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Religious Diversity and the Number of Religious Parties Around the World

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Abstract

Arguing that religious diversity creates incentives for political cooperation, recent research questions the assumption that religious diversity leads to more fragmented party systems and finds a negative association between religious diversity and the fragmentation of vote shares. Before this revisionist perspective can be believed, however, we need to observe the causal processes linking religious diversity and party system fragmentation. One of these is that religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties contesting elections. Using data counting the number of religious parties in elections around the world between 2011 and 2015, the analysis shows that religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties. In line with the revisionist perspective, these results suggest that religious diversity creates incentives for political cooperation that lead elites to cooperate across religious group lines in support of parties representing their shared political interests.

Key Words

Religious parties; religious diversity; religious markets; party system fragmentation; social cleavages

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Why do parties appealing exclusively to particular religious groups form in some countries but not in others? A large body of literature rooted in social cleavage theory suggests that parties appealing to particular social groups are more likely to emerge in contexts with greater social diversity (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 2006; Singer and Stephenson 2009). While this literature suggests religious parties are more likely to contest elections in religiously diverse contexts, the few studies examining this relationship in a handful of countries suggest this relationship is either inconclusive or contrary to expectations (Lowery et al. 2013; Flick Witzig and Vatter 2018; Ferris and Voiz 2018).

Why might the impact of religious diversity be so weak? Some research maintains that religious diversity reduces the viability of religious parties. Because religious groups must compete with one another in a market for adherents (Finke and Stark 1988; Iannaccone et al. 1997; Stark and Iannaccone 1994), they may be less likely to expend resources to support political parties in more diverse, competitive contexts that could be spent more efficiently in their efforts to maintain and attract adherents (Raymond 2016a). As a result, religious parties may be less likely to form in religiously diverse societies, as religious groups find more benefit to cooperating with other religious groups on issues of shared concern than fielding their own religious parties that stand no chance of winning in such diverse contexts.

This revisionist perspective may be illustrated by comparing the experiences of Lithuania and New Zealand. In relatively homogeneous Lithuania, where Catholics comprise an overwhelming majority of the population, two major religious parties (Homeland Union and Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania) have long competed for religious voters' support. In New Zealand, where the religious structure is much more diverse (with Christians divided among Catholics and several Protestant groups, and growing numbers of other religious groups), religious parties have struggled to compete successfully despite the use of a mixed-

member proportional representation system similar to that used by Lithuania. While several religious parties emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s, none managed to attract much support. As a result of the lack of electoral success, religious parties have not contested the last several elections. In keeping with the revisionist perspective, religious parties have had more difficulty in New Zealand because the base of potential voters belonging to each religious group is smaller than the base of voters available to support religious parties in Lithuania. Instead, it is only by cooperating with others (including seculars) that religious groups can hope to influence policy.

The relationship between religious diversity and the presence of religious parties may have important practical implications, as the presence/absence of religious parties may permit/deny religious actors the chance to influence public policy. Even in many secularised Western countries, issues of morality that are of great concern to religious voters remain important political matters, and previous research shows that the presence of religious parties—whether alone (Fink 2008; Engeli et al. 2012) or as part of a governing coalition (Budde et al. 2018)—has significant influence on the shape of policy on these issues (c.f. Hurka et al. 2017). The impact of religious diversity on the number of religious parties takes on further importance with continued immigration diversifying the religious structures of many advanced industrial democracies.

Recognising the importance of this topic, this study examines the relationship between religious diversity and the number of religious parties. Using an original data set including all national-level legislative elections around the world between 2011 and 2015, I estimate this relationship after controlling for several alternative explanations of party development. If religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties contesting elections, then we would have evidence to support the argument that religious diversity puts downward pressure on the fragmentation of the party system.

Previous Research

Most research examining the impact of social cleavages on the development of party systems assumes that higher levels of social diversity lead to the development of more parties and greater fragmentation of votes across these parties. This prediction emanates from the seminal study by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), which theorised that party system fragmentation increases with the number of cleavages. Drawing on this social cleavage theory, most research assumes (implicitly or explicitly) that higher levels of social diversity are synonymous with the presence of more cleavages, and therefore greater levels of diversity will lead to more parties.

In keeping with the predictions of social cleavage theory, most studies examining the impact of social cleavages on party systems have found that measures of social diversity are associated with more fragmented party systems. Most research examining the impact of social diversity on party system fragmentation has focused on ethnic diversity (e.g. Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 2006; Singer and Stephenson 2009). Some research has examined the impact of other cleavages like linguistic diversity (Vatter 2003; Stoll 2008; Flick Witzig and Vatter 2018), as well as class and urban-rural cleavages (Raymond 2016b). Few studies to date have focused on the impact of religious diversity, with most doing so as part of composite measures of social diversity, which effectively assumes that the effects of religion on party systems are similar to those of other measures of social diversity (e.g. Lijphart 1999; Stoll 2013).

Although few cross-national studies have examined the impact of religion *per se*, some previous research suggests religious diversity may be positively associated with party system fragmentation in the same way as is the case with other measures of social diversity. Not only have religious cleavages been important for the development of religious parties in

many democracies in Western Europe (Kalyvas 1996; Caramani 2004; Ertman 2009), but religious cleavages have had important effects on the development of party systems in other countries as well (e.g. Evans 2006; Mainwaring and Scully 2003; McAllister 2007). Because religious cleavages in several countries have produced and sustained religious parties that compete for religious voters' support, most research assumes that religious diversity should produce more fragmented party systems in the same way that other forms of social diversity have been shown to produce more fragmented party systems.

In contrast to the assumption that religious diversity produces more fragmented party systems, other research argues that religious diversity is negatively associated with the fragmentation of the party system (Raymond 2016a). This argument holds that religious diversity creates incentives for religious groups to cooperate rather than to support separate parties. Building on the 'supply-side religiosity' literature regarding the competition of religious groups in a market for adherents (Finke and Stark 1988; Iannaccone et al. 1997; Stark and Iannaccone 1994), this research argues that in more diverse contexts where competition is most intense, religious groups will cooperate to support parties representing their shared issue concerns. By cooperating politically, religious groups may preserve resources that can be more effectively spent competing for religious adherents. Instead of dividing their support across multiple parties representing issues rooted in religious divisions, religious voters will concentrate their support on the party with the best chance of implementing policies favourable to religious groups. Due to the incentives for political cooperation, this revisionist perspective argues that higher levels of religious diversity will be associated with *lower* levels of party system fragmentation.

Before this revisionist perspective can be considered further, further research examining the testable propositions underpinning the argument is needed. In particular, we should observe that religious diversity actually induces political cooperation (i.e. a reduction

in the number of religious parties) if the purported relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation is indeed genuine. The easiest form of cooperation with the best chance of reducing fragmentation of votes is to abandon religious parties. As this revisionist perspective argues, a diversifying religious structure reduces the size—and therefore political influence—of each religious group. Because the supply-side religiosity literature reminds us that religious groups competing in a market for adherents have to think first and foremost about their ability to attract and maintain religious adherents, and because higher levels of religious diversity reflect markets where the competition for adherents is greater than in less diverse markets (e.g. Finke and Stark 1988), religious groups in diverse contexts may be less likely to field their own parties than religious groups in less diverse contexts. Instead, religious groups in diverse contexts—like other organizations in competitive markets (van de Ven 1976; Miller 2002)—will seek to preserve resources that can be spent in the religious marketplace by cooperating with other religious groups sharing similar political interests in support of a smaller number of religious parties appealing across religious group lines. In the most diverse contexts, religious groups may abandon religious parties altogether and instead support parties not affiliated specifically with religion in exchange for policies favourable to the religious groups (issues of morality, favourable state-church relations, etc.) because these non-religious parties are more electorally viable—and therefore more likely to win control of government and enact policy. Thus, if religious diversity leads to political cooperation across religious group lines as the revisionist perspective argues, we should observe that religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties contesting elections.

When discussing the effect of religious diversity, one may wonder whether it is diversity of *religions* or religious *denominations* which puts downward pressure on the number of religious parties. While it is easy to imagine that shared doctrines may facilitate

cooperation between two denominations belonging to the same religion, cooperation between different religions may be more difficult. Two examples illustrate, however, that cooperation between different religions does occur. Both Nigeria and Ghana have similarly high levels of religious diversity.¹ In Nigeria, where Muslims constitute roughly half the population and vote for the All Progressives Congress, Protestants and Catholics (who, combined, constitute the other half of the population) tend to support the People's Democratic Party, reflecting long-term divisions between Muslims on the one hand and an alliance of Protestants and Catholics on the other (Williams and Falola 1995: 82-86, 107-109). Here, it is Protestants and Catholics who need to cooperate to enhance their electoral power vis-à-vis Muslims. In Ghana, however, where most Protestants (constituting roughly half the population) vote for the New Patriotic Party, Catholics and Muslims (collectively constituting about 30 per cent of the population) are both more likely to vote for the National Democratic Congress (Takyi et al. 2010). Here, it is Muslims and Catholics who need to cooperate to offset the electoral dominance of Protestants. These patterns suggest that cooperation between different religions is possible depending on religious groups' relative sizes—and, thus, need for electoral cooperation.

To date, few studies covering only a handful of cases have examined the effect of religious diversity on the number of parties contesting elections. Although religious diversity appears to have little impact on the number of parties in Switzerland (Flick Witzig and Vatter 2018), another study shows that religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of parties in the Netherlands (Lowery et al. 2013). While religious diversity is associated with more new parties entering the electoral scene in Canada, the effect of religious diversity on parties quitting the scene is of similar size (Ferris and Voiz 2018). Though this research has been limited in its territorial scope (and focused on the total number of parties rather than the number of *religious* parties), these findings suggest that the downward pressure on the

number of religious parties predicted by the revisionist perspective has some empirical support. Moreover, such findings provide justification for investigating this relationship in a broader array of countries to examine the generalisability of these findings.

Measuring Religious Parties

To test the argument that religious diversity reduces the number of religious parties, I produced a data set collecting the number of religious parties competing in elections in territories around the world. Specifically, I examined all legislative elections (focusing on the lower house in bicameral legislatures) held in autonomous or semi-autonomous territories during the five years between 2011 and 2015. Because several countries held more than one election during this period, the resulting data set is comprised of country-elections (rather than countries) as the units of analysis. I focus on country-elections during these years (and not earlier years) to ensure the quality of the data collection: while it would have been preferable to collect data for a longer time series, data for several of the indicators used to identify religious parties are not available for earlier elections in developing countries which experience high levels of electoral volatility (and thus the major parties changes from election to election). By restricting the data collection to more recent years in which the information necessary to account for all significant religious parties contesting elections is available, I sacrifice quantity of data over time for the more important quality of reliable measurement.

To produce this data set, I first had to define what constitutes a religious party. Until recently, the concept of ‘religious parties’ had not been defined clearly in the literature. While some particular parties have been defined and classified (e.g. Bick 2001; Hansen and Jaffrelot 2001), general terminology with cross-national applicability had been until recently harder to come by. To be sure, research by von Beyme (1985; see also Kalyvas 1996; Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010) identified Christian Democratic parties as a separate party ‘family’ that

was distinct from parties of both the left and right representing secular issues, while Kirchheimer (1966) identified ‘mass-denominational’ parties representing particular religious groups as a separate type of the mass party model. Research by Gunther and Diamond (2003) divided religious denominational parties further into those supportive of/opposed to political pluralism, while more recent work by Ozzano (2013) defined five types of religious parties based on clearer, more systematic grounds.

To operationalise the notion of ‘religious parties’ in a way that distinguishes religious parties (which are the focus of the arguments of the revisionist perspective regarding the relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation) from other parties that merely speak to issues concerning religious voters (to which the revisionist perspective does not speak directly), the present study uses those features seen in Ozzano (2013) to identify religious parties. To identify religious parties, I focus on the most tangible aspects: their ideologies, organization, goals, and the social bases they target in their appeals to voters and related interest groups. Specifically, I defined a religious party as any party whose organizational or issue/ideological profile is defined explicitly by religion. This definition serves to distinguish parties formed explicitly to represent religious groups, voters, and issues from non-religious parties that may represent issues of concern to religious voters but whose existence is not defined explicitly by religion.

Parties were classified as religious parties if they met any one of the following criteria. First, any party including a reference to the religion represented by the party in their name (e.g. ‘Christian Democrat’ parties) was treated as a religious party. The inclusion of the religion represented by the party in its name serves as an important signal to voters belonging to a relevant social group (i.e. voters belonging to the particular religion represented by the party) that the party represents their values and interests—and is organised to do so before, during, and after elections. Second, any party belonging to an international religious

organization (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood or the Centrist [Christian] Democrat International) was classified as a religious party.

Third, parties were designated as religious parties if they belonged to a religious party family. I used three sources to identify whether parties belonged to a religious party family: the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006), the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015; Polk et al. 2017), and the Parties and Elections in Europe database (Nordsieck 2017). If a party was recognised as belonging to a religious party family by any one of these three sources, I treated the party as a religious party.²

As a final means of determining whether a party was a religious party or not, I consulted parties' websites. Where such websites were available, I treated parties identifying the representation of religious issues and/or identities as fundamental to the organization and goals of the party—rather than merely a set of issues supported by the party—as religious parties. The former rationale explains why parties like the Slovak National Party in Slovakia (which identifies the protection of traditional Christian values as an essential component of the party's nationalistic mission) are treated as religious parties, while parties like the Republican Party in the United States (which is, formally, a secular party whose platform merely supports issues of concern to many religious voters but is not organised explicitly for the purpose of representing particular religious issues or identities) are not.

A final note regarding the criteria applied to pre-electoral coalitions is in order. I treated parties as separate religious parties only if their vote and/or seat totals were reported separately from their coalition partners in official election reports. Keeping a distinct identity within the coalition is important for a party to be recognised by potential supporters, and thus parties whose religious identities are subsumed under a broader coalition identity alongside non-religious parties were usually treated as non-religious parties. In exception to this rule, pre-electoral coalitions are treated as religious parties only if one of two criteria was met.

First, if the coalition is led by a religious party, the entire coalition is treated as one religious party. Second, a coalition is treated as a religious party/coalition if more than one of its member parties would be treated as religious parties according to the criteria listed above.

Following the practice of research examining market concentration (e.g. Bain 1956; Kwoka 1981), I count the number of religious parties finishing in the top ten positions in each election. Focusing on the number of parties finishing in the top ten positions is preferable to trying to count the total number of religious parties in each election because most countries do not publish results identifying every party in every election. In addition to the problem of finding the total number of parties competing in every election, finding reliable information needed to determine which parties qualify as religious parties and which do not—even during the recent period studied here—is much more difficult for parties finishing outside the top ten positions. Thus, to ensure the reliability of the coding of religious versus non-religious parties, I focus on counting the number of religious parties among the top ten parties in each election. While focusing on the top ten parties might introduce an arbitrary cut-off point, using other cut-off points yielded similar results.³

Figure 1 displays the percentages of country-elections at each value of the number of religious parties.⁴ There is a clear right skew to the distribution of religious parties in the country-elections examined here. The plurality number of religious parties is zero, demonstrating that major religious parties are completely absent in many countries. At the other end of the scale, only a few countries feature three or more religious parties finishing in the top ten places. That said, most countries feature at least one religious party, with some featuring multiple religious parties, which means there is important variation in the number of religious parties to explain.

Figure 1 about here

Estimating the Effect of Religious Diversity on the Number of Religious Parties

I estimate the relationship between religious diversity and the number of religious parties around the world by including variables measuring the effective number of religious groups. This index takes the following form:

$$1/\sum g_i^2,$$

where g represents the proportion of citizens belonging to the i^{th} religious group. Higher values of this index reflect more religiously diverse countries.

To measure religious diversity, I use data from several sources. One source is the Pew Research Center (2014). This data set includes the following religious groups into which respondents were grouped: Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, folk religions, unaffiliated, and other. To provide for further nuance in the measurement of religious groups, I supplement this data set with data breaking the Christian populations of each country down into Protestants, Catholics, Orthodox, and ‘Other Christians’ (Pew 2011).

To determine the robustness of the findings using this measure, I also examine several alternative measures of religious diversity. A second measure of religious diversity is taken from Alesina et al. (2003). A third measure of religious diversity uses data from the World Religion Project (WRP: see Maoz and Henderson 2013). Three additional measures are taken from the World Christian Encyclopedia (now World Christian Database, or WCD: see Johnson and Zurlo 2007). WCD data are available for the years 1900, 1970, and 2000, allowing us to analyse the long-term effects of religious diversity on the number of religious parties. Data for 1900, 1970, and 2000 are taken from McCleary (2017). Each of these alternative measures of religious diversity is transformed into an effective number of religious groups.⁵

I include several control variables to account for alternative explanations of cross-national variation in the number of religious parties. One set of variables measures the impact

of electoral systems on the number of religious parties. Because previous research finds that the number of parties contesting elections is higher in countries with larger district magnitudes (i.e. the number of seats elected per district: see Hug 2001; Tavits 2006), I include a variable measuring the logged mean district magnitude in the lowest tier of the country's electoral system.⁶ To account for the impact of proportional upper tiers—which might lead to more religious parties contesting elections due to the fact that proportional upper tiers reduce barriers to party success (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 2006)—I include a variable measuring the percentage of seats elected in an upper tier. Drawing from Duverger (1963), who noted that political parties face few barriers to entering the first round of two-round majority systems than is the case in single-round systems, we might also expect to see that the number of religious parties is greater in two-round majority systems. Countries using two-round majority systems are coded one (and zero otherwise). Data for these variables are taken from the Inter-Parliamentary Union's Parline database and electionguide.org.

Two control variables account for alternative explanations rooted in countries' religious structures. Because religious parties might be less likely to form in more secular societies—because the share of voters concerned with religious issues is smaller than in less secular societies—I include a variable measuring the non-religious proportion of the population.⁷ Additionally, I include an index of government restrictions on religion ranging from zero (no restrictions) to ten (high levels of restriction) using data from Pew (2018). While one view of the impact of government regulation holds that religious parties may be less able to form in countries with higher levels of regulation, another view holds that religious parties may be more likely to form in countries with higher levels of restriction of religion, with religious parties forming to oppose these regulations.⁸

I include four additional control variables. One is a measure of ethnic diversity—the

effective number of ethnic groups⁹—to account for the possibility that parties organised expressly along religious lines are less likely to form in ethnically diverse countries (where parties instead form around ethnic identities that may overlap with religious identities). To account for the possibility that wealthier societies—where the financial resources needed to organise parties are more readily available than in less wealthy societies—might be more likely to sustain (religious) parties, I include a variable measuring the logged per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of the country averaged over the five-year period between 2006 and 2010. Additionally, because previous research finds that the number of parties is greater in more populous countries than less populous countries (e.g. Anckar 2000), I include a variable measuring the logged population of the country. Data for GDP and population are taken from World Bank (2017). Finally, to account for the possibility that the number of religious parties is lower in non-democratic versus democratic elections, I include countries’ Freedom House (2018) political rights scale—recoded to range from zero (non-democratic) to six (democratic).¹⁰

Analysis

I estimate six models, one for each measure of religious diversity using Poisson regression.¹¹ Because several countries in the period under study conducted multiple elections, I cluster standard errors by country. Parameter estimates for each model predicting the number of religious parties finishing in the top ten places are presented in Table 1.

Table 1 about here

In keeping with the revisionist perspective regarding the impact of religious diversity on party system fragmentation, all six coefficients for the variables measuring religious diversity are negatively signed—suggesting that religious diversity leads to fewer religious parties contesting elections. With the exception of the coefficient for the WCD measure of

religious diversity in 1900, each of these coefficients is statistically different from zero. The fact that the coefficients in models 4-6 become stronger and more precisely estimated as one moves from the earliest to the most recent year of measurement suggests the possibility that the number of religious parties fluctuates over time in response to changing levels of religious diversity. As the measurement of religious diversity increases in temporal proximity to the measure of the number of religious parties, the estimated effect of religious diversity strengthens, suggesting that the number of religious parties contesting elections may respond to changes in the diversity of the religious market (i.e. the number of religious parties reduces in response to increasing levels of religious diversity). In any event, the fact that several measures of religious diversity are negatively associated with the number of religious parties demonstrates the robustness of this relationship.

The coefficients measuring the impact of religious diversity on the number of religious parties reach statistical significance even though several control variables are also significantly associated with the number of religious parties. For instance, the positive coefficients associated with the variable measuring district magnitude suggest that religious parties are more likely to form in countries using electoral systems that are more favourable to the formation of new parties—religious or secular. The positive coefficients for the variable measuring government restrictions on religion shows that religious parties are *more* likely to form in countries with higher levels of restriction on religion. The positive coefficients associated with the variable measuring countries' populations suggest that religious parties are more likely to form in more populous countries than less populous countries. Additionally, the positive coefficients associated with the variable measuring countries' levels of democracy suggest religious parties are more likely to form in democracies—and less likely to form in non-democracies. Even after controlling for these variables, however, the fact that religious diversity remains negatively and significantly

associated with the number of religious parties in each model (save model 4) demonstrates the robustness of this finding.

To see the substantive impact of religious diversity more clearly, Figure 2 presents the predicted number of religious parties across the range of each measure of religious diversity. To generate these predicted values, I hold all control variables at their median values. The predicted values in Figure 2 demonstrate that the estimated number of religious parties decreases from roughly 1.5 religious parties in countries with the lowest levels of religious diversity to fewer than one religious party—approaching zero religious parties—at the highest values of religious diversity, suggesting the chances of even one religious party contesting elections are low. To put it another way, the results in Figure 2 suggest that while one or two religious parties with the potential to finish in the top ten positions might contest elections in religiously homogeneous countries, religious parties are unlikely to contest elections in the most religiously diverse contexts.

Figure 2 about here

Thus, the results presented here support the revisionist perspective regarding the impact of religious diversity on party systems. In keeping with the argument that religious diversity puts downward pressure on the number of religious parties by compelling religious groups to cooperate on issues of shared interest to maximise their political impact (while preserving scarce resources that can be spent on competition for adherents in the religious marketplace), religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties in all six models estimated here. The fact this relationship holds when using different measures of religious diversity and even after controlling for several alternative hypotheses demonstrates that this relationship is quite robust.

Conclusion

This study began by noting a recent controversy that has emerged in the literature regarding the impact of religious diversity on party system fragmentation. Most research assumes that religious diversity—like other forms of social diversity—creates conditions for party systems to fragment, especially considering that religious cleavages have led to the formation of several parties representing these cleavages. In contrast to this perspective, however, other research argues that religious diversity creates incentives for political cooperation across religious lines, which puts downward pressure on party system fragmentation. Before considering this revisionist argument further, however, we would need to see evidence of the other testable implications underpinning the argument that religious diversity reduces party system fragmentation. Chiefly, we should observe that religious diversity limits the number of parties contesting elections to represent religious voters and their interests.

In line with the revisionist perspective, the analysis performed here suggests that religious diversity is indeed negatively associated with the number of religious parties. Though several other variables are also associated with the number of religious parties, the fact remains that the negative association between religious diversity and the number of religious parties cannot be explained by these alternative hypotheses. In contrast to the expectation that diversity breeds discord which prevents political cooperation, these results support the conclusion reached in earlier research (Raymond, 2016a) arguing that religious diversity promotes political cooperation that leads to a reduction in the number of religious parties. The findings above, in turn, suggest the negative association between religious diversity and party system fragmentation is due at least in part to the absence of religious parties.

One important limitation to the findings should be noted. The fact that the analysis

focuses on elections during a limited period between 2011 and 2015 suggests caution when attempting to generalise the findings to earlier periods. While the cross-national scope of this study allows us to generalise across countries, additional tests examining earlier periods would be welcome to guard against the possibility that the negative correlations between religious diversity and the number of religious parties seen above are limited to the years included in the analysis.

Though the findings presented above support the revisionist perspective regarding the impact of religious diversity on party system fragmentation, it remains to be seen whether the predictions of this revisionist argument regarding the voting behaviour of religious groups are met. As religious diversity increases, this argument predicts that religious parties become less viable because religious groups begin cooperating politically in support of the same parties based on the groups' shared interests. However, it remains to be seen whether the negative association between religious diversity and the fragmentation of votes across parties is due solely to a reduction in the number of parties, or whether religious diversity impacts the behaviour of voters as well. To this end, additional research examining the voting behaviour of individuals is needed to evaluate the revisionist perspective.

Finally, if religious parties are less likely to form in diverse contexts, this raises questions about how—and to what extent—religious issues are represented by secular parties not explicitly formed around religious identities and issues. In the absence of religious parties, it may be that religious actors are less able to influence policy (Fink 2008; Engeli et al. 2012; Budde et al. 2018). If this is true, religious leaders in diverse societies might therefore need to accept freedom from state regulation of religion—instead of the ability to shape morality policies—as the biggest reward for supporting secular parties (see Jelen and Wilcox 2002: 317-319). However, the degree to which morality issues become major political issues in countries without religious parties (e.g. Australia, the United States)

suggests that the presence of religious parties may not be necessary for issues concerning religious voters to be represented in political debates (see also Hurka et al. 2017). Thus, future research will also be needed to determine the consequences of religious diversity for the representation of religious issues.

Table 1: Poisson Regression Models of the Number of Religious Parties Contesting Elections and Finishing in the Top Ten Places, 2011-2015

| Variables | Model | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| Religious Diversity (Pew) | -0.28 (0.12)* | | | | | |
| Religious Diversity (Alesina et al.) | | -0.16 (0.08)* | | | | |
| Religious Diversity (WRP, 2010) | | | -0.31 (0.08)* | | | |
| Religious Diversity (WCD, 1900) | | | | -0.08 (0.15) | | |
| Religious Diversity (WCD, 1970) | | | | | -0.34 (0.11)* | |
| Religious Diversity (WCD, 2000) | | | | | | -0.35 (0.10)* |
| District Magnitude (Logged) | 0.16 (0.07)* | 0.16 (0.07)* | 0.15 (0.07)* | 0.17 (0.07)* | 0.17 (0.07)* | 0.16 (0.07)* |
| % Upper Tier Seats | 0.28 (0.45) | 0.35 (0.49) | 0.20 (0.46) | 0.35 (0.46) | 0.40 (0.48) | 0.33 (0.47) |
| Two-Round Majority Systems | 0.08 (0.27) | 0.10 (0.27) | 0.04 (0.26) | 0.12 (0.28) | 0.09 (0.28) | 0.03 (0.27) |
| % No Religion | -0.27 (0.68) | -0.40 (0.80) | -0.04 (0.48) | -0.77 (0.92) | 0.12 (0.75) | 0.65 (0.68) |
| Government Restrictions on Religion | 0.11 (0.04)* | 0.11 (0.04)* | 0.10 (0.04)* | 0.13 (0.04)* | 0.13 (0.04)* | 0.12 (0.04)* |
| Ethnic Diversity | -0.10 (0.07) | -0.11 (0.06)+ | -0.06 (0.06) | -0.15 (0.07)* | -0.05 (0.07) | -0.05 (0.07) |
| GDP per capita (Logged) | 0.05 (0.08) | 0.03 (0.08) | 0.04 (0.08) | 0.02 (0.08) | -0.00 (0.08) | -0.01 (0.08) |
| Population (Logged) | 0.18 (0.04)* | 0.18 (0.04)* | 0.18 (0.04)* | 0.18 (0.04)* | 0.18 (0.04)* | 0.17 (0.04)* |
| Democracy (Freedom House) | 0.16 (0.06)* | 0.17 (0.06)* | 0.16 (0.06)* | 0.17 (0.06)* | 0.16 (0.06)* | 0.17 (0.06)* |
| Constant | -3.73 (0.91)* | -3.80 (0.93)* | -3.55 (0.90)* | -3.91 (0.95)* | -3.40 (0.93)* | -3.25 (0.91)* |
| Wald χ^2 | 111.19* | 112.32* | 118.50* | 108.74* | 112.38* | 115.05* |
| McFadden's R ² | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.19 |
| n (Countries) | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 |
| n (Total) | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 |

+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, two-tailed tests. Entries are Poisson regression coefficients (standard errors clustered by country). "WRP" = World Religion Project. "WCD" = World Christian Database.

Figure 1: Distribution of the Number of Religious Parties Among the Top Ten Largest Parties in Elections Around the World between 2011 and 2015





Figure 2: The Predicted Numbers of Religious Parties Finishing in the Top Ten Places across the Range of Religious Diversity between 2011 and 2015



Notes: solid black lines represent the predicted number of religious parties, while the areas shaded in grey represent 95% confidence intervals.

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Appendix to Religious Diversity and the Number of Religious Parties Around the World

This Appendix includes three tables containing information that supplements the information provided in the main text. Table S.1 presents the full list of country-elections included in the study. For each country-election, Table S.1 also includes the names of each religious party finishing in the top ten places. Table S.2 presents descriptive statistics for each variable included in Table 1.

Table S.3 provides information regarding the robustness tests mentioned in the main body of the text. Specifically, Table S.3 presents the coefficients (standard errors) for the variables measuring religious diversity. To facilitate comparisons across the different model specifications, I include the coefficients for each religious diversity variable from the models in Table 1. Each model uses the same list of control variables as seen in Table 1 (unless otherwise specified); to simplify the table and facilitate comparison of coefficients across different model specifications, I omit the coefficients for the control variables.

Table S.3 shows that the results seen in Table 1 are quite robust. The coefficients for each measure of diversity are even stronger when looking at the impact of religious diversity on the number of religious parties finishing in the top four or five places, while the coefficients from models estimating the number of religious parties finishing in the top eight places more closely resemble those seen in Table 1. As with the results in Table 1, all coefficients (except those for the WCD measure of diversity in 1900) are statistically significant.

Regarding differences in the classification of religious parties based on the three measures of parties' ideological families noted in footnote 2 in the main text, the results in Table S.3 show that the results are robust to the use of a measure of the dependent variable treating the parties mentioned in footnote 2 as non-religious parties. In each case, religious diversity remains negatively associated with the number of religious parties finishing in the

top ten places. This alternative measure also has little effect on the statistical significance of the coefficients measuring the impact of religious diversity. While the coefficient associated with the Alesina et al. measure of diversity is less precisely estimated than that coefficient seen in Table 1, it nonetheless remains significant at the 90 per cent level.

Table S.3 also shows that the results are robust to the use of alternative measures of the control variables. Though the coefficient for the Pew measure of religious diversity is less precisely estimated, the results show that using the Pew measure of the non-religious share of the population does not materially affect the results (even the coefficient for the Pew measure of religious diversity remains significant at the 90 per cent level). With the exception of the Alesina et al. measure of diversity, Table S.3 shows that the results remain robust to the use of different measures of ethnic diversity and democracy. While the coefficients for the Alesina et al. measure miss the 90 per cent level of statistical significance, they nonetheless remain negatively signed. In the models using a measure of democracy combining the Freedom House scores for political rights *and* civil liberties, the Alesina et al. measure of diversity remains statistically significant (along with the other measures of religious diversity). The lack of significance in the model using the Polity measure of democracy may be due to differences in the number of countries between the two models—whereas the models using the Freedom House measures include 153 countries, the model using the Polity measure only includes 133 countries. In any event, the results in Table S.3 show that the findings seen in Table 1 are robust to nearly every model re-specification.

Table S.1: List of Religious Parties Finishing in the Top Ten Places by Country and Election Year, 2011-2015

| Country (Election Years) | Religious Parties |
|----------------------------|---|
| Albania (2013) | Democratic Party of Albania |
| Algeria (2012) | National Rally for Democracy; Green Algeria Alliance; Justice and Development Party |
| Andorra (2011) | N/A |
| Andorra (2015) | N/A |
| Angola (2012) | National Union for the Total Independence of Angola; National Liberation Front of Angola |
| Antigua and Barbuda (2014) | N/A |
| Argentina (2011) | Front for Victory; Popular Union |
| Argentina (2013) | Justicialist Party; Renewal Front |
| Argentina (2015) | Front for Victory; Renewal Front |
| Armenia (2012) | Republican Party; Armenian Renaissance |
| Aruba (2013) | Aruban People's Party |
| Australia (2013) | N/A |
| Austria (2013) | Austrian People's Party; Christian Party of Austria |
| Azerbaijan (2015) | N/A |
| Bahamas (2012) | N/A |
| Bahrain (2014) | Al Asalah; Al-Menbar Islamic Society; Al Wefaq |
| Bangladesh (2014) | N/A |
| Barbados (2013) | N/A |
| Belarus (2012) | Belarusian Popular Front Party |
| Belgium (2014) | Christian Democratic and Flemish; Humanist Democratic Centre |
| Belize (2012) | People's United Party |
| Belize (2015) | People's United Party |
| Benin (2011) | N/A |
| Benin (2015) | N/A |
| Bermuda (2012) | N/A |
| Bhutan (2013) | N/A |
| Bolivia (2014) | Christian Democratic Party |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina (2014) | Party of Democratic Action; Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Democratic Union 1990 |
| Botswana (2014) | N/A |
| Brazil (2014) | Brazilian Social Democracy Party; Republic Party; Democrats |
| Bulgaria (2013) | Citizens for Economic Development of Bulgaria; Attack; National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria; IMRO-Bulgarian National Movement |
| Bulgaria (2014) | Citizens for Economic Development of Bulgaria; Attack |
| Burkina Faso (2012) | Union for the Republic |
| Burkina Faso (2015) | N/A |
| Burundi (2015) | N/A |
| Cambodia (2013) | Cambodian People's Party; Front uni national pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre, pacifique et coopératif |
| Cameroon (2013) | N/A |

| | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| Canada (2011) | Christian Heritage |
| Canada (2015) | Christian Heritage |
| Cape Verde (2011) | Movement for Democracy |
| Cayman Islands (2013) | N/A |
| Central African Republic (2011) | N/A |
| Central African Republic (2015) | N/A |
| Chile (2013) | Christian Democratic Party |
| Colombia (2014) | Colombian Conservative Party |
| Comoros (2015) | N/A |
| Congo, Republic of (2012) | N/A |
| Costa Rica (2014) | Citizens' Action Party; Social Christian Unity Party; National Restoration Party; Costa Rican Renovation Party |
| Côte D'Ivoire (2011) | Rally of the Republicans |
| Croatia (2011) | Croatian Democratic Union; Croatian Peasant Party |
| Croatia (2015) | Patriotic Coalition |
| Curaçao (2012) | National People's Party |
| Cyprus (2011) | Democratic Rally |
| Czechia (2013) | Top 09; Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party |
| Denmark (2011) | Christian Democrats |
| Denmark (2015) | Christian Democrats |
| Djibouti (2013) | N/A |
| Dominica (2014) | N/A |
| Ecuador (2013) | Social Christian Party |
| Egypt (2011) | Democratic Alliance For Egypt; Islamist Bloc; Al-Wasat Party |
| Egypt (2015) | Al-Nour Party |
| El Salvador (2012) | Party of Hope; Party of Hope-National Conciliation Party |
| El Salvador (2015) | Christian Democratic Party; National Conciliation Party-Christian Democratic Party |
| Equatorial Guinea (2013) | N/A |
| Estonia (2011) | Pro Patria and Res Publica Union; Party of Estonian Christian Democrats |
| Estonia (2015) | Pro Patria and Res Publica Union |
| Ethiopia (2015) | N/A |
| Faroe Islands (2011) | Centre Party |
| Faroe Islands (2015) | Centre Party |
| Fiji (2014) | Social Democratic Liberal Party |
| Finland (2011) | Christian Democrats |
| Finland (2015) | Christian Democrats |
| France (2012) | Union for a Popular Movement |
| Gabon (2011) | Gabonese Democratic Party |
| Gambia, The (2012) | N/A |
| Georgia (2012) | Christian Democratic Union |
| Germany (2013) | Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union |
| Ghana (2012) | N/A |
| Greece (2012, May) | New Democracy; Independent Greeks; Golden Dawn; Popular Orthodox Rally |

| | |
|--------------------------|--|
| Greece (2012, June) | New Democracy; Independent Greeks; Popular Association-Golden Dawn; Popular Orthodox Rally |
| Greece (2015, January) | New Democracy; Independent Greeks; Golden Dawn |
| Greece (2015, September) | New Democracy; Popular Association-Golden Dawn; Independent Greeks-National Patriotic Alliance |
| Greenland (2013) | N/A |
| Greenland (2014) | N/A |
| Grenada (2013) | N/A |
| Guatemala (2011) | National Unity of Hope |
| Guatemala (2015) | National Unity of Hope |
| Guinea (2013) | Parti de l'espoir pour le developpement national |
| Guinea-Bissau (2014) | Party for Social Renewal |
| Guyana (2011) | N/A |
| Guyana (2015) | N/A |
| Haiti (2011) | N/A |
| Haiti (2015) | Christian Movement for a New Haiti |
| Honduras (2013) | National Party; Christian Democratic Party |
| Hong Kong (2012) | N/A |
| Hungary (2014) | Fidesz-Christian Democratic People's Party; Jobbik |
| Iceland (2013) | N/A |
| India (2014) | Bharatiya Janata Party; Shiv Sena; Shiromani Akali Dal; Indian Union Muslim League |
| Indonesia (2014) | National Mandate Party; National Awakening Party; Prosperous Justice Party; United Development Party |
| Ireland (2011) | Fine Gael |
| Isle of Man (2011) | N/A |
| Israel (2013) | The Jewish Home; Shas; United Torah Judaism; United Arab List |
| Israel (2015) | The Jewish Home; Shas; United Torah Judaism |
| Italy (2013) | Democratic Party; The People of Freedom; Lega Nord |
| Jamaica (2011) | N/A |
| Japan (2012) | New Komeito Party |
| Japan (2014) | New Komeito Party |
| Kazakhstan (2012) | N/A |
| Kenya (2013) | Wiper Democratic Movement |
| Kiribati (2011) | N/A |
| Kiribati (2015) | N/A |
| Kosovo (2014) | N/A |
| Kuwait (2012, February) | Sunni Islamist |
| Kuwait (2013) | Sunni Islamist |
| Kyrgyzstan (2015) | N/A |
| Latvia (2011) | Latvia's First Party/Latvian Way |
| Latvia (2014) | N/A |
| Lesotho (2012) | N/A |
| Lesotho (2015) | N/A |
| Liberia (2011) | N/A |
| Liechtenstein (2013) | Patriotic Union |
| Lithuania (2012) | Homeland Union—Lithuanian Christian Democrats; Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania |
| Luxembourg (2013) | Christian Social People's Party |

| | |
|-------------------------|---|
| Macau (2013) | N/A |
| Macedonia (2011) | Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonia National Unity; Democratic Union for Integration; Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization – People’s Party |
| Macedonia (2014) | Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonia National Unity; Democratic Union for Integration; Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization – People’s Party |
| Madagascar (2013) | N/A |
| Malawi (2014) | Congress Party |
| Malaysia (2013) | United Malays National Organization; Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party |
| Maldives (2014) | Progressive Party of Maldives; Adhaalath Party |
| Mali (2013) | N/A |
| Malta (2013) | Nationalist Party |
| Mauritania (2013) | Union for the Republic; Union for Democracy and Progress |
| Mauritius (2014) | Mauritian Solidarity Front |
| Mexico (2012) | National Action Party |
| Mexico (2015) | National Action Party |
| Moldova (2014) | N/A |
| Monaco (2013) | N/A |
| Mongolia (2012) | N/A |
| Montenegro (2012) | N/A |
| Montserrat (2014) | N/A |
| Morocco (2011) | Justice and Development Party; Istiqlal |
| Mozambique (2014) | Democratic Movement of Mozambique |
| Myanmar (2015) | N/A |
| Namibia (2014) | N/A |
| Netherlands (2012) | Christian Democratic Appeal; Reformed Political Party; Christian Union |
| New Caledonia (2014) | The Rally-UMP; Caledonian Union-FLINKS |
| New Zealand (2011) | N/A |
| New Zealand (2014) | N/A |
| Nicaragua (2011) | N/A |
| Niger (2011) | N/A |
| Nigeria (2011) | N/A |
| Nigeria (2015) | N/A |
| Northern Cyprus (2013) | N/A |
| Norway (2013) | Christian Democratic Party; The Christians |
| Pakistan (2013) | Pakistan Muslim League; Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf; Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam; Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid e Azam Group); Pakistan Muslim League (F); Jamaat-e-Islami; Mutahida Deeni Mahaz |
| Panama (2014) | People’s Party |
| Papua New Guinea (2012) | Triumph Heritage Empowerment Party |
| Paraguay (2013) | Beloved Fatherland Party |
| Peru (2011) | Alliance for the Great Change |
| Philippines (2013) | People-Power Christian Muslim Democrats; Philippine |

| | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| | Democratic Party-People's Power |
| Poland (2011) | Civic Platform; Law and Justice; Polish People's Party; Poland Comes First |
| Poland (2015) | Law and Justice; Civic Platform; Polish People's Party |
| Portugal (2011) | Social Democratic Party; People's Party |
| Portugal (2015) | Portugal Ahead |
| Puerto Rico (2012) | N/A |
| Romania (2012) | Right Romania Alliance; Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania; Greater Romania Party; Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania |
| Russia (2011) | N/A |
| Rwanda (2013) | Patriotic Front Coalition |
| St Kitts & Nevis (2015) | N/A |
| St Lucia (2011) | N/A |
| St Vincent & the Grenadines (2015) | N/A |
| Samoa (2011) | N/A |
| San Marino (2012) | Sammarinese Christian Democratic Party; Union for the Republic |
| Sao Tome & Principe (2014) | Independent Democratic Action |
| Senegal (2012) | N/A |
| Serbia (2012) | Democratic Party of Serbia, Dveri |
| Serbia (2014) | Democratic Party of Serbia; Dveri |
| Seychelles (2011) | N/A |
| Sierra Leone (2012) | N/A |
| Singapore (2011) | N/A |
| Singapore (2015) | N/A |
| Sint Maarten (2014) | N/A |
| Slovakia (2012) | Christian Democratic Movement; Slovak Democratic and Christian Union-Democratic Party; Slovak National Party; Party of the Hungarian Community |
| Slovenia (2011) | Slovenian People's Party; New Slovenia |
| Slovenia (2014) | New Slovenia; Slovenian People's Party |
| Solomon Islands (2014) | N/A |
| South Africa (2014) | Freedom Front Plus; African Christian Democratic Party |
| South Korea (2012) | N/A |
| Spain (2011) | People's Party; Convergence and Union; Basque Nationalist Party |
| Spain (2015) | People's Party; Basque Nationalist Party |
| Sri Lanka (2015) | United National Front for Good Governance; Sri Lanka Muslim Congress; All Ceylon Makkal Congress |
| Sudan (2015) | National Congress |
| Suriname (2015) | N/A |
| Sweden (2014) | Christian Democrats |
| Switzerland (2011) | Christian Democratic People's Party; Evangelical People's Party |
| Switzerland (2015) | Christian Democratic People's Party; Evangelical People's Party; Federal Democratic Union |
| Syria (2012) | N/A |
| Taiwan (2012) | Kuomintang |

| | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Tajikistan (2015) | Islam Renaissance Party |
| Tanzania (2015) | N/A |
| Thailand (2011) | N/A |
| Thailand (2014) | N/A |
| Timor-Leste (2012) | N/A |
| Togo (2013) | N/A |
| Tonga (2014) | N/A |
| Trinidad & Tobago (2015) | United National Congress |
| Tunisia (2011) | Ennahda Movement |
| Tunisia (2014) | Ennahda Movement |
| Turkey (2011) | Justice and Development Party; Felicity Party; Great Unity Party; People’s Voice Party |
| Turkey (2015, June) | Justice and Development Party; Felicity Party |
| Turkey (2015, November) | Justice and Development Party; Felicity Party; Great Unity Party |
| Turkmenistan (2013) | N/A |
| Turks & Caicos (2012) | N/A |
| Uganda (2011) | N/A |
| Ukraine (2012) | All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland”; Freedom |
| Ukraine (2014) | Self Reliance; All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland”; Freedom |
| United Kingdom (2015) | N/A |
| United States (2012) | Constitution Party |
| United States (2014) | Constitution Party |
| Uruguay (2014) | Independent Party |
| Uzbekistan (2014) | N/A |
| Vanuatu (2012) | N/A |
| Venezuela (2015) | N/A |
| Zambia (2011) | N/A |
| Zimbabwe (2013) | N/A |

Table S.2: Descriptive Statistics

| Variables | Mean (S.D.) | Min | Max |
|---|--------------|-------|-------|
| The Number of Religious Parties Finishing in the Top 10 Places | 1.07 (1.21) | 0 | 7 |
| Religious Diversity (Pew) | 1.94 (0.83) | 1.00 | 5.22 |
| Religious Diversity (Alesina et al.) | 2.20 (1.14) | 1.00 | 7.16 |
| Religious Diversity (WRP, 2010) | 2.32 (1.15) | 1.02 | 5.84 |
| Religious Diversity (WCD, 1900) | 1.51 (0.61) | 1.00 | 4.96 |
| Religious Diversity (WCD, 1970) | 2.04 (0.95) | 1.01 | 5.65 |
| Religious Diversity (WCD, 2000) | 2.25 (1.09) | 1.02 | 6.56 |
| District Magnitude (Logged) | 1.28 (1.42) | 0 | 6.11 |
| % Upper Tier Seats | 0.09 (0.17) | 0 | 0.69 |
| Two-Round Majority Systems | 0.13 (0.34) | 0 | 1 |
| Non-Religious Share | 0.08 (0.11) | 0 | 0.76 |
| Government Restrictions on Religion | 2.91 (2.11) | 0.1 | 8.7 |
| Ethnic Diversity | 2.35 (1.76) | 1.00 | 14.33 |
| GDP per capita (Logged) | 8.68 (1.61) | 5.19 | 11.98 |
| Population (Logged) | 15.47 (2.21) | 10.35 | 20.94 |
| Democracy (Freedom House) | 4.04 (1.95) | 0 | 6 |

Table S.3: Robustness Tests of the Impact of Religious Diversity on the Number of Religious Parties Contesting Elections and Finishing in the Top Ten Places, 2011-2015

| Robustness Test | Measure of Religious Diversity | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|
| | Pew | Alesina et al. | WRP | WCD (1900) | WCD (1970) | WCD (2000) |
| Results from Table 1 | -0.26 (0.11)* | -0.16 (0.08)* | -0.30 (0.08)* | -0.06 (0.14) | -0.32 (0.11)* | -0.34 (0.09)* |
| Religious Parties Finishing in the Top 4 Places | -0.31 (0.15)* | -0.29 (0.12)* | -0.36 (0.11)* | -0.18 (0.19) | -0.38 (0.13)* | -0.36 (0.12)* |
| Religious Parties Finishing in the Top 5 Places | -0.27 (0.13)* | -0.21 (0.09)* | -0.31 (0.10)* | -0.14 (0.16) | -0.33 (0.11)* | -0.34 (0.10)* |
| Religious Parties Finishing in the Top 8 Places | -0.30 (0.11)* | -0.17 (0.08)* | -0.32 (0.08)* | -0.05 (0.14) | -0.32 (0.10)* | -0.34 (0.09)* |
| Dropping Parties with Dissimilar Ideology Scores | -0.23 (0.12)* | -0.14 (0.08)+ | -0.27 (0.08)* | -0.08 (0.15) | -0.30 (0.12)* | -0.31 (0.10)* |
| Using the Pew Non-Religious Measure | -0.23 (0.12)+ | -0.15 (0.07)* | -0.28 (0.08)* | -0.05 (0.14) | -0.29 (0.11)* | -0.30 (0.09)* |
| Using State Support for Religion in Place of Government Restrictions on Religion | -0.26 (0.11)* | -0.13 (0.07)+ | -0.29 (0.08)* | 0.11 (0.12) | -0.25 (0.10)* | -0.29 (0.09)* |
| Fearon Measure of Ethnic Diversity | -0.27 (0.11)* | -0.11 (0.08) | -0.30 (0.08)* | -0.04 (0.15) | -0.31 (0.10)* | -0.32 (0.09)* |
| Polity Measure of Democracy | -0.27 (0.12)* | -0.12 (0.08) | -0.27 (0.08)* | -0.12 (0.14) | -0.34 (0.11)* | -0.32 (0.09)* |
| Combined Freedom House Measure of Democracy | -0.26 (0.11)* | -0.16 (0.08)* | -0.29 (0.08)* | -0.05 (0.14) | -0.32 (0.11)* | -0.34 (0.09)* |

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$. Entries are Poisson regression coefficients for each measure of religious diversity (standard errors clustered by country). Coefficients for all other variables omitted from the Table. “WRP” = World Religion Project. “WCD” = World Christian Database.

¹ In addition to having similar levels of religious diversity according to data from Pew (2011, 2014) and the World Religion Project (Maoz and Henderson 2013), both use similar electoral systems.

² While the three sources generally produced consistent classifications, there were disagreements over the classification of parties in cases where some sources treated right-of-centre parties as religious while others treated the parties as conservative. Recoding parties for which the three ideology measures produced dissimilar classifications and which were not coded as religious according to other criteria—this list included Civic Platform and the Polish People’s Party in Poland, and Convergence and Union and the Basque National Party in Spain—as non-religious produces similar results. The results of these robustness tests can be seen in the online appendix.

³ To ensure that the results are not due to the choice of ten as the number of positions in which to count the number of religious parties, I also examined the number of religious parties finishing in the top four, five, and eight positions in each election. The results using these alternative measures of the dependent variable—seen in the online appendix—produce similar conclusions regarding the impact of religious diversity.

⁴ A full list of the parties coded as religious parties can be seen in Table S.1 in the online appendix.

⁵ The data from Alesina et al. are reported as fractionalization scores ranging from 0 to 1. To transform these into effective numbers of religious groups, I use the following formula:

$$1/(1-F)$$

where F refers to the fractionalization scores reported by Alesina et al. The data taken from the WCD are reported as the percentages belonging to the following groups: Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, other Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, those belonging to several East Asian religions (Shintoism, Taoism, Chinese Universalism), the non-religious (atheists, agnostics, and otherwise non-religious), and all other religions. These categories are broken down even further (e.g. Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Judaism) in the WRP data, with 32 different religious group categories in all. Both the WRP and WCD data are transformed into an effective number of religious parties in the same way as the variable using Pew data.

⁶ While recent research casts doubt on the possibility that the effects of social diversity on party system fragmentation interact with the permissiveness of the electoral system (Ferree et al. 2017; Milazzo et al. 2018), other research examining the fragmentation of vote/seat shares suggests that the effects of electoral systems and social diversity are conditional on the impact of each other variable (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 2006). In keeping with recent literature, model fit tests using Bayesian Information Criteria showed that models interacting religious diversity and district magnitude did not significantly improve model fit over the models presented here.

⁷ The measure used here is the percentage of non-religious citizens recorded in the WRP. The results are robust to the use of the ‘unaffiliated’ percentage reported by Pew (2014).

⁸ Replacing this variable with a variable measuring countries where the state supports established religion(s)—using data taken from Fox and Flores (2009; see also Fox 2011, 2014)—produces similar results. While the coefficients for this measure of state regulation of religion remain positive, they are no longer statistically significant. The coefficients for the variables measuring religious diversity, by contrast, remain statistically significant.

⁹ This measure uses data from Alesina et al. (2003) and is calculated in the same way as with

religious diversity. The results are robust to the use of alternative measures of ethnic diversity—e.g. the measure produced by Fearon (2003).

¹⁰ Replacing this variable with the combined Polity measure of democracy (subtracting the autocracy from democracy scores: Marshall and Jaggers 2017) or a variable combining Freedom House’s political rights and civil liberties scales produces similar results.

¹¹ Results using negative binomial regression do not indicate problems of overdispersion, demonstrating that negative binomial regression models are unnecessary.