Ethics, power and space: International hospitality beyond Derrida


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Jacques Derrida’s writings on hospitality make him, along with Emmanuel Levinas, perhaps the concept’s foremost theorist and describe a rich textured web of paradoxes and uncertainties. While it is conventional to begin with a definition of hospitality, Derrida (2000: 6) warns us that ‘We do not know what hospitality is’, as it ‘rebels against any self-identity, or any consistent, stable, and objectifiable conceptual determination’. Yet, despite this chronic ambiguity, we are offered Derrida’s apparently un-Derridean assurance that hospitality is ethics (Derrida 1999a: 19); not just an ethics, but ethics itself (Derrida 2001: 16-7). While immensely provocative, this claim is not really unpacked nor its implications drawn out in the depth one might wish. Furthermore, Derrida links this notion of hospitality as ethics to an understanding of power and control as sovereign mastery, a link which is potentially very limiting for how we use and understand hospitality in a global context.

This article seeks to reaffirm the importance of hospitality for discussions of international ethics, but also to suggest a way in which we can push beyond the limitations imposed by Derrida. When we interrogate the implications of hospitality as ethics, we reveal a constitutive link between ethics, power and space within practices of hospitality. As it operates to form relations between self and other, inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion, those distinctions also need to be policed, managed and controlled, even after the threshold of the home is crossed. Such management and administration of hospitality takes us beyond sovereign mastery and its statist implications. Furthermore, the acts of welcoming and controlling work to produce the home itself, its spatiality (internal and external borders) and its affectivity (feelings of belonging and non-belonging). I argue that if we are to retain Derrida’s aim of transforming and improving the practice of international hospitality (2001: 22-3), we must pay attention to the ways that his assumptions are being disrupted.

The article begins by exploring what it means to say that ethics is hospitality in an international context, arguing that actual acts of hospitality can be conceived as spatial and affective relational practices. The second section outlines the implications of this claim for the power relations operating in practices of hospitality, especially those that manage the space of the home and (re)produce its affective dimensions. The third section examines what an investigation of spaces created as homes through everyday practices of international hospitality might look like, focusing on refugee camps. These are non-state, non-sovereign, extra-territorial spaces that are produced through the practice of a hospitality towards those most in need, thereby disrupting the assumptions of Derrida and international ethics regarding who/what can be a host, a home and
an agent of international ethics. I am suggesting here that Derrida’s focus on sovereign mastery tends to reinforce the instinct in international ethics to restrict the space we can see as hospitality’s ‘home’ to the state. Moving beyond sovereign mastery reveals the spaces, such as camps, that actually do much of the hosting of those who most need the safety accorded to guests. As such, I argue that a micro-ethico-politics of hospitality must become the centre of our analysis if we are to think through who, or what, is heeding the call for ‘Hospitality Now!’ And, indeed, how they might do so better.

INTERNATIONAL HOSPITALITY AND ETHICS

Hospitality can be difficult to draw out or unpack, in part because it is an ‘everyday practice’ (Still 2010: 1). It is an occurrence we all know something about as we engage in it on a daily basis, inter-personally and professionally. Like all everyday practices, hospitality is easy to overlook and consider unworthy of deeper thought and conceptualisation. This is especially the case with international ethics, the area of International Relations (IR) which examines the nature and extension of moral duties and responsibilities across, or over, international borders. Here, with some notable exceptions who are responding to the hospitality theme in cosmopolitanism and the natural law tradition (e.g. Baker 2010b, 2011, 2013; Benhabib 2004; Brown 2010; Cavallar 2002), the tendency is to ignore everyday acts, such as hospitality, as banal and secondary, favouring instead moments of crisis such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, famine or natural disaster (Onuf 1998). In contrast, Derrida’s interest in an explicitly political hospitality was always linked to the international and the restrictions of the state and citizenship within a wider world politics. We can see this, for example, in his political agitation for the so-called sans-papiers and against the attempt under French law to make a crime of hospitality being offered to potentially illegal migrants (Derrida and Roudinesco 2004: 59; Derrida 2002b: 133-144; 2005: 8-9). The exclusionary nature of the state was partial motivation for his advocacy of ‘cities of refuge’ for persecuted authors (2001: 1-25). Writing in these contexts, for him international hospitality is always urgent, it is always needed now. One cannot delay the relation to the other encapsulated in hospitality because the ‘home’ of hospitality brings with it a sense of ease, the comfort, safety and security of being at-home-with-oneself that we seem to desire. It is this idea of the ‘good’

1 The ‘international’ in international ethics causes some problems as it suggests that this area only focuses on ethical obligations between nation-states (see Bell 2010: 3-4). I am using the term in the broader sense described above as it is increasingly recognised that, under conditions of globalization, both international ethics and IR more generally must encompass a far greater range of global interactions (Bell 2010).
encapsulated by the home that makes hospitality ‘ethicity itself, the whole and the principle of ethics’ (Derrida 1999a: 50).

As Derrida outlines it most famously, ‘Insofar as it has to do with the *ethos*, that is, the residence, one’s home, the familiar place of dwelling, inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the manner in which we relate to ourselves and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners, *ethics is hospitality*’ (2001: 16-7). Thus, our home describes our *ethos*, our way of being and dwelling, our spirit and character, and as such constitutes and is constituted by our relation with otherness, that which comes from *outside*. Our welcoming of the outside into the inside involves also interpreting and constructing the outside as *outside*, as not belonging (and thus produces the inside as precisely what belongs); thus, how we welcome or choose not to welcome it is the very definition of the ethical relation (Diken and Laustsen 2005: 184). It is always a matter of ‘answering for a dwelling place, for one’s identity, one’s space, one’s limits’ (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 149).

Yet, for all the urgency of this ethics as hospitality, Derrida holds back from allowing it a stable representation as it remains forever torn between complete openness and degrees of closure. This is the divide between what Derrida calls *the* law of unconditional (unquestioning, absolutely open) hospitality and the *laws* of hospitality (with interrogation, restrictions and exclusions) in their conditional form (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 77-91). The two are both entirely distinct and yet impossible to separate – both require the other and yet are violently opposed. This is because we find that the unconditional law of hospitality, an absolute openness, is not only impossible to organise into a law or politics (Derrida 2003: 129; Derrida 1999a: 90), but even if it were to operate, it would destroy the host’s mastery of the home that makes hospitality possible in the first place (Derrida 2002a: 364). Rather than a home, we would be left with undetermined space that could offer nothing determinate, none of the ‘goods’ of hospitality such as security, sustenance and shelter. And yet, the conditional *laws* of hospitality are no solution to this problem; as conditions placed on an unconditional, they will always be contraventions, annulments of *the* Law. Indeed, in placing such conditions, these laws appear to remove themselves entirely from the realm of hospitality as such. What saves them from being merely laws (as opposed to laws of *hospitality*) is that they keep at least the thought, the reference point, of the unconditional: the absolute openness of an impossible ethics (Derrida 2003: 129).
The need to negotiate and renegotiate the relation between the law and the laws is thus at the heart of hospitality’s instability and variety. It is also in large part why Derrida warns us against attempts to tame it (Derrida 2000: 6; see also Nyers 2006: 72). Yet, in a first step ‘beyond’ Derrida, I think some attempts at determination are necessary, though also tentative, in order to ward off an expansionist approach where hospitality comes to encompass any form of potentially concrete responsibility-taking for others (e.g. Baker 2010; 2011). The problem here is caused by Derrida’s movement from dealing with hospitality as what Matei Candea (2012) calls a ‘scale-free abstraction’ (e.g. ethics/hospitality as an ‘interruption of the self’ – Derrida 1999a, 51) to a concrete action (e.g. towards the sans-papiers – Derrida 2002b; 2005) in his discussions. I would suggest that, while ethics is hospitality in an abstract sense, as it defines the ethos and its relation to the other, the concrete material practice of hospitality is only one way in which this ethos and relation is expressed. Therefore, I want to argue that concrete hospitality is a spatial, relational practice with affective dimensions; this is what makes it a complex interplay of ethics and power relations.

Hospitality is necessarily a spatial practice because it involves the crossing of borders and thresholds. It is structural, requiring an inside and an outside, and that the two be separated by more or less clearly defined boundaries (Still 2010; Germann Molz and Gibson 2007). But it also requires that the divide between the two – whether they are in the form of the walls and doors of a house, the more or less clearly defined boundaries that separate communities or cities, the borders of the state or region – be transgressed (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 47-9; Derrida 1999a: 92). That which belongs outside must be welcomed, permitted or called inside. Space is, according to Doreen Massey (2005: 71), a sphere of coexistence containing a multiplicity of trajectories, involving previously unrelated subjects and objects, people and things, coming into contact with each other. What hospitality works to do then is delimit space, tame it as a sphere of coexistence, restrict the multiplicity, regulating, filtering and channelling the trajectories and contacts that it allows; preventing the ‘bad’ trajectories, enabling the ‘good’, while missing and turning a blind eye to others.

But more than this, hospitality makes or produces a space – that space is no longer just any sphere of coexistence involving any kind of relation or contact. It makes the space your space rather than my space, and the practice of my crossing into your space is conducted on this basis. Hospitality brings a particular space into being, cordonning it off from others as this rather than that – as private rather than public, as individual rather than communal, as home rather than away, as
domestic rather than international, imbued with certain values and excluding others. The outside constitutes the inside, but the practice of hospitality ensures that this inside is not constituted as an impregnable fortress but through a permeability that both welcomes and rejects. The work of hospitality then is in both maintaining and disrupting this inside, this delimited space, by allowing the outside in. It is both consolidating and transformative (Selwyn 2000: 19). Hospitality requires a spatial relation that it also disrupts and upsets, but seeks to manage and contain, thereby constructing a highly particular, contingent and yet always contested space.

It is this spatial relation that helps distinguish the actual conduct of hospitality from other forms of ethical responsibility-taking for others. If I offer a stranger a sandwich in the street, this may be a charitable but not a hospitable gesture as it involves no crossing of spatial boundaries – indeed, we need not even touch. If I seek to resolve a fight in a public park, I may act responsibly but not hospitably, as all parties to the quarrel share a space which is not solely their own. When ‘Action Against Hunger’, or another NGO, sends food aid to a starving or malnourished population, this need involve no hospitality. When Amnesty International campaigns for the rights of those tortured by a violent regime, this may be compassionate and caring but not hospitable. If a state intervenes, militarily or otherwise, in the affairs of another sovereign state, the act may be considered right or wrong, legal or illegal, just or unjust, but it is not hospitable (indeed, it can be a violation of hospitality as a forceful incursion into another’s space). In this sense, I disagree with Gideon Baker’s (2011, 111; 2010) claim that hospitality cannot be finally separated from humanitarian intervention.

Hospitality requires the spatial boundaries that it simultaneously displaces through their crossing. It is also this spatial aspect, along with its affective dimensions, that makes hospitality a particular kind of ethics, or even, more abstractly, ethics itself. Hospitality does not take place in just any space; nor does it involve transgression of non-meaningful boundaries. What gives the space and boundaries their meaning is their affective-relational structure: they constitute lines between feelings of belonging and non-belonging, comfort and discomfort, security and insecurity, ease

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2 Even in Baker’s Levinas-inspired argument, it makes more sense to conceive of humanitarian intervention as a practice linked to justice rather than hospitality. It is also problematic that he claims the host ‘goes forth’ beyond its borders in conducting humanitarian intervention; this is to confuse being a host with being an agent: if the host leaves its home it can no longer be a host. Indeed, it often becomes a(n unwanted) guest. His argument that hospitality and humanitarian intervention are inseparable depends upon an unacknowledged move from hospitality as an abstraction (where it is completely linked to justice, responsibility and so on) to a concrete practice (where the two are distinct).
and awkwardness. The space of hospitality is the home, along with the sense of ease and comfort from being-at-home-with-oneself.

But what is a ‘home’? It is, I would suggest, spatial and structural in the way outlined above; it requires an inside and outside. But it is just as much affective, a matter of feelings and emotions (Blunt and Dowling 2006: 22), whether they be of familiarity rather than strangeness, comfort over discomfort, homelessness not unhomeliness. This fusion of the spatial, structural and affective is what makes the ‘home’ a matter of an ethos, what links it to one’s identity, making it a concept not of being alone, but of being-at-home. And of course, both the spatial and affective are relational and political. Treating the home as a product of affect does not mean we need to romanticise it as a pure, fixed and secure place of belonging, a static, ‘comforting bounded enclosure’ (Massey 1992: 12), something opposed to the ‘away’ of strangeness and danger (Ahmed 2000: 87-8; George 1996: 2). Such boundedness is always contested, as is the belonging and homeliness of its affective identity and history.

A large component of the identity of that place called home derived precisely from the fact that it had always in one way or another been open: constructed out of movement, communications, social relations which always stretched beyond it. In one sense or another most places have been ‘meeting places’: even their ‘original inhabitants’ usually came from somewhere else. This does not mean that the past is irrelevant to the identity of a place. It simply means that there is no internally produced, essential past. (Massey 1992: 14)

If we let go of ‘home’ as a stable, fixed, secure ethos and identity with an essential past, we must acknowledge that homes can never be politically neutral. They are always the product of selected inclusions and exclusions, a ‘negotiated stance’ (George 1996: 2). For me, the name of this ethico-political negotiation is hospitality, the process by which the subject produces and manages its ethos, its boundaries and openings, its spatial and affective sense of belonging and non-belonging, identity and difference.

Another crucial aspect that emerges from what Blunt and Dowling call a ‘critical geography of the home’ is that our understanding must necessarily be ‘multi-scalar’. Once we conceive of home as a ‘spatial imaginary’ (1996: 2) through which we negotiate an ethos, identity and subjectivity, we can no longer limit it to a particular scale. Imaginaries of home and home-
making negotiations occur at the level of the family, community, suburb, neighbourhood, city, nation, state, region or can be ‘located on a park bench’ (1996: 29). If home is the affective and spatial imaginary produced through the ethico-political processes and management of inclusion and exclusion (i.e. through hospitality), it cannot be restricted to one space. Should we try to limit it to a single scale, the complexity and contingency of the home would immediately deconstruct.

**POWER AND HOSPITALITY: BEYOND SOVEREIGN MASTERY?**

While Derrida’s work has been vital for drawing out the importance, urgency and contingency of international hospitality, I have suggested that we also need to be clearer than he allows in separating actual practices of hospitality from other potentially ethical conduct. But another area in which we need to push beyond Derrida’s thought is in the relation between ethics and power in practices of hospitality. Throughout his writings on the concept, Derrida frequently traces hospitality to the question of the state and the decision of the sovereign – whether the state as sovereign, resistance to the sovereign state’s hostility, or the state contesting our sovereignty over our own private home (for example, see Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 47-79; Derrida 2001: 22-23; 1999a: 20-1; 2003: 127-9; Derrida and Stiegler 2002: 17-19 and 36). This is profoundly limiting to our ability to think international ethics beyond the state, to other spaces, actors and power relations; furthermore this restriction of ethical action to a potentiality of the sovereign state subject is a common trope in the study of international politics (Jabri 1998).

A regular recurrence in Derrida is the reference to the structural linguist, Émile Benveniste, who traces the word hospitality to the Latin chain *hosti-pet*, where the notion of host and guest, *bostis* and *bospes*, links to *patis, potestas* and *ipse* (Benveniste 1973: 71; see for example, Derrida 1998: 14 and fn. 2; Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 41). In this way, hospitality is linguistically closely tied to power (*poti-, potior* – ‘to have power over something, have something at one’s disposal’ (Benveniste 1973: 74)) and self-identity (through *ipse*). The power of hospitality is treated as a specific and traditional kind of power here, that of power over, sovereign power and possession of the home and its space (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 41). Thus the power of hospitality appears to be that of ‘mastery’ (Derrida 2000: 13), mastery of the self, the self’s space and the self-same (*ipse*) (Derrida and Stiegler 2002: 111). It is about control of thresholds, of the decision to welcome or reject (Derrida 2000: 14). So the power of hospitality is the power of the male sovereign to decide on who is allowed in and to control the borders of the home, often equated
with the state, that which is self-same. In this sense, his rendering parallels the traditional IR understanding of the central characteristic of genuine (as opposed to post-colonial) states: a central sovereign authority with mastery of its borders (Jackson, 1987; Sørensen, 1997).

This sovereign power over the home is, in part, what allows the equation of hospitality as ethics described earlier. Without it, the *ethos*, the self-same, the being-at-home-with-oneself that is produced by and through the relation to otherness, is threatened and potentially void. Yet this leads to a paradoxical trait of hospitality, beautifully outlined by Derrida (2000: 14),

> It does not seem to me that I am able to open up or offer hospitality, however generous, even in order to be generous, without reaffirming: this is mine, I am at home, you are welcome in my home, without any implication of ‘make yourself at home’ but on condition that you observe the rules of hospitality by respecting the being-at-home of my home, the being-itself of what I am. There is almost an axiom of self-limitation or self-contradiction in the law of hospitality. As a reaffirmation of mastery and being oneself in one’s own home, from the outset hospitality limits itself at its very beginning, it remains forever on the threshold of itself... It becomes the threshold.

Self-mastery and sovereignty is essential and yet radically undermines hospitality. Without sovereignty, we would offer nothing to the other by welcoming them into our home, and as Derrida affirms, hospitality would be ineffective ‘without, in some concrete way, giving something determinate’ (2003: 129; 1999b: 69). But in offering something, we offer *this* but not *that*, food, but not a bed; a bed, but not the master’s bed. Free-reign over the home, a genuinely unconditional hospitality, would be to relinquish mastery, making the host the guest and the guest the host, thereby offering *nothing*, nothing that was not already the property of the other. The destabilising, indeed genocidal, effects of such an unconditional hospitality of colonial occupation have been elegantly illustrated by Gideon Baker (2010). Thus the undecidability that Derrida reveals simultaneously reverses the power of sovereign mastery, and displaces it. What we are left with is the *hôte*, that which in French means both ‘host’ and ‘guest’, but neither simply one not the other and denoting the impossibility of ‘host’ and ‘guest’ as stable, sovereign identities (Derrida 1999a: 41-2).

Derrida’s reading of hospitality thus exposes the deconstruction of sovereign mastery as it pertains to the moment, the decision, of inclusion or exclusion. It is, as he notes, a matter of
thresholds. But what becomes of the power of hospitality once this threshold is crossed? Once inside, both host and guest are destabilized. Both will perhaps seek in various ways to assert their sovereignty, but neither can successfully do so without ending the hospitable relation and casting the other out. Once the outside is inside, as it always necessarily is, how is the power of hospitality exercised to manage and control the home? How does this work to produce more or less inclusive exclusions and exclusive inclusions? What subjects or identities are enabled when ‘host’ and ‘guest’ are displaced? Does such power multiply and diffuse thresholds throughout the space of the home, or has the threshold been defused, placing it in the past?

If we are to consider the ethico-spatial power relations that are enacted in a practice of hospitality, we must consider these questions. Derrida shows some awareness of the diversity of power relations once the threshold is crossed. After claiming that ‘ethics is hospitality’ he observes that being at home with oneself ‘supposes a reception or inclusion of the other which one seeks to appropriate, control, and master according to different modalities of violence’ (Derrida 2001: 17). But his concern is with the reception and inclusion; he does not pursue what modalities of violence and power are rendered in such efforts to control. Despite this, Derrida’s focus on hospitality is neither politically neutral nor abstractly theoretical. Rather, he comes at it through the ‘burning issue’ of displaced persons and the right of asylum, his aim being to ‘understand and to transform what is going on today in our world’ (Derrida 1999b: 70). His retention of the apparently impossible unconditional hospitality alongside the conditional is born of a desire to ‘transform and improve’ the practice of hospitality (2001: 22). While I share this desire and goal, I am suggesting that he effectively imposes limits on hospitality as, firstly, largely state-based, and secondly, centred on sovereign power. He thus repeats the concerns and limitations imposed by traditional approaches to international ethics in IR, where the state forms the horizon of ethical and political imagination (see Walker, 1993). This means we cannot effectively see, understand or transform the manifold practices of hospitality in the contemporary world.

The urgency, the burning nature of the issue is undeniable. According to the UNHCR (2014: 2), an average of 32200 people per day are forced to leave their homes and seek hospitality elsewhere.³ By the end of 2013 the total number of displaced people worldwide had risen to over a record 51.2 million, up from 45.2 million the year before (UNHCR 2013),⁴ roughly equivalent

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³ It is important to bear in mind that UNHCR figures are commonly thought to be conservative (Agier 2011: 19).

⁴ The rest of the 45.2 million are made up of asylum seekers and stateless people.
to the population of Spain or South Africa. This included 16.7 million refugees and 33.3 million internally displaced (UNHCR 2014). However, despite the concentration of hospitality literature on the immigration, asylum and sanctuary policies of Western states and cities (from a variety of different perspectives, for example, see Benhabib 2004; Carens 2003; Darling 2011; Bagelman 2013), the vast majority of the displaced remain in the global south, including all the internally displaced and 80% of refugees (UNHCR 2011: 23). Yet the hospitable assistance (the concrete offer of something determinate) given to over 25 million (10.55 million refugees; 14.7 million internally displaced) of these people is not offered by a state at all, but by an intergovernmental agency, the UNHCR (2011: 7). We can perhaps begin to see how inadequate a picture is given by an approach to hospitality which takes Western states and sovereign power as its primary reference.

**PRODUCING SPACE/GOVERNING HOSPITALITY**

When we try to venture beyond the limits Derrida’s thought imposes on hospitality what becomes apparent is the way different international spaces are formed through the hospitality they offer. The most obvious instance of this continues to be the practices of modern states. As Nevzat Soguk (1999: 18) has noted, ‘The processes by which a specific figure of the refugee is obtained and institutionalized become instrumental in the practices of statecraft, working to produce, transform, and stabilize the images and identities of specific hierarchies in statist terms, such as that of citizen and refugee and of inside and outside’ (see also Doty 2003). Elsewhere, I have examined the problematic power relations involved in the creation and re-creation of global cities in the welcome they offer to cosmopolitan elites and irregular transient workers (see Bulley 2013; Bulley and Lisle 2012). However, to keep with Derrida’s theme I want to concentrate here on displaced people, a ‘guest population’ which Western states and cities, in spite of the former’s treaty obligations, are increasingly dire at welcoming. Though necessarily briefly, I want to examine the way hospitality produces and arranges the power relations of the contingent, contested spaces of refugee camps.

*Extra-Territoriality: Beyond Sovereign Power?*

Refugee camps exist to provide essential hospitality to those most in need, the survivors of war, conflict, ethnic cleansing, famine and natural disasters. As such, they offer the necessary means to sustain at least a bare form of life through offering food, water, shelter, medical aid and basic
security. This has led recent literature to argue that such camps are ‘abstract spaces’ employing biopolitical tactics to merely maintain and manage refugees’ raw biological existence (Diken and Laustsen 2005: 86; see also Edkins 2003; Hanafi and Long 2010; Perera 2002). Making use of Agamben (1995; 1998), this literature compares such camps to ‘gated communities’ in Western cities and, ultimately, Nazi concentration camps, seeking to demonstrate how ‘the Camp’ has become a zone of indistinction in which we all live (see Diken 2004). However, such a totalising framework extrapolates from the asylum reception and detention centres in Europe (Diken and Laustsen 2005: 66-91), while ignoring the fact that the vast majority of camps are situated in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, are administered by the UNHCR, and bare little relation to the camps they speak of. It also does little justice to the great diversity in the types of ‘space’ produced by the hospitality refugee camps exist to offer.

According to the UN, there are at least four major types of camp, but Agier (2011: 39-59) argues for a more analytical typology according to the type of ‘space’ they constitute. These include ‘self-organized refuges’, such as ghettos, informal camps and squats; ‘sorting centres’, such as holding, waiting zones and transit centres; ‘spaces of confinement’, such as traditionally conceived UNHCR rural settlements and refugee camps; and ‘unprotected reserves’, including camps for the internally displaced. The numbers that experience the hospitality of such spaces is impossible to estimate. But including spaces such as ‘self-organised’ camps, grim and debasing though they generally are, demonstrates the continuing agency of displaced people to disturb and unsettle the host/guest binary by themselves constructing temporary, dangerous ‘homes’. One characteristic of all camp spaces, however, is this temporality. It is purely the emergency situation (famine, conflict, war) which justify their existence, ‘but at the same time these factors tend to reproduce themselves, spreading over the long term’ (Agier 2011: 71). Indeed, this temporal ‘spreading’ can produce relative permanence, meaning fifteen years for Somalis in Kenyan camps, thirty for the Sahrawi in Algeria, or over fifty (and indefinitely) for Palestinians in various parts of the Middle East.

All such camps are spaces of exception which disrupt and displace the norms that international politics seeks to sustain, those of states, sovereignty, territory, community, temporality, ethics, rights and legality. They are marginal spaces in almost all respects. Hannah Arendt (1973: 297-8)

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5 This also works to counter the construction of refugees which analyses of bare life can sometimes contribute to. Such framings risks playing into the traditional discourse on refugees, which sees them as incapable of representing or sustaining themselves (for an excellent analysis, see Nyers 2006).
famously observed that refugees have lost the right to have a right, showing that the ‘loss of home and political status have become identical with the expulsion from humanity altogether’. Refugees who experience state-based hospitality, as per the 1951 convention, at least have the possibility of making a new home and gaining the rights that citizenship confers; those experiencing camp hospitality are limners, between jurisdictions and clear-cut sovereignties, within extra-territorial spaces that ‘do not belong to the national space on which [they are] established’ (Agier 2011: 71). Often such camps are literally at the border between two states, while the land upon which they are established has been ceded, formally or informally by the state in question (Zambia, Kenya or Guinea amongst many others) to the temporary jurisdiction of the international community, generally represented by the UNHCR.

This space can thus be reclaimed at any time by the formally sovereign host, and their precariousness is illustrated through a frequent absence from official maps (Agier 2011: 135). Equally, while traditional state sovereignty may legally still exist (as per the maps), the actual ‘hosting’ power of hospitality exercised over the space and the subjects it encompasses is precarious, contested and contingent: though generally administered by the UNHCR, it is a vast array of NGOs and charities, such as CARE, MSF or the Lutheran World Federation that process the displaced, feed them with World Food Programme provisions, and offer medical assistance, while local police in UNHCR uniforms secure the boundaries of this ‘home’. Enactions of sovereign power continue to exist at the borders of these camps – with officials’ exercising authority over decisions to include and exclude – but the sorting, managing and diffusion of refugees once over the formal threshold is exercised by a variety of agencies which perform the role of an assembled host while being themselves guests in a space to which they do not formally ‘belong’. Yet as humanitarian actors, these agencies have created the camp as a specifically humanitarian space (Yamashita 2004). They thereby manufacture their own belonging as humanitarians, administrators of humanitarianism.

**Disciplining and Governing the Displaced**

To examine how the power of hospitality operates in the extra-territorial spaces of the refugee camps, we must look therefore beyond the threshold moment of sovereign decision, here exercised by non-state officials. Doing so reveals the different technologies and tactics of power which are used to govern the identities, agency and movement of displaced people. As Liisa

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6 For a wider treatment of the global government of refugees beyond the camps, see Lippert 1999.
Malkki (1995: 300) observes, in Foucauldian terms refugee camps are ‘a technology of “care and control”’ – a technology of power entailing the management of space and movement – for “peoples out of place”. To adequately examine the way hospitality operates in such spaces, Foucault offers a more differentiated view which is explicitly tied to the production and management of space and spatial formations (see Elden 2007: 30). In his later lecture series, Foucault (2007a: 107) outlines a triangle of different power relations, involving sovereignty, disciplinary power and governmentality (‘le conduire des conduits’ – famously translated by Colin Gordon (1991: 2) as ‘the conduct of conduct’). While sovereignty is exercised over a territory, as we have seen, disciplinary power is exercised over individuals, often using space to confine and train their bodies, while governmental management takes the mass concept of ‘population’ as the focus of its ‘calculations’ and management (Foucault 2007a: 107-8). In the case of a refugee camp, the operations of all these forms of power govern its hospitality and produce its space.7

From the moment a displaced person arrives at a formal camp, then, they are ‘processed’ through transit centres where their ‘needs’ are assessed and they are categorised according to their health, mental state and ‘vulnerability’ – the mentally ill, physically handicapped, elderly, single women, single parents and children are seen as especially vulnerable (Agier 2011: 150). They then wait in often squalid and overcrowded conditions to be further processed according to their ethnicity, nationality, date of arrival and family groups, before they are taken to the various ‘zones’ of the camp where they are thought to belong.8 The various means of assessing and gathering information about the guest population of the camp are then employed to produce them as knowable subjects, segregate them and thereby fix and discipline those identities. It is not used only to determine their inclusion or exclusion from the camp, but to enable their better categorisation and thus the management of their behaviour once inside.

Through technologies of both care and control, then, international agencies produce the refugee camp as a particular kind of space, or temporary home, through an ethos of specifically humanitarian hospitality. As noted by studies of international development, an ethos of humanitarianism is one that seeks to both save lives and technocratically govern and administer

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7 Foucault (2007a: 106-8) makes clear that these three forms of power co-exist in a society, rather than one replacing the other. Thus, I am not arguing that sovereign mastery has been eliminated in refugee camps; rather, it becomes only one of the ways in which hospitality is conducted and the space and population of the camp controlled.

8 For an example of this process in the Maheba camp in Zambia, see Agier 2011: 120-126.
the behaviour and conduct of the poor and suffering around the world (Duffield 2001; Ilcan and Lacey 2013; Edkins 2000). While offering protection and a semblance of security, the managerialism of this hospitality also affectively delineates those who belong in that space (the carers and controllers) and those who do not (the cared for and controlled). To take one example, Jennifer Hyndman (2000: 128) describes how, for the duration of a refugee’s stay in Dadaab in Kenya, they were regularly subjected to headcounts, involving being rounded up into fenced lots. The information regularly gathered is then formed into ‘situation reports’, by which are meant standardized accounts – generally involving quantitative measurement and aggregate data – of the refugee population through statistics and description of camp conditions and UNHCR activity (2000: 132). This allows the space of Dadaab, and the subjects it contains, to be more easily ‘consumed’, understood and compared to other camps at the UNHCR branch in Nairobi and headquarters in Geneva (2000: 122).

At the same time, these processes of sorting and segregating materialises the space of the camp, splitting it into zones, sectors and areas where some groups belong more than others. Movement within many camps is restricted according to the zones (though this depends upon the camp), while movement beyond the confines of the camp can be entirely disallowed. Representatives of the international community (UNHCR and NGO staff), the assembled hosts, are separated in compounds, reducing or annihilating the space where hosts and guests can meet or mix (2000: 115).

However, though they may try, these forms of disciplinary and governmental management can never achieve total control and always produce resistance and counter-conducts. In Dadaab this has taken the form of boycotting or diverting food rations (Agier 2011: 152-3), tearing down the fencing enclosures used for headcounts (Hyndman 2000: 128), with refugees breaching camp boundaries to work and live in nearby towns while returning for medical and food aid, with Kenyan locals doing likewise to receive free medical care (Agier 2011: 186). New networks and circulations of political economy are thereby being enabled by these counter-conducts, and they work to reform the space of the camp (see Bulley 2014). It is useful, therefore, to ask what specific identities and forms of agency are produced and enabled by the governmentalised hospitality offered within refugee camps.

**Agency - Between Host and Guest**

Despite these acts of resistance, it can appear fairly clear who the assembled hosts (UNHCR and NGO staff) and guests (the displaced) are in many camps. While ‘hosts’ may themselves be ‘guests’ of the national territory on which the camp formally exists (Kenya, Zambia, Guinea,
etc.), the various disciplinary, governmental and sovereign powers of hospitality appear to be exercised by a particularly privileged group capable of generating their temporary belonging. Yet, when examined closely, the space of the refugee camp is riven with diverse power hierarchies, identities and relationships which are never encompassed by reductive visions of ‘host’ and ‘guest’ – the hosts are always in the process of becoming-guests, and guests becoming-hosts. Examining the way power is operating to produce these identities also allows us to identify tendencies within this practice of international hospitality which may approach the ‘transformative’ attempts to negotiate ‘better’ forms which Derrida held as his aim (1999b: 70; 2001: 22).

Hyndman’s study of Dadaab (2000: 11) thus notes a hierarchy of three identities operating on the basis of greater or lesser legal status and entitlement: the ‘sub-citizens’ at the base (generally Somali refugees), ordinary ‘citizens’ (local Kenyans who work in the camp), and ‘supra-citizens’ (the international UNHCR and NGO staff). These groups are spatially segregated, with sub-citizens in the camps (which supra-citizens cannot enter at night), citizens in nearby towns, and supra-citizens in ‘safe’ compounds outside the camps. Each are subject to their own restrictions (2000: 140). And beyond this structure, there appears a final category of the most-marginalised, most disempowered: women. The rising levels of consultation that take place between representatives of refugees and international staff (sub- and supra-citizens) are rarely if ever attended by women, who are deemed to have insufficient language skills or social status (2000: 142). Given the permanently gendered character of hospitality (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 149; Derrida 1999b: 17-18) it is unsurprising that we see a gendered power relation producing the most disempowered of ‘guests’.

Agier (2011: 139-140), in his own study of Dadaab, notes a more differentiated, four level social hierarchy within the ‘sub-citizens’ identified by Hyndman. At the top are the small number of Somali notables, the heads of clans with a superior status. A second category is formed by the ‘voluntary community workers’, refugees who gain power and influence through their proximity to international workers. Third there are the petty traders and craft workers who depend upon the first two groups for occasional employment, but are primarily reliant upon camp aid. The base of the hierarchy, and by far the most numerous group, are those who live on the minimal WFP and UNHCR aid (food, medical, care, shelter, heating and water), as well as occasional supplements from relatives outside the camp. This group has no resources of its own. However, Agier’s study, which took place ten years after Hyndman’s, illustrates how these power relations
are dynamic, evolving and re-forming on different terms, with new identities being ‘patched’ onto existing ones (Agier 2011: 142). NGOs are further complicating the picture by funding certain groups and individuals such as artisans and community workers, bringing more possibilities for income generation and challenging existing hierarchies by opposing and counterposing alternatives (2011: 144). For example, NGO workers record football matches and films which are then shown in ‘video shops’ run by Ethiopoians, Sudanese or Somalians but are frequented by all for a small fee. Similarly, coffee shops and markets have formed throughout Dadaab (2011: 134-7). Such interference and shifting of identities and power relations has been met with significant resistance in itself, yet the destabilising of the traditional power relations continue (2011: 142-4).

While there are signs of agency, shifting power relations and resistance within the space of the camp, we could also suggest that these sometimes take the form of refugees themselves seizing a sovereign power of inclusion and exclusion – becoming hosts themselves. We can see this occurring as the camps become temporally stretched, developing and sustaining themselves beyond the emergency they were set up to deal with. Agier notes that at Maheb a camp in Zambia, the first generation of arrivals had become self-sufficient by the end of the 20th century, through farming the land both they were offered and had appropriated. This commandeering of land has meant that, as the camp needed to expand, the UNHCR had to negotiate with older refugees for the opening of zones for new arrivals (Agier 2011: 120-6). The administrators could no longer simply assign that space. While this ‘sovereign’ appropriation and ‘mastery’ appears far more precarious than many of us experience over our own home (being impinged upon by a range of other actors, from Zambian authorities to UNHCR staff and other refugees), it does signify the limits which hospitality in camps can potentially reach, disrupting and destabilizing our previous conceptions of territory, community, hospitality and home. The space of the camp, its hospitality, homeliness, ethics and power relations, can thus take on a life of their own.

CONCLUSION
Derrida’s thought on hospitality is crucial to thinking through its possibilities and limits for everyday ethical practices in international politics. Yet, like international ethics more broadly, Derrida’s hospitality remains largely tied to the centrality of the state and sovereign power in focusing on the moment of inclusion and exclusion, welcome and rejection. As such, we arguably need to push hospitality to do more, to extend our understanding of the ethics and
power of hospitality in order to further Derrida’s aim of understanding, transforming and ‘bettering’ the practice of hospitality, of international ethics as hospitality.

In this article I have argued that we need to venture beyond Derrida, to think more about the interaction between ethics, power and space that both produces, and is produced through, specific practices of hospitality. To do this is to challenge and advance the way hospitality works globally. There are many directions in which we could move beyond Derrida here, from, for example, a return to Levinas from whom Derrida’s reading developed (see Baker, 2011) to a biopolitical, auto-immune reading developing on the work of Roberto Esposito (2009; 2011). In my own, more Foucauldian-inspired intervention, I have argued that we need consider, firstly, the way that practices of hospitality work to produce extra-territorial spaces of international politics beyond the state, such as the refugee camp; and secondly, how once the threshold of a homely space is crossed, different forms of power operate, supplementing and disturbing sovereign power through mechanisms of discipline and control. A greater awareness of the micro-politics of hospitality as ethics, in its everyday international enactment, is a mode of critique which displaced ‘guests’ are already conducting: modes which draw out ‘how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures’ (Foucault 2007b: 42).

There is a definite danger in such an analysis of romanticizing refugee camps, or other spaces; something which I have no desire to do. Yet, if there are tendencies towards a ‘better’ form of hospitality to be drawn out of the camps, we must attend to them with urgency. Any discussion of this ‘better’ must remain tentative as it can only ever be the product of a contingent and contextual negotiation (see Bulley, 2006). However, my wager is that ‘better’ forms would not only seek a more open welcome to the other, but also seeks to keep that welcome open once the threshold is passed. Such a negotiation between host and guest would perhaps allow the flourishing of other forms of life, association, community and home-making, without seeking to control every aspect of the other’s behaviour, thus reducing them to the same. ‘Better’ forms of hospitality would be more open to processes of hosts and guests shifting and reversing their roles. We see glimpses of such potentially transformative hospitality in spaces such as refugee camps (for an excellent example not discussed here, see Ramadan 2008), though they remain halting, temporary and all-too reversible.
REFERENCES


