examine the process by which polarised polities emerged, and the manner in which divisions became mobilised politically. We then examine the content of the agreements designed to overcome these divisions, focussing in particular on the provisions for converting voter preferences into parliamentary seats by means of the electoral system, and the impact of the power-sharing formula on government formation. We conclude by seeking to explain the different outcomes in the two cases, detecting elements of the explanation in the quality of institutional design, in the presence or absence of other fall-back mechanisms outside the domestic political process—the army in Fiji, and direct rule from London in Northern Ireland—as well as in political, cultural and socio-economic factors.

The emergence of polarised polities

Notwithstanding the geographical distance separating the two cases considered here, and their contrasting historical trajectories, there are two important comparable aspects of the political evolution of Fiji and Northern Ireland. The first is the British imperial legacy, with its important consequences for political institutions and political culture. The second is the long-term impact of policies of plantation and settlement, which resulted in a relatively even balance of two distinct but geographically overlapping and competing populations of similar size (the Northern Ireland population numbered 1.8 million in 2011, and the Fijian population...
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0.8 million in 2007; the respective areas of the two states are 14,000 and 18,000 square kilometres).

Northern Ireland may be seen as a periphery of the island of Ireland; but the status of Ireland has been defined over the centuries essentially as a periphery of Great Britain (Coakley, 2008a). Unlike the position in the two other Celtic peripheries, Scotland and Wales, English rule in Ireland never achieved a level of popular acceptance sufficient to permit it to become a contented part of the United Kingdom. In the seventeenth century, British strategy for the pacification of Ireland rested substantially on a policy of ‘plantation’, encouraging the settlement, especially in the northern province of Ulster, of English and Scottish Protestants on land confiscated from the native Irish (largely Catholic) population. This policy left a vivid demographic legacy that was given new life in the nineteenth century, when mass mobilization of Catholics behind demands for ‘home rule’ or autonomy within the United Kingdom found its counterpart in mass mobilization of Ulster Protestants in defence of their British heritage. The outcome was an imperfect partition of the island in 1921: the southern part quickly established its de facto and eventually its de jure independence, while Northern Ireland remained a divided periphery of the United Kingdom, albeit one enjoying a measure of self-government.

British colonization of Fiji occurred in an altogether different global context at the end of an era of establishing settler colonies, most importantly in nearby Australia and New Zealand. Colonial rule was accepted by leading indigenous customary chiefs, who ceded Fiji to the British Crown in 1874. British policy was to coopt and rule through the traditional leaders, not to displace them in the interests of establishing yet another colony that would serve as a magnet for the overseas exodus of Europeans. The first formally appointed Governor, Sir Arthur Gordon, put in place a ‘protectionist’ policy prohibiting further alienation of native lands, restricting indigenous participation as plantation labourers and codifying in law the obligations of Fijian ‘commoners’ to their traditional chiefs. To provide a labour force for the sugar plantations, more than 60,000 indentured labourers were brought from the Indian sub-continent between 1879 and 1916. Their wages were low and conditions poor, and contracts were punitively enforced through the courts, leaving a lasting legacy of bitterness against the colonial order. After indenture was ended in 1916, the sugar industry was reorganized. Indian tenant farmers, normally on land leased either from native owners or from the state, supplied sugar cane mainly to the Australian-owned Colonial Sugar Refining Company. By 1921, when Ireland was partitioned, colonial Fiji had established for itself a political economy based on reliance on Indian labour, Fijian land and white-owned capital.

[figure 1 about here]
The subsequent demographic experience of both Fiji and Northern Ireland, summarised in figure 1, compounded the inevitable political difficulties. Designed as a region in which Protestants would have a clear majority, Northern Ireland had a large Catholic minority of 35% in 1921. The minority remained at this level until the 1970s, but from that point onwards it began to increase steadily (a consequence in part of differential migration patterns, but in particular of big differences in rates of natural increase between the two communities). Catholics accounted for about 45% of the population by 2011, and projections based on age structure suggest that, other things being equal, Catholics will outnumber Protestants by the middle of the twenty-first century.

In Fiji, decline in the indigenous population as a result of exposure to hitherto unfamiliar infectious diseases was halted only in the 1920s, after the global influenza epidemic resulted in the deaths of around 5% of ethnic Fijians. Meanwhile, the Fiji Indians increased in number, and Fiji-born Indians came to outnumber those who had sailed from Calcutta or Madras. By 1946 indigenous Fijians found themselves out-numbered by the descendants of the immigrant population. Nevertheless, indigenous birth-rates were accelerating by the 1960s, and by the 1980s Indian out-migration—particularly after the coup in 1987—allowed the indigenous population to reclaim a majority. By 2007, the share of ethnic Fijians had grown to 56.8% and that of Fiji Indians had dropped to 37.5% (Fiji, 2008: 4).

Figure 2 offers a commentary on the big difference in patterns of demographic evolution in these two cases, focusing on the two largest groups in the respective societies. The Northern Ireland pattern shows the impact of a higher fertility rate on the part of Catholics, the symmetry of the pattern of Catholic increase broken on the left-hand side of the diagram as the Catholic birth-rate assimilated to the Protestant one in the late twentieth century. This trend resembles that of ethnic Fijians, where an initially very high level of natural increase has been replaced by a much lower one. But the absence of symmetry in the Fijian case arises from an anomalous pattern among Fiji Indians. The report on the 2007 census pointed out that the Fiji Indian level of fertility in 1966 had been ‘amongst the highest in the world’, but that the extremely rapid pace of fertility transition had resulted in a move to the opposite extreme, with a drop below replacement level by the early twenty-first century, so that ‘from now onwards, the Indian population will decline in numbers, even in the absence of emigration’ (Fiji, 2008: 41). Since the 1987 coup the Fiji Indian emigration rate has been extremely high, and has been interpreted as ‘undoubtedly by far the most important factor’ in accounting for that community’s relative population decline (Fiji, 2008: 2).
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Ethnic political mobilisation

Bipolar politics cast a long shadow on patterns of political mobilisation in the two cases. Northern Ireland had traditionally been characterized by a two-party system that essentially represented a continuation of the political cleavages of the nineteenth century.¹ On one side was the Ulster Unionist Party, representing the Protestant population of Northern Ireland and forming part of the British Conservative Party. Its main opponent was the Nationalist Party, originally an all-Ireland organization, but confined to Northern Ireland after 1921. After the partition of Ireland, competition between these two parties was confined to the narrower ground of Northern Ireland, where the Unionist Party assumed control of the new autonomous territory. The fact that the British government allowed the Northern Ireland government a free hand facilitated policies essentially of ethnic exclusion (including gerrymandering at local election level and discrimination in the allocation of public housing and employment), as unionists monopolised the most important positions in the power hierarchy.

The shocks of the civil unrest that began after 1968, driven by Catholic grievances, gave a severe jolt to the traditional party system. On the Catholic side, the success of the civil rights movement and dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness of the Nationalist Party led to the creation of a new party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), in 1970. Notwithstanding its name and its affiliation to the international socialist movement, the party’s de facto role quickly became that of representative of the Catholic community, replacing the Nationalist Party. The cornerstone of the SDLP’s policy has been acceptance of existing constitutional realities, coupled with a commitment to power sharing government and a demand for recognition of the Irish identity of the minority within Northern Ireland through the creation of overarching all-Ireland institutions. The more radical alternative on the Catholic side, the IRA, largely stood aside from electoral politics during the 1970s, and fought a guerrilla campaign for Irish unity. From the early 1980s onwards, however, its political wing, Sinn Féin, became an enthusiastic participant in elections. Initially offering only a modest challenge to the SDLP, by the early twenty-first century it had pulled ahead of that party in its pursuit of Catholic support (see table 1, which reports results of Northern Ireland elections over the period 1969-2011).

1 For further analysis of the Northern Ireland case, see McGarry and O’Leary, 2004, 2009; Ruane and Todd, 1996, 1999; Tonge, 2002; Wilford, 2001.
On the Protestant side, the Unionist Party splintered in the face of changed political circumstances. Northern Ireland’s original devolved parliamentary and governmental institutions were suspended in 1972, depriving the Unionist Party of power, and the party itself split three ways, managing to re-unify only in the late 1970s. In addition, it was challenged from the outside by the more militant Protestant Unionist Party, reorganized in 1971 as the Democratic Unionist Party. Elections to an abortive Northern Ireland Assembly in 1973 and to a Constitutional Convention in 1975 showed the profound fragmentation of unionism. By the time elections to a new consultative Assembly took place in 1982, however, the unionist tradition was dominated by two forces: the old Unionist Party, and its radical challenger, the Democratic Unionist Party. Following the Good Friday agreement of 1998, the consociational deal brokered by the British and Irish governments that permitted the reintroduction of devolved government in Northern Ireland, the Democratic Unionist Party steadily increased its level of support in the new Assembly, finally becoming the largest party there.

This pattern of stable electoral competition since the early 1980s (with a moderate and a militant party on each side of the communal division) is completed by the rather less significant political centre. The middle terrain had originally been occupied by the Northern Ireland Labour Party, which sought to emphasise issues of social class rather than constitutional divisions. In 1970, a new party -- the Alliance Party -- appeared, seeking to draw support from both Protestants and Catholics, and it quickly became the dominant force in the centre (Coakley, 2008b).

Political mobilisation in Fiji was initially characterized by a confrontation between Indian politicians and the colonial state. The British colonial system of government was based on the notion of communal representation, with seats on the legislative council divided between Fijians, Fiji-Indians and the tiny but powerful ‘European’ minority. When election eventually replaced nomination in determining membership of the legislative council, this was based on three separate communal electoral rolls (lists of racially classified voters who were entitled to vote for designated seats for members of their own ethnic group). This system, which ensured ‘parity’ between Indian, Fijian and ‘European’ representation, was understandably

2 Gillion 1977. For further analysis of the Fiji case, see Fraenkel, 2003, 2006b; Premdas, 1995; Firth, 2012.

3 ‘Europeans’ were people of European descent, though many were from Australia, New Zealand or North America; this category later included people of mixed descent
seen by Indian leaders as a tool of colonial exploitation. These arrangements helped to nurture two enduring features of Fiji politics—indigenous ambivalence towards calls for popular democracy, and a political alliance between Fijian and ‘European’ representatives against the ‘Indian threat’. When the thorny question of devising political institutions to accompany decolonization came under consideration in the mid-1960s, the compromise reached in London entailed creation of a multi-ethnic ‘national’ constituency alongside the communal ones, rather than concession of the key Indian demand for a common electoral roll (Norton 2004; Lal 2008).

At independence in 1970, then, the British bequeathed to Fiji an elaborate and ethnically weighted electoral system, designed as a compromise between Indian and ethnic Fijian demands as regards political representation. Political parties emerged much later in Fiji than in Northern Ireland—only in the twilight of the colonial era in the 1960s—but the pattern was also that of an emerging two party system. On one side was the Federation Party (renamed National Federation Party in 1968), born in the Indian-dominated sugar cane regions and able to win all of the Indian communal constituencies from 1966 to 1982. At the other end of the spectrum, the Alliance Party appealed primarily to indigenous Fijian voters but sought to sustain links with leading European politicians. It won most of the Fijian and ‘general voter’ seats from 1966 to 1982 (the ‘general voters’, a category originally dominated by Europeans, were those falling outside the two main ethnic groups). Each party was reasonably certain of success in the communal constituencies of its associated ethnic group, with the overall election outcome invariably being decided in those ‘national’ constituencies where ethnic Fijians and Fiji Indians approached parity in numbers. Despite the overarching bipolar political pattern, because of the first-past-the-post electoral system, small breakaway splinter parties or variations in turnout could make a major difference in the close-to-parity marginal seats, and these decided the overall outcomes at the most tightly contested elections in April 1977 and 1987 (see table 2).

The ethnic Fijian Alliance Party was easily able to win the initial post-independence election in 1972, because in addition to solid Fijian and general voter support, it had the support of 23.7% of Fiji Indians. That was to prove the largest share of the Indian vote ever secured by this, or any other, predominantly Fijian-backed party. By the mid-1970s, the party’s efforts to command the political centre were undermined by the emergence of the Fijian Nationalist Party, which obtained 24.3% of the ethnic Fijian vote in April 1977, depriving the Alliance Party of a majority (though, after Fiji’s first major post-colonial constitutional crisis, it was able to continue in office in a caretaker capacity). At fresh elections in September 1977, the
Alliance Party was able to regain control, assisted by a split in the Fiji Indian National Federation Party. Fiji’s political history during the 1970s resembles the classic pattern sketched by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972: 88-9): an ethnic outbidder forces a centrist party towards a more robust defence of communal interests. Following the shock of losing the election in April 1977, the Alliance Party calculated (like the 1970s Northern Irish parties as observed by Richard Rose) that ‘the chances of winning an extra seat by adding a few votes from the other community were much less than the chances of losing votes by appearing “soft” on key sectarian issues’ (Rose, 1976: 78).

This pattern of ethnic Fijian electoral dominance was broken in 1987: the Alliance Party was again defeated, this time by a coalition between the National Federation Party and the newly formed Fiji Labour Party, each of which was reliant largely on the votes of the Fiji Indians. These parties formed a new government, led by an indigenous Fijian, but a month later it was overthrown by the overwhelmingly indigenous Fijian military forces. Efforts to reach a settlement that would entail a restoration of constitutional rule were derailed by a further military intervention in September 1987, after which the 1970 constitution was abrogated. On the basis of a new 1990 constitution, which reserved the positions of President and Prime Minister for indigenous Fijians, and gave the Fijians 37 of the 70 parliamentary seats as compared to 27 for the Indians, Fiji went back to the polls in 1992. Coup leader General Rabuka emerged as Prime Minister at the head of a new party, the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), which gained 66.5% of the ethnic Fijian vote. This outcome was repeated in the 1994 election, when the SVT Fijian vote share fell only slightly to 65.3%. Although the 1987 coup was bloodless, it left a lasting legacy of civil strife and communal antagonism: Indian hostility to Rabuka’s government was to remain strong even after the coup leader embraced reform in the mid-1990s.

Character of political settlements

The pursuit of efforts to resolve inter-communal conflict in the two cases illustrates a significant contrast between dependencies and sovereign states, as well as drawing attention to other important differences between Northern Ireland and Fiji. In the former, it was ultimately the British government that played the key decision making role; in the latter, competition between the two communities was not moderated by any outside power, but the army eventually intervened. In Northern Ireland, a prolonged campaign of violence over the years 1970-94 resulted in more than 3,000 deaths and colossal social, economic and psychological damage; in Fiji, ethnic Fijian control of the armed forces meant that military rule rather than civil conflict or external intervention was the main alternative to political
accommodation. Finally, Northern Ireland’s very existence was at issue, unlike the position in Fiji: nationalists wanted not just an end to British rule, but union with the Republic of Ireland.

In Northern Ireland, the pursuit of a settlement was hampered by the gap between the ultimate aims of the parties, but was facilitated by the role of outside forces (notably, of the British government, from the early 1970s operating in concert with the Irish government). After the old, Unionist-dominated majoritarian institutions of Northern Ireland were abolished in 1972, the British government made it clear that Northern Ireland would not be fully integrated within the United Kingdom, but that ‘direct rule’ would be imposed pending an internal settlement. It also required any such settlement to have two components: it would be based on power sharing between the two communities, and it would recognise the ‘Irish dimension’ to the problem by establishing formal links with the Republic of Ireland.

The most ambitious effort to meet these conditions occurred in 1973-74, when a power-sharing government linking the Ulster Unionist Party, the SDLP and the Alliance Party took office, and an all-island Council of Ireland was planned. This initiative failed, however, in the face of militant unionist opposition and a general strike. Subsequent efforts in 1975-76 (through the election of a constitutional convention) and in 1980-82 (through inter-party talks, and the election of a new consultative assembly) failed to produce agreement. In 1985, the British government introduced a new source of pressure on unionists by offering a formal voice to the Irish government in matters affecting the government of Northern Ireland, pending a domestic settlement.

The ultimate outcome was a set of prolonged inter-party talks in the mid-1990s, facilitated by paramilitary ceasefires, eventually resulting in agreement in 1998. This provided for a set of consociational structures: an assembly elected by the single transferable vote, a government made up of ministers selected in proportion to party strengths in the Assembly, and provisions for a veto on matters affecting the vital interests of either community. The new posts of First Minister and Deputy First Minister were created; these were to be elected in a joint vote, and were required to come from different communities. The agreement also provided for new political structures linking the Republic of Ireland with Northern Ireland, and with the United Kingdom more generally. Importantly, measures for dealing with the legacy of violence were also put in place. The agreement got off to a faltering start, with the power sharing government collapsing in 2002, as discussed below, and it was initially opposed by the militant Democratic Unionist Party. It was placed on a more secure footing in 2007, when the Democratic Unionists finally signed up to a slightly amended version. Since then, the government headed by a Democratic Unionist First Minister and a Sinn Féin Deputy First Minister seems to have brought a new level of political stability to Northern Ireland, even
though, critics argued, a heavy price was paid for this: consociation required recognition (and therefore, arguably, institutionalisation and reinforcement) of intercommunal divisions.

The pressures towards accommodation were more domestic in origin in Fiji than in Northern Ireland. After the 1987 coup, the prospects for a settlement acceptable to the Fiji Indians had looked bleak. The 1990 constitution had been designed as an ‘interim’ arrangement lasting seven years. In 1995, deliberations on a new constitution began. A Constitutional Review Commission, chaired by former New Zealand Governor-General Sir Paul Reeves, proposed a compromise between the demands of Fijian and Indian political leaders in the areas of electoral reform and political representation (Reeves et al., 1996; Lal, 1997, 1998). The commission’s recommendations were mostly accepted by a parliamentary select committee, and the amended version was enacted into law.

The new dispensation was innovative as regards both the legislative and executive branches of government. First, there was to be a 71-member parliament, with 25 ‘open’ constituencies (a much lower proportion than proposed by the Reeves Commission) and 46 communal constituencies divided between Fijians (23), Indians (19), General voters (3) and Rotuman islanders (1), roughly in accordance with population shares. Each voter had two votes, one in a communal constituency and the other in an open constituency. The Australian-style alternative vote system was to be used in all 71 constituencies, with compulsory registration, compulsory voting and a requirement that at least 75% of candidates be ranked in order of preference. Ostensibly to simplify the ballot, a form of ticket voting was adopted, modelled on that used for elections to the Australian Senate. Voters could either record preferences ‘below-the-line’ (ranking at least 75% of candidates), or they could simply tick next to a political party ‘above the line’. Doing the latter entailed endorsing party lists of preferences, which were lodged with the Elections Office prior to each election. This proved a particularly important provision since around 92-95% of ballot papers were completed above-the-line, thereby granting political parties an exceptional degree of control over the allocation of preference votes (for details, see Fraenkel, 2001). Second, the President and Vice-President were to be nominated by the Great Council of Chiefs, an all-indigenous body. The Reeves Commission had rejected mandatory power-sharing, claiming that the alternative vote system would spontaneously deliver robust inter-ethnic coalitions (Lal, 1998: 93). The finally agreed arrangements, by contrast, provided that all parties with over 10% of seats would be entitled to participate in cabinet (Fiji, 1997: 17).

Whereas in Northern Ireland, arrangements for proportionality in the distribution of ministerial appointments were combined with a proportional representation-based electoral system, in Fiji a majoritarian electoral system was adopted with only cabinet portfolios distributed
proportionally. This difference in the underlying electoral system comprised one of the most important institutional contrasts between the two political settlements.

**The operation of preferential voting**

The single transferable vote system of proportional representation was introduced to Northern Ireland in 1920 for local elections, and one year later for elections to the new, devolved institutions, with a view to facilitating minority representation. However, the local Unionist administration re-introduced the plurality system for local elections in 1922 and for elections to the Northern Ireland House of Commons in 1929, and this continued as the electoral system until devolved government collapsed in 1972. The reputation of this system was damaged by abuses at local level, and the single transferable vote was reintroduced in 1973. All subsequent elections to Northern Ireland assemblies (and indeed to local authorities) have taken place under this system, with one exception: in 1996 a list system of proportional representation was used in elections to a constitutional forum.

The outcome of elections under the single transferable vote was predictable: there was a high degree of votes-seats proportionality, aided by relatively large constituencies. The system also helped to allow the representation of separate tendencies that would have been forced to coalesce under the plurality system. Thus, a political landscape once dominated by two parties was now host to a multi-party system. The Ulster Unionist Party had for some time been challenged from its militant and moderate fringes by the Democratic Unionist Party and the Alliance Party respectively; but in the mid-1970s the main party itself divided three ways, with frustrated militants and moderates going their separate ways, a luxury facilitated by proportional representation. By the 1980s, however, only the Democratic Unionists survived to challenge the Ulster Unionists from the militant side; and the SDLP was now facing a much more powerful challenge on the militant nationalist side, Sinn Féin. By the early 1980s, the five-party system that survives to the present had been securely established.

Fiji's choice in 1997 of a single-member alternative vote (AV) system, and of a predominantly communal seat allocation system, ensured that electoral outcomes in 1999, 2001 and 2006 were broadly consistent with the experience of 1970-87 under the plurality system. In all three AV elections, the 19 Indian communal seats were taken by the largest Fiji Indian-backed party, the Fiji Labour Party, each of them two-party contests with the National Federation Party. The new voting system made no difference to these outcomes, since the Fiji Labour Party obtained over 50% of votes at the first count in every Indian communal constituency. Thus there was no need for ballot transfers. By contrast, contests for the 23 Fijian communal seats in 1999 involved multiple parties, and ballot transfers proved critical,
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with preferences mostly disadvantaging the Fijian-supported SVT, the party of the incumbent government. In the wake of the coup of 19 May 2000, which entailed the overthrow of the Labour government by ethnic Fijian extremists, contests for the 23 Fijian seats in 2001 and 2006 were marked by a shift to more militant Fijian parties, with the new Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL meaning ‘United Fiji Party’) as the main beneficiary (Fraenkel and Grofman, 2006).

Since parties rooted in the Fijian community could make no headway in the Indian communal constituencies, and vice versa, the overall outcome at all three elections was inevitably dependent on contests in the 25 open constituencies. In 1999, the Fiji Labour Party was able to win 18 of those open seats, largely drawing on party official-controlled transfers of preference votes from the ethnic Fijian-backed parties. In 2001, the tables were turned, and the SDL was able to win 13 of the 25 open seats, largely drawing on preference votes transferred from the small centrist ‘Moderates Forum’ parties. In 2006, the outcome was virtually a dead heat, with the SDL taking 13 and the Fiji Labour Party 12 of the 25 open seats. The high degree of disproportionality witnessed at the first AV elections in 1999 and 2001 diminished in 2006, and the squeezing out of centrists between the two increasingly homogeneous ethnic parties was reflected in the fact that the number of first count leaders who eventually failed to win seats fell to zero.

Two important questions arise in respect of the electoral experimentation we have described. The first is the system’s overall proportionality between party vote and seat shares. In table 3 we reproduce Michael Gallagher’s (1991) ‘least squares’ index of disproportionality. The lower this figure, the more proportional the system; zero would represent perfect proportionality, and figures below about five indicate a reasonably proportional arrangement. Northern Ireland traditionally fared poorly by this measure: prior to 1973 the proportionality index was very high, with the Unionist Party, in particular, normally winning many more seats than its share of the votes should have entitled it to (though the index is hard to interpret here, given the high proportion of uncontested constituencies). Fiji demonstrates the difficulties of the plurality system, with its disproportionate outcomes, though it is striking that even under this system some relatively proportional results were achieved, as in 1982. This was largely because of the presence of two large and relatively homogenous ethnic parties, each protected by a substantial number of communal seats. Intra-ethnic splintering could potentially generate a striking increase in disproportionality, as seen at the second election in 1977. Of course, this table is based on mechanical analysis of data; we need to recall also
that the plurality system encourages tactical voting, making it difficult to infer voters’ sincere preferences.

The second major question is the extent to which the preferential voting systems discussed here promoted cross-ethnic vote pooling. In Northern Ireland, vote transfers across the ethnic divide have tended to be miniscule, and preferential voting has offered little encouragement to centrist parties. However, there is some evidence that vote transfers assisted the more ‘moderate’ of the competing parties within the two ethnic blocs. In Fiji, the Reeves Commission concluded that the alternative vote system ‘encourages the emergence’ of moderate parties, and that it would facilitate the formation of multi-ethnic governments (Lal, 1997: 81). But experience does not bear this out: the three elections of 1999, 2001 and 2006 saw a polarization of the political stage, with moderates faring increasingly poorly. The bulk of vote transfers did not flow towards the centre, but tended instead to assist the more radical parties. To the extent that a potential for multi-ethnic government arose, it was due to the 1997 constitution’s provisions for power-sharing, which we examine in the next section.

The operation of power-sharing

The constitutional settlements in Northern Ireland and Fiji in the closing years of the twentieth century offered some prospect of political stability, but implementation posed formidable difficulties. In Northern Ireland, although most parties signed up to the power-sharing deal in April 1998, and a referendum and Assembly election a few weeks later showed popular endorsement of the new arrangements, the new government took office only in December 1999. It was only then, too, that the other institutional components of the agreement (such as the North-South Ministerial Council, and the British-Irish Council) came into existence. The delay arose from the refusal of the Unionist Party to enter government with Sinn Féin until the process of IRA disarmament had begun. A creative ‘fudge’ on this matter finally allowed the new government to take office. The formal provisions of the 1998 agreement were as follows:

14. Executive authority to be discharged on behalf of the Assembly by a First Minister and Deputy First Minister and up to ten Ministers with Departmental responsibilities.
15. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister shall be jointly elected into office by the Assembly voting on a cross-community basis, ....
16. Following the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, the posts of Ministers will be allocated to parties on the basis of the d’Hondt system by reference to the number of seats each party has in the Assembly (Ireland, 1998)

Each party selects one of the 10 pre-determined portfolios as its turn arises. Thus, when the agreement was implemented, three Unionist and SDLP ministers and two Sinn Féin and
Democratic Unionist ministers took up their posts (the latter, opposed to the agreement, refused to attend government meetings but otherwise fulfilled their functions).

Following the final collapse of the crisis-ridden government in 2002, direct rule from London was reinstated. Fresh Assembly elections in 2003 showed the two militant parties, the DUP and Sinn Féin, surpassing their more moderate rivals, but stalemate continued at the level of government formation. This was finally broken in late 2006 when a supplementary agreement between the parties and the British and Irish governments was reached in St Andrews, Scotland. This made minor changes to the provisions for selection of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister and to certain other provisions of the 1998 agreement. These were sufficient to win Democratic Unionist endorsement. Following a further election in 2007 that demonstrated the dominance of the Democratic Unionists and Sinn Féin within their respective communities, the governmental institutions were restored—with the First Minister and Deputy First Minister posts now held by these two parties. This pattern was confirmed in a further election in 2011, after which the focus of the institutions shifted increasingly from divisive constitutional and symbolic matter—which, however, continue to lurk in the background and occasionally to spill over into intercommunal antagonism—to the safer ground of social and economic policy.

Fiji's power-sharing arrangements were not part of the original constitutional recommendations of the 1995-96 Reeves Commission, but were proposed by the parliamentary select committee that considered its recommendations, and incorporated in the constitution in 1997. The relevant articles were as follows:

90. The President and Vice-President are appointed by the Bose Levu Vakaturaga [Council of Chiefs] after consultation by the Bose Levu Vakaturaga with the Prime Minister. …
98. The President, acting in his or her own judgment appoints as Prime Minister the member of the House of Representatives who, in the President's opinion, can form a government that has the confidence of the House of Representatives. …
99. (3) The Prime Minister must establish a multi-party Cabinet in the way set out in this section comprising such number of Ministers as he or she determines.
(4) Subject to this section, the composition of the Cabinet should, as far as possible, fairly represent the parties represented in the House of Representatives.
(5) In establishing the Cabinet, the Prime Minister must invite all parties whose membership in the House of Representatives comprises at least 10% of the total membership of the House to be represented in the Cabinet in proportion to their numbers in the House (Fiji, 1998).
Notwithstanding further articles that sought to cover such eventualities as parties refusing invitations to join the government, or offers of posts to parties with less than 10% of seats, important gaps remained. There was no control over which portfolios qualifying parties would receive, nor any provisions for participating parties to have input into the selection of ministers, nor any specified limits on the overall size of cabinet.

These gaps resulted in extensive litigation after the 1999 and 2001 elections (Fraenkel, 2006a). Following victory in the May 1999 election, the leader of the largely Fiji Indian-backed Fiji Labour Party gave portfolios to his three coalition allies, only one of which had reached the 10% threshold. As legally required, he also offered participation to Rabuka’s SVT. With 38% of the indigenous vote, the SVT was the largest Fijian party by vote share, but as a result of the new alternative vote system it had just 8 seats in parliament, only narrowly reaching the 10% threshold. Bristling from its election defeat, the former governing party put conditions on its participation, which the prime minister rejected. An appeal to the courts resulted in a decision in favour of the prime minister. The excluded SVT instead assumed leadership of the official opposition, and SVT politicians figured prominently in the initially small extra-parliamentary indigenous Fijian movement to depose the Labour government. On its first anniversary, that government was overthrown by Fijian extremists, including some of the backbenchers whose leaders had joined the Labour-led government.

After the 2001 election, the tables were turned, with victory for the newly formed and mainly ethnic Fijian-backed SDL. Hoping to follow the earlier pattern, the SDL leader offered cabinet participation to the Fiji Labour Party leader, whose party had 27 of the 71 seats, but stated that the two parties had ‘diametrically opposed’ policies, that government would be based on SDL policy, and that power sharing was ‘unrealistic and unworkable’ (Qarase, cited in Fraenkel 2006a: 325). Following a stand-off, a coalition government was formed that excluded the largest Fiji Indian-backed party. An appeal to the courts this time, however, resulted in rejection of the prime minister’s stance. He was forced to broaden the base of the government, but sought to get around this by nominating an inflated, 36-member cabinet, with a set of tokenistic portfolios, with minimal responsibilities, going to the Fiji Labour Party.

Later litigation exposed two difficulties with the constitutional wording. First, it was not clear whether proportionality referred to a party’s proportion of all seats in parliament, or its proportion of the total number of seats of all parties eligible for membership of the government through meeting the 10% threshold. The Supreme Court ruled in 2003 in favour of the latter interpretation; thus, the Fiji Labour Party might claim 47% of portfolios, rather than 39%. The second difficulty was that, as the Supreme Court recognised in 2004, strict application of this ruling might result in ‘a Cabinet dominated numerically by parties hostile to
the Government, with the consequence that the Cabinet (or government) would not have the confidence of the House’; it therefore allowed for balancing appointments of non-party ministers. The Fiji Labour Party rejected the resulting offer of cabinet participation and instead, with an election looming, opted for opposition. After the 2006 election, in which the SDL won an overall majority, the Fiji Labour Party split in response to an offer of participation in government. A promising experiment in power-sharing, for the first time involving the major Fijian and Fiji Indian parties, was overthrown by the military coup of December 2006 (see Green, 2009).

The ultimate success of efforts to install power sharing government in Northern Ireland and Fiji was, then, rather uneven. In Northern Ireland, the ‘safety net’ of direct rule from London permitted the new institutions to collapse in 2002. The British government was able to continue to administer Northern Ireland until 2007; societal chaos and renewal of armed conflict was not the only alternative to a power-sharing government. In Fiji, too, there was an alternative to the parliamentary system, but here it was indigenous rather than external. Military intervention in 2006 took on a more enduring form than had been the case after earlier coups; the alternative to power sharing turned out to be not civil war, but rule by decree, backed by the military, and an authoritarian state structure.

**Assessment**

The 1997-98 political settlements in Fiji and Northern Ireland aimed to bring closure to troubled eras of civil strife. The level of violence in Fiji was much less than that in Northern Ireland, but Fiji Indian alienation from the state was nevertheless intense. In Fiji, resistance was limited by the monopoly on weaponry of the Fijian military, made up overwhelmingly of ethnic Fijians. The process of implementation of the agreements draws attention to several lessons for conflict resolution in balanced bipolar systems. They have to do with the adequacy of institutional design, including provisions for the conduct of elections and formation of power-sharing cabinets, and as regards the extent to which exogenous factors undermine or reinforce the process of implementing agreements.

First, there appear to be important respects in which the formula in Northern Ireland has been more effective than that in Fiji. This is to be seen in the first place in the electoral system. The re-introduction of STV in Northern Ireland in 1973 provoked some initial unionist resistance, but it quickly acquired near-universal acceptance as a system for translating votes into seats, yielded low levels of invalid voting, and did not generate major discrepancies between vote and seat shares. The temporary use of the list system of proportional representation in 1996 was precisely that: a one-off effort to secure representation for very small groups seen as vital in the negotiation process. Fiji’s use of the
alternative vote, coupled with ticket voting, helped to deliver unusually disproportionate results and a high level of invalid voting and, in the wake of the 1999 election, exacerbated tensions. The key architects of the political settlement would have been defeated under any electoral system, but the alternative vote inflated the extent of their electoral defeats in 1999, and magnified the risk of extra-parliamentary action to oust the Fiji Indian-led government. Aside from continuing non-proportional effects, AV encouraged intense communal polarization at subsequent elections and ensured that Fiji’s parliament had an under-represented political centre.

Second, Northern Ireland’s arrangements were more effectively proofed against political irresponsibility than those in Fiji: parties simply designate their ministerial nominees in accordance with a mathematical formula, and the posts of First Minister and Deputy First Minister, originally to be elected by the Assembly, have since 2007 been chosen in the same automatic way, removing the need for extended negotiation. In Fiji, by contrast, while parties winning a minimum share of seats acquired guaranteed representation in government, the system did not work smoothly in practice. The absence of a ceiling on cabinet size, lack of qualifying party input into ministerial selection and substantial misfit with retained Westminster foundations generated continuing difficulties. In a context of intense inter-party haggling and discord, much of the responsibility for enforcing the multi-party cabinet provisions fell to the courts; indeed, perhaps the most extensive litigation concerning power-sharing anywhere in the world was contained in successive rulings by the Fiji High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. Ultimately, the court eased the power-sharing constraint on the 2001-06 Fijian government by allowing the Prime Minister to appoint additional non-party ministers or senators to cabinet unconstrained by the power-sharing formula. Once it did so the major Fiji Indian party declined to participate in cabinet.

Third, the cost of institutional collapse has always been a major—if not always a sufficient—deterrent for ethnic elites. Where political settlements fail, the result is frequently intense social conflict or civil warfare, and usually, at a minimum, a lasting legacy of bitterness. Yet there is another alternative to power-sharing (and, indeed, Westminster-style) government: authoritarian government, often under the control of the military. In both Fiji and Northern Ireland, forces outside the parliamentary arena were critical to the fate of political settlements. In Fiji, the December 2006 military coup was not just a reaction to institutional failure; it was also an intervention in a political arena that bore the scars of the 1987 and 2000 coups and of a troubled subsequent era of civilian governance. It was initially, ostensibly, a ‘clean-up campaign’ against corruption, but was soon declared to be a military-driven effort to transcend ethnic cleavages arising from an electoral history dominated by
Conflict in Fiji and Northern Ireland

communal loyalties. In non-sovereign states, another alternative to democratic government is possible: external rule can hold the line as regards domestic conflict and even, as in Northern Ireland from 2002 to 2007, provide a reasonable level of effective day-to-day government. But in this case external interest was not just a safety net: the British government’s commitment to a stable Northern Ireland, actively supported by the Irish and American governments, was a vital resource at the disposal of the power sharing executive.

Conclusion

There are striking differences between the two cases we have considered in this article, not least differences in geopolitical context (presence/absence of a supportive external environment) and in levels of socio-economic development. Indeed, these factors are interrelated. The quality of life of most Northern Ireland residents is guaranteed not by the vibrancy of the local economy (which has seen the disappearance of many of its traditional industries, such as engineering, ship-building and textile manufacture) but by financial transfers from the UK government. In Fiji, it was financial inflows associated with the tourism industry that rescued an economy in which the traditional industry, sugar, was in steep decline. There was no external party to bail out the government. In neither case did strong economic development facilitate the emergence of progressive elites willing to promote or embrace political settlements. In both cases, domestic politicians seeking to bridge the communal divide were often few in number and politically weak, at times even paralysed. Instead, in Northern Ireland the presence of a powerful external player – the British state – was critical to the success of the political settlement. In Fiji, there was no such overseas force, but there was a strong domestic player that stood outside the political arena, which initially saw itself as the upholder of the new constitutional arrangement. The Republic of Fiji Military Forces—ironically prepared by its UN experience for intervention in civilian conflict (Firth and Fraenkel, 2009) — saw itself as a guardian holding the ring when civilian elites failed to engage in compromise and reconciliation. Eventually, however, it was the Fiji military that destroyed the 1997 settlement, and substituted a new 2013 constitution designed to transcend ethnic cleavages.

The failure of Fiji’s 1997 political settlement was not an inevitable consequence of the political institutions chosen. It was rather, initially, the inability of the architects of the constitutional compromise to secure election in 1999 that threatened to destroy the accord. The incoming Labour-led government — which viewed conflict solely through a lens founded on social class rather than ethnicity — refused to recognise the threat not just from ethnic Fijian extremists, but also from the more mainstream or ‘moderate’ indigenous politicians (for whom the common post-coup refrain was that they accepted the ‘goals’ but not the ‘means’).
The choice of institutions did, however, exacerbate difficulties. The majoritarian AV system gave Labour an absolute majority in 1999, removing dependence on forging a coalition. Although Labour formed a ‘People’s Coalition’ with several small Fijian parties, these allied parties had little leverage because there was no possibility of ousting the government through a no confidence vote, so encouraging support for extra-parliamentary methods of ousting the government. Fiji’s power-sharing institutions were poorly devised, and did not fit well with the majoritarian electoral system. Loopholes were easily exploited by governments either to free themselves of the need to forge multi-ethnic cabinets or to disempower unwanted coalition allies. In Northern Ireland, the mandatory power sharing institutions were more skilfully crafted, and since there was a proportional electoral system in place there was anyway greater encouragement for some kind of coalition government than under Fiji’s AV system.

In both settings, the legacy of protracted conflict was a major threat to political settlements, and this would have been true no matter which political institutions had been adopted. The loss of life was, importantly, far greater in Northern Ireland than in Fiji, but Fiji Indian alienation from the state (dating back to the colonial era and the experience of indentured labour) was comparable to the experience of Catholics in post-partition Northern Ireland. In both cases, states failed to overcome this alienation by delivering material benefits (not just to Indians in Fiji, but now too impoverished sections of the ethnic Fijian population; not just to Catholics in Northern Ireland, but now too disenchanted working-class Protestants).

Political culture is not merely a matter for the masses; elites, too, are trapped in the world of their own collective and individual upbringing, and, particularly in deeply divided bipolar societies, are often pressured to be responsive to the perceived needs of their supporters. Critics have argued that they are often unprepared to offer decisive leadership and are captured by hard-liners into half-hearted support for inter-communal settlements (an allegation levelled at Unionist leader David Trimble in Northern Ireland, and Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara after the 1977 crisis in Fiji). As these two cases show, if inter-ethnic government is to be established and survive without dependence on external force, a minimum level of trust between elites on either side must be present. The great dilemma of governing such societies is that power sharing is most important precisely when the conditions for its implementation are most demanding: when trust between communities has broken down. Institutional design matters, and is worthy of a big investment of time and effort, but while it is an important element of any enduring settlement, it is not a sufficient condition for success.
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Figure 1. Relative size of ethnic groups, Northern Ireland and Fiji, 1880-2011

Source: Northern Ireland, 2012; Fiji, 2008, and earlier census reports.
Figure 2. Structure of two largest ethnic groups by quinquennial age groups, Northern Ireland, 2011, and Fiji, 2007

Note: Bars refer to proportions of the total population for the relevant age groups; unlabelled bars refer to intermediate categories; the last bar refers to those aged 75 or over.

Source: computed from Northern Ireland, 2012; Fiji, 2008.
Table 1: Party support (seats) in elections, Northern Ireland, 1969-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>DUP</th>
<th>UUP</th>
<th>other unionist</th>
<th>Alliance Party</th>
<th>other centre</th>
<th>Nat/SDLP</th>
<th>SF</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: DUP, Democratic Unionist Party; UUP, Ulster Unionist Party, SDLP, Social Democratic and Labour Party; SF, Sinn Féin. ‘other unionists’ includes Vanguard Unionist Party, Unionist Party of Northern Ireland, and other smaller unionist groups and independents; Nat/SDLP includes the Nationalist Party and independent nationalists in 1969.
### Table 2: Party support (seats) in elections, Fiji, 1966-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Major Fijian Party</th>
<th>Other Fijian Party</th>
<th>Centre/Inds &amp; Others</th>
<th>Fiji Labour Party</th>
<th>National Federation Party</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-2</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td><del>28*</del></td>
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<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: parties are grouped as follows: ‘Major Fijian Party’ is the Alliance Party (1972-87), the SVT (1992-9) and the SDL (2001-6); ‘other Fijian’ includes Christian Democratic Alliance, Conservative Alliance, Fiji Association Party, Fijian Nationalist Party, Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party, Western United Front, All Nationals Congress Party, Party of National Unity. ‘centre/others’ includes General Voters Party, New Labour Unity Party, United General Party, Independents.


### Table 3: Levels of disproportionality, Fiji and Northern Ireland, 1965-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiji</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plurality system</strong></td>
<td><strong>Plurality system</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>6.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977 (1)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977 (2)</td>
<td>16.7</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992*</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994*</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternative vote</strong></td>
<td><strong>Plurality system</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Disproportionality is calculated using the Gallagher index (Gallagher, 1991). The value of this index varies depending on the manner in which parties are classified and grouped.

* Mixed single member and multi-member plurality