‘Left to Fend for Themselves’: Immigration, Race Relations and the State in Twentieth Century Northern Ireland

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‘Left to Fend for Themselves’: Immigration, Race Relations and the State in Twentieth Century Northern Ireland

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ABSTRACT
Race relations legislation was only introduced to Northern Ireland in 1997, 31 years later than in Britain. This article examines the obstacles and challenges faced by minorities there during the twentieth century. By providing a case study of Northern Ireland, the article shifts the focus away from British inner cities, emphasising that outlying regions – so often overlooked within the context of UK race relations historiography – also had to grapple with issues surrounding race and immigration. The article challenges the notion that Northern Ireland was exclusively white, showing how ethnic minorities there were repeatedly overlooked and excluded.

KEYWORDS Immigrants; ethnic communities; minorities; migrant politics

Introduction
In the mid-1960s, when English politicians were grappling with debates about a supposed ‘colour problem’, Northern Ireland’s Home Secretary confidently proclaimed that, in Ulster, ‘racial discrimination does not, in fact, exist’. By repeatedly making this bold assertion, Northern Irish policy-makers segregated the region from British race relations discourse. Throughout the twentieth century it was commonly accepted that, for all its ongoing problems, race in Northern Ireland was a non-issue. By continually overlooking Northern Ireland within the context of UK race relations, scholars have propagated and pandered to this flawed assumption. Key historical texts contain no references to Northern Ireland. Recent studies like Kennetta Hammond Perry’s London is the Place for Me (2015) or Mark Matera’s Black London (2015) display a
similarly Anglo-centric approach, skewed towards London. The tendency to prioritise English inner-cities is understandable given the historical concentration of migrant communities in London, Birmingham and Manchester. However, other scholars have demonstrated the value of studying outlying towns and regions, especially those which are not typically associated with high immigration.

In focusing on Northern Ireland, this article continues the trend of regional migrant analyses, emphasising how local contexts and concerns shaped rhetoric surrounding race and immigration. In doing so, it highlights dramatic divergences within the UK-migrant experience; the multiplicity of contexts in which immigrants were received emphasises that UK debates surrounding race were not singular, but varied according to local and regional influences. Understanding the idiosyncrasies of the race relations debate in Northern Ireland can contribute to several areas of both established and emerging historiographies, re-evaluating conceptions of Northern Ireland’s social composition during a period of conflict. Fundamentally, this article seeks to challenge the prevailing view that twentieth century Northern Ireland was a mono-ethnic society, a place where ‘there’s no racism because there’s no black people’. As Anoop Nayak argues, by excessively focusing on inner city areas of high immigration, scholars risk the dismissal of outlying regions as ‘bastions of whiteness’, places where debates about race were irrelevant.

As the peace process has gradually imbued twenty-first century Northern Ireland with stability, the region’s ethnic minority population has grown exponentially. According to the 2011 census, there were 28,760 Black, Asian and mixed race people living in Northern Ireland, up from an estimated 4000–6000 in 1995. Accompanying this increase has been a wealth of academic interest in Northern Ireland’s minorities and their position in a ‘post-conflict’ society. Welcome as these developments are, the experience of long-term minorities remains under-explored. As recently as 2016, Rebecca McKee described twentieth century Northern Ireland as ‘ethnically homogenous’, relegating historical immigrant communities to a mere footnote. The bloody conflict between Catholic nationalists and Protestant unionists has dominated public discourse, causing Northern Ireland to be seen as ‘a place apart’: a region where different rules applied. Whereas places such as Scotland – which had also witnessed orange and green tension – experienced a normalisation of its political climate in the early to mid-twentieth century, in Northern Ireland the national question remained predominant. Unlike in Britain, where issues such as race and immigration were considered on their individual merits, the overriding concern in Northern Ireland was how a change in policy would affect zero-sum sectarian political dynamics. As Chris Gilligan contests, scholars’ tendency to present Northern Ireland as ‘an aberration’ in debates about UK race relations reproduces assumptions about the region’s exceptionalism. By isolating Northern Ireland from broader academic discussion, minorities living there continue to be marginalised and overlooked.
Here, statistics, newspapers, official correspondence and oral history will be deployed to show that Northern Ireland was home to sizeable immigrant populations throughout the twentieth century. After briefly outlining the region's fraught political context, discussion will shift to the apathy which surrounded immigration debates in the twentieth century. Case studies of the Indian and Chinese communities – the region's two largest ethnic minority groups – will be presented, documenting the lived experience of migrants, showing that they were subjected to significant discrimination and state neglect. Finally, the 1990s campaign for legal safeguards will be traced, culminating with the belated introduction of protective legislation.

**Politics in Twentieth Century Northern Ireland: A ‘place apart’**

Ethnic minorities in Northern Ireland suffered from a woeful lack of protection. It is a mere twenty years since the Race Relations (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 became law. Until then, ethnic minorities were deprived of the basic protection that their counterparts in Britain were afforded for over three decades. Employment, housing and services could all be refused on the basis of skin colour, with no prospect of legal redress. Mechanisms for reporting racial hate crime were inadequate and, for decades, immigrants had little access to basic support such as language classes, interpreting services and social security. It remains a striking anomaly that Northern Ireland, a major region of the United Kingdom, was excluded from such a vital piece of legislation. Whilst race became a salient issue in British towns and cities in the 1950s and 1960s, in Northern Ireland it was barely mentioned. When successive British Race Relations Acts were passed in 1965, 1968 and 1976, Ulster was exempted. Northern Ireland was home to several thousand ethnic minority inhabitants, all of whom could have benefited from race relations law. However, within a fraught political and security context, the needs of ethnic minorities were considered subordinate to internal sectarian politics, leaving them isolated, marginalised and vulnerable.

In order to understand how the race relations debate evolved in Northern Ireland, it is necessary to delve into the region's unique political circumstances. Twentieth century Northern Ireland was a polarised society characterised by decades of antagonistic 'cut-throat sectarian politics'. The state came into existence after Ireland was partitioned in 1921 following a lengthy campaign by Nationalists for Home Rule and, latterly, independence. Twenty-six of Ireland's thirty-two counties became independent within the newly formed Irish Free State; the remaining six northern counties remained under British rule. In Northern Ireland, Protestant unionists outnumbered Catholic nationalists by roughly two to one. The region had its own devolved parliament – a grand building situated in the affluent suburb of Stormont, east Belfast – with a majoritarian electoral system. For the following five decades, local politics operated along bloc sectarian lines, ensuring that Unionists had a perpetual majority and Nationalists were confined to opposition. The Northern regime
was highly conservative: successive governments were comprised of a small recurring cast of elite, ageing male Protestants. James Craig, Northern Ireland’s first Prime Minister, served nineteen years in office, whilst one of his successors, Basil Brooke, served twenty. Unionist leaders maintained a hegemony by pursuing a one-issue electoral strategy. All polls were presented as a binary choice between Unionism and Nationalism, ensuring that voting continued to mirror ethno-sectarian divisions. This ‘siege mentality’ diminished the importance of socio-economic issues such as unemployment, healthcare and welfare provision.

With Unionists in control of state institutions, nationalists were frequent victims of discrimination. Catholics were underrepresented in local government and the civil service. They were more likely to be unemployed, suffer deprivation and live in poor quality housing. Until the 1960s, Unionist authorities generally dismissed allegations of mistreatment. However, the mid to late-1960s witnessed growing Catholic disaffection, with newly established pressure groups like the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) calling for an end to anti-Catholic discrimination. In 1972, the Stormont parliament was suspended and direct rule from London was introduced. During the ‘Troubles’ (c. 1969–1997) – when thousands were killed, paramilitary activity rose dramatically and the British Army was deployed on the streets – Northern Ireland’s public image was defined by bombs and bullets. The region was presented as dangerous and unpleasant, a fact which has often been used to explain low immigration levels. Westminster was content for Northern Ireland to remain a ‘place apart’. As Gilligan notes, Irish conflicts had proven an ‘irritant’ to successive governments since the nineteenth century, meaning that it suited both the UK government and the Unionist regime at Stormont for Northern Ireland remain within its own distinct category.

**Immigration and the State in Twentieth Century Northern Ireland: Apathy and Indifference**

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, following waves of immigration from the black Commonwealth, race entered the foreground of British politics. By 1966, there were 360,000 black immigrants living in England and Wales compared to only 21,000 fifteen years earlier. The terms ‘immigrant’ and ‘coloured’ became virtually synonymous. A growing sense emerged that blacks and whites were incapable of living in harmony. ‘Race relations’ became a discernible field within British social science; although most academics were sympathetic to black migrants, they were still portrayed as a societal out-group. It became widely accepted that Britain had a ‘colour problem’ directly linked to immigration. In matters such as rental accommodation, discrimination was often justified on the flimsy grounds that ‘the neighbours’ might disapprove of a black family moving into the community.
In an attempt to combat the problem, calls for race relations law increasingly entered the mainstream of British politics by the early 1960s. Amid growing pressure from international bodies such as the United Nations (UN), support for protective legislation became an official policy of Harold Wilson's Labour government, elected in 1964. The first Race Relations Act (1965) outlawed racial discrimination in public places, cementing the consensus within mainstream politics that racism was fundamentally unacceptable. Protective legislation was strengthened in 1968, and again in 1976, equipping minorities in Britain with the most comprehensive anti-discrimination safeguards in Europe. Although imperfect, the 1976 Act was comprehensive, covering employment, education, trade unions, service provision, private clubs and more. The legislation formed the basis of legal protection for Britain's ethnic minorities for the remainder of the century. The story of British racial tension has been outlined on numerous previous occasions. However, reactions to race and notions of a ‘colour problem’ varied widely across the UK, something which existing literature often struggles to recognise.

Unlike their British counterparts, officials in Northern Ireland were unconcerned by race or immigration throughout the twentieth century. Debates usually reflected local concerns, with the sectarian conflict prominent in the thoughts of ministers and civil servants. The UK-wide Aliens Order was introduced in 1920, and severely tightened immigration restrictions. Under the legislation, people from Éire were able to enter Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK unchecked. Stormont’s Home Secretary was concerned that ‘this does not appear to be proper’ and, in 1923, asked Whitehall for a rethink. Officials were preoccupied with security in the context of a volatile, newly formed state; foreign immigration was afforded minimal attention. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, debates about immigration were framed in relation to the Irish border. In 1938, Lord Craigavon, Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister, asked the Attorney General to review the issue of cross-border migration ‘with a view to preventing undesirables from the south of Ireland entering Ulster’. Craigavon made it clear that these ‘undesirables’ were hostile Irish Republicans rather than foreigners. Thus, concern centred on limiting the arrival of Irish Catholics and subversive Republicans rather than ‘aliens’ of other nationalities.

Concerns about cross-border migration led to the passage of one law that significantly affected foreign immigrants. The Safeguarding of Employment Act (Northern Ireland, 1947) made it illegal for people from outside Northern Ireland to work in the region. A state-issued permit was required for anyone who wished to get a job there. Citizens of Éire were, once again, the Act’s main target. In 1952, a civil servant highlighted the legislation’s success in preventing them ‘from flocking over the Border [sic]’ to find work. Due to high unemployment, it was considered vital to conserve jobs for the people of Northern Ireland, rather than Éire. The Unionist regime was also determined to preserve the region’s Protestant majority. Although not intended as such, the Act served
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as an additional obstacle to prospective immigrants from the Commonwealth. For example, an Indian man named Mr. Joshi arrived in Northern Ireland in June 1962 seeking work. Having spent his entire savings on the journey, Joshi found that he lacked the necessary employment permits and was left stranded. His case was raised by a Stormont MP, who appealed for him to be offered assisted travel to England. Whilst migrants such as Joshi were not the primary targets of the Safeguarding of Employment Act, their lives were affected as a by-product of security concerns. The Act remained in force for thirty years until it was repealed in 1977. Ironically, although Northern Ireland was a region of low immigration, due to intense concern about cross-border infiltration, it ended up with legislation that was the most restrictive in the UK.

Stormont’s indifference to foreign immigration meant that ministers were happy to delegate responsibility to Whitehall. When confronted with an emotive residency application in 1936, Lord Craigavon commented that ‘all questions of aliens are a matter for the Imperial Government at Westminster’. Belfast Port had no immigration facilities until 1926 and only established them to appease shipping companies that previously had to pay for an alien’s officer to travel from Glasgow. Indifference continued to underpin attitudes in the 1940s and 1950s. When, in 1959, the Home Office in London proposed the discontinuation of police registration of immigrants, their counterparts in Belfast were ‘completely in agreement’. Politicians and officials in Northern Ireland were therefore perfectly content to be subsumed under Westminster’s immigration legislation; any concern that arose centred on the Unionist government’s preoccupation with securing the Irish border rather than anxiety over foreign arrivals.

Northern Ireland’s Race Relations Debate: There is ‘no colour problem’

Early advocates of the Race Relations Act (1965) intended the law to include Northern Ireland, but most Ulster officials questioned whether this was necessary. From 1958 to 1964, Fenner Brockway – a committed anti-racist Labour backbencher – introduced several Race Relations Bills to the House of Commons; it was a source of ire in Belfast that Brockway repeatedly refused to exempt Northern Ireland from his proposed legislation. The steadfast insistence of Stormont to exempt themselves from British race relations law was ironic given that, for decades, legislative parity with the mainland had been a cornerstone of Unionist rhetoric. Since the 1930s, the Northern Ireland Government had pursued a ‘step-by-step’ approach, pledging to maintain equality with British social policy. Therefore, it was peculiar that a regime so staunchly committed to British values was determined to avoid being covered by British racial equality guidelines.

Northern Ireland’s exclusion from racial equality law was justified by repeated claims of its irrelevance. Most public figures asserted that racism did not exist
in Ulster. In 1958, one civil servant wrote that ‘there never has been any discrimination on account of colour or race’.41 Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister, Terrence O’Neill, agreed, stating in a 1964 cabinet meeting that there was ‘no colour problem’.42 This optimistic assessment of Northern Ireland’s racial situation extended beyond the Unionist regime. Unusually for the region’s polarised legislature, debates about race garnered cross-party agreement. W.R. Boyd, of the Northern Ireland Labour Party, stated in 1964 that ‘coloured people from any part of the world will get a greater welcome in this small country than they will get anywhere else’.43 Boyd was confident that ‘the coloured person in our community is respected and is treated kindly as a fellow human being’.44 James O’Reilly, an Irish Nationalist, similarly denied the presence of racial problems.45 Racism was deemed such a non-issue that the topic was seldom debated. However, it is difficult to understand how the possibility of racial discrimination was dismissed so categorically. As Fryer notes, racism in Britain often assumed subtle, covert forms such as the denial of houses or jobs; it would have been impossible to prove the absence of similar behaviour in Northern Ireland.46

Firstly, it is necessary to interrogate what individuals such as Terrence O’Neill meant when denying that Ulster had a ‘colour problem’. When the term first emerged in Britain in the late 1950s and early 1960s, it was assumed that the nation’s ‘colour problem’ could be pinpointed in palpable manifestations of racial tension. As Ruth Glass, a race relations sociologist, argued in 1960, Britain’s ‘colour problem’ was visible in the form of public antagonism and race riots.47 The newsworthiness of events such as the 1958 Notting Hill Riots provided concrete evidence of discrimination and tension.48 Therefore, the absence of such problems in Northern Ireland was perhaps seen as sufficient to deny the existence of racial tension. However, Northern Irish politicians frequently corroborated their assertion that the region was free from racism by highlighting the small number of immigrants living there. F.V. Simpson, of the Northern Ireland Labour Party, suggested that

we are in a rather different position from the rest of the United Kingdom in that the coloured population of this area is largely restricted to students. We have not got vast numbers of coloured people employed in Northern Ireland.49

Effectively, Simpson attributed Ulster’s alleged lack of racism to a lack of immigrants. In doing so, he propagated the notion that migrant settlement, rather than white prejudice, causes racism. As Gilroy argues, British debates were similarly constructed: it was the presence of black communities, and the threat that they posed to white homogeneity, that was depicted as problematic.50 Therefore, when officials and politicians asserted that Northern Ireland had ‘no coloured immigrant problem’, it is reasonable to infer that what they actually meant was simply that it had very few immigrants.51

This dismissive attitude continued into the 1970s. In 1978, the possibility of racism in Ulster was raised with the Northern Ireland Office by a civil servant who asked whether there was now a case for extending the Race Relations
Act. His enquiry was rebuffed with the familiar line that Northern Ireland’s ‘relatively small coloured population was accepted by the majority of the community and there was no evidence of racial discrimination’.\(^{52}\) Within the reply was another, more telling statement. The Northern Ireland Office wished to ‘leave well alone until such time as a particular case or circumstance gives rise to public demand for legislation in this field’.\(^{53}\) Legislators were told to wait until racial discrimination occurred, rather than taking preventative steps. Only on one occasion did the issue generate notable controversy. On August 2 1978, the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) held a meeting at the UN headquarters in New York. After the British representative had outlined the UK’s position, external observers from the international community commented on the legislation’s uneven implementation, describing it as ‘unusual’.\(^{54}\) Representatives from Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, India and Panama – some of which had questionable human rights records themselves – lambasted the British ambassador for their failure to protect Northern Ireland’s minorities.\(^{55}\) The British representative reportedly received a ‘rough ride’, and provided a flimsy justification for Northern Ireland’s omission, making vague references to the region’s ‘different’ circumstances and adding that immigrants generally avoided Northern Ireland.\(^{56}\)

However, criticism from the CERD conference was soon brushed aside and legislation continued to exclude Northern Ireland. Ulster’s prevailing ‘no problem here’ attitude continued through the 1980s and 1990s.\(^{57}\) A 1984 report by the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights concluded that discrimination in Northern Ireland remained low because the number of minorities was ‘very small when compared with similar racial groups living in Great Britain’.\(^{58}\) A similarly apathetic review was undertaken by the Central Community Relations Unit (CCRU) in 1992. Despite stating that the government was ‘open to promoting’ race relations law, and recommending an increase in cultural education, claims that state institutions were ‘fully committed’ to ensuring the well-being of ethnic minorities smacked of lip service.\(^{59}\) Overall, the publication was non-committal and concluded that existing laws were fit for purpose. Therefore, by the mid-1990s, when minorities in the rest of the UK had been protected for thirty years, those in Northern Ireland remained exposed.

**Minorities and Discrimination in Northern Ireland: Case Studies of the Indian and Chinese Communities**

Counteracting the notion that Northern Ireland’s had no racial problem, this section will present case studies of the region’s two largest migrant populations: the Indian community and the Chinese community, both of which experienced individual discrimination and state neglect. As Table 1 shows, a population of migrants from the Indian subcontinent resided in Northern Ireland from the 1930s. By the 1960s, there was both an Indian and a Pakistani Association in
Belfast. In 1971 – when notions of a ‘colour problem’ were being dismissed – Northern Ireland’s South Asian population numbered over 1000. Most of the Indian community – the majority of South Asians in Ulster – were clothing salesmen, both itinerants and shopkeepers. Despite the bold assertions of Northern Irish politicians, Indian salesmen were subjected to prejudice and mockery. As early as 1936, travelling Indian salesmen were the subject of a Stormont debate. One MP branded the salesmen a ‘nuisance … who go around bothering people’ , while another chastised ‘these foreigners from other countries going about on bicycles and engaging in unfair competition with our own people’ . The same year, an Indian merchant in Belfast had his house surrounded by a mob of 150 people after it was alleged that he had brought a white woman into his flat. Admittedly, such incidences of overt hostility were rare. However, Indian migrants were also ridiculed through crude stereotypes and racialised mockery. An example of such condescension emerged in a 1971 song, ‘Belfast, Belfast’ , by popular Northern Irish show-band Clubsound. The opening verse of the song, written from the perspective of a cheerful but hapless Indian salesman, goes as follows:

I come from India to Belfast town,
I’m tall and handsome and my skin is brown,
I’ve got no money but I’m ready to work,
And I got me a house in Gilnahirk,
I’m selling clothes from door-to-door,
Lovely clothes they’re fashioned by Dior,
Panties, knickers and y-front drawers,
When they see me coming they open their doors.

Although clearly intended as a comic, playful number, ‘Belfast, Belfast’ is pervaded by crude, racial condescension, contradicting the notion that minorities in Northern Ireland were always treated ‘kindly’. As Gavin Schaffer argues, such comedic exploitation of racial and ethnic difference depicts minorities as alien and absurd, reinforcing their subordination and ‘apartness’. In ‘Belfast, Belfast’ the ludicrous attempt at an Indian accent and lines such as ‘will somebody please smell that man’s breath?’ are cases in point. The song was more than simply an obscure, niche novelty record. Clubsound achieved substantial

Table 1. Number of residents in Northern Ireland practicing the three main religious faiths of the Indian community.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mohammedan</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Sikh</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>1039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>1871</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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popularity in 1970s Northern Ireland. When ‘Belfast, Belfast’ was re-released on the band’s 1976 album, ‘Clubsound Capers,’ it swiftly achieved £100,000 worth of Northern Irish sales.\(^6\) The song’s popularity suggests that the majority of Northern Irish listeners were comfortable with the crude racialisation of Indian hawkers. Although legislation could not have prevented patronising sentiments like those in the song, the social and cultural exclusion that underpinned such examples of ‘humour’ in Northern Ireland proves that the region’s immigrant communities remained on the margins of mainstream society. Such mockery could be dismissed as relatively harmless. However, crude disdain and condescension serve to exacerbate social distance, rendering other forms of discrimination more likely.\(^6\)

Chinese migrants provide further examples of exclusion and isolation. As demonstrated in Table 2, a sizeable Chinese population emerged within Northern Ireland’s catering sector in the 1960s and 1970s. By 1977 – a year after the Race Relations Act was strengthened in Britain – there were at least 25 Chinese restaurants listed in the Belfast Street Directory, almost fifteen per cent of the total. The actual figure was probably higher. In addition to businesses which may have been overlooked by the directory, several restaurants lacked ownership details but had names which were typical of UK–Chinese establishments, such as ‘Silver Sea’ and ‘Golden Bird’. Regardless, a lesser figure of 25 marked a significant Chinese presence. Chinese restaurateurs were astute at recruiting employees from their home villages, utilising long established kinship networks.\(^6\) Each restaurant required a team of several employees and many of the young migrants who worked as chefs and waiters will have had families, suggesting that Belfast was home to several hundred Chinese migrants by the late 1970s. The Chinese community later became the largest ethnic minority in Northern Ireland; yet, precise figures detailing the size of the community are difficult to obtain due to an absence of census data.\(^7\) Unlike the rest of the UK, ethnic identity was not recorded within the Northern Ireland Census until 2001, marking another way in which ethnic minorities were rendered invisible.\(^7\)

Chinese migrants experienced several obstacles to integration. Language was a major issue; most had only a basic grasp of English, leading them to become profiled by locals as ‘deaf and dumb’.\(^7\) Chinese housewives were especially

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of businesses</th>
<th>Percentage of total catering businesses (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

vulnerable to isolation. Often confined indoors with young children, and lacking the English skills to perform basic tasks such as grocery shopping, many female migrants lived a lonely existence. Women often worked in the kitchens of family restaurants and takeaways. The long, gruelling hours required to run these businesses left little time to socialise, or to engage with the local community. Chinese migrants were also stereotyped in relation to their profession, similarly to the Indian community. In the local press, ‘Chinamen’ were invariably portrayed as novel and exotic. In a 1976 feature on Northern Irish tourism, the Fermanagh Herald reported the opening of the White Satin Inn, a Chinese restaurant in the town of Greyabbey, County Down. The paper described how the owner, Mr. Yau, would explain the concept of chopsticks to bemused locals. Although Yau was described as ‘hospitable’, the article concluded that most Chinese men in Ulster were mysterious and ‘inscrutable’. The paper portrayed Yau exclusively in relation to his role as a restaurateur, reinforcing the notion that this was the sole occupation of Chinese migrants. Anna Lo, a Hong Kong-born politician who moved to Northern Ireland in 1974, reported similar treatment. In a 2016 interview, Lo recalled how, despite a burgeoning career in the media, people often asked her what takeaway she worked in, assuming that her ethnicity determined her occupation.

Although such crude labelling could be dismissed as harmless ignorance, it tangibly affected the lives of Chinese migrants. Restaurateurs became dehumanised, viewed solely through their ability to satisfy local patrons. In his comprehensive investigation of Chinese identity in the UK, David Parker outlined the power imbalance between Chinese caterers and their western customers. In a restaurant or takeaway transaction, white consumers retain purchasing power whilst Chinese caterers, as service providers, are expected bow to their demands. As a result, Chinese takeaways have become prime sites for racial abuse, with employees often powerless to retaliate. San Wong, founder of Belfast’s prominent ‘Welcome’ takeaway and restaurant chain, described having to brush off frequent shouts of ‘Ching Ching, Chong Chong Chinaman’. Some takeaways were the site of more extreme violence and vandalism, leaving their owners with a general sense of helplessness. Migrants were woefully unprotected; few reported crimes to Northern Ireland’s police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), either due to the language barrier or a lack of faith in law enforcement. Allegations emerged of racism within the RUC, with some officers reportedly dismissing Chinese migrants as ‘stupid Chinkys’. Arguably more inhibiting for the Chinese community than individual acts of hostility has been the cycle of economic ghettoisation which has restricted social mobility. As recently as 2007, a study by Mary Delargy found that 90% of Northern Ireland’s Hong Kong Chinese community still worked in catering, at least on a part-time basis. Migrant economic segregation was a significant problem across the UK. As John Rex demonstrated in the 1980s, despite their economic success, entrepreneurial migrants were often confined to a ‘separate
economic and social pyramid’ from the rest of society, leaving them unable to penetrate the mainstream employment market.\(^{83}\) In Northern Ireland, Chinese confinement within catering stemmed from a lack of viable alternatives, especially among the second and third generations. Catering businesses constituted a ‘refuge’ of last resort for those who found other avenues closed. Younger Chinese people often described takeaway work as an uninspiring ‘fall-back’.\(^{84}\) Feng-Bing found that most Chinese children actively wished to escape the catering trade in order to transcend the name-calling and stereotypes that have accompanied the profession.\(^{85}\) If all else failed, most were prepared to leave Northern Ireland to pursue alternative careers. The inability of Chinese people to escape Ulster’s catering industry – despite an active desire to do so – implies the existence of systemic factors inhibiting their progress. At a 1991 Belfast conference organised by the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ), participants discussed institutional racism in Northern Ireland. Several factors were cited as obstacles to Chinese social mobility. For example, Chinese restaurateurs were generally assumed to be wealthy, naturally suited to catering and therefore less qualified for other jobs.\(^{86}\) The deep association of the Chinese community with takeaways became self-perpetuating, erecting barriers to other professions. Other factors exacerbated marginalisation. Authorities made no attempt to inform Chinese people of their statutory rights, often leaving them unable to access welfare to which they were entitled. Support within sectors such as healthcare, education and the justice system was inadequate.\(^{87}\) One participant at the 1991 CAJ conference argued that a lack of state support had forced the Chinese community ‘to fend for themselves for the last thirty years’.\(^{88}\)

As the above case studies of the Indian and Chinese communities demonstrate, Northern Ireland was home to sizeable populations of ‘coloured’ immigrants during the second half of the twentieth century. Both communities suffered discrimination – explicit and covert – which impacted on their social mobility and quality of life. Therefore, claims that Northern Ireland had ‘no colour problem’ were unhelpful and misleading. Legislation would not have been a silver bullet correcting all the obstacles and injustices faced by Northern Ireland’s ethnic minority communities. However, the social and economic exclusion to which these groups were subjected often left them marginalised and isolated. As Lester argues, the British Race Relations Act outlined acceptable behavioural standards and confirmed the eradication of racism as a ‘major social objective’.\(^{89}\) Conversely, an absence of legislation in Northern Ireland allowed the authorities to shirk their responsibility to protect minorities.\(^{90}\)

**Official Policy: Justifications and Contradictions**

In her 2016 autobiography, Anna Lo highlighted a glaring contradiction in the argument that low immigration should excuse Northern Ireland from the Race Relations Act. Rather, the opposite was true; due to their low numbers, ethnic
minorities were less visible, more isolated and more vulnerable. Denied the support networks found within burgeoning immigrant communities in British inner-cities, Northern Ireland’s Indian and Chinese populations were in exceptional need of protection.91 Gerry Fitt, a Republican Labour MP – who later founded the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) – stated as much in 1968. Fitt passionately declared that racial minorities were entitled to the same protection as elsewhere in the UK, but his was a lone voice.92 Reading between the lines of official correspondence, this section will unpick the motives behind government decision-making.

Initially, politicians framed their opposition to race relations law as a principled defence of Northern Ireland’s constitutional rights. Under devolution, Stormont was responsible for certain deferred powers, such as home affairs, while Westminster had primacy in national matters. When the incorporation of Northern Ireland into the Race Relations Act was first mooted, members of Stormont’s cabinet were fearful of an ‘invasion by Westminster’ in their transferred powers.93 To accept the legislation would set a ‘bad precedent’, interfering with Stormont’s constitutional status and blurring the boundaries of legislative responsibility.94 At first glance, this argument appears reasonable. If ministers genuinely believed the Race Relations Act to be unnecessary, they were within their rights to resist interference in Northern Irish affairs. However, on closer inspection their case was flimsy. As Birrell has argued, the distinction between central and deferred powers was notoriously difficult to define.95 The extension of race relations legislation – which Stormont ministers admitted was ‘fairly innocuous’ – was hardly likely to redefine political dynamics between London and Belfast.96 As we have seen, Stormont was incredibly relaxed about delegating responsibility to Westminster regarding immigration policy, and the regime had generally attempted ‘to affirm the Province’s British identity’ through social policies.97 Therefore, sudden concern about British ‘interference’ regarding race relations could be perceived as disingenuous.

Other comments suggest that ministers were ideologically rather than constitutionally opposed to race relations law. In a 1964 cabinet meeting, William Craig, Stormont’s Home Secretary, poured scorn on the entire purpose of the law, arguing that ‘discrimination between private persons can never be ended by legislation’.98 Scepticism therefore extended to the principles that underpinned the Race Relations Act, rather than simply the manner of its implementation. For the conservative regime at Stormont, such ideological dogma was unsurprising. But policy-makers had a more fundamental objection, one which most convincingly explains the government’s reluctance to enshrine racial equality into law. In 1964, W.B. Maginess, Northern Ireland’s Attorney General, brought up Northern Ireland’s national conflict. He claimed that the minority nationalist community may seek ‘a spate of prosecutions’ against unionists if the Race Relations Act were to be introduced.99
Discrimination was a highly contentious issue in 1960s Northern Ireland. Whilst British politicians were grappling with how to deal with their ‘colour problem’, those in Northern Ireland were concerned with the campaign for Catholic civil rights. Race relations was therefore approached through the prism of zero-sum political self-interest. Maginess’s fear of a ‘spate of prosecutions’ stemmed from anxiety about the gradual foothold that the nationalist community was gaining in Northern Irish society through the Civil Rights Movement. In his letter, Maginess noted Nationalist leaders’ propensity for raising allegations of discrimination wherever possible and was concerned that the Race Relations Act would supply them with further ammunition. Although Northern Irish Catholics were a religious rather than a racial minority, the conflict between them and Protestants in Ireland frequently adopted an ethnic flavour, with national, political and religious elements fusing to form a quasi-ethnic identity. Therefore, Maginess feared that the Race Relations Act would galvanise the Catholic community to claim that they were the victims of racial rather than merely religious discrimination, opening the floodgates for a wave of claims. Stormont’s primary contribution to the Race Relations Act was to lobby against the inclusion of religion, emphasising how its opinion was shaped by an overarching preoccupation with violent sectarian conflict. Unionist anxiety that Catholics would seek protection under the Act highlights broader ambiguities surrounding the law’s passage and application. As Schaffer demonstrates, many proponents of anti-racist law were keen for the Act to protect Jewish as well as black people. Indeed, the Act was used to prosecute British fascists who espoused anti-Semitism. The incorporation of anti-Semitism illustrates the legislation’s blurred remit, emphasising that the Act could be interpreted to include religion. The question of exactly who should be protected was imprecisely defined, an ambiguity which likely raised fears in Belfast about the potential for complaints by Catholics.

We can therefore begin to appreciate why authorities in Northern Ireland were so keen to exclude themselves from race relations law. As was the case with concerns about cross-border migration, the anxious and tangled dynamics of sectarian divisions loomed over all aspects of policy. Having successfully excluded themselves from racial equality law in the 1960s the issue was subsequently put on the backburner. The outbreak of the ‘Troubles’ consumed political debate in Northern Ireland, marginalising all else. After direct rule, race rarely figured in public debate, and the retention of the status quo suited Westminster. In an already fraught situation, there would have been little appetite in London for a proliferation of discrimination claims. Thus, officials were happy to unquestioningly accept the argument that Northern Ireland had ‘no race relations problem’. Despite living in Northern Ireland in their thousands, immigrants and ethnic minorities found that their needs were subordinate to the political implications of the enduring sectarian divide.
The marginalisation experienced by ethnic minorities, combined with their relatively small numbers, meant that there was little scope for political mobilisation. The Indian Community Centre (ICC) – founded in 1981 – was a social hub rather than a political pressure group. Whilst the Chinese Welfare Association (CWA) – established in 1986 – repeatedly highlighted the social needs of the Chinese community, its arguments were ignored by policy-makers. For much of the twentieth century, ethnic minorities remained passive, voiceless members of society: ‘seen but not heard’. A concerted campaign for legal protection against racism finally developed in the 1990s. Events such as the 1991 CAJ conference were organised by a new generation of activists such as Anna Lo and Patrick Yu; the latter went on to chair the Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities (NICEM). As Lo recalls, this grassroots band of politically conscious migrants challenged racism and were not prepared, as their predecessors had been, to meekly keep their head down.

Officials were initially slow to respond to calls for greater protection, arguing that existing laws were sufficient. As recently as 1992, the British government maintained that ‘immigration to Northern Ireland from outside the British Isles continues to be insignificant and there has been no race relations problem’. Such dismissals fly in the face of the evidence presented in this article. By the 1990s, the government’s flimsy justification for a lack of legislation was increasingly disputed; commentators began challenging prevailing orthodoxies. Several speakers at the CAJ conference dismissed the idea that Northern Ireland was free from racism. Similarly, at a 1994 Belfast seminar on ‘Racism and Poverty’, Dr. Michael Chan of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) publicly scorned the government for its inaction. New organisations were founded, such as the Multi-Cultural Resource Centre (MRC) in 1991 and NICEM in 1994. These groups sought to raise awareness of diversity and reverse decades of marginalisation. Some Northern Irish MPs at Westminster – from both the Nationalist SDLP and the Ulster Unionists – also began to lobby for race relations law to be extended to Northern Ireland. Although community and human rights organisations provided most of the legwork, the momentum in favour of anti-racist legislation was also facilitated by the reframing of debates about the Northern Ireland conflict. The region’s nascent peace process was increasingly discussed with reference to ‘cultural pluralism’, which encompassed a growing acceptance that multiple groups needed accommodating. This pluralistic discourse of ‘good relations’ led to the inclusion of race in debates which had previously focused on binary sectarian identities; as McVeigh and Rolston argue, race therefore became ‘very firmly inserted into a paradigm from which it had been almost totally missing before’.

Growing recognition of discrimination, combined with a more coherent campaign, meant that arguments about racism could no longer be brushed aside. Evidence accumulated proving that Northern Ireland did have a problem with racism, and the issue was placed firmly on the agenda. Academic analyses of
race in Northern Ireland – previously thin on the ground – began to proliferate. The first such example was Irwin and Dunn’s 1997 report *Ethnic Minorities in Northern Ireland*. Paul Hainsworth’s edited collection, *Divided Society*, was published in 1998 and remains an important contribution to the literature on Northern Irish ethnic minorities. The timing of this increasing public awareness of race was significant. The 1990s is widely regarded as the beginning of Northern Ireland’s peace process, witnessing paramilitary ceasefires and the inclusion of formerly armed groups into mainstream politics. Although politics in Northern Ireland remains sharply divided along national lines, as Geoghegan has argued, the peace process facilitated a degree of societal ‘normalisation,’ affording space to discuss issues which had previously been crowded out.\(^{116}\) In post-conflict Northern Ireland, with the prospect of sectarian violence less imminent, topics such as ethnic minority rights were given more attention. The growing salience of race was belatedly converted into legislation. In February 1997, the Race Relations Order (Northern Ireland), modelled on the British Race Relations Act (1976), passed through the British Parliament, one of the final acts of the outgoing Conservative Government.\(^{117}\) Although the outlawing of racial discrimination and harassment was a welcome development, the fact that it occurred 31 years after Britain’s first Race Relations Act proves how, for most of the twentieth century, Northern Ireland was given special treatment regarding race and immigration. The manner in which the needs of ethnic minorities were brushed aside emphasises the one-track nature of official thinking, which prioritised sectarian struggles above all else.

Although the 1997 Order brought Northern Ireland into line with the rest of the UK, the region continued to apply equality law to its own timetable. For example, when the British Race Relations Act was superseded by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000), no similar legislation was passed in Northern Ireland.\(^{118}\) Ulster equality law was only updated with the passage of the Race Relations Order (Amendment) Regulations (Northern Ireland) (2003), which implemented the EU Framework Employment Directive, and a further piece of legislation in 2009.\(^ {119}\) The law as applied in Northern Ireland post-1997 was broadly similar to that in Britain; minor discrepancies of timing and content did not alter the fact that Northern Ireland had fully signed up to the principles of racial equality law. However, these differences remind us that, into the twenty-first century, policy-makers in Belfast were keen to retain and assert their independence over social policy, resisting absorption by Westminster.

**Conclusion**

The anachronism of Northern Ireland’s exclusion from British racial equality law has rarely been highlighted in the considerable body of academic literature.
surrounding UK race relations. If mentioned at all, the region’s peculiar historical arrangement has warranted a mere footnote.\(^{120}\) Seeking to redress this glaring oversight, this article has shifted the focus from England to a different region, highlighting the diversity of migrant experiences across the UK. Northern Ireland was home to ethnic minority communities since at least the 1930s. Whilst the passage of the 1965 and 1976 Race Relations Acts are often heralded as defining moments in the history of British racial equality, both excluded Northern Ireland. It is vital that scholars acknowledge the presence and struggles of ethnic minorities in a region where they were denied protection, suffering the consequences of societal prejudice and state neglect. Scholars of British race relations, in repeatedly and complacently overlooking Northern Ireland, have only exacerbated such indifference. Although this article has provided a basis from which to analyse the historical migrant experience in Northern Ireland, future research is needed to enhance our understanding. A qualitative, interview-led study of migrants’ lives could provide an appreciation of how extensively the marginalisation and exclusion discussed in this article impacted individuals and communities.

Academic analyses of Northern Ireland tend to acknowledge migrant communities as an afterthought, secondary in importance to the sectarian divide. But name-calling, crude stereotypes and racialised mockery – although often dismissed as ‘friendly banter’ – were all features of the Northern Irish immigrant experience.\(^ {121}\) Each had an alienating effect, marginalising ethnic minorities and hampering potential integration. Authorities failed to deal with intimidation and violence, particularly against migrants in the catering trade. Racism was a feature of society, having a destructive effect on migrants’ well-being. Evidence of damaging racism renders it all the more concerning that authorities in both Belfast and London were able, with such ease, to dismiss calls for legal protection. Throughout the twentieth century Ulster was seen through the reductive, binary lens of ‘two communities’: Protestants and Catholics.\(^ {122}\) Although, numerically speaking, their presence was small, immigrants were an important part of society, and their abandonment by the state until the late 1990s, although explainable, remains inexcusable. Twenty-first century Northern Ireland is becoming ever more diverse and multicultural: the Belfast Mela – a festival celebrating cultural diversity – continues to grow, attracting up to 30,000 visitors in recent years.\(^ {123}\) Belfast’s annual Chinese New Year celebration is another major event, attracting thousands of participants and spectators.\(^ {124}\) Growing diversity and recognition of other cultures is welcome, but we must remember that immigration has been occurring in Northern Ireland for decades. Otherwise we risk legitimising the ignorance and denial that prevailed throughout the twentieth century, and allowed authorities to evade their obligation to deal with racism and discrimination.
Notes

3. Perry, London is the Place for Me; Matera, Black London.
4. See, for example: Jenkins, “Inherent Vice?”; Clayton, “Diasporic Otherness”.
8. See, for example: Geoghegan, “Managing ‘Race’ in a Divided Society”; Irwin and Dunn, Ethnic Minorities in Northern Ireland; Lee, “Who Do You Think You Are?”.
12. Gilligan, Northern Ireland and the Crisis, 4–5.
16. Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom, 78.
17. Ruane and Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict, 93–94.
19. Gilligan, Northern Ireland and the Crisis, 5–6.
25. Fryer, Staying Power, 375.
26. Perry, London is the Place for Me, 200–201; Goulbourne, Race Relations in Britain, 101–102.
28. Ibid., 103.
29. Ministry of Home Affairs, Belfast to Cabinet Office, Belfast, April 7 1923 (PRONI CAB/9B/94/1).
30. C.H. Blackmore, to W.A. Magill, November 16 1938 (PRONI CAB/9B/94/1).
31. Safeguarding of Employment Bill (Northern Ireland) (PRONI ED/13/1/2382).
32. T.F. Hall to A. Eagleson, January 14 1952 (PRONI LAB/5/71).
33. Mitchell, Devolution in the UK, 87.
36. Lord Craigavon to Archbishop of Armagh, August 29 1936 (PRONI CAB/9B/94/2).
38. A.J. Kelly to R.J. Green, April 15 1959 (PRONI CAB/9B/94/1).
42. Minutes from a Meeting of the Northern Ireland Cabinet, February 27 1964 (PRONI CAB/4/1257).
44. Ibid.
46. See note 25.
47. See note 24.
53. Ibid.
59. Central Community Relations Unit, *Race Relations in Northern Ireland*, 5; Ibid., 17.
63. Gilnahirk is a district in east Belfast.
64. The song can be listened to at www.hmvdigital.com/releases/1665543#t18211261.
70. Watson and McKnight, “Race and Ethnicity,” 129.
72. Lo, *The Place I Call Home*, 100.
76. Interview Anna Lo, November 17, 2016, 5.
77. Parker, *Through Different Eyes*, 68.
78. Interview San Wong, October 17, 2016, 6.
81. See note 79.
84. Interview Dean Lee, June 20, 2016, 5; Pang, “An Investigation,” 121.
88. See note 86.
89. Lester, “From Legislation to Integration,” 23–24.
90. Stormont resisted calls to implement the racial segregation of American soldiers during World War II, proving that the regime did, at times, act in favour of protecting racial minorities. However, the allied status of African-American soldiers, coupled with their transience in Northern Ireland, renders this case somewhat different to those of other minority groups. See: Topping, “The Dusky Doughboys,” 1152–1154; Topping, “Laying Down the Law,” 742.
91. Lo, *The Place I Call Home*, 104.
93. Minutes from a Meeting of the Northern Ireland Cabinet, March 9 1965 (PRONI HA/8/1950).
96. Minutes from a Meeting of the Northern Ireland Cabinet, March 9 1965 (PRONI HA/8/1950).
102. Ibid., 268.
103. Ibid., 268.
105. J.S. Fitzpatrick to Sharon McCloskey, August 27 1987 (PRONI HSS/13/44/24).
106. Holder, Huq and Martin, *30 Years Seen But Not Heard*.
120. See, for example: Lester, “From Legislation to Integration,” 27.
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**Interviews**

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