Alternative Sanctions Before The Special Jurisdiction For Peace: Reflections on International Law and Transitional Justice


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Reparations, Responsibility & Victimhood in Transitional Societies

Alternative Sanctions Before The Special Jurisdiction For Peace:

Reflections on International Law and Transitional Justice
Executive Summary

Criminal courts play an important function in post-conflict societies in reaffirming moral values and establishing the rule of law. In the face of mass atrocities over decades, no amount of punishment is going to undo the harm caused, but a tailored and comprehensive transitional justice system, including criminal trials that provide proportionate punishments can force those perpetrators to confront their responsibility and for the rest of society to be edified by the performance of justice. For victims, trials and reparations can serve as processes to end impunity of the crimes they have suffered, by receiving public acknowledgement of their harm and forcing those individuals who committed such harm to correct the imbalance in the relationship between them. While no one country’s experience can be replicated exactly in another (or should be), this report seeks to provide some lessons learned and guidance to better inform the Special Jurisdiction for Peace’s (JEP) approach to alternative sanctions, victim participation and reparations. This report follows on from engagements with the JEP in September 2018 and February 2019 that hope to start a dialogue on these issues. As such, it reflects the start of the conversation to broadly set out the contours of the issues, but we expect more specific comments and questions to deepen our discussion.

This report approaches these issues under four headings: restorative justice; victim participation; international standards on sentencing; and alternative sanctions, reparations and accountability. With the first of these, restorative justice has been practiced in some transitional societies. However, often the use of restorative justice has been for low-level perpetrators and associated with truth recovery processes and criminal trials. That said restorative justice could more finely attune criminal trials to be more responsive to victims’ views and concerns in proceedings, and to better shape justice outcomes through dialogue with perpetrators. It must be noted that restorative justice takes time; there can be a number of drawbacks including power imbalances, pressure on participants to satisfy external goals, insincerity of perpetrators, and lack of attention to gender perspectives and harms.

With regards to victim participation, the report outlines the practice of international criminal justice bodies, in particular the International Criminal Court. It highlights the human rights jurisprudence and the literature on procedure justice, which emphasises the importance of victims’ voices being heard in judicial proceedings, respected and reflected in decision making. Given that international crimes involve thousands of victims, there is increasing practice to collectivise the representation of victims, but this brings its own issues of how well victims are communicated with, their voices represented, and how conflicting voices are managed. The section also reflects on the practice of victim participation in other bodies, as well as opportunities for victims to appear in person to give their views and concerns. Final part of this section highlights some of the provisions and challenges of victim protection and psychological support in coming forward to international criminal bodies.

In terms of international guidance on sentencing for international crimes, there is no stipulated penalty schedule in international criminal law. However there are a number of principles to guide sentencing that correspond to traditional domestic penology, in particular proportionality. The jurisprudence of international criminal law and regional human rights courts supports that states do have some discretion to mitigate sentences where perpetrators make contribution to reparations to victims,
reconciliation and the peace process. These lessons can be applicable to the alternative sanction regime, drawing upon the lessons of the international criminal justice bodies and their use of pleas, mitigation and reparation for international crimes. The use of alternative sanctions is a means to strike a proportionate balance of punishment and restoration by engaging in communication with the perpetrator on the wrongfulness of their actions. By allowing perpetrators to mitigate the harm they have caused through incentivising confessions and certain forms of reparations, it can help to break the silence of impunity, but also communicate norms and reaffirm the rule of law. Ex-combatants can make an important contribution to dealing with the past and should be provided with a framework to resolve some of the victims’ moral harm and unanswered questions. Consideration should also be made of complex victims, or victimised perpetrators, in how they can fit into the JEP process in terms of restorative justice and reparations.

The report finishes on a number of recommendations:

- The JEP should make use of process and outcome indicators to measure the impact on victims and affected communities on its work;
- Alternative sanctions should be viewed as a way to find a proportional punishment to repair the relationship of the perpetrator with society and more reparative measures to repair the relationship or at least civic trust of victims;
- Reparations ordered by the JEP should not include compensation, but make the most of the JEP’s position in facilitating measures of satisfaction and community service from perpetrators in consultation with victims. Victims should be signposted to other reparations available through the Victims Unit;
- The JEP cannot undo all the harm of the Colombia conflict, but it can make a modest contribution to re-establishing morals and human rights values.
Introduction*

1. Transitional justice offers a toolkit for each country to craft their own solutions to mass atrocities within their own particular circumstances and in light of domestic and international legal obligations. International law obliges states to effectively investigate, prosecute and remedy international crimes and gross violations of human rights to ensure that there is no impunity for such atrocities. This reflects that impunity is silence – the failure to speak out and for society to confront the atrocities of the past, enables perpetrators to deny they occurred and for victims to be left with the burden of harm. As such, efforts to investigate, prosecute and remedy are intended to prevent impunity of such crimes as the ‘opposite of justice’, as impunity serves to repudiate victims’ suffering and access to redress. By blocking victims from seeking recognition and an appropriate remedy, impunity can implicitly signal that such individuals, groups, and communities deserved to be harmed. Accordingly, taking a victim-centred approach is a way to seek restoration, recognition of their suffering and assigning responsibility to those who caused it.

2. International law does not prescribe the way in which states should punish or the processes in which investigations and remand must take place, just that gross violations are effectively, promptly and transparently investigated with appropriate redress to victims and proportional punishment for perpetrators. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court can only exercise its jurisdiction over a state party where it is admissible on the grounds that the state is unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute international crimes. Unwillingness is determined on whether or not domestic proceedings are being used to shield a person from the establishment of criminal responsibility, there is no unjustifiable delay and it is processes in which investigations and remedy must take place, just that gross violations are effectively, promptly and transparently investigated with appropriate redress to victims and proportional punishment for perpetrators. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court can only exercise its jurisdiction over a state party where it is admissible on the grounds that the state is unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute international crimes. Unwillingness is determined on whether or not domestic proceedings are being used to shield a person from the establishment of criminal responsibility, there is no unjustifiable delay and it is being conducted in an independent and impartial manner.

3. At their core, criminal courts aim to provide retribution, not as vengeance (i.e. lex talionis), but as proportional punishment that recognises the rights of all the parties involved (victims, perpetrators and society), with punishment through sentencing as a means to ‘right the wrong’. No amount of punishment can undo or equate with international crimes, given its ‘radical evil’ that ‘explode[s] the limits of the law’. Instead, the contribution of perpetrators to victims and society through reparations, peace building, reconciliation efforts and community service can be seen as a way to mitigate the severity of the punishment. Criminal courts can also serve utilitarian goals, not to ‘torture’ the offender or to undo the crime, but to achieve its aims of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation so as to enhance social utility, thereby fulfilling society’s interests by preventing future crimes.

4. Criminal courts can also play an important expressive function, in that they convey moral or normative messages by condemning those who have breached society’s values. Duff suggests that punishment as a communicative process can result in repentance, reform and reconciliation of perpetrators, by imprisoning them to show the errors of their ways and to repair the damage they have caused so as to prevent their repetition in their future behaviour. This shares some aspects of reintegrative shaming discussed further below on restorative justice, that courts can offer a forum to reprimand behaviour and encourage perpetrators to confront their wrongdoing and remedy it. However for unresponsive perpetrators who reject the moral messages being communicated by a court, punishment can serve to educate the public by imposing ‘shame, sanction, and stigma’ on offenders. The role of the JEP as a retributive, expressive and restorative court, places it in a unique position to respond to extraordinary violence by re-establishing values in Colombian society. The use of alternative sanctions is a means to strike a proportionate balance of punishment and restoration by engaging in communication with the perpetrator on the wrongfulness of their actions. By allowing perpetrators to mitigate the harm they have caused through incentivising confessions and certain forms of reparations, it can help to break the silence of impunity, but also communicate norms and reaffirm the rule of law. This reflects that after protracted conflict and gross violations of human rights, no amount of punishment can undo the harm done, but criminal courts can be wielded in a way to re-establish moral values in a society, which for too long has permitted and incentivised violence.

Report Layout

5. This report sets out the experience of other transitional societies in responding to mass atrocities. This is not to suggest that their processes and successes can be replicated or should be, but rather it is indicative of how other countries have developed context specific responses to atrocities. It begins in the first section by outlining the use of restorative justice as an approach to dealing with the past, by involving victims, perpetrators and the community to come together in a safe and supportive space, facilitated by an impartial mediator, to negotiate amongst

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* Written by Luke Moffett, Cheryl Lawther, Kieran McEvoy, Clara Sandoval, and Peter Dixon. Thanks to Sofiap Corr for her background research and Adriana Rudling for her comments.

themselves ways to deal with the consequences of the crime. While using informal or traditional forms of justice to repair the social fabric and relationships in communities can be more inclusive, there are dangers and challenges in such an approach, such as an unequal power relations, lack of procedural protections and scaling restorative justice up to address mass violence.

6. In section two provisions on victim participation are detailed, in particular noting the challenges of using a formal legal process in international criminal proceedings. This includes notions of procedural justice, victim application process, representation and voice, the different modalities victims can participate and the importance of protection and psychological support measures. The third section outlines the international legal standards on sentence reduction, amnesties and pardons used in exchange for incentivising truth recovery, non-recurrence of violence and reconciliation. The final section discusses the contribution ex-combatants can make to transitional justice processes, in particular how providing a legal space through a restorative informed retributive criminal justice can incentivise individuals and organisations to be more responsive in providing reparative measures to victims. The report concludes with some reflections on how the experiences in other jurisdictions could help relevant stakeholders in Colombia reflect on these issues along with some recommendations for the JEP.

**Restorative Justice**

7. Restorative justice is ‘a process whereby parties with a stake in a specific offence collectively resolve how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future. In particular, restorative justice processes emphasise the restoration of relationships between offenders, victims and communities rather than the punishment of perpetrators. Criminal justice has long been criticised for instrumentalising victims by prioritising the prosecution of perpetrators or ‘upholding the rule of law’ rather than focusing on the needs of victims, which may be more complex than measuring the degree of retribution or ‘jail-time’ received by offenders. For some restorative justice advocates, the state is sometimes involved in ‘stealing the conflict’ between victims and perpetrators through a depersonalised process, using victims’ suffering to further a retributive agenda, wherein criminal justice professionals and politicians can portray themselves as being ‘tough on crime’. Retributive processes may not only ignore the needs of victims, but also leave perpetrators with a sense that they have been victimised by a punitive justice system (thus allowing the offenders to take avoid taking real responsibility for past actions) and remove the broader community of any of its responsibilities for healing damaged relations, because it has become the job of the state.

8. Restorative justice therefore attempts to find imaginative ways of shifting the ‘ownership’ of past harms away from being the sole preserve of the state and to involving perpetrators, victim and communities affected by those harms in an effort to improve social cohesion. Criminal justice punishment can be ‘disintegrative’ inflicting more damage on society and ‘ruptures familial and social bonds ... generates further animosity and antagonism, and often engulfs the parties in bitter, never-ending hostilities. In contrast restorative justice is intended to restore relationships between the parties and promote personal ‘active responsibility’ of the offender to make amends to the victim for the harm they have caused by righting their wrongs. The offender can contribute to alleviating the victim’s suffering through acknowledging responsibility for their actions, facing the consequences of the harm he/she has caused, empathising with the victim, offering a sincere apology, and (where possible) making restitution or paying compensation. In this way, the offender can be better reintegrated back into community having attempted to address their past harms, which in turn makes their likelihood of re-offending significantly less likely. While they can be compelled or incentivised into such a process, it should not aim to humiliate offenders, instead offering them a way to be resocialised and reincorporated into society as a citizen. This process has been described by the Australian criminologist Braithwaite as ‘reintegrative shaming’ – a shift away from the stigmatisation of the offender. Braithwaite described the difference as, ‘Reintegrative shaming communicates disapproval within a continuum of respect for the offender; the offender is treated as a good person who has done a bad deed. Stigmatization is disrespectful shaming, the offender is treated as a bad person. Stigmatization is unforgiving - the offender is left with the stigma permanently, whereas reintegrative shaming is forgiving ... Put another way, societies that are forgiving and respectful while taking crime seriously have low crime rates; societies that degrade and humiliate criminals have higher crime rates.’

A restorative justice process can provide a more informal space for affected parties to recover the truth, by enabling victims to discuss with the perpetrator the nature and motivations for the harm. This can allow participants “to tell the ‘whole truth’ as they see it”, without evidential rules and procedures that limit them to...

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20 See Braithwaite n.18.
narrating the facts relevant to a criminal court. The involvement of the victim and community in restorative conferencing can encourage the active responsibility of these actors in ‘putting things right’ and the prevention of recurrence of violations. By focusing on the social and personal context of the harm, the participants and the consequences, restorative justice hopes to provide contextual justice rather than consistent justice in sentencing.

9. There are of course shortcomings and challenges in using restorative justice processes, such as the lack of proper procedural safeguards and emotional support that can cause further suffering to participants, the dominance of certain groups’ interests over others, pressure on participants to facilitate more collective goals of healing and restoration or diversion priorities of the state to avoid court proceedings, and to ease pressure on prisons, or not responding sufficiently to victims’ needs. The restorative potential of such informal justice meetings can be compounded by non-engagement by victims or offenders, or insufficient funding by the state, leaving voluntary organisations to find or supply the capacity and resources to support such processes. The 2000 UN Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters suggest that to overcome these issues well-trained facilitators can help to ensure a safe and appropriate environment for treating the participants with dignity and impartiality, as well as being sensitive to vulnerable participants.

Restorative Justice and Transitional Justice

10. In relation to transitional justice, restorative justice is increasingly relied upon as a theoretical and practical framework within which to situate less retributive facing approaches to past crimes. For example, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), described the work of the TRC in the following terms,

‘Retributive justice – in which an impersonal state hands down punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for perpetrators – is not the only form of justice. I contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which was characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here the central concern is not retribution or punishment but, in the spirit of ubuntu, the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships. This kind of justice seeks to rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he or she has injured by his or her offence. This is a far more personal approach, which sees the offence as something that has happened to people and whose consequence is a rupture in relationships. Thus we should claim that justice, restorative justice, is being served when efforts are being made to work for healing, for forgiveness and for reconciliation.’

In other contexts, there has been some practice of informal processes to adjudicate international crimes and political violence that can be termed as restorative. Indeed the inclusion of provisions on victim participation (discussed in the next section) and reparations within the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) have even been seen as a ‘restorative turn’ in nuancing retributive justice in addressing international crimes, but this may be more rhetorical given what can realistically be delivered within a criminal justice framework. At the ICC, while victim provisions promised restorative justice, it very much connected to the trial and punishment of perpetrators, as seen with the limited participation opportunities of victims to directly engage and question accused persons, as well as reparations being limited to convicted persons. Victims can present their views on punishment, including the length of sentence and mitigating and aggravating factors. More generally, alongside the use of conditional amnesties and immunities, transitional justice mechanisms have been able to create a space where individuals can come forward to speak without fear of self-implication.

11. There are of course some challenges. Restorative justice cannot restore relationships or victims to their position before the violation or conflict and victims’ expectations of any justice process (retributive or restorative) need to be managed accordingly. Moreover, in some contexts where the state has been a protagonist in the conflict, there may be suspicions of the state’s motivations in seeking to frame past violence as only involving the perpetrators and victims, thereby obscuring its own past culpability. For example, this has certainly been the case in Northern Ireland wherein discussions of the conflict that focus only on past violence between Catholics and Protestants, while ignoring the role of the British state, are treated with great suspicion. In contexts where there is residual suspicion towards the state, a facilitator who is perceived as impartial from the state, by commanding respect and following clear restorative justice values, can help to build trust amongst participants in proceedings. Indeed, the use of a neutral facilitator who is distinct and independent from the state may help to demonstrate a shift from punitive approach to responding to violence (both criminal and structural) of the past. There are a number of context specific practices of using restorative justice processes to address international crimes alongside other transitional justice mechanisms. These experiences reflect the social, political and cultural circumstances of the country in transition. That said, they provide some lessons

22 Braithwaite n.16, p129.
28 Desmond Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness, Rider (1999), p55. The South African experience is discussed further below.
31 See discussion below on Amnesty and Pardon.
32 McEvoy and Mallinder n.19, p428.
on the successes, tensions and challenges in moving beyond retributive justice to engage in more restorative and informal processes to redress victims’ harm and improve social cohesion.

**Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts**

12. In response to the genocide in Rwanda there were three mechanisms established – the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, national courts, and the community level gacaca courts. The 12,000 gacaca courts in Rwanda were created to enable rapid prosecution and trials, aimed not only in providing punishment, but also to reconstitute Rwandan society by providing penalties that allow convicted persons to ‘amend themselves and to face their reintegration’. Based on the traditional gacaca model of informal dispute resolution in the community, modern gacaca courts intended to look beyond punishment alone and the reintegration of offenders through community work in a process that involved victims, perpetrators and community members.

13. In terms of process, while victims were given a participatory role, like others in the community hearings, they often remained silent providing only their witness statement. Over time participation dropped as most community members were peasants, who could not afford to spend one day a week at the hearings, become ‘trial fatigued’ with little incentive beyond curiosity to participate in another hearing, or cases were too individualised, failing to tackle broader or more complex narratives of the period, such as war crimes by government forces (RPF) against Hutus. Others were discouraged from participating or appearing as a witness due to intimidation, ostracism from the community, or being falsely accused. Yet in practice there remains an unequal relationship that impacts upon individuals participating in the gacaca courts. The traditional role of the judge (inyangamugayo) shifted from being a mediator to being an arbiter on guilt and punishment. Perpetrators appeared at the gacaca courts in pink jump suits under armed guard, without legal representation. Accusations were encouraged to uncover those responsible and the truth, and guilt was established on a prima facie burden of proof. The system itself while building on traditional community justice, is a retributive mechanism intended to deal with mid-level and rank and file perpetrators of the genocide.

14. The Rwandan government intended that the punishment of those involved in the genocide would help to facilitate their reintegration into their old communities. The gacaca court system was intended to incentivise perpetrators by offering a reduced sentence (halfed) if they made a plea guilty, showed remorse through truth telling and apologised to the victims, and engaged in community service or victim compensation, allowing them to rebuild trust with members of their old community and victims. However, such community service was often conducted far from victims and their community, providing them with little direct benefit. Confessions were partially made, for minor offences, placing greater blame on those who had been killed or where in exile or to settle a score, with allegations that perpetrators colluded in their confessions to hide evidence and limit their responsibility. Perpetrators were often indigent, unable to pay compensation or return property they had stolen after years in prison, causing some victims to abandon the gacaca process. Others negotiated directly with perpetrators to obtain money and buy their silence. Apologies were seen by some victims as lacking sincerity and as instrumental in allowing perpetrators to get a lighter sentence. In addition, the gacaca courts failed to integrate a gender perspective, although the government was proactive in including women as judges (inyonamugayo); rape was only added in 2008 despite being a feature of the genocide; and there was an uneasy balance with victims coming forward in front of their own community with in camera (confidential in private) hearings for sexual violence crimes that seemed contradictory to the goals of gacaca in encouraging public debate and community participation.

15. The prison and community service experience has had mixed results. Community service work was determined based on the needs of the region, but included activities such as repairing roads, rebuilding homes of victims, building bridges or planting trees. While most of the community service is conducted through the Rwandan government’s Travaux d’Intérêt Général (TIG – works of public interest), it halves their sentence where they confessed and recognised their crime. This meant that someone convicted of 20 years could have their sentenced reduced to 10 years, serving 50% i.e. five years in full time community service. Those who do community service ‘tigistes’ are required to work three days per week, and where they are staying in a camp their days are combined. The institution the tigistes work for provides them with medicine, food and accommodation, with clothes and education supplied by the Rwandan Correctional Service. According to Brehm et al, 29% (91,556) of cases dealt with by the gacaca courts involve community participation.

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34 Which dealt with 93 leaders, military commanders and senior perpetrators.
35 Addressing 10,000 high level or most responsible perpetrators.
36 To deal with 1.2 million low level participants in the genocide.
38 Penal Reform International (PRI), The contribution of the Gacaca jurisdictions to resolving cases arising from the genocide Contributions, limitations and expectations of the post-Gacaca phase, (2010), p67.
44 Clark ibid., p251.
46 PRI ibid., p46, Clark, p79; HRW p80.
47 Clark n.43, p250.
49 Presidential Order No 66/01 of 02/11/2012 Determining the Modalities of Implementation of Community Service as an Alternative Penalty to Imprisonment.
service obligations.\textsuperscript{50} In their assessment of sentencing, Brehm et al found that the high level perpetrators (Category 1) who were ineligible for community sentence were convicted of 19 years on average, excluding life sentences, whereas mid level perpetrators who committed murder, rape and torture (Category 2) were convicted of 15 years on average.\textsuperscript{51} Category 3 perpetrators who committed property crimes served no prison time or community service, but were instead had fines imposed (90%) on them averaging at $311 USD or agreement with victims, with some (9%) initiated by the perpetrator who wished to be forgotten and returned the victims’ property.\textsuperscript{52}

16. There is some research to suggest that for ex-prisoners who engaged in the gacaca courts and worked in the community service through TIG, have remained embarrassed or silent about their role during the genocide once being released, particularly with their family, entrenching denial.\textsuperscript{53} The impact of perpetrators removal from their family has also caused marital problems, as they are unable to contribute to their wealth and wellbeing, partners remarried, and there were a number of tigistes committing suicide within the TIG camps or they left the country upon release, rather than returning home to their community.\textsuperscript{54} Other tigistes have found the community service useful in giving them new skills and work experience, or at least more liveable conditions than prison with less surveillance and contact with the outside world.\textsuperscript{55}

17. For victims they were divided on the TIG, some worried that tigistes would settle old scores at night, but these concerns did not materialise as tigistes often worked far away from their home communities and had no reason to leave the camp at night as relatives and friends were too far away.\textsuperscript{56} This is not to negate that victims feared the proximity of former genocidiaries in the community and the community service did not mitigate this for all.\textsuperscript{57} For some victims seeing tigistes rebuilding their house or working alongside them in the fields helped to alleviate some of their fears. More generally society in Rwanda initially perceived early release and community service as a ‘trick’, but with those who did not confess remaining in prison overtime society’s perceptions began to change along with sensitisation programmes by the state, and welcomed the opportunity for economic benefits from the TIG in communities.\textsuperscript{58}

18. The gacaca court process provided a forum to confront the widespread involvement of individuals in the genocide, position the community to shame perpetrators through their confessions, express moral values to contribute to preventing its repetition, while allowing some recovery of truth, expression of remorse and reintegration.\textsuperscript{59} Although confession, apology and remorse were integral to the gacaca system, enabling such reintegrative shaming requires a ‘sufficiently coherent and engaged community to have the capacity to reintegrate a wrongdoer’.\textsuperscript{60} As a result, the ‘gacaca has always been an uneasy mix of restorative and retributive justice’ which over time became ‘less participatory and more coercive’.\textsuperscript{61}

\section*{Northern Ireland}

19. In Northern Ireland, there are a number of informal restorative processes have been led or contributed to by former combatants: community restorative justice; search for the disappeared; and a number of truth recovery initiatives. The first of these have been efforts over the past twenty-five years to transform violence within communities by paramilitaries, who often carried out punishment attacks against alleged anti-social offenders as part of their ‘policing’ activities in working class areas.\textsuperscript{62} When the paramilitary cease-fires were called in 1994, such ‘policing activities’ continued. Thereafter, engagement between human rights and civil society actors and the Republican and Loyalist armed groups ultimately led to the creation of community based restorative justice programmes as alternatives to violence. These non-violent and lawful projects, many of them staffed by former combatants, were shaped by the principles and practices of restorative justice.\textsuperscript{63} These projects benefitted from former combatants, along with local community members, acting as volunteers to provide moral authority and legitimacy to a non-violent approach in mediating disputes, which followed restorative justice values with a flexible process.\textsuperscript{64} While the number of attacks has markedly dropped within communities, such attacks do continue by dissident republican and loyalist groups.\textsuperscript{65} However, mainstream IRA punishment violence has completely stopped. In 1996 there were 302 punishment shootings by loyalist and republican groups, which by 2006 had dropped down to 49.\textsuperscript{66} Such ex-combatant restorative processes did have the effect of transforming community dispute resolution, reducing distance between victim, offenders and the community,\textsuperscript{67} and at the same time facilitated

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{50} Hollie Nyeeth Brehm, Christopher Ugger, and Jean-Damasclène Gasanabo, Genocide, Justice, and Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 30(1) (2014) 333–352.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Brehm et al ibid., p344.
\item \textsuperscript{52} Ibid p340-341.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{55} PRI Monitoring and Research Report on the Gacaca Community Service (TIG): Areas of reflection, March 2007, p22-23.
\item \textsuperscript{56} See ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{57} PRI 2007, p35.
\item \textsuperscript{58} PRI 2007, p28-31.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Clark n.43, p205.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Martha Minow, Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair, Princeton University Press 2002, p75.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Waldorf n.39, p422-423.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Such as drug dealing and burglaries. Such attacks involved a range of punishments from warnings, beatings, shootings and exile. See Anna Eriksson, Restorative Justice in the Northern Ireland Transition, Wilan (2006), 341-361, p344.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Eriksson n.62, p345.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Harry McDonald, Northern Ireland ‘punishment’ attacks rise 60% in four years, The Guardian, 12 March 2018.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
Restorative Justice

20. Engagement by paramilitaries in finding solutions to the harm they caused is also apparent in two other respects. During the Northern Ireland conflict, 16 people were disappeared by non-state armed groups (principally the IRA). To help facilitate the recovery of victims’ remains, the Independent Commission for the Location of Victims’ Remains (ICLVR) was established by the British and Irish governments in 1999. In the attempt to incentivise information retrieval, the ICLVR offers a de facto amnesty for those individuals who come forward with information relating to the recovery of the disappeared. The offer of immunity from prosecution is entirely pragmatic and reflects the reality that without the input of those directly involved in the act of disappearance, the recovery of victims’ remains would be highly unlikely, if not impossible. Of course, given the guarantee of non-prosecution, there was little scope for the Republican movement to fail to co-operate with the recovery of the remains of the disappeared. At the end of 2018, the remains of 13 of the 16 disappeared have been recovered and returned to their families for burial. However, the ICLVR has concentrated on the single goal of determining the location of remains of those victims who were disappeared – broader goals of truth and acknowledgement were not built into the commission. Indeed, such objectives may have run contrary to the ‘quiet’ nature of its operation.

21. Outside of this legal framework some victims have directly engaged with paramilitary groups to uncover further information of the death of their loved ones through more informal back channels. Notable examples include the work of anti-victim organisations who have acted as interlocutors between victims’ families and former members of paramilitary organisations in the quest to answer questions of significance to family members and the rehabilitation of the reputation of informers killed by the IRA, wherein investigations were internally conducted and apologies made to the families and later published in a republican magazine. However such informal engagements have become more difficult for ex-combatants over fear of self-incrimination and prosecution, after testimony provided by now deceased members of paramilitary organisations were published as part of a Boston College project, resulting in the tapes being subpoenaed by the Northern Ireland police and the arrest of living comrades implicated in the stories.

South Africa

22. Established in 1996 to deal with the horrors of apartheid and with the ambitious goal of ‘reconciling a nation’, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) adopted a language of healing, forgiveness, reconciliation and restorative justice. Restorative justice is premised upon the belief that crime or anti-social behaviour is ‘a violation of people and relationships’ rather than simply lawbreaking. As a result, restorative approaches seek to identify the ‘harm’ caused by the offenders’ actions to individual victims, the wider community and the harm caused by the punishment and stigmatization to offenders themselves.

23. Eschewing retribution, the TRC sought to restore relationships between victims and perpetrators and repair the damage suffered by both parties. As noted above, for the Chair of the TRC Archbishop Desmond Tutu, this emphasis on restorative justice was ‘consistent with traditional African approaches to conflict transformation – “western justice is largely retributive”’. The TRC’s restorative focus also resonated with the traditional concept of Ubuntu as ‘humaneness’ and respect for human dignity in the move from violence to reconciliation. These sentiments were shared by the South African Constitutional Court in its examination of the National Reconciliation Act 1995 that established the TRC,

by encouraging these survivors and the dependants of the tortured and the wounded, the maimed and the dead to unburden their grief publicly, to receive the collective recognition of a new nation that they were wronged, and crucially, to help them to discover what did in truth happen to their loved ones, where and under what circumstances it did happen, and who was responsible.

That truth, which the victims of repression seek so desperately to know is, in the circumstances, much more likely to be forthcoming if those responsible for

70 Chapman and Campbell n 66, p177.
71 The Northern Ireland (Location of Victims’ Remains) Act 1999 was passed by the British government, and the Criminal Justice (Location of Victims’ Remains) Act 1999 was passed by the Irish government.
74 See Ron Dudos, Closing the gap: symbolic reparations and armed groups, International Review of the Red Cross 93(883) September 2011, 783-808.
75 Boston College tapes: Truth recovery pie in the sky as long as shadow of arrest looms, Belfast Telegraph, 30 January 2015.
78 Braithwaite n 16.
80 Cited in Minow n 2, p81.
81 umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu – ‘people are people through other people’. TRC Volume 1, Chapter 5, p27.
such monstrous misdeeds are encouraged to disclose the whole truth with the incentive that they will not receive the punishment which they undoubtedly deserve if they do. Without that incentive there is nothing to encourage such persons to make the disclosures and to reveal the truth which persons in the positions of the applicants so desperately desire. With that incentive, what might unfold are objectives fundamental to the ethos of a new constitutional order. The families of those unlawfully tortured, maimed or traumatised become more empowered to discover the truth, the perpetrators become exposed to opportunities to obtain relief from the burden of a guilt or an anxiety they might be living with for many long years, the country begins the long and necessary process of healing the wounds of the past, transforming anger and grief into a mature understanding and creating the emotional and structural climate essential for the “reconciliation and reconstruction” which informs the very difficult and sometimes painful objectives of the amnesty.

24. The restorative approach articulated by the TRC can be divided into four aspects:

a. ‘seeks to redefine crime: it shifts the primary focus of crime from the breaking of laws or offences against a faceless state to a perception of crime as violations against human beings, as injury or wrong done to another person;

b. is based on reparation: it aims at the healing and the restoration of all concerned – of victims in the first place, but also of offenders, their families and the larger community;

c. encourages victims, offenders and the community to be directly involved in resolving conflict, with the state and legal professionals acting as facilitators;

d. supports a criminal justice system that aims at offender accountability, full participation of both the victims and offenders and making good or putting right what is wrong.

25. The importance of the full participation of former combatants and their contribution to truth recovery was also framed within a restorative lens:

‘that the accountability of perpetrators be extended to making a contribution to the restoration of the well-being of their victims. The fact that people are given their freedom without taking responsibility for some form of restitution remains a major problem with the amnesty process. Only if the emerging truth unleashes a social dynamic that includes redressing the suffering of victims will it meet the ideal of restorative justice.”

26. That said, a number of critiques have been made of the restorative capacity of the TRC. First, the legal nature of amnesty committee hearings often left victims as spectators of legal debates between their own and other lawyers in the hearings. Informal meetings facilitated by TRC staff and lawyers, offered a more direct way to obtain truth and assess the sincerity of the perpetrator’s remorse. However, these were not organised by the TRC and the timeframe of the hearings may have been too soon for victims to engage in such processes.

27. Second, the amnesty hearings did not require perpetrators to express remorse or an apology, just the truth, though perpetrators did at times express regret and sympathy, others entered a rote apology and some even justified their actions.

28. Third, the separation of the committees on amnesty, violations and rehabilitation and reparation, limited the relational aspect of sharing information between perpetrators and victims. Although the committees allowed information to be transferred between them and provided opportunities for victims to engage with perpetrators, the system was not set up to facilitate detailed discussions on truth, such as the location of those disappeared. Numerous investigators were involved in the amnesty committee to verify facts and identities as well as to trace victims, but this was a substantive amount of work and time to collect and collate such information.

29. Fourth, perceptions of the TRC being more ‘perpetrator friendly’, in particular the amnesty commission, were not helped by the TRC being able to resolve a

83 TRC Volume 1, Chapter 5, p126.
84 TRC Volume 1, Chapter 5, p131.
87 See McEvoy and Mallinder n.19.
89 Sizwe Phakathi and van der Merwe ibid, p158-139.
91 477 disappearances were recognised by the TRC in part based on information provided by perpetrators and has been used as a starting point for their recovery and reburial by the Missing Persons Task Team. See Jay D. Aronson, The Strengths and Limitations of South Africa’s Search for Apartheid-Era Missing Persons, International Journal of Transitional Justice 5 (2011), 262-281.
perpetrator’s legal situation by confirming or denying them an amnesty, whereas despite making recommendations for reparations, victims had to await years for implementation by the state.92 Despite the promise of restoration, reparations were limited in scope to those victims who testified before the TRC, falling within its definition of gross violations of human rights, and by the subsequent partial implementation by the South African government.

Expectations can widely vary amongst victims from confronting those responsible, finding the truth or location of the remains of a loved one, obtaining acknowledgement and reparation or an apology, or to contribute to healing and reconciliation of the country.93 In terms of justice and reparations, victim engagement was a way to highlight their interests in economic rehabilitation, such as education or skills development, as a means to assert their dignity after living under the repression of apartheid.94 Counselling was not provided by the TRC, but through other groups, such as Khulumani Support Group, however, such groups did not have the capacity to provide services to thousands of victims and other participants.95 The South African experience offered innovation in exploring truth and offender-victim engagement, but without supportive services, it failed to inform victims of what they could expect from an early stage, provided a narrow focus on specific gross violations and the partial and delayed reparations offered missed an opportunity to ensure a more joined up response to dealing with the past. Moreover, having an acknowledgement ceremony or truthful revealing account by a perpetrator may not by itself contribute to healing. This may reflect a broader trend of expectation outstripping the capacity of any one commission, requiring modesty on what such mechanisms can do in the face of mass atrocities.

Other contexts

The use of restorative justice or traditional rituals in addressing conflict-related crimes is apparent in a number of other contexts.96 In Northern Uganda, traditional Acholi practices were incorporated into the Juba peace agreement between the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Ugandan government, alongside the creation of a war crimes division to provide an ‘overarching justice framework’ through formal and ‘complementary alternative justice mechanisms’.97 Despite the final peace agreement not being formally signed by the LRA, a range of traditional ceremonies are engaged with to facilitate community cohesion and mediate conflicts. Other mechanisms which have been enacted, such as the 2000 Amnesty Act that provides a blanket amnesty to anyone in rebellion, has no conditions for an individual to contribute to truth, accountability or reparations.98 In the absence of a joined up comprehensive process to deal with the past, traditional ceremonies, although having mixed contemporary use by individuals, have been sought out the former combatants and victims to assist in reintegrating and normalizing their place in the community. These traditional ceremonies are framed on restoring harmony in the community through the clan taking responsibility for the actions of its members, whether through internal reconciliation ceremonies or external with other clans.99 Kyouo tong gweno (stepping on an egg on top of an opobo twig) is a cleansing ritual used to purify those who have been away from home for a long time, and is applied in welcoming back former child soldiers.100 There are also reburial rites like inko cogo (reburial of the bones) and area cleansing has facilitated appropriate burials, family reunions and for some members of the community to return from displaced persons camps, by removing bad spirits caused by the spilling of blood on the land during the war.

One of the most discussed traditional ceremonies in Acholi is moto oput (drinking the bitter root), where warring parties are reconciled after the responsible party or clan acknowledges their wrongdoing in front of the community, provides a truthful account, makes compensation to the victim’s clan (culo kwor) to atone for the harm, and then both clans share a meal together. Where clans are warring amongst each other, moto oput ceremony can be linked to negotiations on appropriate reparations for the damage caused, and followed by the gomo tong (bending of spears) to prevent recurrence of violence. Cultural and religious institutions have also played a key role in promoting healing and reconciliation amongst the affected communities.101 Nonetheless, these mechanisms do not provide official acknowledgment of responsibility or harm and there are little corresponding reparations from the state for victims. While one off reintegration packages are provided to amnesty reporters (USD $70 and tools), there is no corresponding support for victims. As one northern Uganda interviewed by the team stated, “I am a victim, but I do not have the benefits of a perpetrator, who is also a victim.”

Similarly in Timor Leste, there were three mechanisms to deal with the occupation and liberation war, from the truth commission (CAVR), Serious Crime Unit (CRU) to deal with senior perpetrators, down to the grassroots Community Reconciliation Process (CRP). Offenders would voluntarily make a written application to the CAVR, which would be sent to the Office of the General Prosecutor for review if it needed to go before the CRU, otherwise it would go before the CRP. The CRP invoked traditional community mediation to reintegrate over 1,000 perpetrators, due to the devastation caused by the occupation and conflict to the criminal justice system.102 The CRP or nahe biti bo’ot (‘stretching the big mat’ where perpetrators, victims and elders sit) involved mediation between the aggrieved party and the perpetrator in the form of a panel from the community. This process culminated in a one-day ceremony, but usually required three months pre-negotiation to reach

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92 SATRC, Vol. 6, p84.
93 Sizwe Phakathi and van der Merwe n88, p122.
94 Ibid., p126.
95 Ibid., p127.
97 Clause 5.3 of the Agreement and clause 19 of the Annexure.
98 The blanket nature of the amnesty has been reinterpreted by the Ugandan Supreme Court in 2015.
100 Quinn ibid., p88.
102 Interview, Gulu, Northern Uganda, July 2011.
103 1,371 perpetrators completed a CRP. See Chega! Part 9: Community Reconciliation, para.6.
34. The ceremony itself drew from traditional rituals of *lisan* and was opened by a prayer from a Catholic priest in the local language. The offender would make a statement on their responsible acts, with questions from the CRP panel, victims and community members. This often did not result in interrogation of their accomplices, instead victims’ questions concentrated on ‘idiosyncratic issues’ important to them. Where an agreement was reached, it would be read out and signed by all the participants, whereby the perpetrator would apologise to the community, pay a fine to the victim or give symbolic reparations (such as jewellery or *tais* (textiles)), or community service (property reconstruction, cleaning or infrastructure repair) and renounce all forms of violence for political ends. Thereafter they would be welcomed back and immunity granted from civil and criminal liability. These ‘acts of reconciliation’ were not intended to ‘burden’ perpetrators with obligations beyond their means. For those who broke their commitments to the victim or community, they faced up to a year in prison or a US $3,000 fine. Where an agreement was not reached it would be referred to the police. Most of the perpetrators before the CRP were low-level individuals, who had mostly committed theft.

35. For victims, the CRP enabled them to confront their perpetrator and ascertain some form of truth, or at least it distilled some information from the rumour, exaggeration and lies during the chaos of the war. Victims’ capacity and ability to engage in the process was limited, as they were not supported by the CAVR or briefed on what to expect. Victims also had less time to prepare than the perpetrator who made the request, further compounding their frustrations. Many victims were unable to participate in hearings due to sickness, lack of transportation or being unable to afford taking a day off work in the fields; this had a gender dimension for women who were often excluded by male family members or had to look after children. Perpetrators only provided token reparations, and the state has yet to pass the 2012 reparation bill. In addition, victims reported feeling pressurised by the community to reconcile with the offender. Participation in the CRP did not automatically mean that they wanted to reconcile with a perpetrator, some felt it was a personal choice, others felt that there was an imbalance in favour of the interests of the perpetrator to ensure fast reconciliation. That said, the CAVR truth commission noted that the grassroots CRP had the effect of deepening and broadening the reach of efforts to tackle impunity, by reaching across the country, at the local level, incentivising perpetrators to acknowledge their crimes, take responsibility for their wrongdoing and make efforts to remedy the harm caused to victims and their community. Yet for those perpetrators most responsible for serious crimes, including sexual violence, they were able to slip across the border to West Timor, escaping justice before the CRU and CRP.

36. The participation of victims in proceedings involving international crimes has been growing since its inclusion in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This inclusion within the Rome Statute reflects the frustrations of civil society victims and victims with previous tribunals’ neglect of victims’ interests. It also coincided with domestic developments, which increasingly included victims in civil law countries, such as *partie civile* or *Nebenklage*. The *partie civile* procedure in French-speaking countries enables victims to initiate prosecutions, participate as a party in proceedings, and bring ancillary claims for damages on the prosecution’s case. In the German-speaking countries the *Nebenklage* procedure permits victims to appoint their own counsel to act as a private accessory prosecutor, who can inspect files, present their case in a trial, question witnesses, object to judges’ orders and questions, apply for evidence to be taken, and make statements. In addition, victims in Islamic law countries have the right to prosecute privately an offender and to claim compensation. In some common law countries, victims can also bring private prosecutions and make impact statements during sentencing.

37. Involving victims in decision-making processes can help them to express their voice on issues that affect them, providing them with some ownership based on

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105 Braithwaite ibid., p205-206.
108 CAVR Part 9, para 80.
109 Stanley n.107, p114.
110 CAVR Part 9, para 132.
111 Stanley n.107, p116-117.
112 CAVR Part 9, para 132.
114 Stanley n.107, p120-121.
115 CAVR Part 9, paras.143-144.
117 Such as the ECCC, EAC, STL and Kosovo. Art. 17 STL Statute; Art. 22 Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, 3 August 2015.
120 Section 1177 and 403–406 of the Strafprozessordnung of the German Criminal Code.
feelings of respect, in that their voices are valued. Social psychologists have long conducted research on participants on the fairness in decision-making and judicial process. Their research indicates that participants who were able to exercise their voice in procedures which affected them and influenced decision-making had greater satisfaction than those who were unable to express their views. Tyler clarifies these in respect to consistency, representation and accuracy; consistency based on comparison to prior decision, representation on the extent to which participants can make their case, and accuracy in how decisions are reached taking into account participants’ input. The benefits for victims in participating in proceedings can vary depending on whether they are directly presenting their views and concerns before a court, appearing as a witness, or more indirectly by being named in proceedings on their harm or represented through their lawyers. For those directly participating in proceedings, it can validate their experience of victimisation and make them feel empowered through the law. However, it can also be stressful and psychologically strain victims where proceedings are long. For those who participate through their lawyers or see their perpetrator convicted, it can acknowledge their suffering, provide some physical protection by imprisoning responsible perpetrators and reveal some truth as to the atrocities committed against them. For some victims participating directly can be a mixed experience, as one victim interviewed by the authors in Guatemala, who participated in the trial of former Guatemalan president Rios Montt, stated: 

“[When I went to] give my testimony and now I was very happy because Rios Montt was going to jail. Finally – justice. I was happy. I told him in front of him ‘you are the one who killed my kids. I am happy I met you. I can see your face because I don’t know you, I didn’t have any problems with you, whenever you came to our village, you burned everything, you killed everyone. I don’t owe you anything’. I told him. I told him that ‘I’m happy that I’m here, that I met you and you’re going to pay for this and tell me, what did you do with my kids?’ and he answered ‘You’re lying’ and I said ‘No, I don’t lie, I’m saying the truth, they died and you killed them, because I’m a survivor, I saw what you did, I saw what the whole military did, I remember what happened because after that, life was very sad.’”

Although only the perspective of one individual, it reflects the mixed emotions of participating in criminal proceedings. Moreover, it illustrates the confrontational nature of criminal proceedings, where victim and accused are disputing their own versions and justifications of the past. In the end Rios Montt died before his second trial of genocide could be completed. Such visible participation can also result in victims facing intimidation and social ostracism. Indeed the victim quoted above was subjected to domestic violence from her husband and stigmatised by her community to remain silent in case they were attacked again by the military.

For victims expressing their views and concerns, while recognising their value, agency and dignity, is not a one-way process. The value in voicing concerns is only shared by participants where a decision maker, such as a judge, considers their views in decision-making. In particular, they need to be satisfied with and explain their decisions. Clarity and certainty of the role of victims and how they are being heard and its impact on decision-making, can help to mitigate frustration at negative outcomes, as a victim making a statement for sentencing can help to affirm their dignity and self-worth. There can still be value expressive benefits where a victim’s input has no effect on the outcome, but participants appreciate being given the opportunity to voice their concerns. It is very important in restorative and procedural justice approaches to criminal justice to inform victims of what they can expect from the process, wherein modesty of what is deliverable with the framework of the institution is key. This can be greatly assisted by engaging victims through a process that is clear and certain in how, why and when they will be engaged with. For instance the victim lawyers in the Kenyatta case at the ICC, while often hundreds of miles away and victims faced security issues, kept victims informed of proceedings through phone calls every 6-8 weeks as well as to communicate their views and concerns. Civil society actors can play a key role in support these process, from not only carrying out community sensitisation, but also filling out forms, provide legal advice or covering costs for victims to attend hearings or workshops.

An example of this process has been developing in Northern Ireland with victim impact statements. These statements are often letters written by victims on how the harm of the crime has affected them or expert reports from psychiatrists. Similar practice is now well established in the United States, New Zealand and Australia, and more recently the UK. For some victims writing these reports can offer some catharsis, by putting down their harm on paper, but by itself it is not enough to amount to closure. The effectiveness of a victim statement depends on the skill of the statement taker and how articulate a victim is in explaining the impact of the harm on them. However these statements have become quite legalised with intermediaries, mainly family liaison officers in the police and the prosecution, ensuring that victims do not implicate the defendant in other crimes not subject to the case. At the moment in Northern Ireland, the statement is just written but in the rest of Ireland and the UK victims can orally read out their statement to the court if they choose, this does not undermine the rights of the defendant as it is usually after the judge has decided the sentence, but before it is pronounced. In some cases of a single person being killed, a number of family members may want

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123 See Jo-Anne Wemmers, Victims in the Criminal Justice System (Kugler 1996).
126 O’Connell, n 3, p301.
127 Ibid, p300.
128 Interview with project team, C20, Ixil region, Guatemala, May 2018.
129 O’Connell, n 3, p301.
to submit an impact statement. A collective form for families has been introduced, but this has not been used much and uptake of the victim personal statement (VPS) in general is quite low. That said while there may be multiple statements for each victim, it does not detract from the pluralistic harm experience by families in the aftermath of loss that a judge can express in their sentencing remarks. Yet if victims’ voices are collectivised by taking away the uniqueness of a victim’s story, emphasizing different aspects, or representing victims’ harm in generic terms, it may understate impact of the crime or undermine the communicative function of the victim’s statement.

41. In practice in Northern Ireland and the UK, the VPS is framed under headings to give it some shape and ensure it is more helpful to judges, and also to minimise it being a rant at the defendant. This very much reflects the use of the VPS as a statement to judge on the consequences of the harm of a victim, rather than a direct engagement with a defendant. There are disclosure issues – some victims do not want the defendant to know the extent of their suffering, in particular where they live in the same community or family, for fear it could be used against them in emotional abuse or future attacks, which has the effect of silencing or disincenitivising victims from coming forward or detailing all their suffering. Cross-examination on such statements can have a similar effect. At the same time there needs to be some control or verification of the extent of harm, as some victims made statements that were not true, can exaggerate their harm (or self-diagnose), may be quite volatile in the severity of the punishment of the defendant or may risk prejudicing the judge. For example one victim, whose son had been murdered, said he had been beaten to a pulp in her VPS, but this was not true.

42. The VPS can also send moral messages about the defendant’s responsibility in a crime as a way of ‘shaming’ them by laying bare the harmful consequences the crime has had on the victim and their next of kin. This is not to suggest that VPS can always provide a sort of restorative justice forum in criminal sentencing, but it can help to return some of the victim’s agency and identity undermined by the defendant during the crime by confronting them and the court with the harmful effects. The VPS can have therapeutic benefits through the victim’s harm being publicly acknowledged. This reflects both the practice of emoting (i.e. publicly sharing their emotions) and the role of procedural justice in how victims’ voices are accurately respected and considered by the criminal justice system. Lens et al suggest that there are no direct therapeutic effects from making a VPS, but feelings of anxiety can decrease where the victims feel satisfied by how they were respected and treated. The VPS can offer a way of acknowledging the victim’s suffering through their inclusion in the sentencing process. Judges reading out the VPS alongside their sentencing remarks can publicly acknowledge the victim’s experience, making their suffering official and giving a valued place for their voice. Acknowledgment can help to give the victim a human face, rather than being just anonymous or a statistic. In Northern Ireland, judges failed to capitalise on the victim statements by not acknowledging them in their sentencing remarks or judgements, which dis incentivised victims from making them and frustrated third parties, such as the police and civil society groups, from helping victims or promoting them.

43. Courts can also benefit from the insights of victims. Victim participation can help to humanise and make their suffering more visible. Victims as witnesses of violence can contribute to truth recovery through a more comprehensive account of what happened by involving those primarily affected. Victim participation can also encourage greater levels of transparency and accountability making the international criminal justice more legitimate in the eyes most affected. That said, victims while key stakeholders in justice processes, are one of a number of interested parties in criminal proceedings whose rights and views have to balanced. Victims do not speak with one voice; they can contradict and compete with each other. Their needs and interests can change over time. Those who are seriously injured or disabled, mentally impaired, elderly or very young may not be able to speak on their own behalf or be able to engage as much as they would like in processes. In such cases, provisions should be put in place to ensure they are kept informed and that their views and concerns are effectively presented to decision makers, such as allowing them to designate a representative or legal guardian.

44. It is worth outlining how the process of victim participation works for international crimes. While a formal legal process, distinct from restorative proceedings above, it does offer lessons on a lawyer dominated process. The rest of this section begins by outlining the application process at the International Criminal Court, before turning to discuss the legal representation of victims and challenges of ensuring the accuracy of their voice in legal proceedings. The following sub-section examines the modalities of victim participation at the ICC in how their views and concerns are represented and practice before the Court. Given that there are tens of thousands of victims before the ICC, there is increasing collectivisation of their participation through legal representatives, which is explored in the subsequent section and contrasted with the few occasions victims have participated in person. The final sub-section highlights the rules and practice of victim protection and psychological support before international criminal justice bodies.

**Application Process**

45. At the International Criminal Court (ICC) the Victims Participation and Separation Room (VPRS) in the Court’s Registry facilitates access for victims by receiving, collecting and processing their application into a secure database. Application forms are reviewed on whether or not they provide sufficient information on the incident and personal details of the individual applicant, which the VPRS will try to

134 Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2015, s.33(2).
138 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2127, paras 28–29.
Victim Participation

verify this information and a prima facie analysis of the applications veracity. The Victims Support Section (VSS) in the ECCC performs a similar function of both the ICC’s Office of the Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) and VPRS, in collecting and screening applications, as well as providing legal aid and advice to victims. There were proposals to merge the OPCV and VPRS into a Victims’ Unit at the ICC as part of the ReVision programme to make the administration more efficient, but this was strongly resisted by staff of the Court and has since been dropped.

46. Victims apply to participate at the ICC through an application form. Initially this was a 17 pages document, then reduced to 7, and is now only one double-sided page. However, it is only in English, French and soon Sango (CAR II), so it has to be translated into the local languages of victims by intermediaries, i.e. local civil society organisations. The move to a one-page application is intended to expedite the application process, with one side collecting information on the victim’s personal details and connection to incidents/crimes, with the back page dedicated to collecting basic views on appropriate reparations if proceedings do arise. In contrast, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has a standard five page application form available on the ECCC website in English, French and Khmer. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon has a 9 page application form, available on the Tribunal’s website in French, Arabic and English.

47. In 2012 the ICC collectivised its application process in the Gbagbo case, victims could collectively apply through a group application form with participation to be facilitated by an individual victim representative. In turn they would be represented by a single Victim Legal Representative (VLR). The ICC Registry has noted that a flexible approach is needed as, ‘it is not always feasible or advisable to bring together groups of victims physically for the purposes of an application process. In some cases the security context may not be conducive for such meetings, in others not all victims feel comfortable speaking in front of groups, whether due to the nature of the harm suffered (such as victims of sexual violence) or generally due to tensions within a community, fear of stigmatisation, or other reason.’

48. In the subsequent Muthaura and Kenyatta case, Trial Chamber V took a tiered approach to victim applications, in order to ensure victims’ views and concerns could be heard before the commencement of the trial. The Chamber distinguished between individual and collective applicants, individuals could still appear before the Court and have their applications individually assessed. The majority of victims under the collective participation application would be represented by a common legal representative and would not have to go through the application procedures under Rule 89 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Instead these collective victims would be registered and the VPRS in conjunction with the legal representative would prepare and submit reports on the victim population. This collective approach aims to mitigate the cost and time spent on the application procedure, while protecting the rights of the defendant from undue delay and allowing victims to present their interests. Furthermore, the Chamber stated that, ‘registration does not imply any judicial determination of the status of the individual victims. Moreover, when assessing any submissions or requests made by the common legal representative, the Chamber will be mindful of the fact that the represented victims have not been subject to an individual assessment by the Court.’

49. As a result of the number of victims applying before international criminal justice bodies, at the outset information require from them is reduced in order to facilitate administration; for victims who want to participate in proceedings further information and verification is required. For reparation proceedings the application is only useful for mapping out general sentiments to assist the Registry to have a certain idea of victims’ views, who will have to go through another application or at least verification with the Chamber and Trust Fund for Victims if proceedings do arise on conviction of the accused.

50. Intermediaries have played an important part in extending the reach and capacity of the ICC in engaging with victims, especially in areas of ongoing conflict. These civil society actors, community leaders or international NGOs, usually have a pre-existing relationship of trust with victimised communities, speak their language and understand the local context, enabling them to explain developments and procedures of a court into words that victims can understand. However, such engagement can be time and resource intensive for local civil society actors, especially when the ICC is usually unwilling to pay them for their time over concerns of impartiality. Intermediaries can become frustrated at the Court neglecting their input into proceedings as they do not have legal standing, or they can become frustrated at delays or lack of acknowledgment of their contribution in organising victims and collecting applications. None of the international criminal justice bodies that allow victim participation provide legal aid to allow victims to complete their applications. Some lawyers work pro-bono, but vast majority of victims are reliant on intermediaries to assist them in providing relevant information and evidence for their applications. Victims can also become frustrated in being mobilised and engaged by civil society and international actors, without seeing any substantive change to their situation, causing them to disengage. Intermediaries can also face intimidation and security threats, and may not be in the best position to explain messages from the Court or counsel to victims, particularly where it

142 Rule 12, ECCC Internal Rules.
143 https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/forms
145 Prosecutor v Gbagbo, Organization of the Participation of Victims, ICC-02/11-01/11-29-Red, 6 February 2012.
146 Registry Observations in Compliance with the Decision, ICC-01/04-02/06-54-Conf, 6 May 2013, para.8.
148 Ibid., para 37.
includes rejection or collapse in a case.\textsuperscript{52} Only the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) provides for the possibility of a temporary victim's legal representative to represent victim's views in specific proceedings, such as appealing decisions on the rejection of a victim's application.\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{Representation and Voice}

51. Legal representation can allow victims' interests to be more effectively conveyed by a lawyer who understands legal procedure and norms.\textsuperscript{55} Legal representatives can act as information conduits between victims and legal processes, translating their interests into legal submissions, procedures and appeals, removing the burden and stress of victims participating themselves.\textsuperscript{156} There is a danger that in relying on lawyers to present victims' interests their views become simplified, filtered, reinterpreted or compromised to reflect the diverging views among the victim group, inhibiting victims' voice and agency.\textsuperscript{157} The use of legalese\textsuperscript{158} can inhibit victims from becoming active participants in proceedings. In addition, victims who are able to participate may not be representative of all victims or their inclusion may have to lead to the exclusion or marginalisation of other voices. Justice demands can be driven by ‘urban elites and high-profile victims, who have a strong moral voice and an ability to clearly articulate demands.’\textsuperscript{159} The ICC in the Côte d'Ivoire cases had to request the Registry to reengage affected communities, as participation was dominated by males and certain and ethnic groups, with very few participants who had been the victims of sexual violence, including victims of rape.\textsuperscript{160}

52. At the ICC, victim participation is mostly provided through Article 68(3), which enables victims to provide their views and concerns where their personal interests are affected. Such ‘views and concerns’ are usually presented by the legal representatives of the victims (VLRs) where the Court considers it appropriate. The Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) distinguish this further by only entitling VLRs to attend and participate in proceedings, thereby giving the representatives ‘enhanced’ procedural rights, rather than the victims themselves.\textsuperscript{161} This is a largely pragmatic development; given the large numbers of victims that would be eligible to participate in a case, allowing each individual to personally appear before the Court would be unworkable.

53. Decisions on participation are determined on a case-by-case basis, leading to diversity in the practice of appointing legal representatives. The case of Thomas Lubanga saw seven VLRs representing 129 victims, whereas in later cases there were fewer counsel - only two VLRs (assisted by field assistants) representing 5229 victims, though from January 2014 victims in the Bembo case were represented by one VLR following the death of the other appointed representative. The Registry of the Court also has an independent Office of the Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV), which is responsible for providing legal research and advice to participating victims, as well as appearing before the Chambers on specific issues, or to act as legal counsel for unrepresented victims.\textsuperscript{52} The Court’s Rules assert that victims ‘shall be free to choose a legal representative,’\textsuperscript{166} but the Chamber can request that victims or groups of victims choose a common legal representative(s).\textsuperscript{163} If victims are unable amongst themselves to choose a common legal representative(s) within the time limit set by the Chamber, then the judges can decide or ask the Registry to choose one or more legal representatives, which have increasingly been the OPCV. Given that cases before the ICC involve a few thousand victims, victims’ legal agency is limited to collective and indirect participation through a common legal representative.

54. In the Gbagbo case, the Court appointed the OPCV as the principal common legal representative, as well as a team member based in the field and a case manager. The Court held that this approach was the ‘most appropriate and cost effective system at this stage as it would enable to combine understanding of the local context with experience and expertise of proceedings before the Court, without causing undue delay in the case at hand.’\textsuperscript{164} A similar approach has been adopted in the Ntaganda case where two counsel from the OPCV have been appointed to represent two victim groups, supported by two or more legal assistants.\textsuperscript{165} This is despite 213 victims signing power of attorney to six lawyers.\textsuperscript{166} This organisation of legal representation through two lawyers of the OPCV was to ensure victims could be effectively legally represented at an early stage.\textsuperscript{167} Such developments can signal an apparent preference for trial practicality over respecting victims’ legal agency, to ensure that the experience of lengthy interlocutory appeals and administration of victim participation do not delay trial proceedings.

55. The ICC has recognised the need for lawyers appointed for victims to understand the local context or be from the same country so as to promote effective and meaningful common representation. They are appointed on criteria that lend themselves to being more associated or empathetic to victims by sharing with them (i) the language spoken by victims [and the legal representative], (ii) links
between them provided by time, place and circumstances, (iii) the specific crimes of which they allege to be victims, (iv) the views of victims, and (v) respect of local traditions. The Registry’s criteria for legal representatives were set out in the Ntaganda case as being able to ‘also demonstrate abilities to communicate easily and to establish a relationship of trust with victims.’

56. In representing victims, the judges in a Chamber have oversight in ensuring VLRS consider the ‘views of the victims, and the need to respect local traditions and to assist specific groups of victims.’ The Court has been careful to guarantee effective communication between VLRS and victims by requiring counsel to come from the victims’ area and to speak the same language. In addition, the Court has established support teams in The Hague and the field to ‘facilitate regular exchanges’ between victims and their VLRS. The ICC Registry also notifies victims, and conducts outreach to affected communities to inform them of the work and progress of the Court as well as their ability to participate in proceedings. The Court has acknowledged that without notification, victims’ rights would ‘remain little more than a theoretical exercise.

57. For the Court, victims’ interests are affected in criminal proceedings against the accused, owing to their rights to truth and justice. In most of the cases the Court has established that VLRS can participate in proceedings through eight different modalities: to attend hearings; make oral motions, responses, and submissions; file written submissions; access evidence; ask questions; submit evidence; call witnesses; and to be notified. These modalities are intended to protect the rights of the defendant, ensuring that victims do not automatically have the right to participate.

58. Trial Chamber III has allowed victims to present evidence on the responsibility of the accused. The general approach by Court has been to enable victims to present evidence through three participation modalities of: (1) submitting evidence; (2) asking questions; and (3) calling witnesses. These modalities do not appear in the Statute, RPE, or Regulations, but are based on Article 69(3) of the Rome Statute, which enables the Court to request all relevant evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth. This indicates that victims’ role is to aid the Court in the clarification of facts rather than determination of the responsibility of the accused. Nevertheless, the Court has held in the Kenyan cases that the defendant has to be present for victims’ questions and statements, emphasising that defendants’ attendance during victims’ presentation of evidence requires the cooperation of the accused to make it meaningful, suggesting a more restorative function of victim participation beyond clarifying the truth.

59. On the first modality on submitting evidence, the Court has recognised that VLRS can submit incriminating evidence on the defendant’s guilt as long as it satisfies three admissibility criteria, namely (1) relevant material, (2) probative value, and (3) probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Allowing VLRS to submit evidence can present an opportunity to highlight facts that the prosecution or the defence have overlooked or neglected. However, on the two occasions where evidence was submitted by the VLRS, the judges rejected their submissions as they repeated evidence already before the Court or lacked probative value. Submitting evidence has so far not engendered a conflict between the rights of the victims and the defendant, but the Court retains very strict control of the ability VLRS to do so.

60. The other two modalities of questioning and calling witnesses have been more contentious and required a more delicate balancing of rights by the Court. With regards to VLRS questioning witnesses, the Court has established that in order to achieve a balance between the rights of the victims and the defendant, a number of criteria must be adhered to: questions must be neutral in nature (i.e., they must not be a cross-examination or ‘combative’); relevant to victims’ personal interests, and not leading or closed questions. The Court has emphasised that VLRS are not auxiliary prosecutors to prove the guilt or innocence of the accused as in civil law courts, but rather approach to help the judges determine the truth, therefore having a more neutral role.

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**Modalities of Victim Participation**

Bemba, Fifth Decision on Victims’ Issues Concerning Common Legal Representation of Victims, (ICC-01/05-01/06-322), Pre-Trial Chamber III, 16 December 2008, para. 9.

Ntaganda ICC-01/04-02/06-141-Conf-Exp, para 19.

Regulation 79(2), ICC Regulations.

Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-03/07-1328, para 15; Prosecutor v Bemba, Decision on Common Legal Representation of Victims for the Purpose of Trial, ICC-01/05-01/06-1005, 10 November 2010, para. 10.


See ICC Outreach Reports 2007–2010, Public Information and Documentation Section, Outreach Unit.

Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-101, para 164.

Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui, Decision on the Set Procudural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Pro Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-03/07-1790, 13 May 2008, paras 31–44; Prosecutor v Bemba, Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation, ICC-01/05-01/08-320, 12 December 2008; Prosecutor v Abu Abida, Decision on the 34 Applications for Participation at the Pre-Pro Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-03/03-02/09-121; 29 September 2009, para. 3; Prosecutor v Ali Bashir, Decision on Applications a017/06 to a013/06, a015/06, and a044/03 to a042/03 for Participation in the Proceedings at the Pre-Pro Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-02/05-01/09-62, 15 December 2009, paras 4–5.

Rules 91–92 and 144; see Lubanga, ICC-01/04-03/06-119; Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-03/07-474; Katanga and Chui, Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1798, 22 January 2010, Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-320.

See Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sog, Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ICC-01/09-01/10-777, 18 June 2013.

Rule 91(3)(a); Lubanga, ICC-01/04-03/07-1119, paras 108–109; Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para 104; Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2135, para 21–22; Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1798, paras 61–65; Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-807-Corr, paras 30–32.

Katanga and Chui, Directions for the Conduct of the Proceedings and Testimony in Accordance with Rule 140, ICC-01/04-01/07-1665, 20 November 2009, para. 82; and Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1798, paras 102–103.

See Lubanga, Decision on the Request of the Legal Representative of Victims a/0006/06, a/0002/06, a/0003/06, a/0004/06, a/0007/06, a/0149/06, a/0155/07, a/0156/07, a/0404/08, a/0305/08, a/0406/08, a/0407/08, a/0409/08, a/0410/07, and a/0162/07 for Admission of the Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo as Evidence, ICC-01/04-01/06-2135, 22 September 2009, Katanga and Chui, Decision relative à trois requêtes tendant à la production d’éléments de preuve supplémentaires, ICC-01/04-01/07-3217-Conf, ICC-01/04-01/07-3217-Red, 4 January 2012.

Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2137, paras 28–30; Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1665, paras 82 and 90–91; Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1798, paras 72–75; Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-807-Corr, paras 30–32; Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-474, para 135.

Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-217, para 28–29.
61. In the Katanga and Chui case, victims’ legal representatives focused their questions on highlighting the suffering of victims, the context of victimisation, and the continuing hardship victims continue to face. 184 Different Chambers of the Court have taken diverging approaches in balancing victims’ and defendants’ rights with regards to questions asked by VLRs. Trial Chamber II in the Katanga and Chui case has followed a more restrictive approach to questioning by limiting VLRs to factual points, as to preserve the equality of arms between the prosecution and the defence. 185 Trial Chamber II’s strict adherence to this approach can be seen where a VLR asked a witness on a meeting with Katanga whether he had any children as bodyguards with him. This was objected to by the defence as it was linked to the responsibility of the accused, and was instead modified into a more neutral question by the judges. 186 Accordingly, the victims’ role was to voice their experiences and emotions on the harm they have suffered rather than presenting evidence on their interests in truth and justice. 187 This is in contrast to Trial Chambers I and III which have allowed VLRs to question witnesses on factual and legal points that at times have been linked to the responsibility of the accused. 188 Trial Chamber III in the Bemba case has taken this further, with the judges declaring that:

‘the interests of victims are not limited to the physical commission of the alleged crimes under consideration. Rather, their interests extend to the question of the person or persons who should be held liable for those crimes, whether physical perpetrators or others. In this respect, victims have a general interest in the proceedings and in their outcome. As such, they have an interest in making sure that all pertinent questions are put to witnesses.’ 189

62. In the trial the VLR’s questions to a witness concentrated on the responsibility of the defendant by asking him about Bemba’s role in the chain of command and whether he was informed of the commission of crimes. 190 This approach is consistent with a victim-oriented justice, which recognises victims’ interests in truth and justice, as well as their independent perspective from the prosecution.

63. The European Court of Human Rights has recognised that victims do not necessarily infringe the equality of arms as they ‘cannot be regarded as either the opponent – or for that matter necessarily the ally – of the prosecution, their roles and objectives being clearly different’. 191 The ICC has also adopted such a position by stating that victim participation is supposed to provide victims with an independent voice, which is consistent with the intention of the drafters to ensure justice for victims. 192

Therefore the Court’s position that victims are to remain neutral is incorrect as they have an interest in determining the culpability of the accused. Instead, it is the judges who have to be neutral and balance the interests before them.

64. On the final evidential modality, the Court can call a witness or victim on the VLRs’ behalf on the condition that it will provide ‘important information’ and a ‘genuine contribution to the ascertainment of the truth’ which the other parties have not addressed. 193 Trial Chamber II has also set out some criteria for evaluating the VLRs’ applications for victims to testify, namely: has the matter already been addressed by the prosecution so as to avoid repetitions; is it closely related to the charges; is it typical of the experiences of a larger group of victims or is the victim uniquely apt to give evidence; and will it bring to light new information to the Chamber? 194

Collective participation

65. Given the increasing number of victims participating in cases before the ICC, the Court has tried to streamline the application and representation of victims to minimize the impact such organisation and oversight has on proceedings. The Rules and jurisprudence of the ICC recognise that collectivizing victims’ voices can be detrimental to certain groups. The Court requires that as far as possible victims’ distinct interests should be represented and any conflicts of interest to be avoided. 195 This has been particularly so for victims of sexual or gender violence continuing hardship victims continue to face. 196 In the Bemba case, Trial Chamber III grouped victims geographically. 197 This allowed victims of the same family and community to be represented together and facilitated contact between them and their legal representative. 198 Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice (WIGJ) warned the Court that organisation of victims into geographical groups, especially considering their numbers, may not protect victims’ distinct interests, such as those who suffered sexual violence. 199 Instead, WIGJ proposed that victim representation should be organised on the nature of the crimes committed against them so as to reduce conflicting interests, but there can be remaining difficulties where victims are displaced.

66. Where a conflict in interests arises between victims under one VLR, the Court can split the group and order the OPCV to represent the separate group of victims. 200 However, defining what constitutes a conflict of interest requiring separate representation remains difficult, 201 but Trial Chamber IV indicates that a ‘conflict of interest may arise when the situation or the specificity of the victims is so different

184 For instance, Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-39-ENG, 21 November 2006, pp. 95 and 141.
185 Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1665, paras 90–91; Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-2298, para. 112.
186 Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-141-Red-ENG, 14 May 2010, p.28–34.
188 McGonigle n.188, p298-300.
189 Bemba, Decision (i) Ruling on Legal Representatives’ Applications to Question Witness 33 and (ii) Setting a Schedule for the Filing of Summations in Relation to Future Applications to Question Witnesses, ICC-01/05-01/06/018-1729, 9 September 2011, para.39.
190 Bemba, Decision (i) and (ii) para. 15.
192 Berger v France, App. no. 4822/99 (ECCHR, 21 May 2003), para.38.
193 Situation in DRC, ICC-01/04-01/03, para [5]. Prosecutor v Bemba, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the Supplemental Applications by the Legal Representatives of Victims to Present Evidence and the Views and Concerns of Victims, ICC-01/05-01/08-2138, ICC-01/05-01/08-2140, 23 February 2012, para.25.
194 In accordance with Articles 64(4)(d) and 69(3); Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1665, paras 45–48.
195 Ibid., para.30.
196 Prosecutor v Banda and Jerbo, Summary of Information relevant to the grouping of victims, ICC-02/05-03/09-205-Aux2-Red, 25 August 2011, para.5.
197 Rule 90(4) RPE, as provided in Art. 68(1) ICCSt.
198 Bemba, ICC-01/04-01/08-300, paras 18–20.
199 Statement by the Women’s Initiatives at the opening of the Trial of Jean-Pierre Bemba Combo, 22 November 2010. p4.
200 Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1328, para.16.
201 Hirn n.152, p130.
that their interests are irreconcilable.202 In the Katanga and Chui, Trial Chamber II split the common legal representation between those victims who were former child soldiers and the larger group of those who had been attacked by the militias in Bogoro on 24 February 2003, due to the victims coming from different ethnic groups.203 In the Kenya cases, in which ethnicity was such a significant factor in the Post-Election Violence, the Registry considered at length whether this was a basis for separately representing victims. Ultimately it held that in each case, the various ethnic groups among the victims did not have ‘clear and significant distinct interests’. Indeed, the Registry noted that intermediaries, lawyers and others working with victims had warned against separating victim groupings distinct interests’.204 In the Ongwen case victims are organised based on their choice of legal counsel between the OPCV (1,502 victims) and a team of external counsel (2,061 victims), who cover the same crimes and locales.205 This reflects that lawyers can represent to an extent competing and diverse groups of victims, who will often not speak with one voice or completely agree. The role of the mediator is to instead echo their views and concerns, and to ensure that each perspective is effective communicated and translated into legal actions within the Court.

67. There are advantages to collecting victim representation and participation: it expedites proceedings, maximises the prospects of coherent strategy from victims, and is more financially efficient, being cheaper than constituting multiple teams of a smaller size.206 However there can also be dangers in collaborating participation, such as the dominance of certain victims’ views, the loss of individuals’ voices, the creation of further complexity, and if not properly regulated the cause of secondary victimisation.207 Introducing new levels of representation risks an additional person misrepresenting the interests of victims, such as victims being organised in to victim association or groups, which are then represented with a single lawyer.

68. Collective victim participation has become the norm in other international and hybrid criminal proceedings on international crimes. Probably the most developed of these other tribunals is the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) which is mandated to address the crimes of the Khmer Rouge. Victim participation at the ECCC is somewhat different from the ICC.208 As a hybrid body, victim participation was established by judicial officers within the Court’s Internal Rules, rather than being in its statute. The ECCC Rules distinguish ‘victims’ as those natural persons or a legal entity that has suffered harm as a result of a crime within its jurisdiction, from a civil party as a victim whose application to participate has been declared admissible.209 Victim participation at the ECCC as a civil party draws from similar provisions for victims within Cambodia’s own criminal procedures. The ECCC requires the Court to ensure that victims are ‘kept informed and that their rights are respected throughout the proceedings’.210 The role of civil parties in the criminal proceedings includes ‘supporting the prosecution’ and seeking ‘collective and moral reparations’.211 Civil parties can individually participate at the pre-trial stage, but beyond this at trial and later stages their participation can only be through a single, consolidated group ‘whose interests are represented by the Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers’.212 Civil parties can testify and provide statements of suffering, but they cannot represent themselves, nor directly address the Court other than through their representatives.213

69. In the first case against Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, the civil parties were allowed to choose their own legal representative.214 Some 94 civil parties participated and were represented by four legal teams. A survey of some of the participants and victims found that only 14.6% of civil parties and 20.8% of civil party representatives attended live proceedings, with many of those not attending citing they did not know about the possibility of going in person to proceedings (39-42%) or not being invited or official asked (31.5-34%), with 16% unable to attend due to limited resources as money, transportation time and distance to the court.215 Yet in the second case, against Nuon Chea and Khieu Sampha, the Court amended the rules and organised participation through two Lead Co-Lawyers (one international and one Cambodian) who would coordinate with civil party representatives,216 due to over 4,000 civil parties wanting to participate in the case. This has limited civil parties’ rights to select and release their legal representatives, as well as their

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203 Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-328, para 12.


206 A total of 4,307 victims are participating with the counsel for the remaining four victims to be decided at a later date. See Ongwen, Updated Consolidated List of Victims Admitted to Participate in the Proceedings, (ICC-02/04-01/15-S62), 13 January 2017.

207 Prosecutor v. Francine Kimmi Muthaura, Ufuwu Muigai Kanyanta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Proposal for the common legal representation of victims, ICC-01/09-01/11-245-Anx2, 1 August 2011, para 9; Registry, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Proposal for the common legal representation of victims, ICC-02/11-01/11-120, 16 May 2012, para 9; ICC, Katanga and Chui, Order on the organisation of common legal representation of victims, ICC-01/04-01/07-328, 22 July 2009, para 30; STL, Prosecutor v. Alphonsus Al, Pre-Trial Judge, Decision on Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings, STL-11-01/PT/3, 8 May 2012, para 120.


209 See Killean and Moffett n.151, p720-721.

210 Glossary, ECCC Internal Rules (Rev.b), 3 August 2011.

211 Rule 23(l), ECCC Internal Rules.

212 Rule 23(l), ECCC Internal Rules.

213 Rule 23(l), ECCC Internal Rules.

214 Decision of 1 July on the Civil Party’s Request to Address the Court in Person, Case 002 (002/19-09-2007:ECCC/OCIJ), Pre-Trial Chamber, 3 July 2008.

215 ECCC Internal Rules, (Revision 1), 1 February 2008, Rule 23(l).


217 ECCC Internal Rules, (Revision 5), 5 February 2010, Rules 12a, 23(l).
Victim Participation

70. In other tribunals legal representation has been organised differently from the ICC and ECCC. At the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) victims are unable to arrange their own legal representation before the STL, and must await the designation of a legal representative by the Registrar after being granted participation status. The Tribunal does not formally recognise any legal representation, which may be privately arranged by victims during the application stage. The Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) were organised on the basis of civil law tradition and Senegalese law, whereby victims participated as civil parties. At the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Habré case, victims could form civil parties to participate or join together as a group represented by a joint legal representative. Some 4,500 victims participated as civil parties in the Habré case, represented by three victim associations. The Kosovo Specialist Chambers only allows legal representation through a victims’ counsel provided through the Registry’s Victims Participation Office. At the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Habré case, victims could form civil parties to participate or join together as a group represented by a joint legal representative. The Chambers could offer the victims or a group of victims the choice of having one or more joint representatives, but if they are unable to select one or more within the allotted time, the Administrator of the EAC can appoint one or several representatives. The Kosovo Specialist Chambers only allows legal representation through a victims’ counsel provided through the Registry’s Victims Participation Office.

71. While the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is focused exclusively on the 14 February 2005 bombing that killed Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 21 others, there are over 70 victims participating through three legal counsel, one international lead-co-lawyer with international criminal law experience with two Lebanese counsel who have an existing relationship with the victims. In the International Crimes Division in Uganda, two vice legal representatives have been appointed to represent 98 victims in the Kwoyelo case, with a similar arrangement for the Mukulu case. Yet in its first decision on the Kampala bombing against members of Al-Shabaab, no victims were able to participate and the prosecutor did not engage with victims for an impact statement on sentencing.

72. Common across our engagement with legal representatives for victims in domestic, hybrid and international criminal proceedings has been the lack of funding which has inhibited their ability to engage regularly with victims. At the Ugandan ICD while victims could appoint their own lawyer where they could afford it, all are impoverished and dependent on legal aid and so were not consulted on which counsel they preferred as the two appointed in the Kwoyelo case are funded by the state. Even upon being appointed, these legal counsel have other cases, as money has been slow in being paid from the Registry of the ICD, meaning that one of the victim lawyers who lives a few miles away from the community only sees them every six months. Similar problems of sufficient legal aid was a problem for victims in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which noted that a limited budget and tariffs that were lower than normal, discouraged higher skilled lawyers from representing victims.

Participation in person

73. Some victims have participated in person at the ICC to present their personal views and concerns to the Court. In the Lubanga and the Katanga and Chui cases the Court required victims to testify under oath so that their testimony would be used as evidence, giving them the status of witnesses. These victims were allowed to discuss at length their victimisation, other crimes that occurred, and the responsibility of the accused. The Court has found victims personally voicing their views and concerns should ideally only be made through their legal representatives, in order to protect the defendant who can only cross-examine witnesses. In the Lubanga case, Trial Chamber I decided that the purpose of presenting their views and concerns was not part of the evidence, but to provide the judges with a contextual understanding of the facts before the Court. The Court has used this discretion on the grounds that it is empowered to find and determine the truth.

74. In the Bemba case, Trial Chamber III allowed three victims to express their views and concerns through live video link, on the basis of their harm being representative of a larger group of victims before the Court. Despite opposition from the defence and the prosecution, the judges allowed these three victims to speak in their own

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218 Killeen and Moffett n.151, p721.
219 See STL Directive on Victims’ Legal Representation.
221 Article 22(5).
222 Article 14, EAC Statute
223 Article 22(5).
224 Appointed on the basis of include notably the views or preferences expressed by the participating victims, the nature and complexity of the case, the skills, experience and personal attributes of the legal representative, including language skills, previous experience in international criminal proceedings, and/or familiarity with Lebanese and/or Lebanese law, and any existing relationship between the victims who are to be represented and the legal representative. Designation of Victims’ Legal Representation, STL-11-007/P116 16 May 2012, para.9, and Article 19(c), STL Directive on Victims’ Legal Representation.
227 Section 46, ICD Rules; and Bakoo, n. 224.
228 Interview UGJ, July 2018, Gulu, Uganda.
229 TRC Final Report, Vol. V; p117
231 Article 67(1)(a); Prosecutor v Lubanga, Order Issuing Public Redacted Version of the Decision on the Request by Victims a0225/06, a0229/06 and a0270/07 to Express Their Views and Concerns in Person and to Present Evidence during the Trial, ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, 9 July 2009, para 25-26; Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-178188-ENG, paras 86-89
232 ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, para 25
233 Bembo, ICC-01/05-01/08-2138, paras 39-51; Victims a0562/08, a0394/08, and a0511/08; see Bembo, Transcripts 25-26 July 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08-T-227-RED-ENG and ICC-01/05-01/08-T-229-RED-ENG.
right, not as witnesses. This was justified on the grounds that victims needed to narrate in their own words the factual and background to the charges which their views and concerns arose from. In addition, it would be impossible for victims, particularly those who suffer from sexual violence, to be able to present their views and concerns in an abstract general way devoid of the facts and lived experience of what occurred.234 As they were not being sworn in as witnesses, they could not be examined by the prosecution or defence, and as a result the judges would not consider victims’ views and concerns as part of their final determination of evidence.235 As such, the direct participation of victims is only used to give a very selective contextual background. The victims’ oral statements to the Court discuss their experience of violence by Mr Bemba’s troops and the consequential harm they continue to face.236 Although the victims expressed satisfaction and some form of relief by testifying before the Court, they only stated this when prompted by the judges. An area of concern of such testimony was the victims’ unmitigated expectations of the ICC, with one looking to obtain funds from the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) and another looking for a new artificial leg. While such opportunities may help to provide a “human perspective” to a court,237 the long-term benefit to victims is questionable, particularly in light of the collapse of the Bemba case in June 2018.

75. In order to protect the rights of the defendant, victims who participate anonymously are limited to making opening and closing statements, accessing public documents, and participation in public hearings.238 In the Lubanga case, the Court held that while there is a need to protect the accused from anonymous accusation, victim participation would be undermined if they had to give up the protection of anonymity in order to participate.239 Accordingly, “[t]he greater the extent and the significance of the proposed participation, the more likely it will be that the Chamber will require the victim to identify himself or herself.”240 As an additional safeguard, the Chamber emphasised that it will always know the identity of the victim and will be in the best position to judge the extent of his/her participation. In contrast, the Bemba case judges found that there is no distinction in the way in which anonymous and non-anonymous victims can participate.241 In practice this issue may be moot, as anonymous and non-anonymous victims are commonly represented by the same legal representatives.242

76. The protection and support of victims appearing before international criminal justice bodies has been an institutional challenge, especially where there is ongoing insecurity or perpetrators remain at large or in power. That said a number of practices have emerged from these courts and tribunals that aim to minimise secondary victimisation of victims who engage with them. The ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) were under an obligation to protect victims and witnesses, with specific measures for survivors of sexual violence.243 Both tribunals had Witness Support Sections for witnesses and victims coming forward to testify to provide them with a safe and dignified environment, so as to avoid causing them trauma in proceedings.244 The tribunals provided protective measures including confidentiality measures in proceedings (private hearings, and voice-face distortion), anonymity and relocation. The ICTY adopted protective measures in 38% of cases, where at the ICTY this was 95%.245 Despite these provisions at least 9 witnesses were killed in one case at the ICTY,246 and 99 witnesses and victims were killed in the months running up to the setting up of the Witness and Victim Support Section of the ICTR. Many others were stigmatised, ostracised from their family or community, harassed, and even violently attacked.247 In proceedings of the ICTY and ICTR, victims appearing as witnesses also suffered from some defendants who verbally attacked them, such as Milošević calling one a “murderer and robber”,248 and Karadžić saying another was “not a victim” despite surviving a mass execution in Srebrenica.249 The criminal nature of proceedings meant that the chambers and parties were more interested in establishing facts and individual criminal responsibility, than hearing victims’ voices. These experiences of secondary victimisation negatively impacted upon victims’ willingness to engage with the tribunals and also shaped their expectations and perceptions of justice.250

77. At the ICC the treatment of victims is similar to the ad hoc tribunals, with a Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU) in the Registry providing protection measures, security, counselling and other appropriate measures for victims and witnesses who appear before the Court.251 The Court also operates the Initial Response System (IRS) in countries under investigation, which allows victims or witnesses to seek...
assistance at any time they believe they or their families are in danger.\textsuperscript{252} If any calls are received, a local partner extracts the individual(s) and places them in a safe location before the need for further measures of protection are assessed. However, this system relies on local police forces, who may be corrupt or the crimes may involve the government, and could result in further harm to the individual. The VWU also has a protection programme which can relocate victims and witnesses if needed via or out of the country. The VWU also offers 24 hour ‘psychological, social assistance and advice’ to victims, witnesses, and their families, as well as in-court support assistants to ‘attend to [their] emotional and physical needs’.\textsuperscript{253}

78. The ICC includes a range of protective measures to enable victims and witnesses to participate in proceedings by minimising their risk in doing so. Such measures can include closed hearings (in camera), pseudonyms, voice and facial distortion, public non-disclosure, and redaction of identity or identifying information from the record.\textsuperscript{254} The Court has varied the use of these measures depending on the stage of proceedings and in striking the correct balance between the rights of the defendant to confront their accuser and the protection and safety of victims. For instance, judges have redacted most of the information on victims in the pre-trial stage, as they do not impact the rights of the defendant until the trial stage.\textsuperscript{255}

While cost effective when the Court does not have a substantial presence on the ground, redactions can also limit victims’ ability to participate, as in balancing with the rights of the defendant, if victims want more participatory rights, such as questioning witnesses or the defendant, they need to forgo their anonymity.\textsuperscript{256} The most extreme measure the Court can use is relocation, but it is often reluctant to use it, as noted by the Appeals Chamber, relocation is a ‘serious matter that can . . . have a dramatic impact’ and ‘serious effect’ upon the life of an individual, particularly in terms of removing a witness from their normal surroundings and family ties and re-setting that person into a new environment. It may well have long-term consequences for the individual who is relocated – including potentially placing an individual at increased risk by highlighting his or her involvement with the Court and making it more difficult for that individual to move back to the place from which he or she was relocated, even in circumstances where it was intended that the relocation should be only provisional. Where relocation occurs, it is likely to involve careful and possibly long-term planning for the safety and well-being of the witness concerned.\textsuperscript{257}

79. For vulnerable victims or witnesses, they can be provided with special measures that include a support person in proceedings, shielding devices, videoconferencing technology, and sensitive questioning.\textsuperscript{258} Judges have also played a key role in keeping defendants and defence counsel’s questioning of victims in check, and they are obliged to do so under the rules of the Court as are counsel under their code of conduct.\textsuperscript{259} Judges have incorporated some good practice of procedural justice by allowing victims to testify by first ‘telling their story’ in their own form, without interruptions or leading questions.\textsuperscript{260} In addition, judges have been empathetic and respectful to victims, thanking them for attending and helping the Court to determine the truth, as well as wishing them the best of health.\textsuperscript{261}

80. Despite these protective measures in Kenya, witnesses and victims were identified on social media by Kenyan journalists and other actors, intimidated by threats, the use of bribery, and the exertion of social pressure, with some being killed.\textsuperscript{262} As a result, the proceedings against the president, vice-president and other indicted persons collapsed.\textsuperscript{263} Together the experience of international criminal justice bodies in protecting victims and witnesses who come before them in post-conflict societies is problematic, which is not helped by distance of such courts or risk of individuals being identified in close-knit communities.

International standards on sentencing for international crimes

81. There is no specific obligation on states under international human rights law or international criminal law to provide a required or particular penalty for those responsible for international crimes (crimes against humanity, genocide or war crimes). The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court provides a maximum sentence of 30 years, and life sentences in cases of extreme gravity.\textsuperscript{264}

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\textsuperscript{252} Regulations 93 and 95; Registry Regulations; Report of the Court on the Kampala Field Office: Activities, Challenges and Review of Staffing Levels; On Memoranda of Understanding with Situation Countries, ICC-AS/P/117, 2011, p.2; Silvana Arbia, The International Criminal Court: Witness and Victim Protection and Support, Legal Aid and Family Visits, Commonwealth Low Bulletin 36(3) (2010) 519–528, p622.

\textsuperscript{253} Article 68(2), Rule 87(1), and Regulation 94, Registry Regulations.

\textsuperscript{254} Article 68(2), Rule 87(1), and Regulation 94, Registry Regulations.

\textsuperscript{255} Kony et al., ICC-02/04-01/05-134, para 21; Situation in DRC, ICC-01/04-374, para 28; Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-979.

\textsuperscript{256} See Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-T.1788-ENG, paras. 92–93.

\textsuperscript{257} Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui, On the Appeal of the Prosecutor against the Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under Article 67 of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules of Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/07-776, 26 November 2008, para 66; endorsing ICC-01/04-01/07-585; a Special Relocation Fund amongst State Parties has been established to sponsor relocations.

\textsuperscript{258} Rule 88. See Moffett n.30, p130-141.


\textsuperscript{260} McGonigle n.188, p. 322, fn. 610.

\textsuperscript{261} See for example the two victims that testified in the Katanga and Chui trial, Witness DRCV19-P-0002, ICC-01/04-01/07-T.1788-ENG, paras. 92–93.

\textsuperscript{262} Article 77(1), Rome Statute.

\textsuperscript{263} Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, following an application seeking an adjournment of the provisional trial date, 10 December 2013.

\textsuperscript{264} Article 77(1), Rome Statute.
but in the first few convictions before the Court the average has been 13.25 years.265 In terms of complementarity, the ICC only foresees sentencing being an issue where such provisions are intended to shield a person from criminal responsibility or proceedings were not conducted independently or impartially in light of international due process norm, which are inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.266 To date the ICC has not made a case admissible on the basis of ineffective sentencing, though there are two cases where indicted suspects wanted by the Court, have been prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned, to then receive a pardon some months later.267 It would be hard for international judges to determine that reduced sentences brokered under a peace agreement and approved by a national legislature are best decided before the Court.

82. International fair trial and access to justice norms include mitigating in sentencing, amnesties and pardons. While there has been a growing body of jurisprudence recognising victims’ right to justice, it is an obligation of means and not outcome upon a state. In other words, victims do not have a right to demand a particular person is convicted or a specific sentence or sanction.268 The rest of this section outlines the issue of sentence mitigation for international crimes, as well as the use of amnesties and pardons to facilitate accountability, truth and reconciliation. These principles and jurisprudence can be instructive in providing a customary international law basis for decision-making on alternative sanctions.

**Sentencing and proportionality**

83. Sentencing for gross human rights violations and international crimes should impose appropriate penalties proportionate to the gravity of the violation.269 The ICTY has followed such a proportionate retributive approach, characterised by its determination of ‘just deserts’, with sentences ‘having to be proportional to the gravity of the crime and the moral guilt of the convicted.’270 A similar calculation is used by the ICC.271 The Inter-American Court has stated that the rule of proportionality requires that States,

‘impose penalties that truly contribute to prevent impunity, taking into account various factors such as the characteristics of the offense, and the participation and guilt of the accused.’272

84. In the Rochela Massacre case, the Court stated in relation to the Justice and Peace Law proceedings that

‘punishment which the State assigns to the perpetrator of illicit conduct should be proportional to the rights recognized by law and the culpability with which the perpetrated acted, which in turn should be established as a function of the nature and gravity of the events. The punishment should be the result of a judgment issued by a judicial authority. Moreover, in identifying the appropriate punishment, the reasons for the punishment should be determined. With regard to the principle of lenity based upon the existence of an earlier more lenient law, this principle should be harmonized with the principle of proportionality of punishment, such that criminal justice does not become illusory. Every element which determines the severity of the punishment should correspond to a clearly identifiable objective and be compatible with the Convention.’273

85. The European Court of Human Rights has similarly found that,

‘just and proportionate punishment are the subject of rational debate and civilised disagreement. Accordingly, Contracting States must be allowed a margin of appreciation in deciding on the appropriate length of prison sentences for particular crimes.’274

86. Proportionality in international criminal law is a key consideration in international criminal justice bodies sentencing, but such assessments are based on the gravity of the crime, and mitigating and aggravating factors.275

**Sentence mitigation and guilty pleas**

87. International criminal justice has traditionally since the Second World War permitted sentence mitigation as not to ‘reduce the degree of the crime ... [but]
more a matter of grace than of defense.276 Mitigation of sentence and early release have a number of factors that will decrease the number of years a person responsible for international crimes will stay in prison.

88. The ICC in early release decisions takes into account the ‘genuine dissociation’ of a sentenced person from their crime, the prospects of them being resocialised or successful resettlement back into society, whether their release would give rise to ‘significant social instability’, any ‘significant’ action by the sentence person for the benefit of victims and the impact of their release on victims and their families, and their individual circumstances, such as worsening health or advanced age.277

89. The UN Principles to Combat Impunity foresee the role of confessions, disclosure and repentance as a legitimate justification for reduction of sentence, but not an exemption from criminal or other responsibility.278 This reflects that most criminal justice systems allow reduced sentences with guilty pleas, but the Impunity Principles provide no guidance on the scope of such reduction or whether it can be automatic.279 The Convention on Enforced Disappearances also suggests that State Parties establish mitigating circumstances for individuals involved in disappearances who effectively clarify the fate, whereabouts or identity of the victim(s).280 However, imposing small suspended fines on state forces responsible for killing civilians can make punishment derisory and fail to ensure the protection of individuals’ right to life. In an effective criminal justice system, there needs to be an acknowledgement of responsibility for serious human rights violations with appropriate sanctions.281 In addition, leniency can be viewed as unwarranted, such as the case of domestic violence being justified on grounds of custom, tradition or honour.282 There has to be consistency and certainty that leniency or pardons apply to state and non-state actors equally, those provided to state actors responsible for violations alone will be seen as incompatible with human rights obligations, especially where they have faced no disciplinary sanctions.283 Relevant for our analysis are mitigating factors on a convicted person’s contribution to a peace or reconciliation process, cooperation with a court, behaviour after the crime, and conduct towards victims including any efforts to compensate them.284

90. The cessation of violence and involvement of perpetrators in peace negotiations is an important mitigating factor at the ICTY and ICTR.285 Such efforts are required to be ‘genuine and concrete’.286 In the Katanga case, the ICC considered that the convicted person’s ‘personal and active support to the process of disarming and demobilising child soldiers’,287 assistance in the release of hostages, and protection of civilians within his own community,288 could not play a determinate role due to his crimes committed against member of the other civilian community in Ituri the Herna. Such efforts need to be ‘both palatable and genuine, without the need to demand results’289 with evidence based on a balance of probabilities.290 Convicted persons need to show that their peace and reconciliation efforts are sincere, genuine and implemented. The ICC held in the Bemba case that the accused writing a book on peace was insufficient.291 Efforts to contribute to peace in other countries and not in country the individual was convicted of crimes in, has limited value in mitigation.292

91. Similar findings were considered by the ICTY and ICTR in that contrition or contribution to peace or reconciliation can be weighty mitigating factors where they recognise victims’ suffering, acknowledge their responsibility, apologise, and actively promote and negotiate peace.293 However such efforts by convicted person could not be judged by their acts to protect civilians within their own community.294 Statements of remorse and apologies by convicted persons is considered to also contribution to reconciliation by being part of a proportionate sentence, in that it is not too lenient or harsh,295 but judges have recognised that punishment in

276 United States of America vs. Wilhelm List et al. (Hostage Case), 19 February 1948, XI Trial of War Criminals, p337.
282 Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33402/02, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 9 June 2009, para 103.
itself can only make a limited contribution in post-conflict societies.\footnote{296} Statements of remorse and apologies can be mitigating factors where they are genuine and sincere.\footnote{297} There seems to be a need for the convicted person to reflect on their actions and have an awareness of their wrongdoing by trying to make amends for the actions during the war in securing peace and reconciliation.\footnote{298}

92. The Special Court for Sierra Leone considered that the convicted persons acting out of civic duty in fighting to reinstate democracy in the Fofana and Kondewa case,\footnote{299} but that,

‘the crimes for which the Accused were tried and convicted remain very serious crimes, and both Fofana and Kondewa will bear the stigma of a conviction after we have pronounced their sentences. The Chamber hopes that this Judgement will send a message to future pro-democracy armed forces or militia groups that notwithstanding the justness or propriety of their cause, they must observe the laws of war in pursuing or defending legitimate causes, and that they must not recruit or use children as agents or instruments of war. It will, in addition, remind them of their obligation to protect civilians who are unarmed and not participating in hostilities, and whose aspiration is only to protection, regardless of their perceived affiliation.’\footnote{300}

93. However in the AFRC case, a good service record in the army was not considered a mitigating factor, but ‘merely…duty’.\footnote{301} Providing a guilty plea has been noted as a mitigating factor, in that it saves the Court time and relieves witnesses and victims of the stress of testifying,\footnote{302} but it is given more weight were convicted persons are willing to provide testimony in other cases. However, in a number of cases in the early years of the ICTR, while a number of high level of suspects did plead guilty, the tribunal imposed long sentences due to the gravity of the charges of genocide.\footnote{303} Most ICTR defendants were keen to receive reduced sentences, but they were not willing to plead guilty to genocide to receive it, due to many of them viewing the violence as part of a conflict between the Rwandan Hutu government and Uganda Tutsi rebels.\footnote{304}

94. Contributing reparations or assisting victims can be considered a substantial mitigating factor of sentence. The ICC mitigating factors in sentencing explicitly recognise the defendant’s conduct in providing compensation to victims.\footnote{305} There are similar provisions in the Ugandan ICD.\footnote{306} Giving a convicted person a substantial contribution in post-conflict societies.\footnote{307} Statements of remorse and apologies can be mitigating factors where they are genuine and sincere.\footnote{308} There seems to be a need for the convicted person to reflect on their actions and have an awareness of their wrongdoing by trying to make amends for the actions during the war in securing peace and reconciliation.\footnote{309} The weight that assisting victims and civilians is judged against the gravity of the offences the individual is convicted of such as saving a family from another community when involved in killing hundreds of civilians.\footnote{310} The ICC has been explicit that assistance to victims and civilians in general should be given more weight as a mitigating factor, than selective assistance.\footnote{311} Expressing statements of remorse, including apologies, are considered a significant factor.\footnote{312} However, expressing sympathy or empathy to victims is given less weight, as the convicted person is not renouncing their wrongful actions.\footnote{313} Despite these considerations, aggravating factors of the convicted person’s seniority and gravity of offences, in particular genocide, can outweigh such efforts towards victims.\footnote{314}

95. In the Katanga case at the ICC the convicted person provided a recorded video where he apologises to the victims of the Bogoro massacre, as part of an assessment for reducing his sentence. However, the victims participating in the case rejected his apology. While the defence counsel did meet with the victims in Bogoro to discuss the apology and sentence reduction, the victims remained unhappy with some feeling further traumatised by the meeting. There was a feeling amongst the victims that Mr Katanga’s apology was not sincere and would not have been forthcoming without him benefiting through a reduced sentence. The legal representative of the victims further presented testimony from a community leader in Bogoro on the traditional settlement of disputes by the Hema as,

‘According to our custom, when there is a conflict between two people they can sit down to discuss it; the first thing that we do is seek to make amends. The second stage is to bring people together to try to find a solution. Where Katanga is concerned, it is as if he is reversing the process. Personally, I do not agree with this back-to-front approach. People should first sit down, make amends, and then apologise. If someone has been hurt, the wound must be treated and, once the person is cured, forgiveness can be sought.’\footnote{315}

As a result, despite Mr Katanga offering to meet with victims to give a personal apology, it was rejected as insufficient to benefit the victims.\footnote{316}

96. Similarly in the Al Mahdi case the convicted individual plead guilty and apologised to the victims and the community in Timbuktu for the destruction of the World Heritage site.\footnote{317} He also called upon others to not engage in such destruction of cultural property and vowed to never commit atrocities again.\footnote{318} Yet the victims felt

308 See Prosecutor v. Paul Bisengimana, Case No. ICTR 00-60-T Judgement, 13 April 2006, para 125.
309 Bamba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3399, 21 June 2016, para 72.
310 Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, para 105.
311 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3484, para 117.
312 See Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, para. 2273.
313 Legal Representative’s observations on the reduction of sentence of Germain Katanga, 18 September 2015, ICC-01/04-01/07-3597-ENG, para 54.
314 Decision on the review concerning reduction of sentence of Mr Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3615, 13 November 2015, paras 91-103.
315 Transcript of Hearing, 22 August 2016, ICC-01/12-01/15-T-4-RED-ENG, page 8, lines 13-16.
316 Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence ICC-01/12-01/15-171 27 September 2016, para 103-104.
it was insufficient. While some were willing to accept the apology, as forgiveness is a tenet of Islam, others were concerned that they could not forgive Mr Al Mahdi by only his words, but by his deeds, as they were concerned that accepting his apology may forego their claims for reparation. As stated by their legal representative, ‘Apologies alone, as sincere as they may be, cannot make amends for the harm suffered and allow the victims to return to their previous lives and regain their dignity.’ Despite these interventions, the Court held that Mr Al Mahdi’s apology was a ‘significant’ mitigating factor.

97. In comparison at the ECCC in Case 001, while the Duch made a number of public apologies and expressed remorse to the victims, the Chambers found it undermined by his failure to offer a full and unequivocal admission of his responsibility, particularly as he requested an acquittal in his closing statement, which was held to diminish his remorse. In the subsequent Case 002/01 Nuon Chea did apologise to the public and victims, but the Court found it was undermined by ‘his failure to accept responsibility for his own wrongdoing’, as he minimised his own responsibility for the Khmer Rouge’s lack of control over ‘traitors’ who committed the crimes against humanity and genocide of which he was convicted. Accordingly, a range of conducts by defendants, in particular in contributing to peace and victims’ needs, is considered a sufficient and proportionate factor in reducing sentences for international crimes. However, the failure to acknowledge responsibility seems to be a clear ground to distinguish the proportion of punishment in sentences. Similar issues are factored into the provision of certain amnesties and pardons in post-conflict societies.

Amnesty and pardons

98. Amnesty extinguishes or prevents criminal and civil liability, whereas a pardon ends the ‘execution of a penalty, though in other respects the effects of the conviction remain in being.’ Pardons are seen as more acceptable, due to them being the prerogative of the executive and after the pronouncement of a person’s guilt and sentence, provided they are made on justifiable grounds. For the ICRC, amnesty was a way to ‘encourage gestures of reconciliation which can contribute to re-establishing normal relations in the life of a nation which has been divided.’ Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II, while providing a broad amnesty to those taking part in hostilities, has recently been limited by regional and national courts to exclude international crimes, as going beyond the act of rebellion or waging war.

99. Regional human rights courts have developed a body of jurisprudence around the permissibility of amnesties in delivering national goals. The European Court of Human Rights has held that obligations to prosecute and punish individuals can, exceptionally, be set aside for a ‘reconciliation process and/or a form of compensation to the victims’. In particular it has stated that, ‘even in such fundamental areas of the protection of human rights as the right to life, the State is justified in enacting, in the context of its criminal policy, any amnesty laws it might consider necessary, with the proviso, however, that a balance is maintained between the legitimate interests of the State and the interests of individual members of the public.’

100. Blanket amnesties are seen as problematic and in violation of international human rights law, not just in the extent they allow impunity, but in how they deny victims’ right to an effective remedy. This has also been recognised by the ECCC. The Inter-American Court has a long jurisprudence on such issues. Recently in relation to the Ugandan Amnesty Act 2000, the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights stated that states, ‘should ensure that such amnesties comply with both procedural and substantive conditions. In procedural terms, conditional amnesties should be formulated with the participation of affected communities including victim groups. Substantively speaking, amnesties should not totally exclude the right of victims for remedy, particularly remedies taking the form of getting the truth and reparations. They should also facilitate a measure of reconciliation with perpetrators acknowledging responsibility and victims getting a hearing about and receiving acknowledgment for the violations they suffered.’

101. As such, trade-offs with punishment must ensure that there is an effective investigation that can lead to the identification of those responsible, some form of accountability of such individuals and appropriate and adequate reparations
to victims. This is to ensure that society knows the facts of what happened and prevents their occurrence or any appearance of state tolerance or collusion in such unlawful acts.\footnote{Jelić v. Croatia, Application no. 57856/11, 12 June 2014, para. 94.}

102. The Juba peace agreement between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government stipulated a number of accountability mechanisms to address the conflict. Lower ranking combatants would be subject to traditional justice, and state forces would be judged through existing accountability mechanisms. For senior LRA suspects, a cooperative system was proposed before the International Crimes Division, where suspects who make a confession, disclosure or other relevant information, would in turn benefit for the purposes of sentencing.\footnote{Clause 5.3.6, Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, 29 June 2007.} Cooperation in providing relevant information would have included the individual’s conduct during the conflict, details assisting in establishing the fate of persons missing during the conflict, the location of land mines or unexploded ordnances of other munitions, and any other relevant information.\footnote{Clause 15, Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation 19 February 2008.} Such individuals who cooperated would have expected to benefit from alternative penalties and sanction, which were to ‘reflect the gravity of the crimes or violations; promote reconciliation between individuals and within communities; promote the rehabilitation of offenders; take into account an individual’s admissions or other cooperation with proceedings; and, require perpetrators to make reparations to victims.’\footnote{Clause 6.4, Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, 29 June 2007.}

103. Similarly, in the Central African Republic the Special Criminal Court for high level perpetrators of international crimes is supported by a justice, truth, reparations and reconciliation commission with branches at the local level. Its mission is to identify and investigate crimes and abuses, with perpetrators to be divided into two categories: ‘Those whose perpetrators must be brought to justice, [and those] that may be subject to reparations through the payment of compensation or the performance of community service, in order to promote a spirit of contrition and inter-community reconciliation.’\footnote{Section 19(1), Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission Act 2017.} It is worth noting that in Uganda the peace agreement fell apart and so the issue of alternative sanctions did not arise, and in CAR violence remains ongoing, with suspects in both contexts being transferred to the International Criminal Court.

104. Amnesties and sentence mitigation have been used in a number of contexts to incentivise ex-combatants and perpetrators to fulfil the wider political goals of the transition.\footnote{Mission Report of the Agja-Wayamo Delegation to the Gambia: Meeting Expectations on the Road to Justice: Achieving Accountability in The Gambia, The Africa Group for Justice and Accountability (Agja) and The Wayamo Foundation, p11.} The Gambian Truth Reconciliation and Reparations Commission can provide an amnesty to those who report before it and give a ‘full disclosure’ and ‘reflect the gravity of the crimes or violations; promote reconciliation between individuals and within communities; promote the rehabilitation of offenders; take into account an individual’s admissions or other cooperation with proceedings; and, require perpetrators to make reparations to victims.’\footnote{Section 19(1), Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission Act 2017.} This amnesty excludes those who were involved in any acts that formed part of a crime against humanity.\footnote{Section 19(3).} It is intended that informants who have committed crimes against humanity while not eligible for an amnesty, will be able to benefit from reduced sentences where they cooperate.\footnote{Case CCT 23/10, Judgment of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, [2011] ZACC 11.} In South Africa, the amnesty and truth exchanged for perpetrators of gross human rights violations to facilitate the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, did not absolve the person’s moral responsibility in such violations so as to allow them rewrite history or ‘muzzle the truth’.\footnote{In the cases involving Simone Gbagbo in Cote d’Ivoire and Saif Gaddafi in Libya.}

105. Pardons can also play an important part in incentivising individuals to express remorse or contribute to repairing the harm caused to victims. This issue is gaining increasing attention at the ICC\footnote{Case Barrios Altos y Caso La Cantuta vs. Perú, de Investigar, Juzgar y, de Ser el Caso, Sancionar, Resolución de la Corte Interamericana De Derechos Humanos, 30 May 2018, para. 47.} as well as the Inter-American Court, in relation to the release of former Peruvian president Fujimori. On Fujimori’s release from prison in Peru on humanitarian grounds, the IACHR declared that punishments cannot be unduly affected or rendered illusory, given that they are integral to victims’ right to justice.\footnote{Case CCT 23/10, Judgment of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, [2011] ZACC 11.} Where sentences are reduced for serious human rights violations it must be a reduction that is the least restrictive to victims’ right to justice, and applied in extreme cases and for a prevailing need (such as emergency medical care).\footnote{Ibid. para.57.} Again this is a question of proportionality in achieving the wider public goal, for instance release on medical grounds for better treatment, is less restrictive of victims’ right to justice, than extinguishing a sentence through pardon.\footnote{Ibid. para.57.} That said the executive has discretion to show mercy in punishment, subject to judicial oversight, drawing from international criminal law on mitigation of sentence and early release, paying civil compensation, clarifying the truth, recognising the seriousness of the crimes they have perpetrated, their rehabilitation, and the effect of their release on society and victims.\footnote{Ibid. para.57.} In line with amnesties and sentence reduction, pardons and other measures are increasingly being seen as legitimate provided there are clear legal boundaries on their extent and conditionality. In other words, provided there is a legitimate public interest (reconciliation, remedy to victims) and they allow the investigation and attachment of responsibility, alternative sanctions can be crafted under international law that do not run afoul of being blanket amnesties or self-serving pardons.
Alternative sanctions, reparations and accountability

106. Reparations are measures to remedy and alleviate victims’ suffering, but they also serve an expressive function in validating victims’ harm as wrongful and obliging those responsible to repair their wrong.105 For victims, such accountability is evinced by identifying those parties responsible, holding them to account for their actions, imposing a judgment on their liability, and requiring them to provide reparations.105 Attaching responsibility for reparations to perpetrators, whether individual, state, or organisational, can fulfil an important psychological function for victims in appropriately directing blame at those who committed the atrocity against them and relieving their guilt.105 Reparations made by the responsible perpetrator can also help to symbolise their commitment to remedying the past and to be held to account for their actions. However, compensation paid to victim without any acknowledgement of responsibility can be seen as perpetuating impunity by ‘buying them off’. Alternative sanctions are often not widely supported by the public as they ‘fail to express condemnation as dramatically and unequivocally as imprisonment’.106 Thus, responsibility for reparations is seen as evinced by acknowledging the wrong, by expressing remorse and apologising for their actions and by taking steps to repair the harm done.106

107. Responsibility in international law has traditionally been the domain of states. However the increasing occurrence of non-international armed conflicts and non-state armed groups controlling territory has meant that such groups can act like facto authorities in the area they control. This gives rise to certain human rights obligations in particular circumstances, including the obligation to remedy gross violations of human rights and grave breaches of international humanitarian law. Accountability can be broadly understood as the constraint of power, but can be narrowly defined as its ‘operationalisation’ with common characteristics including, 

1. there is an individual or institution that is capable of being held to account for their decisions, actions or omissions; 
2. there is an individual or institution that is empowered to hold the decision-maker accountable; and 
3. there is a process by which the decision-maker is required to disclose and explain their decision, and that there is an enforcement process, in which the accountability actor can impose sanctions on decision-makers who violated their duties.107

108. Holding the individuals most responsible for the actions of the group in committing international crimes is a ‘legal fiction’, especially where such crimes are carried out on a collective basis with individual participation deeply conformist or complicit.108 Members of an armed group agree with the group’s principles, purpose, or aims, and by themselves in a normal society would not agree to such actions, but for the group. Moreover, as members of an armed group expressing approval of the organisation’s action and benefiting from membership of the group, they should be collectively responsible for the acts of the group and contributing as far as possible to the ‘cost’ of reparations. The collective behaviour of members in an organisation reflects the collective pressure, organisation, and culture through discipline and orders which conditions individuals to collectively act as an armed group, thus lending itself to organisational responsibility and collectively seeking reparations from members of a group, rather than just individuals.109 Imposing collective responsibility on the membership of an organisation is not collective punishment,109 but recognition that members have an obligation to make good the harm they are responsible for or face individual criminal prosecution. As such reparations and ex-combatants contributions to them, are not intended to be punitive, but an attempt to rebalance the harm caused.109

109. For instance, a large car bomb exploded in Omagh in western Northern Ireland in 1998, killing 29 civilians and two unborn twins. While no individual has yet been prosecuted for this bombing, some of the victims’ families brought civil litigation against the dissident republicans they identified as responsible. In 2009, Belfast High Court upheld their claim against four individuals, including Liam Campbell, a senior Real IRA leader who was held to be a representative of the RIRA Army Council that sanctioned the bombing, and ordered them to make reparations.110 Therefore the court not only held those individuals who carried out the bombing responsible, but also those commanding the organisation, reflecting that this sort of atrocity was not the act of individuals, but a concerted organised effort by an armed group involving different responsible actors. For the victims suing for compensation, their efforts were hoped to ensure some form of accountability and deter such groups from committing violence in the future.110 In other contexts, armed groups have agreed to provide reparations as part of a peace agreement and transitional justice processes.111

348 Combs n.106, p.93
349 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga, Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be applied to Reparations, ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, 7 August 2012, para.179
352 See Moffett n.30, p.175.
357 Drumbl n.10, p.25.
358 Klaftner n.355, p.265.
359 Brosin & Ors v Seamus McKenna & Ors [2009] N(IQ) Q, paras.81-86.
360 The families hoped that the litigation would be ‘a vehicle for putting as much information as possible into the public domain about the bombing and the man they claim were involved’. Real IRA founder loses Omagh civil case appeal, The Guardian, 7 July 2011.
361 For instance in Uganda under Clauses 6.4, 8.1, and 9, Juba Peace Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, 29 June 2007.
Reparations in international criminal justice bodies

110. Since the creation of the International Criminal Court, reparations have been awarded against those convicted before the Court. As discussed in the previous section, providing reparations to victims is considered a mitigating factor in international criminal justice sentencing. At the ICC, the Court has the discretion to award a fine against convicted persons as well as reparations.362 To date, this has only been ordered against Mr Bemba for his conviction of witness tampering. Reparations at the ICC have only been awarded in three cases at the Court, with all of the convicted persons being ingenuously, meaning that their financial contribution is offset to the future. Ongoing insecurity and their incarceration has prevented those convicted from directly contributing symbolic measures to victims. In the Lubanga case the Court declined to order compensation given his lack of financial resources, but also because awarding monetary awards to the victims who were child soldiers may cause community resentment and social tensions.363 While initially the Court in the Lubanga case awarded community based reparations to affected communities, this was later rejected on appeal on the grounds that reparations had to be aimed to victims harmed by the crimes of which the accused is convicted.364 Instead the Chamber approved the Trust Fund’s later implementation plan of collective reparations that included symbolic measures of construction of community centres and a mobile programme to reduce stigma and discrimination against former child soldiers, along with service-based collective measures through physical and psychological rehabilitation, vocational training and income generating activities.365

111. In the subsequent Katanga case victims of a massacre in Bogoro, Ituri (DRC) demanded monetary measures to alleviate their suffering and rejected collective symbolic measures such as apologies and memorials as unsuitable, pointless or able to cause unrest.366 Instead the Chamber awarded $250 to the victims as a way to provide a ‘personal and symbolic acknowledgement’ and to help them to regain their ‘self-sufficiency and to make decisions for themselves on the basis of their needs.’367 The Court also approved the Trust Fund’s implementation plan for services such as housing assistance, education assistance, income-generating activities, and psychological rehabilitation, to be provided to the victims of the massacre.368 Similar in the Al Mahdi case involving the destruction of the world heritage site at Timbuktu, the victims rejected the TFV proposed symbolic measures of memorialisation, use of Mr Al Mahdi’s apology and a re-sanctification of the buildings, as inappropriate.369 Taking these concerns on-board the Court approved the Trust Fund’s implementation of economic development, including compensation to directly affected victims.370

112. International criminal justice bodies have increasingly used the language of ‘collective’ reparations, which is often absent in the conceptualisation and operation of many domestic reparation programmes, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the 2005 UN Basic Principles on Reparations.371 On the ground, victims may not distinguish collective reparations from assistance where they are delivered in the same form, i.e. monetary awards or collective development. Reparations carry a strong symbolic component that brings them into the ‘politics of recognition’ of who is seen as deserving of publicly acknowledged redress.372 Contreras-Garduño suggests that collective reparations should be complemented with symbolic measures, such as apologies and memorials, to more clearly associate such reparations as a measure of justice.373 As such collective reparations have to be carefully crafted to ensure that they are ‘aimed at conferring official recognition upon victims, and assisting to restore dignity and preserve the collective memory.’374

113. Collective reparations are meant to provide ‘benefits conferred on collectives in order to undo the collective harm that has been caused as a consequence of a violation of international law.’375 This reflects that with international crimes harm is not limited to individuals, but causes collective harm, as it is committed in a discriminatory way or through indiscriminate attacks against groups or civilian populations, such as crimes against humanity and genocide.376 Necessarily individual harm is bound up with collective harm, due to their membership of the group.377 The ICC in Katanga defined reparations to a collective as ‘a group or category of persons that may be bound by a shared identity or experience, but also by victimization by dint of the same violation or the same crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.’378 Together with measures of satisfaction such collective reparations measures can vindicate the ‘moral status’379 of victims as human beings who have suffered unlawful harm, which they did not deserve. Collective reparations send important moral messages about the wrongfulness of their

362 Article 77(2)(a), Rome Statute.
363 ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, para 231, and ICC-01/04-01/06-329-AnkA, para 87(1).
364 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, para 274, and ICC-01/04-01/06-329, 03-03-2015, para 214.
365 Order approving the proposed plan of the Trust Fund for Victims in relation to symbolic collective reparations, 21 October 2016, ICC-01/04-01/06-3231; and Order approving the proposed programmatic framework for collective service-based reparations submitted by the Trust Fund for Victims, 6 April 2017, ICC-01/04-01/06-3289.
366 ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-1-ENG, para 301.
368 ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-1-ENG, paras 302-304.
370 Decision on the Updated Implementation Plan from the Trust Fund for Victims, ICC-01/12/01/15-324-Red, 4 March 2019.
375 Friedrich Rosenfeld, Collective reparation for victims of armed conflict, International Review of the Red Cross 92(979), September 2010, 731-746, p732.
376 Moffett n.30, p11-12.
378 ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-1ENG 17-08-2017, para 274.
Alternative sanctions, reparations and accountability

114. The International Criminal Court is unique compared to other international criminal bodies, as a Trust Fund for Victims was created alongside it that had been fundraising for a number of years before a reparations decision was reached. The Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) ordered compensation against the convicted person amounting to $139 million (USD) in the case of Hissène Habré, but as none of his assets had been identified a trust fund has been established to provide compensation to victims. As the EAC rejected collective and symbolic reparations as they lacked specificity of their cost, location and programme operation. In addition, as the EAC did not have jurisdiction over Chad it could not find it responsible nor order it to implement collective measures. In domestic Chadian proceedings against 20 of Habré’s associates, a court awarded $125 million (USD) after their conviction for torture, including the seizure of their assets and half liability of the state, due to the convicted person’s official position at the time of the violations. The trust fund established by the African Union in 2018, is intended to facilitate compensation through identifying assets stolen by Habré and his cadres as well as contribution from donors, but also has powers to award collective and moral reparations in collaboration with the Chadian government, as well as with other states, inter-governmental organisations and civil society groups. One civil party group (AVCRH RH) had requested the chamber for 30% of funds designated for compensation to be used to fund collective reparations to benefit communities affected by the crimes. These means included income-generating development projects, creation of monuments in memory of the victims, commemoration 30 May as a day against impunity, educational materials in school curricula, and socio-professional training facilities for indirect, women and children victims.

115. At the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia explicitly excludes compensation or other monetary measures of reparations, by only permitting claims for ‘collective and moral’ measures. As such the purpose of such reparations before the ECCC are to ‘acknowledge the harm’ suffered by the victims before the Court as a result of crime and the accused is convicted and ‘provide benefits’ that address their harm. This narrow scope of reparations reflects the legal and political situation the ECCC operates within, in that it does not have a trust fund, has millions of potential victims and has no jurisdiction over the Cambodian government to enforce implementation. In Case 001 against Kaing Guek Eav (aka Duch) involving the torture site of S-21, the Court only awarded reparations that include a declaration that all the civil parties admitted in the case had suffered harm as a result of the Duch crimes, along with a compilation of all statements of apology and acknowledgement made by him during the trial. In Case 002/01 against the two most senior remaining leaders of the Khmer Rouge Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, focused on crimes against humanity related to the forced displacement of civilians and execution of soldiers. The ECCC approved in Case 002/01 eleven out of thirteen proposed measures ranging from a national remembrance day for victims, psychological therapy and self-help groups, inclusion of material on the Khmer Rouge in the national curriculum, publication of the judgement and inclusion of civil parties’ names on the ECCC website. These measures were supported by the ECCC as they had receiving funding from donors and provides ‘support to the victims, keeps their memory alive, acknowledges their suffering and awakens public awareness to avoid repetition of acts such as those that occurred. Two measures on creating public memorials in Cambodia and Paris were not approved as they failed to receive funding. Civil parties in Case 001 had proposed a national remembrance day, but the Court rejected this as it required action by the state, which only consented in Case 002/01 as no funding was required to implement it.

116. The subsequent Case 002/02 against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan examined a broader category of crimes that included genocide against the Cham and ethnic Vietnamese communities in Cambodia, forced marriage and rape, executions, torture and enforced disappearances. The lead co-lawyers proposed 18 reparation projects ranging from mental health support, legal and civil education for minority groups, a song-writing competition, dance production on forced marriage, a photo exhibition on genocide of Cham and ethnic Vietnamese. The ECCC refused to approve five projects as they had not received funding from donors. Notably the ECCC rejected part of project 13 involving mental health support and livelihood support to elderly civil parties, given that the latter part looked like monetary reparation, rather than collective and moral measures. Project 15 involving acknowledgement of discrimination and persecution of indigenous minorities in Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri provinces was rejected as the accused were not charged or convicted of these crimes. As such the ECCC reparation process is a means for donor funded programmes to receive official approval for specific projects that aim to address some of victims’ needs, but without a national reparation programme the measures do not adequately remedy their harm. For instance the ethnic Vietnamese continue to be denied rights as citizens, causing many to living on floating villages on the Tonlé Sap river, as they are unable to own land legally or send their children to school. Due to controversy amongst other civil parties who wanted the ethnic Vietnamese excluded from the ECCC, their reparations were diluted down from assisting them attaining citizenship to


382 Judgment on Reparations, Hissène Habré, EAC, First Instance Chamber, 29 July 2016, para 59-68. See Diab ibid., p44-145.

383 Internal Rule 23 quinquies.

384 Internal Rule 23 quinquies 1(a)-(b).


387 Trial Judgment, paras.682-683.

388 Trial Judgment, 7 August 2014, paras.1126-1162.

389 Trial Judgment, 7 August 2014, para.1164.

390 See Trial Summary Judgment.
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legal and civic education. Similarly the Cham community who had their religious leader killed and tens of thousands of their members killed during the genocide, lost some of their cultural heritage and wanted educational scholarships so that the next generation could reconnect with their cultural legacy, instead before the ECCC they received a photo exhibition and awareness raising activities.\textsuperscript{120}

117. Ultimately the challenges of reparations before international criminal justice bodies is that they are dealing with asymmetrical justice, in that they holding individuals liable for crimes which affected thousands of victims, with no recourse to call upon the state or other responsible organisations to support such repairation measures within a large administrative scheme. It also reflects that international criminal justice bodies cannot provide comprehensive reparations like state administrative programmes, as they lack the resources and capacity. However, courts can provide a form of reparations, at least at the minimalist end, of measures that acknowledge and seek to remedy the moral harm suffered by victims. That said there is emerging practice of ex-combatants, in particular former non-state armed groups, to provide reparations, not as a punishment, but through being incentivised to voluntarily contribute to the remedy of victims’ harm.

Complex Political Victims

118. The final area we wish to address in this report is that of ‘complex political victims’ – those victims who simultaneously or successively experienced harm and participated in systems of oppression and political violence.\textsuperscript{133} One caveat is essential. Arguing for the acknowledgement of complex identities is not to imply a collectivisation of guilt or to suggest that all perpetrators are victims or vice versa. Moreover, it is not meant to deny the victim status of individuals, especially since discourses of blaming and silencing victims are often instrumental to political violence.\textsuperscript{134} However, it is necessary to recognise the messy reality of conflict in which individual identities cannot be neatly accommodated into strict categories of ‘innocent victims’ and ‘guilty perpetrators’. Former vice Chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Alex Boraine takes up this point: ‘To think of the perpetrators as victims is not to condone their actions or their deeds, nor is it to turn away from the many victims whose lives they destroyed by their activities. It is simply to try to understand something of the ambiguity, the contradictions, of war, of conflict, of prejudice.’\textsuperscript{135}

119. Holocaust survivor Primo Levi offers perhaps the most generous insight into the complexity of victimhood, arguing that even in the horror of the concentration camps, the complex network of human relations could not always be reduced to ‘two blocs of victims and persecutors’.\textsuperscript{136} Reflecting on his and others’ ‘inadequate’ efforts at resistance during their time in German concentration camps, Levi hints at a belief that through their ‘failure to resist’, he and fellow prisoners were also complicit in the atrocities that took place. In doing so, Levi implicates all humans in the acts of others, encompassing not only deeds of depravity, but also the failure to act to prevent such deeds:

‘What guilt? When all was over, the awareness emerged that we had no done anything or not enough, against the system into which we had been absorbed. on a rational plane, there should not have been much to be ashamed of, but shame persisted nonetheless, especially for the few, bright examples of those who had the strength and possibility to resist.’\textsuperscript{137}

120. For Erin Baines, the term perpetrator includes bystanders, collaborators, informants, forced perpetrators, forced combatants, victims turned-perpetrators, and perpetrators-turned-victims.\textsuperscript{401} The following example provides a way into this complexity: ‘A student watches his parents being harassed by secret police, the student joins protest or freedom-fighting groups and then is arrested; the student emerges willing to use terrorist tactics against the secret police, and sets off bombs that kill civilians’.\textsuperscript{391} In this example, the student has been a victim, combatant and bystander. Equally, as Claire Moon notes, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission required South Africans to be designated as either ‘victims’ or ‘perpetrators’, but in respect to perpetrators, did not distinguish between the kinds of acts committed, the reasons why they were committed, their consequences or their context, or between individuals who committed just one act and those whose entire operation and purpose was the commission of such acts.\textsuperscript{398} Some of those labelled as perpetrators before the TRC could not easily be accommodated within these categories of ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’. One controversial figure (Robert McBride) who applied for and was granted amnesty for his actions during the liberation struggle (including planting a bomb at a bar, which caused the deaths of 3 people and injured a further 69) declared that he too had been a victim of the white Apartheid regime and that it was his determination to fight against that system that led to his involvement in armed struggle.\textsuperscript{402}

121. The most obvious example of perpetrators who can also be thought of as victims are child soldiers and female combatants.\textsuperscript{403} The use of child soldiers – those under the age of 15 who are conscripted or enlisted into armed groups and/or used to actively participate in hostilities is ubiquitous. For example, between 30,000-60,000 children were abducted to fill the ranks of the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army, while an estimated 7,500 children were recruited by all parties to the Colombian conflict – guerrilla organisations, the military and state-aligned paramilitary groups. Writing in respect to child soldiers in the Lord’s Resistance Army, Baines notes the...
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In other instances, the complex identity of victim–perpetrators refers to individuals who are members of non-state armed, paramilitary or terrorist groups, or state forces who commit human rights abuses but have also been victimized through identifiable international crimes, such as disappearances, extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, torture, serious injury or ill-treatment caused by other actors. The circularity in such claims-making – of people who become involved in violence because of their own or their communities’ experience of violence – has been a constant refrain repeated to one of the authors in literally hundreds of interviews with combatants and ex-combatants over the years. Equally, many ex-combatants continue to suffer as a result of their militarized histories and involvement in violent conflict. Sources of trauma among former combatants in South Africa include the brutalization of South African Defence Force (SADF) conscripts in training, the conditions under which Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) members lived in exile, the resulting paranoia that comes from a culture of infiltration, government security-force harassment of liberation fighters’ families and the consequences of witnessing and participating in violent acts. In Northern Ireland, 45.3% of former republican and loyalist combatants are reported to have experienced moderate or severe physical injuries, while 53.1% have been psychologically harmed. The same survey revealed that 68.8% of respondents engaged in hazardous levels of alcohol abuse, while 32.6% had received prescription medication for depression during the conflict, the effect of the unresolved past on individuals and the knock-on effect onto extended families cannot be underestimated. As Bouris explains, recognizing these perpetrators as victims is quite critical, because if we do not see them as victims, we are unlikely to understand the true horror of [the context].

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123. There is growing practice that ex-combatants can make a useful contribution to securing the peace and assisting transitional justice mechanisms. Their role is not just instrumental in these mechanisms, but ex-combatants can in engaging in such acts rehabilitate their image as not just fighters, but citizens trying to amend for past wrongs. In turn this can to an extent help to re-integrate and resocialise them into society by their public deeds. It is worth keeping in mind that such individuals are not simply perpetrators or combatants, but can be representatives, leaders and mediators in their own communities, to some they are defenders of victimised or marginalised communities, and even victims themselves. In Nepal we interviewed a number of former child soldiers who joined up with Maoist guerrillas after their family members were disappeared by the army, and in Uganda and Guatemala civilians who have been abducted and forced to join armed and paramilitary armed groups.

124. There are experiences elsewhere of ex-combatants making important contributions to reparations. In the Philippines, the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission Bangsamoro recommended that the Philippine army and national police contribute to symbolic reparations, such as formal apologies for their role in human rights and humanitarian law violation, as well as to provide ‘material reparations’, including ‘rebuidling homes, mosques, madrasahs, and other community infrastructure in affected Bangsamoro communities.’ The Commission also recommended that the archives of such organisations should be accessible and protected by them.

125. The contribution of assets by ex-combatants to reparations can provide a symbolic token to offsetting the cost of reparations borne by the state to all victims, but it is likely that any such remaining assets within a group will have been substantially reduced during the conflict. In the Solomon Islands, while amnesty excluded international crimes, the amnesty was conditioned on individuals returning ‘all weapons and ammunition and stolen property’ possessed by militant groups. In Sierra Leone subsistence support to ex-combatants to assist their reintegration where weapons were exchanged for compensation, was perceived as only assisting those who fought in the war rather than the suffering of victims, inhibiting reconciliation and reintegration. It also meant that some vulnerable groups of women and children remained dependent on former commanders, ‘reinforcing loyalty and preventing their return to local communities.’

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405 There are also shades of grey between ‘volunteering’ to join armed groups or being physically or economically forced to do so.
408 Ibid.
410 Ibid.
412 Bouris n.393, p.67.
414 Section 3(3), Amnesty Act 2001. See also the amnesty in Section 5, Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997.
126. While there is some practice of the assets of suspected international war criminals being seized, it requires a team of investigators, cooperation of other states and forensic accountants to identify, freeze and seize such resources.416 How long should such obligations be imposed and balanced with an ex-combatant’s reintegration and ability to support themselves and their family? This issue has been raised at the International Criminal Court, with judges in the Katanga case finding that long term imposition of a debt on a convicted person is based on his obligation to repair the harm caused, rather than consideration of punishment or his reintegration in society.417 However in the subsequent decision in Al Mahdi, the Chamber recognised that the convicted person’s financial circumstances affected implementation, such as instalments, but it did not want to ‘impose hardships’ on Mr Al Mahdi that would ‘make it impossible for him to reintegrate into society upon his release’.418 Ultimately the state has a subsidiarity responsibility to all victims to provide reparations for gross violations of human rights no matter who is the responsible actor, leaving non-state armed groups the space to indemnify victims to provide reparations for gross violations of human rights no matter who is responsible, especially where armed groups are demobilised and disarmed. Ex-combatants and their organisations can make important expressive messages to victims and society in acknowledging their role in the violence of the past and making expressions of remorse. Acknowledgements of responsibility should be sincere and genuine, those that are rushed or rote statements of responsibility can ‘make survivors feel that reparations are being used to buy their silence and put a stop to their continuing quest for truth and justice’.420 Apologies can be distinguished from acknowledgements of responsibility by their remorseful framing and gestures of such statements.421 There are a number of factors that can make an apology successful in that it satisfies victims: timeliness, explicit statements of apology and regret, an acceptance of personal responsibility, the avoidance of offensive explanations or excuses, willingness to make amends and promises to avoid future transgressions.422 As discussed above in relation to apologies made at the ICC and ECCC, such measures are often seen as insufficient or premature without other measures of reparations being made to victims first. Accordingly, apologies and acknowledgment of responsibility can carry symbolic messages of recognition of the wrongfulness of victims’ suffering but needed to be properly timed and appropriately crafted for victims. When coming from ex-combatants, apologies can also contribute to a shift within their own political community to self-reflect on their own actions and justification of the past and violence. Victim participation in developing what an apology should include in terms of language and scope can help to make it more effective and meaningful, but this will need to be carefully constructed that it does not alienate former comrades or supportive communities.

128. Ex-combatants can also play an important role in the clarification of facts, especially in the confusion of war, information can be misrepresented, misunderstood or misperceived. In Northern Ireland, republican and loyalists have carried out internal investigations into murders to determine and clarify facts. These have in some cases resulted in apologies, especially for those identified as informers.423 Use immunities have also been used in a number of public inquiries, such as the Bloody Sunday massacre, whereby any oral or written statement could not be used in criminal or civil proceedings. This enabled members of state forces and the IRA to speak opening about their own involvement in the events leading up to and after the massacre.424 Similarly for individuals who had their amnesty application rejected by the South African TRC, their disclosure was not be used against them in any future prosecution.425 As discussed above in relation to Northern Ireland, ex-combatants have provided key information, which has facilitated the recovery of some of ‘the disappeared’.

129. Legal representation can assist ex-combatants to fill in relevant forms and understand their rights. The experience of the Amnesty Commission of the South African TRC found that applications made by amnesty applicants were very scant, due to them most of them being unable to afford legal representation or for those that could their lawyers advised their client to divulge as little as information as possible.426 The dependence on legal staff to act as judges, lawyers and advocates in the proceedings of the amnesty committee made it largely a ‘court room model’, marginalising victims to ‘an audience in a legal show’ between lawyers.427 Legal representatives of amnesty applicants acted to protect their clients from self-incrimination causing them to be ‘a buffer, gatekeeper and silence in what should have been a space for open and extensive disclosure.428

130. There is clear role for responsible organisations to cooperate in the administration of fact clarification by furnishing corroborating information to investigators to verify statements and information provided by individual members or victims.429 This can help minimise delay, but resources may be needed to help build the organisation’s capacity to expedite such information gathering. Impartial verification with sources outside such organisations should also be used to corroborate information on events to avoid a one sided version of the past. The South African TRC Amnesty Committee recommended that one of lessons from its experience was to have

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416 Three of the convicted individuals before the ICC have been declared indigent. See also the Konyaato case, Decision on the implementation of the request to freeze assets, ICC-01/09-02/11-391 of 7 July 2014. There are only 25 enforced sentences resulting from Colombian Law 975/2005 proceedings, with only 13 compensations ordered being paid out to date.


418 ICC-01/12-01/15-236, para 114.


423 See Dudai n.74.


425 SATRC Vol. 6, p34.

426 Vol. 6, p34.

427 Fullard and Rousseau n.90, p202.

428 Ibid.

429 See SATRC, Vol. 6, p35.
application forms that require individuals to provide a narrative summary of both the incident and the role of the applicant.\textsuperscript{431} In addition, proceedings should only occur where facts are in dispute between the parties, thereby allowing where the parties agree to submit evidence or information into the factual record without a public hearing, so as to expedite the process and minimise costs.\textsuperscript{431} Applicants for amnesty had to make a ‘full disclosure’ to be eligible, with those who were untruthful on a ‘material aspect’ being refused. However, such a full disclosure only had to be on ‘relevant facts’ as to the incidents raised in the amnesty application.\textsuperscript{432} The leadership of the ANC made an organisational submission to the TRC covering 37 leaders, and although their application did not detail individual acts as required for the amnesty, it was awarded collectively. This was subsequently heavily criticised as a ‘blanket amnesty’.\textsuperscript{433}

131. There should be consideration of how military or government actors can contribute to alternative sanctions, such as losing or reducing military privileges, such as them contributing some of their pensions or tax breaks to supporting victims. In the case of former Guatemalan president Rios Montt, he was not given a state funeral, but a private military funeral. While this was not part of reparations to victims or penalty for his earlier conviction of genocide (though later overturned), it reflects the inappropriate use of state funds to commemorate individuals who grossly violated the rights of citizens.

132. In processes were ex-combatants have contributed information or other material, trust, patience, informed expectations, and in particular the leadership of ex-combatants has been key to their success. These restorative processes in Northern Ireland, discussed above, aimed to maximize information exchange, dialogue and mutual consent.\textsuperscript{434} Reintegration and engagement with transitional justice mechanisms by ex-combatants has to be carefully crafted. The use of the language of rehabilitation, shame or punishment for being a combatant, may sit uncomfortably with those who were struggling for a better country or fulfilling their duty as defenders of the state, and neglects their experience of victimisation or the structural causes of their belligerency.\textsuperscript{435} Instead, viewing them as peacebuilding agents can harness the potential of ex-combatants to provide moral, political and organisational leadership to processes dedicated to the past, as well as ‘credibility, respect and legitimacy’, at least within their own political communities.\textsuperscript{436} The organisational structure of an armed group means that former members have a shared experience and history, with bonds of loyalty and a command structure. These bonds can be used to mobilise them collectively to contribute information on the past including location of those disappeared.\textsuperscript{437} This also corresponds to wider issues within DDR, that challenges to reintegration are not so apparent within communities where shaming is caused not usually because of an individual’s role in conflict, but because of their affiliation to the faction or group’s reputation.\textsuperscript{438} Thus having former armed group involved as a collective organisation, can serve not only to maximise its ability to deliver on demobilisation, but also use its membership to crowd-source information within the organisation. It can also assist in the reincorporation of ex-combatants as not ordinary criminals, but responsible agents still struggling to improve or protect their society. Individual leadership within an organisation to catalyse such behaviour is key. Moreover, given their position within their own community, such groups can act as strategic mediators to minimise future violence and guaranteeing non-recurrence through their organic legitimacy.

Challenges

133. There are a number of challenges for ex-combatants in respect to engaging with past focused mechanisms. Personal feelings of blame, shame, stigma may hinder their reintegration or willingness to speak opening about their past. The change of identity from combatant to civilian, may still belie continuing notions of loyalty or social bonds to the organisation or state, or having to confront their underlying justification for violence in contrast with the consequences of their action and victimisation.\textsuperscript{439} This may be further complicated masculinity, complex victimhood, or continuing psychological trauma and the re-opening of old wounds by talking about the past. Ex-combatants, who may be willing to speak about their own involvement in conflict, may be reluctant to implicate others. This was apparent in the Saville Inquiry into the events on Bloody Sunday massacre of 13 civilians in 1974. When called to give evidence, and despite the provision of a use immunity, the former Sinn Fein Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness and formerly second in command of the IRA, referred to a ‘code of honour’ that prevented him from fully revealing all information that would breach the trust and confidence of members of his organisation and its supportive community,

“I feel I cannot answer that question because there is a Republican code of honour. The people who would have allowed us to use their houses, such as the two occasions that you have identified to me, are people who have had placed great faith in those IRA members who were using the house. For me to identify those people are would be a betrayal, in my view...I have a duty, in my view, stretching back 30 years, to those people and I am not prepared to break my word to them under any circumstances.”\textsuperscript{440}

Similarly, Miroslav Bralo at the ICTY cooperated in providing information on the location of disappeared victims that led to the recovery of some of their bodies, but

\textsuperscript{430} SATRC, Vol. 6, p87.
\textsuperscript{431} SATRC, Vol. 6, p89.
\textsuperscript{432} SATRC, Vol. 6, p10.
\textsuperscript{434} McEvoy and Mika n.69, p367.
\textsuperscript{436} McEvoy and Shirlow ibid, p4.
refused to cooperate with the prosecution in implicating other former comrades in fear of retaliation against his family.\footnote{Combs n.106, p.83-84.}

134. Trust is an important part of engaging in such difficult processes in confronting the past. Trust was central in the experience in Northern Ireland in ex-combatant’s role in the recovery of the disappeared.\footnote{See Lauren Dempster, Transitional Justice and the Disappeared of Northern Ireland: Silence, Memory, and the Construction of the Past, Routledge (2019).} Ex-combatants grew confident in the ICBLR’s commissioners and investigators in respect to the values they followed and how they had treated them, the ‘quiet’ nature of the process and the provision of immunity from prosecution. Moreover, there was a political impetus on republicans to address this dark chapter of their past, given that the victims came from within their own community and their families had been effective in public advocating for action around the peace negotiations.\footnote{Morton Deutsch, Trust and Suspicion, in Morton Deutsch, ed., Interpersonal Trust and Social Decision-Making, (2nd edn., 1958), pp.265-279.} Trust is linked to expected outcomes of processes and perceptions of impartiality of the laws, actors and processes involved.\footnote{QB Human Rights Centre, Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past: The Human Rights Commission, 11 September 2018, p.15-16.} Where unrealistic claims and commitments are made that cannot be met by a commission it can contribute to mistrust and disengagement by participants.\footnote{Penal Reform International, Eight Years On ... A Record of Gacaca Monitoring in Rwanda (2010), p35.} This underlines the importance of informing victims at the outset and throughout the process of the likely long period of time it would take to identify the remains and being realistic that there may not be a satisfactory outcome no matter the amount of contribution of ex-combatants.

135. The sincerity of ex-combatants is a further point of consideration when they engage in such processes. In Rwanda apologies before the gacaca courts were judged by how ‘complete and sincere’ they were, which in practice contained a detailed description of the crimes committed, the names of the victims, accomplices, locations, and, if relevant, the property that was damaged.\footnote{Katonga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3484-i-ENG-Corr, para.117.} Local judges determined how fulsome an apology was by its sincerity and the extent to which it corresponded to the truth presented by all the participants involved in the incident. The ICC has held that mere expressions of sympathy or genuine compassion for the victims’ is given less weight in mitigation than an expression of remorse.\footnote{ICTY, Blaškić, Trial Judgement, IT-95-14-T, 3 March 2000, para.775.} The ICTY judged the sincerity of statements of remorse and apologies on ‘not only the accused’s statements but also of his behaviour (voluntary surrender; guilty plea).’\footnote{ICTY, Memory, and the Construction of the Past, (2007) 39-51, p48.} This is not an infallible process, as can be seen in the case of former Republika Srpska president Biljana Plavšić, who received a mitigated sentence of 11 years following her crimes against humanity conviction for contributing to local reconciliation through an apology, making a remorseful admission and her positive impact on the reconciliatory process.\footnote{ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, IT-00-396-AO-J-5, [27 February 2003], para. 71-81.} She declared “I sacrificed myself. I have done nothing wrong. I pleaded guilty to crimes against humanity so I could bargain for the other charges [of genocide].”\footnote{ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, IT-00-396-AO-J-5, [27 February 2003], para. 71-81.} She went on to indicate that her side did nothing wrong during the conflict and the victims deserved what they got.\footnote{ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, IT-00-396-AO-J-5, [27 February 2003], para. 71-81.} Making such reduced sentences or alternative penalties conditional on individuals renouncing violence, along with monitoring of their compliance post release, may help to mitigate such situations.

### Monitoring of Sanction and Reintegration

136. In Northern Ireland, early release for prisoners was a key issue in the peace negotiation and 1998 agreement.\footnote{S. Dara, The Limits of Judicial Idealism: Should the International Criminal Court Engage with CONSEQUENTIALIST ASPERATIONS?, Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs, (2014), p.98-99.} Under the subsequent law, a person in a non-state armed group (prescribed organisation) who is convicted of a schedule offence can obtain a reduced sentence of two years, including murder, gross bodily harm and rape. The sentence reduction does not absolve the individual of their criminal responsibility and it does not expunge their criminal record.\footnote{In the UK - Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998; and in the Republic of Ireland - the Criminal Justice (Release of Prisoners) Act 1998.} Instead, their sentence would be suspended unless they breached the conditions of their release. This consideration for release is centred on applicants upon being let out of prison on the grounds of them not being a supporter or likely to become a supporter of a specified organisation which is opposed to the peace process (i.e. on ceasefire and decommissioning), likely to become involved in acts of terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland; or if a life sentence prisoner, be a danger to the public.\footnote{ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, IT-00-396-AO-J-5, [27 February 2003], para. 71-81.} This process has been very successful with 488 prisoners being released and only 23 being returned to prison in a 20 year period,\footnote{ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, IT-00-396-AO-J-5, [27 February 2003], para. 71-81.} reflecting the political nature and motivation of such violence, but also the role of organisations in transforming their members from conflict to peace. Local police and prosecution service provided monitoring when people came before them on charges or in court, with the panel for sentence reduction only having to meet to determine new cases as they arose. Despite this, individuals released under the scheme and other ex-prisoners continue to face barriers to employment that allow them to fully reintegrate into society as civilians.\footnote{ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, IT-00-396-AO-J-5, [27 February 2003], para. 71-81.}
Conclusion - Alternative Sanctions

137. The JEP sits in a unique position to recalibrate justice that mediates the concerns and needs of victims with the responsibility of perpetrators. This report has sought to highlight some of the international and national jurisprudence and practices in responding to international crimes. There are no simple answers or perfect solutions to follow. However there are good practices and lessons to be learnt, as well as international obligations to ensure victims’ and perpetrators’ right to steer such a process.

138. International human rights law and international criminal law do not specify particular penalties or punishments for international crimes. Although blanket amnesties are generally considered illegal, conditional amnesties are in principle acceptable, where individuals contribute information, reparations or other efforts to reconciliation and peace. Alternative sanctions sit somewhere between punishment and amnesty, in that they ensure that individuals are held responsible for their wrongful actions under international human rights and international criminal law, but their punishment is attenuated by the broad political goal of reconciliation. In particular the attention to shift justice from being retributive, to being more sensitive to delivering victims’ rights to truth and reparations. A criminal court can never fully satisfy victims’ right to reparation or truth, it is why it needs to be completed by bodies specialised in delivering these broad goals. Nonetheless, it can facilitate perpetrators to confront their wrongdoing and incentivise them to make some measure of repair and acknowledgement to victims.

Recommendations

Below are some indicative recommendations that are not exhaustive on learning form the lessons in other context that may be useful for the JEP:

Restorative justice

139. Engaging in restorative justice at the community level can help to rebuild the social fabric in how communities resolve disputes amongst themselves, which can assist in developing communal bonds and social resilience. For victims it can allow them greater ownership of proceedings, enabling them to ‘tell their story’ by narrating events on their own terms, rather than answering questions in criminal proceedings, and provides the possibility of directly engaging with those responsible. Protracted conflicts involve a complex web of responsibility and victimisation, creating a process that only seeks to mediate between victims and perpetrators, could potentially neglect the role of the state in victimising perpetrators or the structural causes of violence. Attention needs to be paid to the gender dynamics of violence and responses to it, to ensure that women and girls can effectively contribute and shape processes to their needs and interests. Similar thought needs to be given to how disabled or elderly victims and perpetrators can engage in and benefit from such processes.

140. There are some common experiences of challenges in these informal settings that the JEP should make an effort to avoid such as: apprehension of participants (victim and perpetrator) in seeing the other participant(s) due to fear of reprisals or being falsely denounced, a lack of sincerity, strategic non-engagement by victims to not participate due to time commitments or security risks, silence in the public forum (may encourage more private meetings), pressure on participants to fulfil external or state goals for the process (such as reconciliation), selective framing of the context, and neglect of a gender perspective, gender-based crimes and sexual violence.

141. Informing expectations and providing some legal certainty on the restorative approach of the JEP is important, but boundaries need to be clear on what a process can and cannot provide. Having complementary processes in place to address other needs (such as the Victims Unit and the truth commission (CEV)) and signposting participants to support services can help improve understanding and satisfaction. Restoration for victims cannot be provided through perpetrators.
Recommendations

142. The traditional and ritual practices in different contexts are cultural rooted in their experience and identity as a community. Rediscovery of traditions, usually tasked to deal with petty crime, can risk them being used by elites to achieve their political goals, instrumentalising victims and the local community or undermining their ability to effectively participate or benefit, due lack of capacity. Care must be taken in returning to a ‘traditional’ or informal form of justice through the ‘tradition’ does not really exist or has been disrupted by displacement and conflict took place and impacted through gross human rights violations where ‘the tradition’ does not exist or has been disrupted by displacement and victims, allowing them to participate and develop a sense of ownership of the restoration, that indigenous practices are not appropriated without consent or used in a manner that insidiously extends state power in a neo-colonial manner. In Colombia there are a range of existing traditional responses to crimes within Afro-Colombian communities and indigenous peoples. There are many places where conflict took place and impacted through gross human rights violations where there is value in recognising the modest contribution a restorative process in the JEP involving victims and ex-combatants can make to peace and dealing with the past. Such processes need to coordinate with other transitional justice mechanisms, and where available, processes and interactions beyond the state. Victim participation should not be framed as only forgiveness, it may need to be slowly introduced or in a staged process, as it may take time for the participants to trust the system and each other.

143. Taking a restorative justice approach can help to humanise perpetrators and victims, allowing them to participate and develop a sense of ownership of the transitional process. Yet when addressing gross violations of human rights or international crimes, the inhumanity of war that created such victims cannot be forgotten. Indeed, a restorative process should be concerned with the victim, but also in reaffirming the wrongfulness of such acts that victimised them and the broader structural causes of violence that perpetuated/continue to perpetuate violence. There is value in recognising the modest contribution a restorative process in the JEP involving victims and ex-combatants can make to peace and dealing with the past. Such processes need to coordinate with other transitional justice mechanisms, and where available, processes and interactions beyond the state. Victim participation should not be framed as only forgiveness, it may need to be slowly introduced or in a staged process, as it may take time for the participants to trust the system and each other.

144. In line with human rights and international criminal law, sentences should be proportional, with the imposition of 5-8 years sanction being conditional on individuals complying with their commitment to peace and reconciliation. Those individuals who will face the higher threshold of 8 years should be left for those who served in higher positions when international crimes were committed, thus reflecting the gravity of their crimes and superior responsibility. Seeing the harm collectively caused by different armed groups and armed forces – there is a collective and individual responsibility to acknowledge and remedy victims’ harm by the organisation and individuals involved.

145. For individual perpetrators, it may be worth them to make individual contributions to truth and acknowledgement, such as testimony on particular dates and events, but also letters of apology or information to victims. Organisations can provide a more corporate view of the collective responsibility of the group, but also make use of their organisation to collect information and for senior leaders to provide wider apologies and acknowledgements of responsibility. Protracted conflicts involve a web of responsible and victimised actors. Consideration should also be made for ex-combatants who have also been victimised by other actors to seek some form of remedy. For instance consideration should be made as to whether victimised FARC members by the state or by their own organisation should receive an apology or reparations from those responsible actors before the JEP, even though they are excluded from reparations through the Victims Unit. This speaks to reparations reaffirming the dignity and human rights of individuals no matter their background, even when they might be responsible for victimising others. It may not mean that victimised FARC members should be awarded compensation, but should receive some form of symbolic reparation through apologies and acknowledgements of responsibility. To be truly restorative, it requires seeing the conflict beyond binary black-and-white terms. If one group only carries out restoration to another in a unilateral way, it misses a deeper problem of the complex multidirectional nature of violence and the role of the state and society that allowed and justified violence to be committed with impunity.

Sentencing and alternative sanctions

146. In a system built on the foundations of restorative justice, victims’ direct and indirect participation is essential to restoring relations and helping victims and perpetrators move forward. Victims need to understand and feel that they play a central role in this system. This can also demonstrate respect and reaffirm victims’ dignity by treating them as right-holders and participants with a valuable role in the JEP.

147. It would be important for the JEP to make a list of the various opportunities that its proceedings allow victims to participate in the process, either directly or through their legal representatives or other intermediaries. It should be borne in mind the potential for victims to enhance justice and/or to benefit from such participation, and determine which of those constitute the best opportunities for participation. The JEP already contains various opportunities for victims to participate through presenting reports, using remedies, or attending some hearings. However, participation in such opportunities is of a different nature. Reports are written by a few and do not allow a direct contact between victims and the system. Provision could continue to be made throughout the process for other mediums of submitting information, such as audio recordings or videos, particularly for those

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463 McEvoy and Mallinder n.19, p632.
465 See Moffett n.405.
victims who are illiterate, disabled or elderly. Hearings are more immediate and permit victims to feel part of the system. However, the JEP should ensure that victims feel part of the justice process and that they are taken seriously and not as a validation mechanism of the system. The JEP should also adopt all necessary measures to consult victims and not to impose participation. They should be given the opportunity to say if they wish to participate, and they should be briefed on what to expect from such a process. Victims’ direct participation should not be limited to appearing at the hearing of acknowledgment of responsibility (at the Chamber of recognition of responsibility) or at the hearing where the Tribunal reads its resolution with its conclusions. Participation, in person, should precede these hearings and will help the JEP tailor justice to those most affected by these crimes, improving victim satisfaction.

148. There are a number of ways to allow victims to participate at the JEP. Restorative justice speaks of affected parties coming together in a safe environment to resolve the consequence of the crime through agreement.466 Such participation at the ICC has not been restorative given the number of victims; the position of the Court in the Hague and victim participation through lawyers. That said there are lessons to be learned from the ICC and restorative justice in terms of victim participation. Respect victims’ agency: allow them choice in how they want to be represented as far as possible, be innovative in means for them to contribute to the JEP, their engagement may be staggered to build trust and confidence that can lead up to direct engagement with perpetrators, such as written letters, recorded video statements, video-links, revealed/hidden identity and one-to-one meetings with support persons. The formality of the courtroom may not be the best space to enable victims to voice their views and concerns. The experience in other contexts, such as the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry in Northern Ireland, some victims found that appearing in a courtroom was quite formal, causing them to be nervous and not effectively articulate their views and concerns, whereas the Acknowledgement Forum, a more informal space where victims could tell their story, while helpful, made some victims feel that they were being infantilised instead of having their rights satisfied. Victim testimony can be impacted by malnourishment, impairing their memory and its cogency and completeness.467 As a result of trauma, victims may have difficulties in recollecting a full and detailed account of events.468 This is connected to the discussion above on procedural justice, in directly engaging and testifying before a court, victims need to ‘telling their stories to an engaged listener and to receive formal and informal acknowledgement’.469 Accordingly, victims appearing as witnesses to only testify and respond to questions may be counterintuitive in ensuring their views and concerns are effectively represented and heard. Victims should be able to present their voices in narrative form without interruption, before then questions being introduced, as far as possible these questions should be submitted to them beforehand to alleviate any stress on them or being ‘ambushed’ through cross-examination.

149. The JEP should avoid using or instrumentalising victims without their consent. In particular, victims should not be rolled out in front of the media in order to capture them having their first meeting with a perpetrator. The experience of the South African TRC was that these encounters worked best in private. The ‘big’ acknowledgment moment by a responsible organisation should be carefully choreographed with victims to ensure that it is with their consent and has a reparative benefit for them, and is not just about legitimising the judicial work.

150. Victim participation can help to pinpoint and correct whether or not such acknowledgments and other outcomes measures would be useful. Victims should have a choice, and be able to change this over time as far as possible. While the process can be framed as restorative, it is important to inform victims of their rights and availability of services, such as representation, counselling, protection and financial support to attend hearings. Representation should include a range of options, including in person, through a victim or community organisation designated by victims, or legal representatives. Legal aid should be provided to allow victims to avail of their legal rights. Having an internal institutional body, such as OPCV at the ICC, helps to provide general information of victims’ rights and signpost them to relevant victim associations, funding for participation in person, or other bodies, such as for reparations. Providing financial support to allow victims attend, both in terms of transport and childcare, can ensure a better engagement by those who work and have family commitments, so as not to exclude the voices of those impoverished or a gender perspective.

151. Given that the JEP will have macro-cases, and that not all victims of the atrocities will be able to participate before it, it is important that through its Secretary, the JEP takes important measures to keep all other victims informed and to create spaces where they can still feel, even if less directly, that they are also part of the process. For example, by being able to see, from abroad the acknowledgment of responsibility of perpetrators, or by having a say in relation to the types of sanciones propias that could be imposed on the perpetrators.

152. Psychosocial support for victims is vital to support them participating directly at the JEP. This should include a support person to accompany them when testifying or sharing their views and concerns, a briefing and debriefing before doing so, allowing them to take breaks when needed, and changing the format of the chamber to be more private or comfortable (i.e. removal of gowns) when dealing with vulnerable victims, such as traumatised or children victims. It may be that victims feel more comfortable speaking to staff within their own victim association, so provision should be made to hold workshops and training for victim groups to build their capacity and therefore reach of psychological support. Ideally counsellors and psychological supports staff in victim groups should be funded by the state to allow for the professionalization of such service provision. Relatedly, it would be important to monitor the way victims experience participation and restorative justice at the JEP, by doing surveys and other assessments in a periodic manner so as to be able to correct, in a timely manner, areas that are seen by victims as problematic. Such monitoring should be cognizant of victims’ expectations. As with reparations, the JEP should closely manage expectations in relation to participation to ensure that victims’ understandings of their rights to participation are in line with the JEP’s organizational practices.

466 Principles 2 and 3, UN Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters.
468 Ibid, p324.
469 Ibid, p332.
Strategic Principles of Participation and Reparation

153. To facilitate the monitoring of victims’ experience of the JEP’s restorative justice system, the JEP should establish strategic principles and benchmarks according to which processes can be designed and victims’ experiences measured. These principles should be of a general nature and should include both process and output/outcome-oriented indicators. Process indicators may include, for example, principles on outreach, including when to consult with victims at various stages of the JEP’s proceedings; what types of information should be provided when victims consult with victims at various aspects of the JEP’s work, including alternative sanctions. Process indicators should also include when and how to coordinate with civil society. Having such clear indicators and principles can help to give victim participation at the JEP more coherence and clarity to victims and the public on what to be expected.

154. Output/outcome indicators should identify the general impact which the JEP hopes to achieve if such processes work as planned. These may include both objective indicators, such as a number or percentage of victims who participate at various stages, as well as subjective indicators, such as the “feeling of being repaired”, victims’ satisfaction, and the successful management of expectations. Such principles will facilitate the JEP’s monitoring of its work and help keep it accountable to its various stakeholders, most importantly victims of the armed conflict. These principles should also enable internal coordination and planning within the organization and across its various units and offices and facilitate the public identify “One JEP” in communities.

Outreach

155. To increase awareness of victims’ rights to participation and repairation, the JEP should develop outreach strategies and mechanisms that will facilitate its communication with victims and communities at the territorial level. This will support the organizational processes through which victims can access the JEP and bolster its key pedagogical role within the Sistema integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y no Repetición. Furthermore, providing clear and objective information about its activities and victims’ rights at various stages, will also provide a valuable counterweight to external accounts that seek to politicize and/ or weaken the JEP’s standing. Outreach materials should be simple and accessible and provide a realistic understanding of the SIVJRR, the JEP’s place within it, how the JEP works as an organization and how its various stages and processes are organized, and how victims can access it, while always taking care not to raise unrealistic expectations.

156. Outreach engagement with victims should be a two-way communication – to conduct interactive activities, to listen to victims and respond to what they are saying, and to take into account victims’ concerns. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights as stated that ‘national consultations are a form of vigorous and respectful dialogue whereby the consulted parties are given the space to express themselves freely, in a secure environment, with a view to shaping or enhancing the design of transitional justice programmes.” As such consultations are not PR exercises and are distinct from outreach, which aim to sensitize affected communities. Once institutions are legislated for, set up and operational, outreach to affected communities is key. The United Nations Secretary General notes the importance of outreach in ensuring the impact and sustainability of transitional justice institutions so that they are clearly understood and coherently communicated. Effective consultation also can contribute to the collective dimension of the right to truth for society and not just victims to be aware of the consequences of the conflict and the need to redress the suffering of those most affected.

157. Inclusion of victims requires effective outreach and even identifying and locating them, as well as consideration of those who do not want to participate and the impact their non-engagement will have on other victims, society and ex-combatants. The mix of individual and collective efforts to engage and provide information to victims and other bodies such as the truth commission, alongside community service may help to bridge this gap.

Coordination and Partnerships

158. The JEP should establish processes and principles of internal coordination as well as take full advantage of its place within the Sistema integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y no Repetición (SIVJRR) through regular and systematic coordination with the institutions of the SIVJRR and, to a more limited extent, the institutions of the broader victims’ policy in Colombia. Colombia’s implementation of justice, truth and repairation processes simultaneously through different state institutions gives it a unique place in the history of transitional justice processes. The comprehensive nature of the system gives the opportunity to provide Colombians with a holistic experience of multiple dimensions of the transitional justice “toolkit”. At the same time, it presents the risk of an uncoordinated and ad-hoc implementation at the territorial level. Victims should not be expected themselves to understand the various institutional identities and organizational realities of the different parts of the system, but rather should be presented with a holistic and coordinated response, to the extent possible. This will require coordination at multiple levels. For example, vertical coordination is necessary to streamline the JEP’s work and communication between its base in Bogotá and staff in the territories. At the same time, horizontal coordination is necessary for alignment and cooperation between organizations. Both will require specific organizational mechanisms to facilitate cooperation, communication and information sharing, such as the proposed Committee of Inter-institutional Coordination. In addition, the JEP should take full advantage of civil society to extend its reach to the territories and multiply its symbolic and operational presence. At the same time, experience with the ICC has shown that civil society can feel taken advantage of if not duly sensitised as to their expected roles and place in a transitional system.

472 Guidance Note of the Secretary-General, United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, March 2010, p.9.
Reparations and community service

159. Consideration needs to be made in how community service can be conducted by ex-combatants in communities affected by the conflict, which is connected to wider development programmes, without undermining employment opportunities for victims or members of the community. Specialist tasks like demining provide employment opportunities for ex-combatants, victims and other Colombians, but in itself is not reparations unless it has reparative value to victims in acknowledging and remedying their harm. It may be a stretch to think of demining as a guarantee of non-repetition. As a form of community service, demining is risky work and may be one measure of alternative sanctions. In terms of reintegration, such demining work may not provide transferable skills to another job once it is completed in a zone, but this should be the concern of the reintegration bodies that the JEP should coordinate with.

160. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace should not order reparation against perpetrators in the form of compensation. This point appears to be also settled by the decision of the Constitutional Court C-080/18. Reparations are a continuum, where at its minimalist end is about providing acknowledgement for moral harm by a responsible actor and its maximalist end is having a comprehensive reparation programme in place. The JEP is not a reparation programme and cannot replicate the work of the Unidad Victoria, nor should it. The JEP can signpost victims to other avenues for reparations and truth recovery. The JEP should learn from the lessons of the ICC, EAC and ECCC that criminal courts cannot deliver large-scale reparations. Instead the JEP needs to be modest and capitalise on its unique position of bringing for perpetrators to confront their wrongdoing to victims and society, and make community service efforts to repair some of the harm. The JEP can engage with other forms of reparation, or contribute with actions that have a reparatory effect on victims and the wider society. For example, the JEP should consider how best to use satisfaction as a form of reparation in the form of apologies or other similar acts of recognition of responsibility to dignify victims. Such acts could also be seen as acts of restitution of dignity for victims. There may also be connections between alternative sanctions and reparations in perpetrators building monuments or memorial gardens for victims with their consent.

161. The sanciones propias equally offer an important opportunity for the JEP to consider its reparatory dimension where it is directed to victimised individuals or groups. While stricto sensu they are sanctions and their primary aim is to punish the perpetrators for their wrongdoing, they could still have a reparatory dimension in particular for victimised communities, by showing atonement from perpetrators, but also demonstrate how ex-combatants can contribute to repair of some of victims’ harm, by for example building a school, a road or demining.

162. Sending individual letters of acknowledgement or apology from ex-combatants or in a compiled report by the JEP to each victim can provide symbolic recognition. The JEP can contribute a very specific form of redress to victims, but this is part of a comprehensive system. Without implementation of reparations to victims through the Unidad Victimas, victims may feel that the engagement with ex-combatants in the JEP process, while providing an opportunity for clarification of facts, apology or location of remains, may be superficial in redressing their harm and alleviate their daily consequences of the conflict and just a process to facilitate the sentence reduction and reintegration of ex-combatants.

163. The JEP could also modestly contribute more broadly to the repair system in Colombia, by supporting perpetrators to transfer assets and ensuring that they go to the Reparation Fund to provide reparation to victims under the Victims and Land Restitution Law/Peace Agreement. At the same time, the JEP should take care not to set expectations too high in areas outside of its control and jurisdiction, understanding that unmet expectations can have a significantly detrimental effect on its broader reception in the territories. It should though make links and reach memorandums of understanding with other transitional justice organisations in how best to coordinate and complement each other on reparations and alternative sanctions.

474 Report by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff, A/69/518, 8 October 2014, para 33.
Alternative Sanctions
Before The Special Jurisdiction For Peace:

Reflections on International Law and Transitional Justice

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