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Explaining patterns in the religious vote cross-nationally

Christopher D. Raymond
Lecturer in Politics
Queen's University Belfast
C.Raymond@qub.ac.uk

Abstract

What explains why some countries feature significant religious parties attracting sizable vote shares from religiously observant voters while others do not? This paper tests an argument holding that major religious parties are less likely to feature in religiously diverse countries. Drawing from the supply-side theory of religion, this argument holds that religious groups will be less likely to support parties explicitly representing religious voters and their interests and instead will support secular parties with a better chance of winning and enacting favourable policies. The analysis conducted here examines, first, whether religious or secular parties receive the plurality of the religious vote and, second, how concentrated the religious vote is on the party winning the plurality or more of the religious vote. In keeping with this argument rooted in the supply-side theory of religion, the results show that religious voters are significantly less likely to concentrate their support on religious parties as religious diversity increases.

Why do some countries feature religious parties attracting significant vote shares, while in other countries religious parties are either absent or attract trivial vote shares? Numerous studies have examined the impact of religious cleavages on voting behaviour, both in contexts with and without parties explicitly appealing to religious voters (e.g., Elff, 2007; Minkenberg, 2010; Raymond, 2011, 2018; Duncan, 2015; Knutsen, 2018). However, there is considerable variation in the strength of religious cleavages: not only is there variation in the types of parties appealing to voters along religious lines, there is also significant variation in the degree to which those parties are able to attract support from religious voters.

The presence and strength of religious parties has important consequences for understanding the conduct of politics. Most immediately, understanding whether and how religious divisions are represented in elections and by whom has important implications for explaining the outcomes of elections. Beyond the outcomes of elections, the representation of religious divisions has significant policy implications, as previous research shows that the content of political agendas pertaining to questions of morality differ significantly between those party systems in which a religious party competes and those without such a party, while the presence or absence of religious parties in legislatures and in government affects the content of morality policy (Fink, 2008; Hildebrandt, 2016; Budde et al., 2008). Thus, understanding whether and how religious divisions are represented has both important theoretical and substantive implications.

To this end, I examine two related questions in this study. First, I examine which type of party attracts the plurality of religious voters' support to better understand why significant religious parties emerge in some cases but not others. Second, I examine the degree to which parties are successful in attracting support from religious voters. This analysis is intended to

help understand why religious cleavages—whether they are represented by religious parties or not—vary in terms of the strength of the divisions among voters.

Religion and Party Systems

To understand the source of religious cleavages, one must begin by looking at social cleavage theory and its implications. Social cleavage theory argues that political parties form as an extension of the major social divisions in society. In the case of religion, where divisions in society along religious lines exist (whether between different religious groups, between religious and secular, or both types of division), Social cleavage theory argues that political parties will form to represent one side of that division. Where religious divisions in society are absent, religious parties will not take shape and voting behaviour will not divide along religious lines.

One important caveat to this argument must be made. While parties appealing exclusively to one group may form in some contexts, such parties will not compete in contexts where religious divisions can be subsumed under other, more divisive cleavages overlapping with religious cleavages. In such contexts, religion may still divide the behaviour of voters, but the interests of religious groups may be represented by parties that are secular in their orientation. This can be seen in the case of the United Kingdom, where the major parties (all secular in their political orientation) still draw support from different religious groups in much the same way as they did in the nineteenth century before the religious cleavage was overtaken by the class cleavage (Wald, 1983; Tilley, 2015).

Applied to explaining variation in the presence/absence of religious cleavages, one interpretation of social cleavage theory for understanding the development of religious cleavages holds that religious cleavages are a product of religious divisions within society. In countries

where the population can be divided between different religious groups and/or between religious and secular, religious cleavages will be present—and absent in countries where the population is religiously homogeneous. Following from that, this leads to the prediction that higher levels of religious diversity will produce more parties formed along religious lines, resulting in greater fragmentation of the vote. This leads to our first hypothesis regarding the presence/absence of religious cleavages and the fragmentation of the vote:

H1a: higher levels of religious diversity increase the chances that religious parties will be the parties receiving the largest share of the religious vote

H1b: higher levels of religious diversity increase the fragmentation of the religious vote

An alternative perspective, however, suggests that religious diversity will have the exact opposite effects. Drawing from religious markets theory (Berger 1963; Finke and Stark 1988; Iannaccone, Finke, and Stark 1997; Stark and Iannaccone 1994), an alternative argument holds that religious diversity creates incentives for religious groups to cooperate, even if this means cooperating in support of a secular party (Raymond, 2016a, 2017). The reason diversity produces political competition is because religious groups operate in two markets simultaneously: not only do religious groups care about policy, but they first and foremost compete in religious markets for adherents. Because religious identities are not fixed, religious groups are like firms in a market and must compete with other groups to attract enough adherents to survive. Because they have finite resources with which to compete, they must prioritise competition for adherents over competition for policy. When religious groups face little

competition for adherents, they are more able to expend resources on party organisations representing their particular religious group and its interests than when the religious market is more competitive. Facing greater competition, religious groups will seek to cooperate with other religious groups in support of parties representing their shared policy interests; in the most competitive situations, religious groups may even collaborate with secular groups and parties. Because higher levels of diversity represent more competitive religious markets (Finke and Stark, 1988), this religious markets-based argument predicts that religious parties will be less viable as religious diversity increases.

This religious markets-based approach yields the following hypothesis:

H2a: higher levels of religious diversity decrease the chances that religious parties will be the parties receiving the largest share of the religious vote

H2b: higher levels of religious diversity increase the concentration of the religious vote

There is also reason to believe the viability of religious parties depends on a society's level of economic development. In countries where urban-rural and class cleavages are absent, religious issues face less competition from issues reflecting these other, nonexistent cleavages. Because religious issues are more viable as political issues in these contexts, religious parties may be more willing to form. Because they face little competition from other cleavages, these religious parties will be more viable, and thus religious voters may be more willing to support a larger number of religious parties over secular alternatives.

However, as society develops—resulting in the emergence of cleavages between urban

and rural, and later between the middle and working classes (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 1970; Bartolini, 2000; Raymond, 2015b, 2016b)—issues rooted in religious cleavages face greater competition from issues emanating from these other cleavages. Facing greater competition from secular parties representing class and/or urban-rural cleavages, religious parties become less viable relative to secular alternatives on the left and right in the eyes of religious voters. This greater issue competition reduces the viability of religious parties: while a single religious party may be viable in religiously homogeneous countries, religious parties will be less viable in religiously diverse countries because the religious vote may be divided across multiple parties. Even in the absence of religious parties, religious diversity may compel religious voters to concentrate their support on fewer parties (whether these parties are religious or secular) in order to maximise the impact of their votes in a way that will force the parties they support (religious or secular) to provide policy concessions in exchange for their support.

This discussion yields the following hypotheses pertaining to the ways in which the effects of religious diversity on patterns in the religious vote may be conditional on countries' levels of socioeconomic development:

H3: the effects of religious diversity will be conditional on countries' levels of socioeconomic development

H3a: religious diversity will lead voters to be less likely to side with religious parties over secular parties as socioeconomic development increases

H3b: religious diversity will increasingly results in greater concentration of the religious vote on

the party winning the plurality of the religious vote as socioeconomic development increases

Research Strategy

To understand variation in the representation of religious groups in elections, I examine two dependent variables. One variable measures the type of party that attracts the plurality of the religious vote. Examining this variable allows us to determine in which countries religious parties—as opposed to secular alternatives competing for the support of religious voters (though not necessarily appealing to voters on religious grounds)—emerge as the principle representatives of religious groups and in which countries such parties do not feature as major players. This allows us to distinguish not only those countries in which religious parties are absent from those countries featuring a major religious party attracting high levels of support from religious voters, but also to distinguish the latter type of country from countries in which religious parties are only minor players, where such parties fail to attract the bulk of the religious vote.

The second dependent variable measures the levels of support received by the party winning the most support among religious voters. This variable allows us to differentiate parties in terms of the level of support they receive from religious voters. While a party may win the plurality of the religious vote, our perspective of how representative such a party is of religious voters and their interests might change if the party only managed to attract a small share of the religious vote instead of an overwhelming majority. The former scenario would suggest that the religious vote is open to competition and the appeals of both religious and secular parties, while the latter scenario suggests religious groups are well represented by the party winning the majority of their support.

Both the type of party winning the plurality of the religious vote and the level of support for that party are found by looking at survey data. Specifically, I use the four waves of data collected as part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project (2018). In each country (and in each election), I calculated the percentages of the religious vote supporting each party and recorded the party receiving the plurality of the vote among this group (used to measure the first dependent variable), as well as the percentage supporting this party (the second dependent variable). Following the practice of most survey-based research examining divisions between religious and secular voters (e.g., Elff, 2007; Minkenberg, 2010; Goldberg, 2019), the religious vote is defined as those attending religious services at least once per month. Because those most engaged with their religion are more likely to vote along religious lines as an extension of that commitment, this measure is preferable to simply measuring the percentage of all voters identifying with a religion yet who might not care about expressing the issue concerns associated with their religious identities. To demonstrate the robustness of the results using this definition of ‘religious’ voters, I also present the results of robustness tests using an alternative measure of support among the religious vote including all voters who identified with a religion.

After identifying which party receives the plurality of the religious vote, parties are then classified into whether the party was a religious party (coded one) or not (coded zero). Following the practice seen in previous research seeking to define religious parties (Raymond, 2019), parties were defined as religious if they met one of four criteria. First, parties winning the plurality of the religious vote were coded as religious if the religious group represented is referenced in the name of the party (e.g. ‘Christian Democrat’). Second, parties were treated as religious if they belonged to an international religious organisation (e.g. Centrist [formerly Christian] Democrat International). Third, parties were coded as religious if they were coded as

belonging to a religious party family by three leading party databases: the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al., 2001; Volkens et al., 2018), the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017), and the Parties and Elections in Europe database (Nordsieck, 2017). Finally, parties were coded as religious if their stated mission and/or organisational structure (found by consulting parties' websites) referenced the defence or representation of religion.

I examine independent variables associated with each hypothesis laid out above. To test the competing hypotheses regarding the impact of religious diversity, I include a variable measuring the effective number of religious groups. This variable is calculated using the following formula:

$$1/\sum g_i^2,$$

where g represents the share of the population belonging to each religious group i . Data for this variable are taken from Alesina et al. (2003).¹

To test the predictions associated with hypothesis 3, I include a variable measuring socioeconomic development. Specifically, I include the Index of Occupational Diversification (Vanhanen, 2003a, 2003b), which is the average of the percentage living in urban areas and the percentage employed in non-agricultural occupations. Higher values reflect higher levels of socioeconomic development (i.e. more urbanised, industrialised societies). To account for the

¹ Alesina et al. report a measure of fractionalization (F), ranging from 0 (low levels of fractionalization) to 1 (high levels of fractionalization). To transform this into an effective number of religious groups, I used the following transformation: $1/(1-F)$. To determine the robustness of this finding, I also examined models using other measures of religious diversity, including data from the World Religion Project (Maoz and Henderson, 2013), as well as the World Christian Database (Johnson and Zurlo, 2007).

possibility that the effects of religious diversity intensify as socioeconomic development increases and class and urban-rural cleavages emerge to compete with issues rooted in religious cleavages, I also include an interaction between religious diversity and occupational diversification.

In the analysis examining whether a religious party attracts the plurality of the religious vote or not, I estimate the dependent variable using logistic regression. When examining the degree to which the religious vote is concentrated on the party winning the plurality of the religious vote, I estimate this variable using beta regression given the fact this variable is measured as a proportion in which values of zero or one are not observed (Ferrari and Cribari-Neto, 2004). To address any variation in the dependent variables specific to each wave of the CSES, I included fixed effects for each wave. To account for the fact that multiple observations appear in the data set for some countries, standard errors are clustered by country.

Alternative Explanations

Before proceeding to the analysis, we need to consider the potential that the effects of religious diversity may be spurious. Several additional variables may affect the viability of religious parties and thus explain part of the variation in the representation of religious voters. One variable potentially impacting religious competition and thus affecting the viability of religious parties is the intervention of the state in support of religion. This takes the form of state-supported religion: state support for religion protects the interests of established churches and provides them with resources independent of their efforts to compete in the religious market (McCleary and Barro, 2006; Fox and Tabory, 2008; Ruiter and van Tubergen, 2009). Not only do these resources advantage established churches in the religious market by securing them from

having to compete for adherents to sustain the organisation, but freeing established churches from competition allows them to engage more easily in policy debates without having to form and maintain political parties—as their support from the state gives them privileged access to policymakers. By giving privileges to established churches, state support for religion disadvantages other religious groups, who have greater difficulty in attracting adherents in the religious market relative to established churches. Because they have to spend more resources competing with established churches to overcome their advantage in the religious market, this leaves other religious groups less able to support religious parties even in otherwise hospitable contexts for religious parties. With religious parties less viable, the support of religious voters will become concentrated on fewer parties, whether this is due to religious groups collaborating their support of one religious party representing all interests or secular parties which may be more viable.

Beyond the advantages conferred on established churches, the absence of state-supported churches may reflect church-state tensions promoting the formation of religious parties. Previous research examining the formation of religious parties in Western Europe notes that the disestablishment of churches—as part of a broader campaign of secularisation—created incentives for religious parties to form in defence of the church (Kalyvas, 1996; Ertman, 2009). Although not initially intended by the (Catholic) Church, religious parties were formed in countries where liberal state-building efforts stripped the Church of authority over education and welfare once the organisations created to oppose secularisation spilled over into politics. The spectacular success of these organisations in elections led to the formation of permanent Christian democratic political parties that rallied sizable shares of the religious vote in elections after election. To account for these possibilities, I include a variable measuring countries with a

state-supported religion (coded one, and zero otherwise).

In contrast to the impact that forces relating to competition in the religious market have on the appearance or absence of religious parties, other arguments hold that the presence/absence of religious parties depends on the demand for religion and religious politics among voters. Whereas religious markets theory holds that the impact of religion on politics depends on factors affecting the supply of and competition between religious organisations, demand-side explanations hold that the preferences and behaviour of voters explain why strong religious parties exist in some cases but not others. In particular, an application of secularisation theory (Berger, 1967; Dobbelaere, 1987; Aarts et al., 2008) would predict that as society secularise, religion becomes less important not only to daily life but politics as well. Secularisation theory has been reinforced by arguments holding that as societies develop, material concerns become less salient, and greater material security means that people have less psychic need for religion to cope with daily life; with less need for religion in daily life, religion similarly becomes less relevant in politics as well (Norris and Inglehart, 2004; see also Inglehart, 1977). Proponents of this argument cite the literature on social dealignment, which holds that the effect of religious identities on voting behaviour has weakened over time in countries around the world (Franklin, Mackie, and Valen, 1992; Dalton, 1996; Lachat, 2007; Best, 2011; Goldberg, 2019), as evidence supporting their claims. As religion becomes less influential in determining voting behaviour, religious parties become less viable as political vehicles. To account for the predictions of this literature, I include a variable measuring the percentage of the population not identifying as religious. Data for these variables are taken from McCleary and Barro (2006; McCleary, 2007).

A considerable body of research in the study of electoral systems shows that proportional representation systems facilitate the development of multiparty systems (Cox, 1997; Clark and

Golder, 2006; Rashkova, 2014; Shugart and Taagepera, 2017). This implies that religious parties may be more likely to emerge in proportional representation systems than in countries not using these systems. However, because proportional representation systems facilitate the development of multiparty systems, the religious vote may be more dispersed across several parties in proportional representation systems because multiple parties (religious and secular) may be viable and appealing in the eyes of religious voters.

These arguments are tested by including a variable measuring district magnitude, or the average number of seats elected in a constituency. Because several countries use multi-tiered systems, where voters possess one vote to elect a member in their district and a second vote to elect representatives from a party list by proportional representation, the CSES included questions measuring voters' behaviour in each tier. As a result, separate observations are recorded for each tier. For these systems, we measure district magnitude in each tier to account for the different contexts potentially affecting voting behaviour in each tier. To account for possible interaction between district magnitude and religious diversity—whereby the effects of religious diversity on support for religious parties and/or support for the party winning the plurality of the religious vote is weaker in higher-magnitude districts because voters in higher-magnitude districts have fewer incentives to vote strategically (McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1972; Riker, 1982; Cox, 1997)—I include an interaction term as well.

In many cases, religious diversity overlaps with other markers of identity like ethnicity. Previous research finds that ethnic diversity leads to more fragmented party systems, with more diversity leading to greater voting divisions along ethnic-group lines (Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994; Clark and Golder, 2006; Rashkova, 2014; Raymond, 2015a). In cases where ethnic diversity is high, issues of concern to religious voters must compete with ethnicity-related

concerns. When religion and ethnicity overlap, it may be easier for religious groups to align their support with the ethnic groups to which they belong: rather than supporting explicitly religious parties, religious groups will be more likely to align with secular parties of the right or left. As ethnic diversity increases—in turn, increasing competition and making parties' exclusive appeals to religious voters less viable—the pressure for religious groups to concentrate their support on the most viable party only increase. This leaves us with the predictions that religious voters will be more likely to side with leftist and rightist parties over religious parties as ethnic diversity increases, and that parties will attract larger shares of the religious vote as ethnic diversity increases. To account for this possibility, I include a variable measuring ethnic diversity. This takes the form of the effective number of ethnic groups—similar to the measure of religious diversity. Data for this variable are taken from Alesina et al. (2003), though the results are robust to the use of an alternative measure calculated using data from Fearon (2003).

An additional contextual factor that needs to be considered is the strength of leftist parties. Independently of other factors motivating their behaviour, the threat of a major leftist party winning the election may motivate some voters to behave tactically and alter their behaviour. Given that religious many voters prefer secular parties of the right over parties of the left, voters may be more motivated to vote for rightist parties over religious parties when the largest vote-winning party is a leftist. By the same token, however, other religious voters may react to the presence of major leftist parties by adopting an attitude of compromising with the likely winner on issues on which they agree so as to avoid antagonising the party and shutting out any hope of securing favourable policies. This leads to the prediction that religious voters will be more likely to vote for leftist and rightist parties than religious parties in countries where the largest party is a leftist. To test whether religious voters are more likely to vote for secular

parties when the largest party is a leftist, I include a variable coded one if the party winning the most votes (total votes, not the votes among religious voters alone) in the election is a party of the left (and zero otherwise).

An additional possibility leads us to expect that religious parties will be more likely to dominate the religious vote in more populous countries. Because previous research finds that the number of parties tends to be greater in more populous parties (Dahl and Tufte, 1973; Anckar, 2000), and because this applies to religious parties (Raymond, 2019), we might expect that religious parties will be more likely to attract more of the religious vote as population size increases. To account for this possibility, I include a variable measuring countries' populations using data from the World Bank (2017).

Finally, there may be partisan differences in the success of parties. In cases where religious parties are not tenable (or, at least, in cases where these parties do not contest elections), there is also a question as to whether religious voters will be equally willing to support secular parties. While religious voters may prefer to vote for a party appealing to them specifically, there are certainly issues on which religious groups may find agreement with the policies pursued by secular parties. While religious groups may find it easy to cooperate with secular parties in some cases, they may still prefer to vote for religious parties when they have the chance. Thus, we would expect that religious parties will attract greater shares of the religious vote than secular parties. I test whether religious parties attract more of the religious vote than secular parties by including a dummy variable coded one for when parties win the plurality of the religious vote (and zero otherwise) when predicting the concentration of the religious vote.

Table 1: Explaining Which Type of Party Wins the Plurality of the Religious Vote

Predictors	Model	
	1	2
Religious Diversity	10.31 (4.60)*	10.00 (5.67)+
Occupational Diversification	10.23 (5.11)*	7.34 (7.20)
Religious Diversity × Occupational Diversification	-15.14 (5.56)**	-14.30 (6.77)*
State-Supported Religion	-1.56 (0.66)*	-1.84 (0.84)*
% Non-Religious	1.63 (2.40)	-0.32 (3.72)
(Logged) District Magnitude	-0.35 (0.44)	-0.29 (0.40)
Religious Diversity × (Logged) District Magnitude	0.46 (0.36)	0.47 (0.35)
Ethnic Diversity	-3.30 (1.36)*	-4.01 (1.38)**
Major Leftist Party	-0.75 (0.53)	-1.43 (0.56)*
(Logged) Population	0.43 (0.25)+	0.70 (0.28)*
Constant	-11.34 (6.61)+	-15.50 (8.34)+
Measure of ‘Religious’ Voters	Attendance	Denomination
McFadden’s R ²	0.25	0.30
n (Countries)	46	46
n (Elections)	146	152

+ $p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, two-tailed tests. Entries are logistic regression coefficients (standard errors clustered by country-election). Wave fixed effects not presented here.

Explaining Which Party Wins the Religious Vote

The results of the logistic regression models predicting whether religious parties won the plurality of the religious vote appear in Table 1. While interpreting the estimated effects of religious diversity based on the results in Table 1 is made difficult by the presence of interaction terms, we can reach one conclusion based on interpretation of the coefficients: the fact the coefficients associated with the interaction of religious diversity and occupational diversification are statistically significant demonstrates that the effect of religious diversity is in fact conditional on socioeconomic development. This finding supports hypothesis 3a.


To understand the impact of religious diversity, however, we need to examine how the

estimated effects of religious diversity are conditioned by occupational diversification. To see these effects, Figure 1 presents the predicted probabilities that religious parties win the plurality of the religious vote at two different levels of occupational diversification: one holding occupational diversification at the 10th percentile, and another at the 90th percentile. All other variables are held to their median values.

At low levels of occupational diversification, the results provide support for hypothesis 1a: in these societies, religious diversity is associated with higher probabilities that religious parties will win the plurality of the religious vote. The probability that religious parties win the plurality of the religious vote in less-developed countries increases from 37 percent in countries at the lowest levels of religious diversity to 60 percent in countries at the highest levels of religious diversity when using the results from model 1 (increasing from 24 to 51 percent when using the results from model 2). This suggests that—similar to early-developing democracies in Western Europe like Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland (see Kalyvas, 1996; Ertman, 2009)—religious diversity in countries at lower levels of socioeconomic development leads to the formation of religious parties to represent cleavages dividing parties along religious lines. At higher levels of occupational diversification, however, the results provide support for hypothesis 2a, with higher levels of religious diversity reducing the probability that religious parties win the plurality of the religious vote. The probability that religious parties win the plurality of the religious vote in highly developed countries in model 1 decreases from 75 percent in countries at the lowest levels of religious diversity to 10 percent in countries at the highest levels of religious diversity. Though the decline is less dramatic when looking at the results from model 2 (decreasing from 48 to 8 percent), the decline nonetheless remains significant (statistically and substantively). In keeping with the religious markets perspective,

this suggests that as religious issues face competition from issues relating to socioeconomic development, religious groups are less likely to support religious parties, and instead look to cooperate with one another and/or with secular groups in support of common interests.

Figure 1: The Predicted Relationship between Religious Diversity and the Probability that a Religious Party Wins the Plurality of the Religious Vote



Notes: grey dots represent the predicted probabilities that a religious party wins the plurality of the religious vote in countries at the 10th percentile of occupational diversification, while black dots represent the predicted probabilities in countries at the 90th percentile of occupational diversification; bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Explaining the Concentration of the Religious Vote

The results predicting the degree of concentration of the religious vote on the party winning the plurality of the religious vote can be seen in Table 2. Though interpretation of the effects of religious diversity is complicated by the interaction term, the results indicate the

Table 2: Explaining Variation in the Concentration of Religious Voters' Support

Predictors	Model	
	3	4
Religious Diversity	-1.69 (0.50)**	-1.94 (0.63)**
Occupational Diversification	-2.05 (0.80)*	-2.44 (0.90)**
Religious Diversity × Occupational Diversification	2.05 (0.64)**	2.44 (0.74)**
State-Supported Religion	0.15 (0.13)	0.05 (0.14)
% Non-Religious	0.65 (0.48)	0.06 (0.56)
(Logged) District Magnitude	-0.16 (0.05)**	-0.13 (0.05)**
Religious Diversity × (Logged) District Magnitude	0.09 (0.04)*	0.05 (0.04)
Ethnic Diversity	0.04 (0.20)	-0.06 (0.20)
Major Leftist Party	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.09)
(Logged) Population	0.07 (0.04)+	0.02 (0.04)
Religious Party	0.27 (0.13)*	0.04 (0.12)
Constant	0.08 (1.00)	1.37 (1.19)
Measure of 'Religious' Voters	Attendance	Denomination
n (Countries)	46	46
n (Elections)	146	142


+ $p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, two-tailed tests. Entries are coefficients from beta regressions, with standard errors clustered by country-election in parentheses. Wave fixed effects not presented here.

presence of interaction between religious diversity and occupational diversification. Thus, as with Table 1 above, the results in Table 2 demonstrate that the effects of religious diversity are conditioned by countries' levels of socioeconomic development, supporting hypothesis 3b.

To evaluate hypotheses 1b and 2b, Figure 2 presents the predicted concentration of the religious vote on the party winning the religious vote. As with Figure 1 above, Figure 2 presents the predicted share of the religious vote won by religious parties at (1) the 10th and (2) 90th percentiles of occupational diversification to illustrate the impact of socioeconomic development on this relationship. As above, all other variables are held to their median values.

At low levels of occupational diversification, religious diversity is negatively associated

Figure 2: The Predicted Relationship between Religious Diversity and the Concentration of the Religious Vote on the Party Winning the Plurality of the Religious Vote



Notes: grey dots represent the predicted concentration of the religious vote on the party winning the plurality of the religious vote in countries at the 10th percentile of occupational diversification, while black dots represent the predicted concentration in countries at the 90th percentile of occupational diversification; bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

with the concentration of the religious vote. At the lowest levels of religious diversity, the party winning the most support from religious voters attracts roughly 45 percent of the religious vote. At the highest levels of diversity observed in the sample used here, that percentage drops to less than 42 percent (using the results from model 3) and less than 37 percent (using the results from model 4). Though the substantive impact seen in Figure 2 is rather weak, it nonetheless provides support for hypothesis 1b—at least at lower levels of socioeconomic development. Because religious issues face little competition from issues rooted in socioeconomic cleavages, Figure 2 suggests that, in keeping with the results seen in Figure 1, religious diversity in less-developed

economies leads to vote shares that are less concentrated on the party winning the most support from religious votes because religious voters divide their support along confessional lines in favour of multiple religious parties appealing to each group.

At high levels of socioeconomic development, however, Figure 2 shows that religious diversity is associated with higher shares of the religious vote. Moving from the lowest to the highest values of religious diversity leads to substantial increases in the share of the religious vote won by the party winning the plurality of the religious vote: while the party winning the plurality of the religious vote tends to attract around 30-35 percent of the religious vote in religiously homogeneous countries, the party winning the largest share of the religious vote tends to win between 45 and 50 percent of the religious vote in the most religiously diverse countries in the sample. Thus, the findings in Figure 2 support hypothesis 2b, suggesting that—in keeping with supply-side arguments—religious diversity leads to greater levels of cooperation across religious group lines, at least in countries at higher levels of socioeconomic development, where religious issues face greater competition from issues rooted in socioeconomic cleavages.

Conclusion

Recognising the need for more explicit comparative analysis of the presence/absence of religious cleavages, this paper has analysed cross-national variation in two properties of religious cleavages: whether the plurality of religious voters are represented by parties formed explicitly to represent religions and religious issues, and the degree of religious voters' support for the largest vote-winning party. The analysis has focused in particular on the degree to which the representation of religious cleavages is shaped by the diversity of the religious structure. While some research leads us to expect that religious diversity will increase the odds that the party

winning the largest share of the religious vote, other research rooted in the supply-side theory of religiosity leads us to expect that religious parties will be less likely to emerge as the largest vote-winner among religious voters as religious diversity increases. Likewise, while the first argument leads us to expect that religious voters will become more fragmented among multiple parties dividing the religious vote along denominational lines as religious diversity increases, the supply-side religiosity argument predicts that religious diversity will result in greater concentration of the religious vote on a single party (religious or otherwise).

This paper contributes to the comparative literature on the representation of religious cleavages by showing how the impact of religious diversity differs by level of socioeconomic development. In countries with low levels of socioeconomic development, religious diversity is associated with a greater likelihood of religious cleavages being represented by religious parties. As socioeconomic development increases, meaning that religious issues must compete with issues rooted in urban-rural and class cleavages, religious diversity becomes associated with lower likelihoods that religious cleavages are represented by religious parties. Similarly, the religious vote tends to be more fragmented in less-developed economies because religious issues face little serious competition from issues rooted in urban-rural and/or class issues. As the economy develops and urban-rural and class issues become more salient, religious groups must coordinate (with one another and/or with non-religious groups) to have their issue concerns addressed. This results in a positive relationship between religious diversity and the degree to which the religious is concentrated on the party winning the largest share of the religious vote.

The analysis conducted here has important implications for our understanding of the representation of religious cleavages. For one, the results help us to understand why the presence of religious parties dividing the religious vote along denominational lines in nineteenth

century Western Europe (e.g. Kalyvas, 1996; Tilley, 2015) has not been replicated in newer countries (e.g. Raymond, 2017). Additionally, the results help us to understand why the increasing religious diversity of many electorates in advanced industrial democracies—due largely to growing non-religious populations, but in some cases due also to the presence of new religions associated with growing immigrant populations—has not translated into greater party system fragmentation along religious lines: because religious issues have to compete with issue concerns rooted in other cleavages, religious diversity has resulted in greater concentration of the religious vote in these countries.

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