Title: INSIDE THE TENT: COMMUNITY AND GOVERNMENT IN REFUGEE CAMPS


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Camps for refugees and the internally displaced are meant to provide spaces of security for individuals and communities at their most vulnerable. They exist explicitly to provide for the survival of those in greatest need. As the Sphere Handbook\(^1\) (2011: 244) notes,

Shelter is a critical determinant for survival in the initial stages of a disaster. Beyond survival, shelter is necessary to provide security, personal safety and protection from the climate and to promote resistance to ill health and disease. It is also important for human dignity, to sustain family and community life and to enable affected populations to recover from the impact of disaster.

The hospitality provided by camps thus aims at something more ephemeral than survival, allowing recovery, providing dignity and the sustenance of ‘goods’ such as family and community. They go beyond the provision of ‘components’ displaced populations are missing; ‘Camps replicate an entire support system’ (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 115). As this suggests, programmes are increasingly being developed by those administering camps (the UNHCR and NGOs such as Oxfam) that deliberately seek to build, encourage and foster community (UNHCR, 2007: 184; 213; Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 23).

As we shall see below, such programmes can easily be dismissed as naïve and misguided, based on misunderstandings about camps and the options they allow. In contrast, I suggest that these programmes are part of wider attempts in what Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (2008: 88) would call ‘advanced liberal’ societies to use a particular construction of community in better managing, maintaining and thus securing human life. Community has become a target and tactic of forms of governmentality that do not necessarily involve the state. I am using the Foucauldian sense of this idea, where ‘governmentality’ refers to the various ways and means by which a population’s conduct is directed, managed and controlled: ‘[t]o govern, in this sense, is to control the field of action of others’ (Foucault, 2002: 341). Using community to govern has the effect of reducing the obligations of formal governmental institutions through a ‘new emphasis on the personal responsibilities of individuals, their families and their communities for their own future well-being and upon their own obligation to take active steps to secure this’ (Rose, 1996: 327-8). Thus we see the rise of ‘government through community’ in ‘the instrumentalization of personal allegiances

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\(^1\) The Sphere Project was set up by NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in 1997 to ‘develop a set of universal minimum standards in core areas of humanitarian response’ (2011, ii). The result is the Handbook, the third edition of which I refer to here.
and active responsibilities (Rose, 1996: 332; Rose, 1999: 176; Miller and Rose, 2008: 90). This article argues that community has now also become a tactic of government used to secure life within the spatial technology of the refugee camp.

Far from being the exception that is becoming the rule (Diken and Lautsen, 2005: 17-8; Diken, 2004), spaces of encampment for the displaced are in this sense becoming increasingly normalised. They are managed by a similar liberal rationality of government to many industrialised societies (see Duffield, 2001), using ‘security mechanisms... installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life’ (Foucault, 2004: 246; see also, Bell, 2006: 151). One of these security mechanisms is the refugee camp and I argue that one of the tactics it increasingly makes use of is a particular and highly instrumentalised account of community. Camps are thus part of wider techniques of ‘global liberal governance’ that use security as a way of creating and regulating political subjects (see Dillon and Reid, 2001; Dillon, 2004; Bell, 2006; de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008; Salter, 2008). What makes this liberal is the focus on efficiency and economy in government (Gordon, 1991: 24) – the aim of ‘governing through encouraging the autonomous existence and self-regulation of populations’ (Dillon and Reid, 2001: 47). However, community is always both more and less than what is claimed of it, whilst continually redirecting and undermining the intentions of its instrumentalisation. I argue that, as Martin Coward (2009: 80) inspired by Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, such attempts to foreclose, contain and use community are ‘only ever a covering-over, effacement or destruction (that leaves ruins and memories)’. Whilst examining the aims of the UNHCR and refugee NGOs can reveal the way community is circumscribed and used to govern, a more ontological account of community reveals it as a ‘constitutive heterogeneity that leaves any enclosure continually unravelling in the “loose ends”’ (Coward, 2009: 85). Such unravelling is revealed in the counter-conducts generated within particular camps.

The article proceeds by firstly examining the way that community has been treated in refugee camp literature, without seeing it as a tactic of government or as an ontological coexistence which resists such regulation. The second section investigates the use of community in the former sense, as a means by which displaced populations are managed and controlled within highly regulated spaces. I turn to three interrelated and cross-referential guides and handbooks on the spatial planning of these spaces: the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies (2007), the Sphere Project’s Handbook, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards for Humanitarian Response (2011),
and Oxfam/shelterproject’s *Transitional Settlement: Displaced Populations* (2005). Together, these guides form something of a manifesto or template for the government of camps through community. The final section shifts to an ontological register, examining how the attempted use of community by liberal governmentality is just one articulation of a more primordial structure of coexistence. As Nancy (1991: 58) has argued, in this understanding ‘community resists... in a sense, it is resistance itself’. The sociality of being resists its own instrumentalisation. The scripting of and government through community we see in camp spaces produces a range of unintended consequences, counter-conducts and contestations of community, security and the camps (what they mean and how they work). These are illustrated ethnographically (a way of taking the camp seriously advocated especially by Agier, 2008; 2011; Rygiel, 2012), by turning to existing work by ethnographers of three very different camps in Tanzania, Kenya and Lebanon.

**CAMPS AND THE MISSING COMMUNITY**

Many accounts of refugees and camps are understandably pessimistic with regard to community. Hannah Arendt’s famous observation that refugees are figures who have lost the right to have a right (1973: 297-8) is partly based on the fact that refugees have *lost* the protection of their state-based community. But while refugees who are permanently resettled have the possibility of gaining the protection of a new community, those in camps are often liminal figures in an extra-territorial space, between clear-cut sovereignties (see Agier, 2011; Ramadan, 2009; 2013). Camps can form in-between places, based on land ceded or leased by the host state to the temporary jurisdiction of the international community, generally represented by the UNHCR (see UNHCR, 2011: 121, 221) or the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Such territory may be taken away at any time. This precarious insecurity is illustrated through camps’ frequent absence from official maps: the three UNHCR sites at Dadaab, despite being built almost two

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2 *Transitional Settlement* forms a set of ‘guidelines’ for agencies ‘concerned with the transitional settlement needs of displaced people and their hosts’ (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 1). The term ‘transitional settlements’ attempts to get beyond the focus solely upon ‘planned camps’ (*Ibid.: 7*), but the range of options suggested covers my broad use of the term ‘refugee camp’. This is the result of a collaborative project between Oxfam and the University of Cambridge’s shelterproject (see [www.shelterproject.org](http://www.shelterproject.org)), funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), using materials developed with NGOs such as Shelter Centre, Engineers Without Borders and Architectes Sans Frontieres (*Ibid.: x-xi*). Making constant reference to the Sphere and UNHCR Handbooks (*e.g. Ibid.: 13-14*), *Transitional Settlement* is an exemplary piece of inter-agency governmentality, involving all ‘stakeholders’ in the planning and management of the camp space (*Ibid.: 30-31*). This makes the guidelines a useful example of the way advanced liberal forms of management tend to ‘govern “at a distance”... by establishing networks, links, or partnerships with state and non-state actors’ (*Ilcan and Lacey, 2011: 51-2*).
decades ago, covering a radius of 15 kilometres and being densely populated by nearly 500,000 refugees in 2011, do not appear on authorised maps of Kenya (Agier, 2011: 135).

It is perhaps no surprise then that the work of Giorgio Agamben (1995; 1998) has provided such inspiration to scholars theorising the refugee camp as a space of sovereign power and exception producing bare forms of life that rule out political community (amongst others, see Edkins and Pin Fat, 2005; Gregory, 2007: 130-135; Hanafi and Long, 2010; Hyndman and Mountz, 2007; Orford 2007; Perera, 2002). The most extreme forms of this interpretation conceptualise camps as ‘non-places’ or ‘abstract spaces’ which ‘fail to integrate other places, meanings, traditions’ (Diken and Laustsen, 2005: 86; Diken, 2004). Upon entering one, a refugee is relieved of their identity, abandoned to a state of exception, excluded from the law (both national and international) though included by being at its mercy (2005: 84-7). Within the camp’s biopolitics of humanitarian control, refugees are reduced to a bare form of life which merely maintains and manages their raw biological existence (2005: 86; Agamben 1998: 133). Others, such as Jenny Edkins (2000; 2003), are more circumspect in generalising though she traces the ‘form of the camp’ through its Nazi incarnation, to famine camps in Africa and refugee camps in Kosovo. In each ‘we find people who are produced as bare life, a form of life that can be killed but not sacrificed, a form of life with no political voice’ (2003: 195-6; 2000: 11).

The apparent necessity of referring to Agamben in these contexts (noted by Ramadan, 2013: 67 and Owens, 2009: 567) has recently been challenged from a variety of perspectives. As Nicholas De Genova (2010: 37) argues, the gain in the currency of Agamben’s thought has ‘entailed a certain inflation and consequent devaluation’. His work is used to over-generalise, flattening important distinctions. ‘Studies of real-world refugee camps cannot be reduced to a formulaic reading of spaces of exception filled with silenced, disempowered homines sacri’ (Ramadan, 2013: 68). While Ramadan argues that this picture may work better for Western asylum detention centres (Orford, 2007; Perera, 2002; Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2005) than camps in Africa and the Middle East, it cannot account for the diverse spatialities of irregular migration and the various forces (economic, social, political, and so on) that produce camps (Agier, 2011: 39-59; Isin and Rygiel, 2007; Milner, 2011). In this sense, Agambenian exceptionalism has been criticised for being fundamentally depoliticizing and erasing socio-political struggles (Huysmans, 2008: 175), thereby replicating rather than challenging orientalist mappings (Rygiel, 2012: 808) and forming a political dead-end (Walters 2008: 193). Not only is the space of the camp inadequately represented, so is the subjectivity of the refugee which is rendered passive (Papadopoulos et al.,
2008: 199; Rygiel, 2011: 4) with little capacity for agency or resistance (Andrijasevic, 2010: 149; Papastergiadis, 2006). As William Walters (2008: 188) puts it, Agamben-inspired accounts foster ‘a rather one sided and flattened conception of migrant subjects. Things are always done to them, not by them’. It is thus difficult to see how politically useful such accounts can be (Owens, 2009: 569).

While I agree with these criticisms, this article has a slightly different concern: as well as being depoliticizing and flattening in rendering refugees and camp space, this work also appears to rule out the possibility of community within camps. Community is difficult to conceive of in a realm of pure domination and necessity and is rarely mentioned in accounts taking their lead from Agamben. However, they complement Jennifer Hyndman’s dismissal of NGO community-building projects in refugee camps. What these well-meaning programmes fail to ‘account for is that a refugee camp is not a self-identified community. It is an institution generated by the international refugee regime’ (Hyndman, 2000: 137-8). The mechanisms of discipline and ‘containment’ make camps ‘enforced “colonies,” not communities defined by voluntary association’ (2000: 140). Community here seems to demand free choice, that it be self-identifying, voluntary and self-organising, an intuition shared by others (see Franke, 2012: 19-20).

It seems that the restricting, repressive power exercised through camps means they are spaces without even the possibility of community, agency or politics (Agier, 2008: 29-30). As Edkins implies, community is something that is destroyed before one enters the camp (2000: 19) – thus, camps are necessarily spaces only of bare life without the politically qualified life possible within a community. While ‘camps as communities may be desirable, this notion of community is not viable’ (Hyndman, 2000: 143).

There are at least two major problems with this account of community. First, it ignores the fact that more is at stake in community-building programmes within camps than well-meaning failure. Rather, these programmes are generating and making use of a particular account of community for the purpose of better managing refugee conduct. As Ilcan and Lacey find in Oxfam’s poverty reduction efforts, they render ‘communities as zones for it to investigate, document, interpret, and ultimately transform, while making its members aware of their allegiance to the community’ (2011: 91). This is an instrumentalised articulation of community working as one of several tactics of government within the spatial security technology of the camp (the subject of the next section). What makes this exercise of power especially seductive is that it works with, and is parasitical upon, the normative conception of community favoured by
Hyndman, as something we can choose, engage in and work upon. It is an enticing way of managing behaviour because it works through something that even refugee camps’ critics agree is a ‘good’: community.

Second, Hyndman’s conception of community relies on individuals as initially separate from one another, who then choose to link themselves, to use their common identity markers (language, religion, culture, and so on) to produce a ‘we’, a common-being. But this account ignores the ontological relationality of being, the fact that we are never pre-social individuals who can choose whether or not to join our individual selves together. Rather, as Nancy has observed, being is always ‘being-with’ (2000: 30). We never choose to come into relation with others; rather, as singularities we ‘compair’ – we come to being with others, through our exposure to and with others (Nancy, 1991: 58). In this ontological conception, community is not something that is added to being, something an individual can elect whether or not to engage in or work on. Community is the inevitable result of the unavoidable sociality of being. I would argue that the instrumentalised account of community as an advanced liberal tactic of government is simply one articulation of a more primordial social relation. Community as necessary co-existence is thus both more and less than Hyndman’s normative conception or the Foucauldian nominalist understanding – more because it is a more originary phenomenon; less because it is not a thing, an entity, that we can lose, gain or set aside (Nancy 1991: 35). Such a fundamental relationality is arguably what the Nazi concentration camps sought to destroy; community is that which resists – hence community is resistance. As Coward (2012: 476) puts it, all attempts to articulate community in political regimes and ideas ‘are constantly being unworked by the constitutive inalienability of alterity’. Similarly, community resists and unworks attempts to use it as a tactic of advanced liberal governmentality.

But the classical conception of community as a bonding of what was separate to create something new (see Coward, 2012: 468) is shared by much of the literature critical of Agamben. In studies of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, community is sometimes referred to unproblematically (Hanafi and Long, 2010), or treated as something created by Palestinians ‘under conditions of duress’ (Sanyal, 2011: 885; see also Ramadan, 2010). Often community is understood as something the refugee or asylum seeker in a camp is necessarily excluded from as a constitutive outside (Darling, 2011: 263), though the gap may be bridged through moments or

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3 At other times Ramadan (2013: 70-73) prefers the term ‘camp-society’, a more ephemeral idea privileged precisely because it is ‘not a monolithic body with a single, pure identity’, but ‘contingent, in process’ and liminal.
practices of solidarity (Johnson, 2012: 125-6; Milner 2011: 321). At other times camps seem to be reminders ‘of what can happen when one transgresses outside the boundaries and loses their political community’ (Isin and Rygiel, 2007: 198). Elsewhere, Kim Rygiel’s fascinating work treats community as something that, though temporary, make-shift, transitory and precarious is produced by the refugees and asylum seekers she examines in Calais (2011: 10-15). Like Wallace (2008: 184), Rygiel sees irregular migrancy as potentially heralding new forms of community and resistance (2012: 814-5; 2011: 7). However, for both Rygiel and Wallace, while community appears to be a matter of cooperation and organisation, living, negotiating and even resisting together, the concept is not fully explained or interrogated.

An exception to this trend is Fiona McConnell’s work on the Tibetan ‘community-in-exile’. While at times treating this as a relatively unproblematic community (2009), her work changes when adopting a governmentality perspective on the management and control of Tibetan refugees. Here, she finds that the TGiE (the Tibetan Government in Exile) has sought to ‘foster a very particular kind of population in exile: a cohesive, united and homogenous community which shares a single national identity’ (2012: 87; 2009). While McConnell does not put it in these terms, the TGiE exercises creative power in constructing a controllable community out of diversity in order to better make its case to the international community. My argument as it proceeds in the next two sections differs from McConnell’s in two important ways. First, my focus is on the way camps are designed to work as spatial security technologies that use a series of tactics to produce and manage a population rarely subsumable under a single national identity. This is the focus of the next section. From the claim that community is being scripted and used as such a ‘mechanism of security’ (Foucault, 2007: 7) it does not however follow that I believe that community in camps as a self-organising, self-identifying homogeneity is possible. Thus, second, I question what precisely is at stake in such a conceptualisation of community, and what happens when we look at community more ontologically. In the final section I go beyond a nominalist reading to argue that community as an ontological co-existence will always resist its own instrumentalisation. Thus not only does the governmentality, or ‘the conduct of conduct’ (Gordon, 1991) within camps breed counter-conducts, community as a structure of being exceeds its being put to work in such a manner. Ethnographies of specific camps thus demonstrate how community and refugees adapt to and overflow the boundaries of their containment imposed by camps.
GOVERNING CAMPS: MOBILITY, STATISTICS AND COMMUNITY

Randy Lippert argues that the governmental rationality exercised over refugees has changed in the recent decades, from disciplinary mechanisms towards the use of modern, advanced liberal tactics (1999: 308-314). This change, which can be characterised as a partial and incomplete movement from camps as spaces of discipline to spaces of security (see Foucault, 2007: 1-27), reflects changes in the way other spheres were governed in industrialised societies from the 1980s, from welfare to health (see Miller and Rose, 2008).

The shift in rationalities is also visible in programs introduced in 1990 to “empower” inhabitants of refugee camps in Africa, schemes in which refugees are imagined becoming more responsible for their own relief and development and less dependent on regular aid. The resemblance here to the contemporary critique of welfare for “the poor” within nations of the modern West is remarkable (Lippert, 1999: 313).

As within Western states, it was discourses of ‘community’ which were often mobilised to carry this shift. This movement is also identified in what Ilcan and Lacey call the ‘global aid regime’ where ‘technologies of agency target the poor with programs of self-empowerment and community orientation’ (2011: 30). This section examines what I referred to in the introduction as a kind of manifesto for the management of refugee camps: a set of three interrelated and cross-referential UNHCR and NGO guides and handbooks on the planning, building and infrastructure of these spaces. Here the role of community as a tactic emerges, though not with camps ‘giving way to refugee “communities”’ as ways of both envisioning and governing the conduct of refugees’ (Lippert, 1999: 313). Rather, governmentality operates by a series of security mechanisms to optimise the lives of refugees; community becomes just one such tactic within a range of other governmental techniques. I outline how this operates to encompass community especially through two means: the production of a space in which refugees’ movement can be both encouraged and controlled; and the production and calculation of the refugees as a population through statistics and indicators.

**Spatial Control of Mobility**
Foucault argues that mechanisms of security operate by inserting the phenomena in question ‘within a series of probable events’ (2007: 6). Similarly, the attempt to map and govern the spatial mobility of refugees begins before a crisis even takes place and while the displaced are ‘in transit’:
the ‘contingency phase’ of an operation is designated the ‘period before an emergency which is yet to occur but is likely to happen’ (Corsellis and Vitalle, 2005: 41). While the ‘displaced population’ are in the process of being displaced, a phase of ‘influx management’ then governs the ‘process of supporting and guiding the transit of displaced populations away from danger, and towards appropriate TS [transitional settlement] options’ (Ibid: 357). If this mobility is correctly and pre-emptively conducted, it allows for a better ‘reception’ and securing of the displaced by ensuring sufficient capacity is available on site. But this means maintaining control of the ‘influx’ – i.e. the movement of the displaced before that movement even begins. To facilitate this, a ‘network of support and pre-registration facilities’ are erected, consisting of ‘way-stations, transit centres, and reception centres’, each with sufficient protection, capacity and clean water (Ibid: 258). A fictitious example allows this situation to be ‘mapped’ in terms of how each facility stands in relation to the others (see figure 8a, Ibid: 359). Here, the broad ‘direction of flight’ is identified by a large arrow and various paths designate where movement is safest as well as the distances involved (half a day’s walk between each facility). The ‘movements of vehicles and people should be organised into an efficient system’ at each transit point along the route (Ibid: 359).

We can see here that camps, as devices which control mobility, are extended spatially far beyond their apparent boundaries. Indeed, they arguably extend to the very moment and place of displacement. Each facility along the line of flight is individually mapped out, with areas for assembly, registration, health screening, distribution centres, food preparation, latrines, accommodation and departure. Minimum spatial standards are specified for each, with reception and transit camps requiring at least 3m² per person (though Sphere (2011: 259) suggests 3.5m²); at least 100m² per 500 people for food preparation (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 361) and at least 100 metres from accommodation to refuse disposal (Ibid: 366; UNHCR, 2007: 223). These maps are organised around small arrows that direct the movement of refugees through each facility, from their guarded entry to their guarded departure. The aim is for quick, efficient and safe circulation through each facility, allowing the ‘influx’ to be managed effectively. The UNHCR (2007: 172 – Annex 6) even provides a ‘Registration layout’ concept map, with arrows moving the refugees from their waiting areas, through ‘admissions’ to ‘registration desks’, back to waiting areas and on to the computerised data-entry and photo desk.

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4 For example of a way-station, see figure 8b (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 363); for a transit centre, see figure 8c (Ibid: 364); and for a reception centre, see figure 8d (Ibid: 366).
A great deal of advice is offered on the spatial planning and organisation of camps. It is emphasised that the creation of a ‘master plan’ is essential (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 368; UNHCR, 2007: 206). This is an overall site plan, regularly updated, marking boundaries, subdivisions, infrastructure and facilities (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 382), but also including information on the social organisation of the refugees as well as topographical and planimetric surveys (UNHCR, 2007: 215). This allows for continuity of control despite the rapid turnover of international staff. A range of minimum standards set out in each document (compared in Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 278-9), include the location and number of tap stands, latrines, showers, fire breaks, distance between buildings and blocks, number and location of refuse (Sphere, 2011: 239-59; UNHCR, 2007: 206-211). The headline figure in each case is that the minimum surface area is 45m² per person, including infrastructure and household agricultural plots (Sphere, 2004: 257; UNHCR, 2007: 210). This creates a mathematics of protection, where the size of the space is determined by the numbers to be secured. Thus, 20,000 people – and all advice is to avoid camps larger than this – generates a space whose dimensions are as follows: ‘20,000 people x 45m² = 900,000m² = 90 hectares (for example, a site measuring 900m x 1000m)’ (UNHCR, 2007: 211).

What is not really shown in these guidelines is the way that, once set up, camps work to control and limit movement. From the transit and reception centres onwards, Agier (2011: 150) notes that refugees are ‘processed’ through categorisation procedures. In multiethnic camps such as Maheba in Zambia, which expanded with a range of different ‘arrivals’ since it was ceded to the UNHCR in 1971, refugees must wait in squalid and overcrowded conditions after registration before being taken to the ‘zone’ in which they are thought to belong (Agier, 2011: 120-6; see also Malkki, 1995: 137). Even without zonal constraints, there is often highly restricted movement beyond a camp’s boundaries. While Palestinians in Lebanon have experienced both relative freedom (from 1968-75) and stark confinement (from 1982-1995) in different periods (see Peteet, 2005: 6-11), the remoteness and isolation of Mishamo in Tanzania and Dadaab in Kenya has always severely restricted mobility. Here movement is also regulated using leave passes (Malkki, 1995: 138) and identity documents (Horst, 2006: 23).

For Hyndman (2000: 140) and Agier (2008: 29), such camps cannot form communities because refugees have little control of their own movement or space. Yet these spaces and their management are, according to their guidelines, firmly structured around the maintenance and reproduction of a particular conception of community. The UNHCR specifies that the ‘basic
planning unit’ for the organisation of camps is the family, and ‘larger units’ then ‘follow the community structure’ (2007: 106 and 186). The space of a camp should be organised around ‘the smallest module, the family’ and then build up through a community (approximately 16 families, or 80-100 people), followed by a ‘block’ (16 communities), a ‘sector’ (4 blocks), and the camp as a whole (4 sectors) (Ibid: 216). Site-planning should always thus be ‘bottom up’, reflecting the wishes of the community and its need for infrastructure, rather than the desires of the administrators (Ibid: 213). Each family plot includes room for at least a kitchen garden to enable a move towards ‘self-sufficiency’ and ‘independence’ – thus we see the ‘space of government’ becomes the community, including the ‘active and responsible’ individual and family (Rose, 1996: 335). The camp’s use of community thereby embodies the ‘privatizing responsibility’ that marks advanced liberalism’s method of governing the global poor (Ilcan and Lacey, 2011: 44).

Interaction between groups is actively encouraged through spatial design, suggesting that communities ‘are not closed form, e.g. square shaped, but resembling more of an H-shape, where both sides are open for better interaction with other communities’ (UNHCR, 2007: 213). Taking all this into account then, an idealised sub-divided camp is organised with a ‘community’ at its base in Transitional Settlements (see figure 8e in Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 380). Far from making community impossible, the spatial structure of camps can go to great lengths to cultivate and capture a particular understanding of it, even with the restrictions on mobility it simultaneously enacts. Emphasis is placed on ‘rebuilding’ community and ‘community development’ (Ibid: 404-8). However, these mechanisms are also part and parcel of the second group of governmental tactics operating to control refugee camps.

**Statistically Producing and Controlling Population**

Foucault observed that governing behaviour through ‘security is exercised over a whole population’ (2007: 11). Thus, the second set of techniques for governing the security of refugees through a camp mechanism is its contribution to forming a displaced population, which can be known and controlled via its aggregation, calculation and disaggregation into different categories of subjectivity. Rather than concentrate on the individual human body alone, biopower and governmentality is ‘massifying’, focusing on phenomena that can be measured and calculated on the basis of birth rates, mortality rates, and the fertility of a population (Foucault, 2004: 243). Furthermore, biopolitical interventions are not aimed at the individual who might live, die, or give birth, but at the general level of these phenomena – modifying the morality rate or stimulating the birth rate (Ibid: 246). It is therefore not surprising that those administering camps explicitly refer to the ‘disaster-affected population’ (Sphere, 2011: 9), ‘displaced population’
(Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 1) or ‘refugee population’ (UNHCR, 2007: 73-4) as the subject of their action.

Much like the spatial tactics observed above, the production of the refugee population occurs before arrival in a camp. The ‘preparedness’ and ‘contingency’ phases of an operation are largely about the collection of information on the population to be secured (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 40-42). The connection Foucault draws between governing through biopolitical security mechanisms and populations characterised by contingency has been examined by Dillon (2007: 45-6; de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008: 523-5). Here, it is the range of population statistics and their uncertain movement that actually produces an emergency requiring the spatial technology of a camp in the first place. ‘Emergency indicators’ generate ‘crisis’ through measurements, by far the most important of which is the mortality rate. If this is greater than 2 per 10,000 of the population, per day, an emergency exists and camps may be required. Another key indicator is child nutrition – an emergency exists if there is ‘10% with less than 80% weight for height’ (UNHCR, 2007: 64 and 546). Such ‘calculative practices’ have become a hallmark of the way UN development operates more broadly (Ilcan and Philips, 2010). The aim is not to secure individual refugees; it is to ensure the morality rate falls and child nutrition rises.

The phases and spatial ordering of camps make these measurements and interventions a matter of efficient administration. Thus, ‘influx management’ demands ‘regular updating of sufficient, accurate and timely information on the size, position, and composition of the influx of displaced people’ (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 357). For this reason, each way-station, transit centre and reception centre outlined above is equipped with at least a preliminary registration capacity. Each space is a matter of care and control (Malkki, 1995: 231): offering rations, water, and a health screening; but also counting refugees to determine ‘influx rates’. Without these, camps cannot offer the security as optimisation of life that their various tactics are directed toward. Each facility keeps refugees alive while forming them as a ‘displaced population’ – a known, calculated mass. In fact, this is a never-ending construction exercise, just as registration is a ‘continuous process’ (UNHCR, 2007: 158). Registration operates through four phases, from determining the strategy; collecting information and distributing cards; computerisation using ProGres software; finally to ‘verification and updating’, which by its nature cannot end (Ibid: 162-5).

The registration and production of a population is enabled by the spatial governmental techniques outlined above. Beyond this, a key part of the registration process (phase two – the
collection of information) can only be ‘conducted on a “fixed” population. This means that the group on whom more detailed information will be collected needs to be temporarily frozen’ (Ibid: 163). Problematically, it is in the interest of refugees to be ‘unfixed’, to register several times and receive more rations; thus fixing necessitates greater coercion than normal. This traditionally operates using tokens and wrist bands (Ibid: 163), though previously fenced enclosures were used to ‘fix’ and headcount the population of Dadaab (Hyndman, 2000: 128). While those fences were ripped up by refugees, the very continuous nature of the registration process shows a more subtle subversion of these mechanisms: if the ‘fixing’ of a population were ever successful, ‘verification and updating’ would be unnecessary. In other words, its repetition as a method of control demonstrates its ineffectiveness to ensure total control. Yet security mechanisms do not aim for complete surety and mastery, but rather an average optimality, or a ‘bandwidth of the acceptable’ (Foucault, 2007: 6; see also Salter, 2008).

The production of a ‘displaced population’ is not, however, meant to be entirely ‘top-down’. Rather, much like the spatial control of mobility, it aims to involve and thereby produce community within camps. The UNHCR emphasises that a major change in protection over recent decades has been that refugees ‘must be involved at the heart of decision-making concerning their protection and well-being’ (2007: 82). Indeed, UNHCR has put in place a ‘community development approach’ which sees all displaced individuals as ‘resourceful and active partners’ in their protection (Ibid: 182). This includes their consultation on the siting of camps (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 127-8), the provision of goods (food and non-food items) and education (UNHCR, 2007: 415). The aim of such community programmes is explicitly constructive, as it is emphasised that traditional structures may have ‘broken down’, and programmes like ‘participatory assessment’ help to ‘mobilize communities’ (Ibid: 182-3).

The community-building and participative approach of UNHCR is both laudable and suspicious, in being a recognisable advanced liberal technique of government. For Ilcan and Lacey such ‘community-targeted empowerment’ (2011: 14) simply uses ‘community’ as another ‘collective label’ (like ‘villagers’ or ‘the rural poor’) allowing for more effective government (2011: 26). Certainly what aid agencies call ‘communities’ are utilised as a smaller unit of the displaced population to better control it. Thus the UNHCR’s ‘actions’ surrounding community ‘empowerment’ include gathering information on control of resources and decision-making structures in order to ‘[s]ystematize the information to build a picture of the population profile’ (Ibid: 185 and 58). However, more than just a collective label, community is used to shift
responsibility towards refugees themselves, to make them part of their own security management – the aim of mobilizing communities is explicitly so they can ‘enhance their own protection’ (2007: 183). As noted earlier, this is a tactic of government we see in industrialised states (Miller and Rose, 2008: 88), which moved away from the state provision of welfare and social security towards an emphasis on individuals and groups taking responsibility for themselves. Thus, a particular understanding of community is brought forth, or is invested with new values such that refugees can govern themselves and each other through their personal ethics, collective allegiances and obligations (Rose, 1999: 176). We can see this movement towards self-responsibilization in the recent emphasis on ‘community resilience’ in Western security strategies (see Chandler, 2012). In this sense, community is used to supplement the top-down production and control of a population, adding what Rose calls ‘ethopower’ (Rose, 2000: 1399) – working through the ethos and values of a responsible, self-governing community – to existing exercises of biopower.

Refugees are thus no longer just another ‘stakeholder’ in their own protection (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 30-31) – their constitution as a ‘community’ (within a population) allows for more control to be exerted. They become a subject of more subtle intervention. Traditional power structures within the displaced community can be utilised, but also constantly interfered with (as they are ‘not necessarily fair’ - UNHCR, 2007: 106 and 186) to suit the gender and minority concerns of the UNHCR and NGOs. Community capacities, resources and labour can be exploited to a greater degree, while ‘empowering’ refugees at the same time (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005: 195). Community ‘participation’ and ‘involvement’ becomes a matter of actively changing behaviour and habits on issues such as personal hygiene through ‘providing information to the community on life in their new situation, which may be markedly different from their previous experience’ (Ibid.: 106-7). Producing, encouraging and ‘empowering’ community is thus enfolded within wider forms of governmentality which aim to secure life and thus impinge on every element of refugee existence.

UNCONTAINABLE COMMUNITY

Drawing out these advanced forms of governmentality that make use of community in managing refugee camps is not to claim that they are entirely successful. Unlike discipline, the security mechanisms of governmentality are not solely regulating but enabling of circulation and distribution of ideas, goods and services (Elden, 2007: 565; Foucault, 2007: 44-9). Camps are
thus spaces in the sense of ‘sphere[s] of coexistence of a multiplicity of trajectories’, where previously unrelated people and things come into contact (Massey, 2005: 63; see also Ramadan, 2013). For this reason, as spaces they produce unexpected and unintentional outcomes, potential emergences of the new or novel (Massey, 2005: 71). Meanwhile, any attempt to conduct conduct will inevitably find correlative counter-conducts (Foucault, 2007: 196). As I shall examine below, just as the attempt to manage behaviour through camps utilises community, so community is a mode by which this is resisted and countered. Thus community, understood non-instrumentally as an ontological sociality, always resists and surpasses its attempted instrumentalisation.

It is questionable how such an instrumental reading of community (as a tactic of government) can work with, or alongside, a more ontological understanding (being as being-with). Foucault’s understanding of power is necessarily ‘nominalistic’ (Foucault, 1998: 93) and therefore particular, local operations of power and resistance are immanent to each other: ‘there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions’ (Foucault, 1998: 95-6). Such a locus appears to be what I am claiming for community as co-existence. However, such a role would, once again, seek to impose a purpose, teleology or programme on community and would itself be resisted. Rather, I argue that counter-conducts, as Arnold Davidson (2011: 28-30) claims, are closely connected to Foucault’s conception of ethics as an ethos – a ‘way of being’ directed towards oneself and others. The supplementation of a nominalist reading of community as a tactic of government with Nancy’s more ontological understanding thus fleshes out the originally relational aspect of an critical ethos of counter-conducts – our way of being and conducting ourselves is always a way of being-with and conducting-ourselves-with-others. Community as unavoidable sociality is thus the ethical-ontological background against which these security mechanisms, conducts and counter-conducts operate. It is not their ‘source’, but it perhaps shows that more is at stake than security as the optimization of life. While security mechanism using community aim to enhance life, Nancy’s insights suggest that being (as being-with) will always exceed the boundaries imposed upon it, revealing the unstable, insecure foundations of such security. This section examines how such resistance operates, how community in camps has undermined and countered the spatial and statistical techniques that govern through community. To do this, I turn to ethnographic accounts of refugee camps in Africa and the Middle-East. Theoretically informed studies of specific camps illustrate the ways in they can produce a range of unintended, unexpected counter-conducts. I focus on three examples of how community exceeds the borders imposed by the governmental strategies of camps: card games, social networks and the giving of meaning.
**Card Games**

Many stories of resistance appear in the form of disruptions to governmental techniques of producing a fixed population through spatial constraint and statistics. Indeed, as we saw, the very need to ‘fix’ the displaced population was in part due to resistance to calculative tactics. Thus common strategies used by refugees to secure more rations include the double-entering of names on lists, registering in more than one zone or village, adding fictional family members and declining to registers deaths and departures from the camp (Peteet, 2005: 72). It is also common for parts of a family’s rations to be sold or traded to for foods more in line with local preferences (Horst, 2006: 82-3; Agier, 2001: 152-3; Sanyal, 2011: 881-2).

More subversive, however, are what Horst calls the identity/ration ‘card games’ played by Somali refugees and Kenyan locals in and around Dadaab. Such games are a counter-conduct produced by the difficulty of fixing and restricting the identity and community of refugees. For example, when individuals and families leave the camp, it is common for them to leave their ration cards with family or friends (Horst, 2006: 94). These can then be used to increase the ration received by the remaining family, while any surplus can be traded. More importantly, the card itself can be traded at local markets for money, goods and services. Because of the access it provides to food and services, such a card is a precious commodity and sought-after by less affluent local Kenyans. Moreover, due to Dadaab’s location close to the Somali border, it is often difficult for Western authorities in the camp to distinguish between Somalis and Kenyans, let alone between refugees and non-refugees (Horst, 2006: 23). One official in Ifo camp in Dadaab claimed that of the 45,000 claiming rations, around 11,000 were local Kenyans (Horst, 2006: 95). Such manoeuvrings are not necessarily moments of solidarity between the refugee and local population (Milner, 2011; Johnson, 2012), but are counter-conducts produced by the interactions of different trajectories and circulations that camps as spaces allow and encourage.

Manipulation of control through such ‘card games’ can also increase wider mobility and the options available to refugees. Thus, a particularly prized exchange for a ration card would be for a Kenyan identity card, which allows the possibility of travel throughout Kenya. In a similar way, Malkki outlines the pragmatic and often ingenious means that Burundian Hutu ‘town refugees’ in the Kigoma region of Tanzania found of manipulating their identity – changing religion, inter-marriage, vague identity descriptors – in order to appear invisible and thereby increase their freedom (Malkki, 1995: 153-183). ‘Card games’ thus act as a metaphor for the shifting, creative
management of refugee identity and community. They indicate the way that the interactive sociality of community overflows apparent boundaries of nationality and ethnic origin as well as camps’ statistical and spatial governmental techniques.

**Social Networks and Transnational Flows**

A particularly important way in which these boundaries are exceeded is through transnational social networks and remittance flows. Peteet stresses the role that cash remittances played in the options available to Palestinians who remained in refugee camps, especially remittances sent by relatives working in oil-producing Middle Eastern states (2005: 80; 175; see also Ramadan, 2013; Doraï, 2003). These also contributed to the burgeoning global articulations of Palestinian community, for which such camps were important nodal points. However, a more developed analysis of networks and flows is offered by Horst’s examination of the Dadaab Somali refugees and their ‘nomadic heritage’.

Horst argues that Somalis have a long history of living with insecurities and have developed a set of coping mechanisms (a ‘nomadic heritage’). These involve frequent movement to greener pastures, strong social networks that entail obligations of assistance and the spreading of investments to reduce risk. She argues that these mechanisms have not only survived in the camps but have ‘now acquired a transnational character’ (Horst, 2006: 2-3). Social networks are ‘complex human relations in which individuals negotiate and at times switch (power) positions, in order to survive’ (Ibid.: 237). They function on the basis of transactions that spread information, services, and resources, beginning with family but also encompassing clan-members, neighbours and the proximate needy. Coalitions based on such networks are neither stable nor unitary but continually being built and rebuilt (Ibid.: 63-70). Such ever-shifting networks, connections and flows demonstrate the uncontainability of community, the inalienable sociality that ‘leaves any enclosure continually unravelling’ (Coward, 2009: 85). They thus counter attempts to conduct by exceeding and undoing the UNHCR’s and NGOs’ instrumental articulations of community. Neither are they formed from self-selecting individuals choosing to form a collective. Rather, such networks can sometimes help the vulnerable regardless of identity markers through systems of *qaaraan* (a sharing of expenses) or *shoolongo* (a savings and loans activity) (Ibid.: 103-4); equally they may offer no help whatsoever to the most needy (Ibid.: 74).

It is clear, however, that Somali refugees in Dadaab rely on a wider and looser sense of ‘community’ than that used by much camp literature, the UNHCR and NGOs. Importantly, this
community increasingly flows across national as well as camp boundaries. While Dadaab, like many camps, is ‘excluded and isolated… this does not inhibit transnational connections’ completely (Ibid: 123). Thus, the introduction into Dadaab, from 1998, of two technological developments, the taar and the xawilaad (electronic and radio technologies facilitating money transfer), has led to a vast increase in the flow of information and money into its camps. The xawilaad in particular is operated by, and almost solely for, the sending of Somali remittances (Ibid: 130-133). Firm statistics on remittance flows are impossible to find or research properly because taar and xawilaad operate illegally while recipients are suspicious of questions, fearing they arise from attempts to tax or inhibit such flows. Nonetheless, Horst estimates that around 10-15% of Dadaab Somalis benefit from xawilaad remittances directly, while ‘a large majority of refugees, say 70%’ benefit indirectly (Ibid: 157). These flows are used to give the displaced more options, from starting businesses or funding education to assisting others, further changing the space of Dadaab. Yet they cannot be contained or even known by the statistical and spatial mechanisms for producing and controlling refugee communities.

Giving Meaning

One of the options that transnational flows give to refugees is the ability to reinvest in the space of the camp, in terms of business and infrastructure. Such investment can add layers of meaning and markers of identity to these spaces. Camps have been described as ‘non-places’ that do not integrate other places, meanings and traditions (Diken and Laustsen, 2005: 86), yet ethnographers show that camps are spaces with a plethora of meanings, demonstrating the agency and uncontrollability of community. A beautifully description of this, which required no monetary investment whatsoever, is given by Malkki of Mishamo in Tanzania. Mishamo is a remote camp set up to protect the enormous influx of Hutus fleeing from Burundi, following successive massacres by the ruling Tutsi in 1972. In researching Mishamo, Malkki found that every aspect of the refugees’ mundane experience – from the construction of the camp itself to the daily violence and hierarchies of power, the education, agricultural production, and visits by UNHCR grandees – was examined and interpreted through the ordering device of a ‘mythico-history’ of the Burundi Hutus (1995: 54). This mythico-history recast daily life in Mishamo into a ‘constellation of meaningful relations’ surrounding concepts of good and evil, purity and corruption, which made life, space and events understandable to all (Malkki, 1995: 107).

Far from destroying meaning, Malkki argues that Mishamo’s spatial, modular form, and isolated geographical placement had the effect of nurturing, concentrating and distilling narratives into a
singular account of Hutu history. Organised as grid-like, numbered villages, connected by paths that were never entirely monitored (see maps in Ibid.: xx-xxii), it operated less like a panopticon and more like a spider’s web: the spread of information and stories along these paths meant anything happening within the space of the camp was trapped, digested and fitted into the Hutu mythico-history. For example, the visit of a UNHCR official was reinterpreted as a benign foreign power (like the Belgians before them) being tricked by the Hutu’s Tanzanian repressors (like the Tutsis before them). The ‘perpetual, self-conscious circulation of ideas and knowledge’ thus produced a very standard interpretation of exile, the camp and the Hutus place within it. While a form of community that was certainly recognisable and discernible to Western audiences (given its nationalist form), this was far from susceptible to instrumentalisation. Indeed, any innovation or event was met with suspicion and translated according to the good/evil, purity/corrupt matrix. Thus, far more than merely a ‘device of containment and enclosure’, contrary to expectation and intention the camp space ‘grew into a locus of continual creative subversion and transformation’ (Ibid.: 237).

A very different account of the production of meaning in supposedly blank spaces can be found in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon (see Peteet, 2005; Ramadan, 2010; 2013; Sanyal, 2011). Peteet’s detailed study in particular shows that not only do camps vary geographically, they also vary temporally – Shatila camp looked completely different in the initial period of exile (1948-1968), in the era of Palestinian resistance (1968-1982), and after its violent re-crafting and subjugation (1980s and 1990s). Throughout Shatila’s history (set up in 1949), ‘the spatial device of the camp simultaneously engendered transformations in Palestinian community and identity’ (Peteet, 2005: 29). Initially, meaning was given to these spaces through their organisation according to villages of origin. Thus refugees imposed ‘their own sense of spatiality on the camps, crafting a microcosm of Galilee’. Indeed, four generations on from displacement, Peteet still found children defining themselves as being from villages in Galilee they had never seen (Ibid.: 100-101). During this period the necessity of identity cards and checkpoints were also productive of lines of inclusion and exclusion which starkly reinforced the ‘placemaking’ of the refugees (Ibid.: 128).

While villages were a point of departure for placemaking, they were gradually ‘overlaid with other sorts of space’, from the institutional (distribution centres and schools) to informal social gatherings (dawaween), inter-village marriage venues, and the markets and bakeries which produced an embryonic national cuisine (Ibid.: 116-117). Layers of meaning appeared through
readopting the rural peasant Palestinians chequered head scarf (the kuffiyeh), and producing communal arts and crafts incorporating Palestinian flags and maps in jewellery and home decor (Ibid.: 149-50; Ramadan, 2013: 73). At its height, and unlike that generated in Mishamo, this resistant meaning-giving was not exclusive or nationalistic. Interactions and solidarities were formed across camp boundaries and it was rarely clear where the borders of camps like Shatila lay (Ibid.: 137). A much wider sense of community solidarity formed, encompassing Westerners working in the camps, Lebanese on the outside and those sending remittances from abroad (Ibid.: 134). This resistance would eventually be crushed by a combination of outside forces, with truly horrific results in Shatila (see Fisk, 2001: 359-400). Nonetheless, Palestinian camps in Lebanon remain perhaps the archetype of how community continually resists and exceeds the governmental strategies put in place to manage, direct and control it.

CONCLUSION

This article has argued for the need to give greater attention to the role that community plays in the government of refugee camps as well as resistance to that government. By turning our attention to this element of camps as spatial technologies of government it is revealed that they are not as exceptional as is sometimes claimed, but are increasingly governed by similar security mechanisms as advanced liberal societies. By supplementing this instrumental reading with Nancy’s ontological understanding of community as an unavoidable co-existence, however, our focus is drawn to the ways such security mechanisms are always being overturned and exceeded. This is not to say that such counter-conducts are necessarily ‘good’ or unproblematic: ‘card games’ can destabilize local populations and conditions within refugee camps; transnational remittance flows raise social tensions and inequality in camps whilst often funding armed resistance; meaning-giving led to exclusive, dangerously nationalist sentiments in Mishamo, with local resentment and the near annihilation of Shatila. The politics of community within camps are produced through this ambiguity, risk and uncertainty. Community thus has the capacity to overturn the camp as a spatial security technology. But equally its irruptive and disruptive capacity can also enable a more politically optimal form of life for refugees with greater agency, meaning and mobility gained through sharing a space of co-existence.
REFERENCES


