DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Social Identity and the Ideology in Intergroup Conflict: The case of Northern Ireland

Gallagher, Anthony

Award date:
1986

Awarding institution:
Queen's University Belfast

Terms of use
All those accessing thesis content in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal are subject to the following terms and conditions of use

- Copyright is subject to the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988, or as modified by any successor legislation
- Copyright and moral rights for thesis content are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners
- A copy of a thesis may be downloaded for personal non-commercial research/study without the need for permission or charge
- Distribution or reproduction of thesis content in any format is not permitted without the permission of the copyright holder
- When citing this work, full bibliographic details should be supplied, including the author, title, awarding institution and date of thesis

Take down policy
A thesis can be removed from the Research Portal if there has been a breach of copyright, or a similarly robust reason.
If you believe this document breaches copyright, or there is sufficient cause to take down, please contact us, citing details. Email: openaccess@qub.ac.uk

Supplementary materials
Where possible, we endeavour to provide supplementary materials to theses. This may include video, audio and other types of files. We endeavour to capture all content and upload as part of the Pure record for each thesis.
Note, it may not be possible in all instances to convert analogue formats to usable digital formats for some supplementary materials. We exercise best efforts on our behalf and, in such instances, encourage the individual to consult the physical thesis for further information.
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGY IN INTERGROUP CONFLICT:
THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Science of the Queen's University of Belfast in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Anthony M Gallagher

Department of Psychology

October, 1986
Acknowledgements

I am grateful for the opportunity of thanking some of those people who helped in the preparation of this thesis. Special thanks must go to Dr Karen Trew who provided encouragement, advice and constructive criticism at every stage of the work. I would also like to thank Professor Ken Brown and Mr David Hale for the excellent facilities of the Department of Psychology. The staff and postgraduate students of the Department also provided, to various degrees, useful discussions and suggestions, particularly Dr Liz McWhirter and Michael O'Neill. I would also like to thank Mrs Cavanagh who typed the manuscript in a fast and efficient manner.

The subjects of the experimental studies and the political activists who agreed to be interviewed must, of necessity, remain nameless. Without their cooperation this work could not have been carried out. They have my fullest thanks for that cooperation.

While carrying out the research for this thesis I was employed as a temporary full-time research assistant in the Department of Psychology. That position, and this thesis, were made possible by a research grant from the Economic and Social Research Council.

Finally, if this thesis is to be dedicated to anyone it must be to the two favourite ladies in my life, Siobhan and Sinead.
Abstract

The aim of this thesis was to investigate the role played by Social Psychological factors in the continuing conflict in Northern Ireland. The study concentrated on the role of social identity and the interplay between competing social identities. The thesis can be divided into three sections: an historical investigation of the background to the conflict sought to trace some of the factors in the development and reproduction of contemporary social identities; a series of experimental studies, based on Tajfel's Social Identity Theory, examined the intergroup behaviour of subjects forced to choose between different identity polarities relevant to the conflict; finally, a content analysis of political party newspapers and a series of recorded interviews with political activists sought to examine in more detail the agenda and content of perceived identities and ideologies in Northern Ireland.

The historical investigation seemed to suggest that there never was a unitary 'imagined community' in the island of Ireland. It was suggested that religion and culture had, for many years, provided a basis for division on the island and that this had been exacerbated by a differential pattern of economic development between Belfast and its hinterland, and the rest of the island.

The experimental studies pointed to the plurality of social identity in Northern Ireland. These studies suggested that the identities of the two communities had a differential impact: while the identities of the minority community (Irish, Nationalist, Catholic) seemed to share an essential unity, those of the majority community (British, Unionist, Protestant) seemed to be psychologically separable.
The examination of ideology seemed to reinforce this finding: while the content analysis of the party newspapers was primarily concerned with the political agenda of the various groups examined, it did point to a range of suggested futures within the political groups of the majority community. The interview data provided further confirmation of this picture, while at the same time demonstrating the existence of an essential, if contested, nationalism among the political groups of the minority community. The notion of 'contestation for meaning' was particularly important in the analysis of the interview material: the symbols and concepts of identity had no simple manifest significance but were rather the terrain upon which different political groups attempted to fix particular meaning or significance. An important conclusion was that this contest for meaning takes place within, rather than between, the two communities in Northern Ireland.

From this analysis it was suggested that the 'problem' in Northern Ireland is deeper than simply a disagreement over the mechanisms of power or government. Rather it was suggested that there is no shared 'syntax of politics' or 'organic ideology' that might provide a common basis upon which discussion between the communities might take place: in that sense the two communities in Northern Ireland are psychologically separated to such an extent that in the public sphere of politics they act towards each other as if they spoke different languages and did not realise this fact. The implications of this for various 'solutions' to the conflict are examined.

In a more general sense the study argues for the importance of drawing upon the wider corpus of social scientific theory and
methodology if the full significance of psychological variables is to be assessed.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>(ii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>(iii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Introductory Comments</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Ireland - Aspects of Nationalism</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Ireland - Partition and Unionism</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Psychology and Northern Ireland</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: Social Identity Theory</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6: Dimensions of Division in Northern Ireland: Experimental</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studies using Identity Labels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7: Dimensions of Division in Northern Ireland: Social Perceptions</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 8: The Concept of Ideology</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 9: Party Propaganda</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 10: Case Studies in Ideology: Introduction and Context</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 11: Case Studies in Ideology: Identities and Perceptions of the</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 12: Case Studies in Ideology: Identities and Perceptions of the</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 13: Case Studies in Ideology: Psychological Themes</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 14: Identity and Ideology in Northern Ireland</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1: Details from the Experimental Booklets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2: Examples of front pages from the political party newspapers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1: Introductory Comments

"Once upon a time it befell Ailill and Medb that, when their royal bed had been prepared for them in Rath Cruachain in Connacht, they spoke together as they lay on their pillow. 'In truth, woman', said Ailill, 'she is a well-off woman who is the wife of a nobleman'. 'She is indeed', said the woman. 'Why do you think so?'. 'I think so', said Ailill, 'because you are better off today than when I married you'. 'I was better off before (marrying) you', said Medb." (O'Rahilly, 1967).

So begins the story of the cattle raid of Cooley, Tain Bo Cualnge, perhaps the best known story of the Heroic Age in Irish Celtic mythology. The story tells how an argument between the King and Queen of Connacht, Ailill and Medb, over their relative standing and worth led to a war between the armies of Connacht and Ulster. Ailill and Medb compared their worldly possessions and discovered them to be of equal match but for Findbennach, a special bull owned by Ailill that Medb could not match: "it was to Medb as if she owned not a penny of possessions since she had not a bull as great as that among her kine".

Medb attempted to restore her honour so sought advice from MacRoth, the herald to the court. MacRoth told Medb of the Donn Cualgne, a bull "even better and more excellent" than Findbennach: this Donn was to be found in the province of Ulster in the House of Daire Mac Fiachna. MacRoth was despatched to borrow the Donn for a year. Although he was received well at first and a deal struck, at a feast held that night Daire's butler overheard one of MacRoth's party suggest that Daire was lucky to be so generous, as if he had not loaned the Donn the armies of Connacht would have seized it by
force. Daire sent MacRoth and his party away empty-handed and, on making their report to Medb, it was decided to return to Cualgne with an army to seize the Donn.

The army of Medb and Ailill set out accompanied by men of Leinster and Munster and guided by exiled Ulstermen. Along the way they found their path blocked by the most famous Ulster warrior, Cu Chulainn, who asked to meet any champion from Medb's army in single-handed combat - as long as Cu Chulainn defeated the champions the army of Medb would not pass. Knowing of Cu Chulainn's strength few were willing to face him, and those who did died in the combat. The men of Ireland decided that the only warrior who had any chance against Cu Chulainn was Fer Diad - the two had shared the same fostermothers and had learnt the arts of valour and arms together. Fer Diad was initially loath to fight his foster-brother but eventually agreed to do so. They fought for days with no result until Cu Chulainn employed the sole advantage he held over Fer Diad - his possession of the ga bolga, a barbed spear held between the toes and launched with the foot. It was with the ga bolga that Cu Chulainn finally killed his foster-brother and demonstrated beyond doubt that he was the strongest warrior in all Ireland.

The story of the Tain goes on, but for the present it is Cu Chulainn that is of interest. The deeds of Cu Chulainn fill a substantial part of the story and he is, in fact, the best known character in all the stories of Irish mythology. In the nationalist tradition in Ireland Cu Chulainn was taken as the archetypal warrior: fearless and strong, an example to all Irish manhood. This image of the brave Irish warrior was symbolised in a concrete
fashion when a monument was built to the rebels of 1916 who rose against British rule in Ireland. The headquarters of the rebels had been the General Post Office in Dublin and in that building today stands a statue of Cu Chulainn, a tribute to these more recent Irish warriors.

While engaged on the present research I have twice come across small replicas of that statue of Cu Chulainn: one of these statuettes stood on the mantelpiece in the home of a Sinn Fein activist - no surprise there. Ironically the other statuette held pride of place on the desk of the 'Supreme Commander' of the Ulster Defence Association, the main loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland. While Irish Nationalists claim Cu Chulainn as the archetypal Irish warrior, the UDA rank him as one of the great Ulster warriors and, not without some justification, point to the fact that his most famous exploits, recounted in the Tain Bo Cualgne, involved him against the 'men of Ireland'. In a land where the symbols of history are perhaps more obvious than in many other, it is indeed ironic that one of the main symbols is both adopted by opposing sides and interpreted by them in entirely different ways.

The debate over the ownership of the symbols of Ireland extends beyond the warriors: the patron saint of Ireland is Saint Patrick whose day, March 17, is a public holiday in Eire. While Catholics have always assumed him to be 'one of theirs', many Protestants claim him as a reformed believer. Although Patrick lived long before the Reformation it is claimed (Barkley, 1960) that the early Celtic church, of which Patrick was a part, was in fact quite separate from Rome and Papal control. Not only is it thought to have had a semi-autonomous existence but it is also described as
more evangelical in character than the Roman church of the time and hence a precursor of the Reformation churches of Europe. It is amusing to imagine that the annual Irish-American beanfeast in New York may well be a commemoration of the world's first Protestant. In fact, the first large scale involvement of England in Ireland is related to this issue: in 1154 Pope Adrian, incidentally the only Englishman to be Pope, presented a Bill Laudabiliter to Henry II of England granting permission for an invasion of Ireland. The ostensible reason was to bring the errant Celtic church back under Papal authority. Henry duly despatched a force in 1169 - there are some Irish Nationalists who believe Ireland's 'English problem' to have begun at this time.

The debates on the theological leanings of Patrick and the early Celtic church have less importance now, but it was an important issue, at least in church circles, during the nineteenth century. During the first half of the century (mainly Protestant) antiquarians resurrected many of the symbols of old Ireland: the round-tower, the Irish wolfhound and the shamrock all became popular symbols of Victorian Ireland, while much of Irish traditional music was transcribed for the first time by these Victorian scholar-gentlemen. This antiquarian interest helped produce the situation where Pat, Taffy, Jock and John Bull, allied with their various encumbrances, all symbolised that unique relationship that was the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland - each unit had its own particular contribution; each was different from the rest; all lived in peaceful harmony together. Perhaps as part of this Victorian image-making the Church of Ireland attempted to solidify its claim to be the inheritor of Ireland's old Celtic church as opposed to the nationalist
claims of the Catholic Church. In the middle of the century this particular debate was carried out with bricks and mortar rather than speeches and pamphlets as both Churches attempted to build as many new churches as they could in the 'Irish' style rather than the 'English' style. Examples of the results can still be seen scattered around the country: the most obvious sign of one of these churches is the presence of a (usually squat) round tower on one side rather than the square, flat-topped bell tower that typified an 'English'-style church (Sheehy and Mott, 1980). This particular debate is no more and the examples that remain are mere historical curiosities. Once militant Irish Nationalism appeared in the latter part of the nineteenth century the symbols of 'Irishism' ceased to contribute to Victorian pluralism and increasingly stressed Irish separatism. Once Irish Catholics appeared to wish to break away from the United Kingdom, antiquarian interest in Ireland's past almost completely disappeared.

The contemporary debate over Cu Chulainn may be ironic, but it is not entirely new.

"Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted. The tradition of the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the minds of the living. And, just when they appear to be engaged in the revolutionary transformation of themselves and their material surroundings, in the creation of something which does not yet exist, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they timidly conjure up the spirits of the past to help them; they borrow their names, slogans and costumes so as to stage the new world-historical scene in this venerable disguise and borrowed language." (Marx, 1973).
While Marx may have been right to criticize those who attempt to reconstruct historical symbols into contemporary ideology (at one level, for example, it is possible to argue that the classical liberal state is merely an attempt to dress up a new form of class exploitation in the social and intellectual trappings of the Roman Empire) one should not underestimate the motivational force of these symbols. One example can be found in an Oral History of Belfast in the 1930s (Munck and Rolston, in press). One of the interviewees in this study had been an IRA member in the 1930s and at one stage he expressed his views on the relative merits of nationalism and socialism thus: "The strongest thing in Ireland is nationalism, I suppose its the strongest thing in the world. There's millions of men have died for nationalism in various countries, in England, in Russia, Germany and America: countless millions have died. But very few have died for socialism". In the context of this Oral History this is an interesting viewpoint particularly since the IRA at the time had an internal debate, that was later to lead to a split in the organisation, between those who proposed taking an explicitly socialist direction and those who were content to let nationalist priorities remain predominant. While the viewpoint expressed above can be argued against quite easily, there still remains something of interest in it: it is possible to understand how the ideas and symbols of nationalism can provide a stronger rallying-point than the intellectual tradition of Marxism. In this context it is interesting to note the importance of explicitly nationalist themes in the ostensibly Marxist struggle of the Vietnamese against the armies of both France and the United States of America (Karnow, 1984).
The depth of historical symbols in Northern Ireland is sometimes taken by outsiders to highlight the stupidity and bigotry of both sides: to the loyalists the calamity of 1641 and the victory of 1690 serve both as warning and guide to action in the present; to the nationalists the men of 1916 and Brian Boru's defeat of the Danes in 1014 are both part of a timeless struggle against the 'gall', the foreigner from across the sea. The derision held by outsiders is reinforced by the actual empirical fragility of so much of this historical symbolism.

Examples of this historical fragility are not difficult to find: despite the claims of Irish nationalism, Ireland has only ever comprised a unified political entity under British rule - Eoin MacNeill, the foremost intellectual nationalist of the early twentieth century, argued that although Gaelic Ireland was divided into four historical kingdoms there did reside at Tara in county Meath a High King, to whom the provincial Kings owed allegiance. In fact it would seem that internal strife was more frequent than unity, and if there was a central figure he was more likely to have had nominal rather than actual political power (Boyce, 1982). Similarly, the location of this seat at Tara actually precedes the time when Ireland was Gaelic: as the historian whose work the UDA has adopted points out, the Gaels themselves were invaders who imposed themselves on an indigenous population (Adamson, 1974).

The 'father of Irish Republicanism', Wolfe Tone, who remains today the symbol of the 1798 rebellion is often cited, with James Connolly, as the historical precursor of the socialist ideas expounded by the contemporary leadership of Sinn Fein. This is primarily due to his appeal to the 'men of no property' in Ireland
as the revolutionary force to drive English political power out of the country. In fact, Tone owed more to continental Jacobinism than to any sense of Irish nationalism and shared the anti-clericalism of the French revolutionaires he tried to recruit to his cause:

"Persecution will keep alive the foolish bigotry and superstition of any sect, as the experience of five thousand years has demonstrated. Persecution bound the Irish Papist to his priest, and the priest to his Pope... Relaxation will undo it." from 'An Argument on Behalf of Catholics in Ireland' by Wolfe Tone (Cronin and Roche, 1973).

One of the contemporary self-images of Ulster Protestants is of a hard-working pioneer race: their ancestors came from Scotland and England in the seventeenth century plantations; they worked hard to turn a relatively barren land into a rich industrial heartland, clearly distinct from the rest of Ireland - these notions seem to be common among settler nationalisms, e.g. United States and Israel. Some of these Ulster-Scots moved in the eighteenth century to the newly expanding America and demonstrated the same pioneering resolve. This spirit has been physically symbolized by recent generations in the Ulster-American Folk Park in county Tyrone. Once again the image owes more to myth than to reality - the Ulster-Scots who went to America went, to a large extent, because they had little or no attachment to Ulster as such (PRONI, Education Facsimiles 121-140; Dickson, 1966) which perhaps partially explains why the Ulster-Scots-Americans are a less vocal and public group in contemporary USA than the Irish-Americans. By the same token, differential industrialisation in Ireland, north and south, may be better explained by the possibilities available for capital accumulation and investment, itself influenced by the system of land-ownership,
rather than the inherent qualities of the pioneering Ulster-Scots compared to the workshy Catholic Irish.

That such images involve such a high level of mythology should not cause us to overly deprecate their motivational power: perhaps psychologists have less justification than most other groups for making this mistake - stereotyping may be considered objectionable and examined to display its objective inaccuracy, but psychologists are fully aware of the power of stereotyping on behaviour. Indeed, at a wider societal level it could be argued that the infatuation with symbols and evidence of 'myth as history' does not solely lie within the prerogative of such miscreants as the Irish. The 'martyrology' of the IRA may be seen as one of the emotional elements feeding the "hatred of England, often paranoid in its intensity, leading again and again to outbreaks of violence, without any clearly thought out and feasible strategy" (Report of the Committee on National and International Problems to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, 1974) but can it not be compared to that most potent symbol in contemporary states, the tomb of the unknown soldier? (Anderson, 1984). Both the martyrs of Irish Republicanism and the 'unknown soldier' symbolize the nation and the sacrifice of those of the nation for this 'imagined community'.

As is also clear, the fact that something is historically inaccurate need not take away from its popularity: as J K Galbraith points out in his memoirs:

"People have believed for four hundred years that the Armada was defeated by God and a tiny British force when, in fact, it was outgunned by ships of superior range, greater size and only slightly inferior aggregate tonnage. The myth of ruthless Nazi competence established during the war still endures." (Galbraith, 1981).
Galbraith then goes on to describe his own work on the United States Strategic Bombing Survey after the Second World War. It had been expected that since the German war economy was operating at such a high peak of efficiency, aerial bombing by the Allies had seriously damaged war production. In fact, not only was German war production less efficient that that of the Allies, if aerial bombing had any effect it was to increase production: peak production was reached in 1944 and only went down slightly in early 1945; this was possible since mass aerial bombing mainly damaged areas of civilian enterprise thus creating an army of surplus labour that could then be used in war production.

More recent historical research has pointed to other examples of such empirically fragile symbols - the Scottish kilt, for example, has only existed since the 17th century, while the rigid classification of clan tartans is even younger (Trevor-Roper, 1983); similarly, the pomp and ritual associated with the British Royal family, sometimes described as representing one thousand years of tradition, is actually of much more recent origin (Cannadine, 1983). It would seem, in fact, that the intra-national prestige of the Royal Family has risen as the inter-national prestige and influence of the British state has declined. What all these accounts emphasize is the human origin of tradition and historical symbols - they do not fall from heaven onto a predefined group of people but are created, or invented, by them in the course of social activity (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983).

The fact of historical symbolism in Northern Ireland should not then be taken as evidence of a particular level of stupidity or bigotry there: as described above, symbolism and mythology are
generally common features of the modern world. It follows from this that it is not sufficient to focus on the fact of symbolism in Ireland as if this can provide particular insights; examination of the form and role of historical symbols is what is necessary for this. Nor is it sufficient to argue, as Kee (1980) does, that the Irish are "prisoners of history", a history, moreover, that can be debunked by an objective observer. To rely solely on the empirical facts of history can ignore the role of these facts in social process, that is, the way they are understood and interpreted by people to provide a framework for the present and a guide to the future. Historians are interpreters of the past just as ordinary people are, albeit with a greater access to information: one need only compare Christopher Hill and C.S. Wedgewood on 17th century England, or Froude and Lecky on 18th century Ireland to see that.

It could be argued, in fact, that symbols, seen as images possessing a cognitive import far beyond their face-reality, have become increasingly important, in European politics at least, since the end of the Absolutist regimes from the 17th century onwards. From this time political power increasingly came to be identified with 'the people', with all the various definitions of that elastic concept, rather than an individual ruler. Before the arrival of the modern state it was religion that provided the straightforward and well-defined worldview by which people organized their lives; in the modern state political power ceased to operate from God and through one man, and tended instead to be represented, or symbolized, by the institutions of the newly centralized states. To that extent we are all in some way 'prisoners of history'. The terms of imprisonment may, of course, have differed from place to place.
While the symbols of a state and its historical mythology generally serve to bolster and stabilize the state by providing a common identity through the past and a mode of political action towards the future, where the latter is usually provided by a written constitution or, as in Britain, by the unwritten conventions of a political institution, in Northern Ireland symbol and mythology have different behavioural consequences in that they promote destabilization and themselves represent a lack of consensus. While it is these behavioural features of Northern Ireland that make it of such interest to Social Psychologists the implication is that it is better thought of relative to stable situations rather than solely on its own terms.

For the moment the most important task following this initial discussion is to set the priorities of this particular Social Psychological investigation. Taking symbol and mythology as a conceptual starting-point, this thesis intends to examine their psychological correlates both at the level of the individual and the group. At the individual level the prime focus of attention is identity, or more specifically social identity: this is considered as an image of the self in a social context; a symbol, or series of symbols, that help place the individual in a social world. The group is considered as a cognitive entity, an 'imagined community' of known and unknown others who are perceived as sharing some common interest or fate. Both levels are united in that the group, so defined, can be seen as a cognitive collectivity through which the social identity of its members is mediated. Both are described in explicitly social terms: this bias will be justified, or at least explained, in a later chapter.

Before going on to examine the impact of these psychological
forces on the people of Northern Ireland, it may be appropriate to
examine their pedigree. The next two chapters focus on some aspects
of Irish history: the first concentrates on the nationalist side and
looks at some of the developments that helped shape and encourage
this particular orientation; the second concentrates more on the
unionist or loyalist tradition and includes some brief comment on the
history of Northern Ireland itself. Of key interest in both these
chapters is the way in which two separate 'imagined communities' grew
up in Ireland: in pursuit of an understanding of this process it
was decided to look at original sources of information (e.g. public
records documents, 19th century census figures) rather than relying
solely on contemporary polemic. The result is a version of the
historical record - in the light of the above discussion it would be
disingenuous to claim it as anything else.
Chapter 2: Ireland - Aspects of Nationalism.

This chapter will examine some of the historical background to the Irish conflict; in particular it will concentrate on the growth and development of Irish nationalism. While specific sources are referred to in the text there are a number of general historical works that have been used in compiling this information: Beckett (1966) and Lyons (1974) provide two of the best known general guides to Irish history, while Fanning (1983) and Harkness (1983) provide short, but highly readable, accounts of the contemporary history of Southern and Northern Ireland with the added advantage of access to previously unpublished state papers.

Ireland's history has been dominated both by successive invasions and by its relationship to its usually more powerful neighbour. From the twelfth century onwards most of the invasions either originated from England or were carried out by England's continental enemies. Indeed some British historians have it that the last invasion of 'Britain' was the landing of General Humbert's French force in support of the United Irish rebellion in 1798. Up to the sixteenth century most of the invaders assimilated, to varying degrees, into the primarily Gaelic island where many of the old Gaelic practices and customs remained.

It was after this period that English rule became formally established throughout Ireland, a policy largely dictated by strategic considerations. Once embarked on, this policy was not long in the making: by the end of the first quarter of the seventeenth century the old system of Gaelic lordship was virtually ended
and English power dominant (Edwards, 1973). Ulster had formed the last bulwark against the English armies and suffered the plantation of a new colonial population in consequence. Arriving in successive waves, the initial being mainly Church of Ireland ('Irish' Anglican), the later Presbyterian, the planted population had to come through two major setbacks before managing to consolidate their position: the first of these occurred in the middle of the 17th century following the accession of Charles I to the English throne. Charles managed to alienate almost all the interest groups in Ireland: the old Gaelic Lords, the 'Old English' Lords and the rural peasantry; when all these groups came together in rebellion, in 1641, this proved to be one of the sparks that started the English Civil War. Lurid tales of Catholic genocide of the Protestant settlers in Ireland raised emotions in England and contributed to the parliamentary cause. Ireland was not pacified until the English Civil War itself was over and Cromwell was able to devote his energies, and armies, to the task; this expedition was opposed by one of the more radical groups within the parliamentary forces, the Levellers.

The second setback faced by the Protestant settlers in Ireland occurred within the space of fifty years. The 17th century was marked by religious wars between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, although this picture was confused by intra-Catholic rivalry. Thus by the 1680s the most powerful European state, France, stood opposed by England and the North European states (in the name of Protestantism) and by Spain and the Papacy (in the name of strategic pragmatism). Anti-Catholicism (contemporaneously known as anti-Papism) was strong enough in England to allow for the fantasies of Titus Oates to promulgate a 'Popish plot' whereby it was suggested that the
Jesuits were planning to take over the country (Kenyon, 1972). The fears generated at the time were heightened by the accession of James to the throne of England: ironically, while the allegiance of an individual could be tested by their willingness to take an oath to the Protestant Ascendancy, the King could not take an oath to himself as head of the Church of England. In a world where international diplomacy was often sealed by wedding alliances (Anderson, 1974), the fact that James was married to a foreign Catholic encouraged the idea that James himself was a secret Catholic who would subvert Protestant power and restore Papal domination over the country.

James' brother-in-law, William, was brought from Holland to restore Protestant power in England. William landed in 1688 and prepared to face James in battle outside London. At the last minute James' officers deserted so he immediately fled to France to seek refuge in the court of Louis XIV. Louis persuaded James to return to Ireland to raise an army to oppose William; faced by a Grand Alliance of England, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and the Northern Protestant states, Louis probably saw this action as a useful diversion for Alliance forces. When James landed in Dublin he called a Catholic parliament to begin rebuilding the legitimacy of his claim to the throne; being a Catholic parliament, its members set about restoring planted lands back to their former owners. Quite apart from the threat from papacy, this attempt to reverse the plantations was sufficient to ensure that the Protestants in Ireland would oppose James' army until help arrived from England. A Williamite army landed in Carrickfergus on the Antrim coast and went on to defeat James at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. Following this James fled to France for good, but the Jacobite army fought on
before finally surrendering at the Siege of Limerick in 1692. Eleven thousand Irish troops then followed James to France where they formed an Irish Brigade in Louis' army. The defeat of the French navy at La Hogue the same year cut Ireland off from further French aid thus ending Ireland's role in this particular European war.

The Protestant plantations had managed to come through the 1641 rebellion and the Jacobite wars of the late 17th century intact. The latter event had secured Protestant power in England and, in consequence, in Ireland. For a time Catholics were suppressed due to the possibility that 'the Pretender' might return. As the 18th century progressed this became less and less of a possibility and so English toleration of the tiny Catholic minority in England increased. A similar trend did not occur in Ireland however: unlike England the Protestants here were a minority who remained keenly aware of the Irish Catholic potential for revolt and of the precarious nature of their own position (PRONI Educational Facsimiles 221-240). It was with a view to neutering any potential Catholic power that the Protestant parliament enacted the Penal Laws. Such laws were not uncommon in Europe at the time although they were typically applied against religious minorities: in Ireland the Catholics were merely a political minority while at the same time an actual majority. The Irish Protestants were particularly concerned that Catholics may attempt to restore the land seized in various plantations, as indeed James' 1689 Catholic parliament had attempted, and so used the Penal Laws as a way of de-militarizing the Catholic population. This was a greater priority than removing Catholicism from Ireland and probably accounts for the way the laws were applied in practice (Wall,
1976). There seemed to be a widespread belief anyway that such a primitive superstitious religion would die out of its own accord when cut off from the sustenance of Rome.

The eighteenth century then saw the consolidation of Protestant power in Ireland. It also saw a nascent Irish nationalism of sorts: the Protestant parliament in Dublin, while initially seeing the native Irish as the main source of threat, increasingly came to look at the unequal relationship between Ireland and England as the century progressed and the perception of a Catholic threat receded. Some of these early nationalists, such as Swift and Molyneaux, decried the lack of any real autonomy possessed by the Irish parliament and complained that Irish commercial interests were subordinate to those of England. The nation these men spoke for was not the 'Irish nation' in the contemporary sense: the interest they sought to promote was the Protestant interest. That this position could be sustained was due to the apparent success of the 'de-militarization' effect of the Penal Laws (the only 'military action' evident was rural banditry); the extent of emigration of men with military experience (500,000 between 1691 and 1791, Edwards, 1973) and the naive belief, as mentioned above, that the native population was disappearing: for example, Molyneaux once asserted that "the great Body of the present People of Ireland are the Progeny of the English and Britains, that from time to time have come over into this kingdom; and there remains but a mere handful of the ancient Irish at this day; I may say, not one in a thousand" (cited in Miller, 1978).

This nascent nationalism reached its apogee with the 1782 parliament, normally known as 'Grattan's Parliament' after the leader
of the Patriot party, when Ireland obtained legislative independence from England though retaining the King of England as the King of Ireland. This measure had been given strength by the necessity of raising a volunteer force in Ireland as a defence against invasion while the regular army was involved in continental enterprises and in the American War of Independence. The volunteer force eventually came to adopt many of the slogans and ideas current in the Enlightenment period (PRONI Education Facsimiles 141-160).

The volunteers were to be disbanded after the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars in 1816, but an offshoot took root as the United Irishmen: this group went further than their contemporaries in their espousal of full Republican government and worked closely with the new French Republic to secure a revolution in Ireland. They adopted not just the ideas of the French revolution but also the structure and organization: the leadership, for example, styled themselves as a Directory (Pakenham, 1972).

While the United Irishmen shared the distrust of Papism then common in Protestant Ireland, and probably shared the anti-clericalism of their French comrades, the main impact of their revolution was felt in the south-east of Ireland where the rising may be better thought of as a Catholic peasant revolt rather than a Republican revolution: stories of massacres of Protestants by the peasant armies helped quell any sympathetic rising in what was thought to be the main Republican stronghold in Ireland, Presbyterian Belfast. Even if Belfast had risen it is doubtful whether the United Irishmen would have been successful: Skocpol (1983) has identified a number of important features of French society that helped the success of their revolution - the one crucial feature that did not exist in
Ireland was a disintegrating army. Not only was the regular British army available, and extremely unlikely to disobey orders, but there also existed a yeomanry, comprised mainly of Protestant Orangemen, and a militia, comprised mainly of Catholic peasants. These forces held together to resist the rebellion.

Despite the failure of the United Irish rebellion it did have one important consequence: as a result of it the British government decided to create an Act of Union between Great Britain and Ireland thus ending the Irish Parliament. This was important in that it removed the bulwark of Protestant power in Ireland, and while Catholics could still not take seats in Westminster they were now in a position to lobby British governments directly for concessions. Now the direct decision-making unit was in London and Irish Protestants, still with greater influence than their numbers would warrant given that only they could be MPs, were reduced to one more interest group lobbying their cause. The mass of Irish Catholics, although still barred from Westminster, could, if properly organized, bypass the Irish Protestants and attempt to influence London. This potential for Catholic power was soon to be realized.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century a number of alternative political vehicles were available for political influence and a variety of interest groups had differential access to them. On the Catholic side the main alternatives were parliament or agitation; the three main interest groups were the small landed and merchant class, the Catholic clergy and the peasantry, the latter forming the bulk of the population. In the initial period it was the small landed and merchant class that provided the main impetus, although it should be borne in mind that agrarian violence remained a normal
feature of rural life. (It should also be remembered that while this century saw the industrial revolution in Britain, Ireland remained a substantially agricultural country - Table 2.1.)

**TABLE 2.1: OCCUPATION CLASSES (%) 1861 CENSUS OF IRELAND**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>England/Wales</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGRICULTURAL</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDUSTRIAL</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The upper echelons of Catholic society had been organized from the late 1700s in a Catholic Association (Wyse, 1829) which had lobbied for parliamentary reform and expressed allegiance to the British Crown. The Association had seen Catholics achieve the right to vote (in 1793) but had not obtained the right to stand for election by the time of the passing of the Act of Union. After this was enacted they continued to press for this right through the offices of sympathetic Protestant Irish MPs, such as Grattan, but while many British MPs were inclined to agree their efforts were thwarted by the knowledge that the King refused to sign any such law viewing it as an abrogation of his coronation oath. Not until the King died could this hurdle be overcome.

This in itself was not enough though since the ending of the Napoleonic wars removed one leverage the Irish held over the British government, i.e. a source of recruits for the army: more pressure had to be put on the government. The key to this pressure was found by Dan O'Connell who took over the leadership of the Association in the 1820s. O'Connell succeeded in wedding the peasantry to the
Association's cause by organizing a series of peaceful 'monster rallies' which eventually led to 'Catholic Emancipation' in 1829. As Fanning (1983) points out the term 'Catholic Emancipation' for this achievement only became popular after the centenary celebrations of the event, and was, in fact, something of a misnomer: while Catholics could now sit in parliament the vast majority of those who could previously vote were disenfranchised since the criterion changed from being a 40 shilling freeholder to a £10 freeholder.

Despite his extra-parliamentary activity in obtaining 'emancipation' O'Connell was not one to support extra-legal activity: he was no revolutionary. He had opposed the 1798 rebellion and had little time for such things as the Gaelic language. Indeed, although lying within the pantheon of heroes of at least one tradition of Irish nationalism, O'Connell was no nationalist in the more contemporary sense. For ten years he operated entirely through Westminster in alliance with the British liberals and it was to parliament he initially carried his campaign for the repeal of the Act of Union. Even in this campaign O'Connell did not seek full national independence as had the United Irishmen. Rather he wished to restore the 1782 constitution where Ireland had legislative independence under the English Crown.

His parliamentary campaign failed for reasons that were to restrict all such campaigns until the last quarter of the century: firstly, the restricted franchise meant that the electorate formed only a small part of the overall population; secondly, the system of open voting ensured that voting was open to influence - the main sources of this were the landlords and the clergy and while O'Connell could generally rely on the latter he could not rely on
the landlords whose interest lay with the Union; thirdly, the fact that MPs were unapid meant that only well-off people were in a position to stand for parliament which often made it difficult to find candidates sympathetic to repeal; finally, even if a candidate was successful there was little control over how they acted in Westminster since political parties or groupings at the time had much less influence and discipline than today (Whyte, 1972).

Because of his lack of success in building a strong Irish lobby in Westminster O'Connell returned to the peasants and began to organize more monster-rallies with the goal this time being repeal of the Union - in 1845 he was said to have organized and addressed over forty rallies each attended by more than 100,000 people (Edwards, 1973). The government was less willing to accede to his demands this time and so decided on a policy of confrontation: one of his rallies was banned and O'Connell, legalistic as ever, accepted the ban and called off the meeting. Following this O'Connell suffered a loss of prestige and his campaign a loss of momentum. Already however, a harbinger of future things was in the wings.

A dissident element within the repeal movement had keenly observed developments in Europe paying particular attention to the spread of popular nationalism; they paid close attention to Mazzini's Young Italy movement and its spread (Hobsbawm, 1962). These dissidents formed a Young Ireland movement (to differentiate from those such as O'Connell who represented 'old Ireland') and resolved to carry out a violent insurrection - following European precedent they also 'invented' the Irish tricolour of green, white and orange that remains the national flag. When their insurrection came it was little more than a gunfight and was certainly much less significant,
in strictly empirical terms, that the contemporaneous agrarian violence (Townshend, 1983), but the Young Irelanders were important both for presenting the alternative of politically directed violence and for laying the basis of a more militant Irish nationalism. It is noteworthy, for example, that while the level of agrarian violence was very high at the time, in common with most rural banditry, that in Ireland was backward looking rather than forward looking (Hobsbawm, 1969). The militant nationalism that was handed down came from the writings of Young Ireland leaders, particularly Mitchell and Davis - both, incidentally, Protestants. An unforeseen event was to push Irish politics in this new direction: the appearance of potato blight in 1845.

The effects of blight and the subsequent famine were devastating throughout Ireland: figure 2.1 shows the extent of the rise in deaths over a short period of time. While the famine itself officially lasted from 1845 to 1847, the graph indicates how deaths continued afterwards, mainly due to the spread of disease. The graph also indicates that the south (Munster) and west (Connacht) of the country suffered the most from famine. (It should be pointed out that these figures were based on the 1851 Census which itself admits the figures may be a gross under-estimate: it seems probable that the areas where the figures are most likely to under-estimate the death rate are rural areas, and these show the highest rates anyway.) The long-term effect on the population of Ireland can also be seen (figure 2.2); following the famine mass emigration became a feature of life in Ireland with the result that the population steadily declined - this decline in fact lasted until the 1970s. Figure 2.3 indicates an interesting anomaly in the population trends: while
Figure 2.1: Death-rates in the four provinces of Ireland, 1842-1850: 1842 = 100 (Census data)

Legend:
- Leinster
- Munster
- Ulster
- Connacht
Figure 2.2: Population growth rates in Britain, Northern Ireland, and Ireland (26 counties) 1981-1991. 1981 = 100 (Census data)
Figure 2.3: Population growth-rates of four Irish cities 1841-1901: 1841 = 100 (Census data)
the rate of increase in most urban centres in Ireland mirrored the trends in the general population, the same is not true for Belfast where the pattern of growth is closer to that of Great Britain than the rest of Ireland. Reasons for this will be examined in the next chapter.

The famine could have such a dramatic effect due to the system of land-distribution in the country: increased sub-division of the land had created a huge number of subsistence farmers who relied on potatoes to feed their family; typically rent on their small plot was paid in kind, either wheat or labour. The problem was that so many relied solely on the potato and did not engage in paid labour. The tragic irony is that throughout the famine period Ireland remained a net exporter of agricultural produce - the peasants could have had as much food as they needed if they had had money with which to buy it. The government was unwilling to provide too much relief as the laissez-faire doctrines of the day suggested that charity would only encourage sloth and pauperism.

In the wake of famine and disease came emigration: from 1831 to 1841 roughly 3000 people left Ireland every month while from 1851 to 1855 the monthly average had risen to over 13,000. Many of the initial emigrants went to England and then onto a further destination: in 1851 215,610 Irish left England for the United States; 29,312 left for British North America (Canada); 4,797 left for Australia. (All figures above are calculated from census documents.)

Historical data indicate who suffered the most as a result of the famine: the poorest peasants, who typically held less than one acre of ground and lived in '4th class accommodation' (usually described as a single-roomed mud or thatched hut) almost completely
disappeared in Ireland (Table 2.2). Some of the larger farmers prospered in the immediate post-famine period (Donnelly, 1975) so that even while the social disintegration of rural society made rebellion impractical, there was probably little desire for it anyway.

**TABLE 2.2: FAMILIES OCCUPYING CLASSES OF ACCOMMODATION (%) 1841-1901**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1841</th>
<th>1861</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1901</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RURAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Class</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Class</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Class</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Class</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Class</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Class</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Class</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Class</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NUMBER OF 4th CLASS HOMES:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841: 1,328,839</td>
<td>1861: 89,374</td>
<td>1881: 40,665</td>
<td>1901: 9,873</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initially then rebellion may not have festered at home, but it did abroad: Marx described the process by pointing out how 'enterprising' landlords took the opportunity from converting land from tillage to more profitable pasture so that boats leaving Ireland with people returned with cattle:

"Like all good things in this bad world, this profitable method has its drawbacks. With the accumulation of rents in Ireland, the accumulation of the Irish in America keeps apace. The Irishman, banished by sheep and ox, re-appears on the other side of the ocean as a Fenian, and face-to-face with the old
Queen of the sea rises, threatening and more threatening, the young giant Republic..." (Marx, 1954).

The Fenian Brotherhood initially organized in the United States and found able recruits among Irish veterans of the American Civil War. Their existence as a semi-clandestine group dedicated to a violent opposition to British rule in Ireland maintained the twin-faced character of Irish nationalism that had begun with 'young' and 'old' Ireland. Although their own attempt at a rising was unsuccessful, the Fenians provided the core that was to become first the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and later the Irish Republican Army (IRA). One of the most significant effects of the Fenians was the export of the Irish troubles to Britain, and the impact of this was sufficient to convince the Liberal leader Gladstone to push through a series of reform measures. These reforms included the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland, the ending of tithe payments to ministers of that Church and a series of land acts.

It was the question of land, rather than revolution, that provided the main basis of nationalist activity in this latter half of the nineteenth century. Attempts in the 1850s and 60s to remedy peasant grievances through parliamentary campaigns failed for much the same reasons as O'Connell's parliamentary campaigns had failed. By the 1870s, however, parliamentary reform had made this option more viable. It was in 1870 that Isaac Butt, a Protestant nationalist, formed the Irish party that achieved a measure of cohesion that had eluded all other Irish groupings in parliament; the Irish party quickly came to dominate Irish politics with their campaign for Home Rule. The campaign took on a mass base when Parnell achieved leadership of the party and united the parliamentary struggle with the
agitation over land rights. Parnell's personal success in uniting the various groups active in Ireland under his leadership (even the Fenians accepted his leadership to some degree) was short-lived when a sexual scandal drew the wrath of the Catholic Hierarchy and split the Irish party. The campaign for Home Rule was not totally devoid of success though; Gladstone had come to accept the need for such a Bill even if only on the pragmatic grounds of receiving the support of Irish party MPs in the Commons. Home Rule Bills were introduced in 1886 and 1893 but both were defeated, the first when Liberal unionists deserted their party in the Commons, the second in the House of Lords. The position of the Lords was to be quite significant: while it retained a veto power it would ensure the defeat of any Home Rule Bill. This was due to the inbuilt Conservative majority in the Lords. While the Liberals had courted the Irish MPs the Conservatives had courted the representatives of Irish Unionism - these were concentrated among the Protestant population of northeast Ulster. Prior to 1886 this group had tended to support Liberal MPs but after Home Rule came onto the political agenda their sole political priority became the maintenance of the Union. Increasingly Irish politics seemed to take on a confessional character as Protestant Unionists and Catholic Nationalists sought diametrically opposed goals. To some extent this image of Irish politics has remained with us to the present day.

The next chapter will examine some of the historical developments in unionism, and in so doing will bring the historical discussion into the 20th century. Before doing this it may be useful to make a few concluding comments on nationalism. First of all, nationalism in Ireland is a fairly recent phenomenon: in Europe
generally nationalism has been a specific political force for about 200 years; although in Ireland contemporary nationalists tend to trace a nationalist tradition back at least to Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen, it is doubtful if Irish nationalism had a mass base for nearly 100 years after their rising in 1798. If the United Irishmen had been successful then perhaps there would have developed a specific national politics, as in post-revolutionary France; the United Irishmen were not, however, successful.

The second important point about Irish nationalism was its varied character at different historical periods: we have seen how the original 'nationalism' or 'perceived national interest' arose among the 18th century Protestants who held political power in Ireland, a numerical minority in the country as a whole. The first popular political struggle, that of O'Connell for Catholic Emancipation and later for the Repeal of the Union in the early 19th century, was hardly national in character: little or no attention was paid at this time to the Irish language or Irish culture. The basis of a popular nationalism which involved language or culture was laid by the Young Irelanders in the 1840s and '50s and was later to be taken up by the Fenians in the later half of the 19th century. Throughout this period the question of land was probably more relevant to the rural peasantry that formed the bulk of the population, and it was not until Parnell wedded this issue with that of national political issues in the latter part of the 19th century that there existed a genuinely popular nationalism. From this point on nationalism had increasing influence in Irish society: in games, language, popular culture, theatre, poetry and politics. It was an influence that was to lead to the 1916 Rising and later to the 1919-1921 war. This
latter war marks a difference between those who feel Ireland won a measure of National Independence in 1923 despite partition, and those who felt it did not - to the former group, those who accepted the Treaty of 1922, the 1919-1921 war was the 'War of Independence'; to the latter group, the anti-Treatyites or Republicans, it was the 'Tan War' (after the Black and Tans, a specially recruited police force): to some Republicans the war of independence is still being fought.
Chapter 3: Ireland - Partition and Unionism

From 1886 to 1916 the Irish party, or various factions of it, enjoyed almost total political support throughout most of Ireland. The one area where they were never successful was in the Protestant counties of Ulster (an indication of the polarized demographic situation can be seen in the 1926 Census figures, table 3.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leinster</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munster</td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connacht</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster (3 Counties)</td>
<td>81.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland (6 Counties)</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here opposition to the various Home Rule Bills was strong and increased with every new Bill. The 1886 and 1893 Bills excited alarm but not a great deal of mass organization - it was not necessary as the anti-Home Rulers could depend on the House of Lords to block any legislation. The 1912 Bill was a different matter: following the 1910 election the veto power of the Lords was severely curtailed and the Liberal government again depended on Irish party support to stay in power. Mass organization was now necessary in Ulster. Two acts indicate the strength of the movement and the lengths to which its leaders were prepared to go: in September 1912 almost half a million Ulster unionists signed a 'Solemn Oath and Covenant' pledging them to resist Home Rule; the same year a Volunteer force was organized in Ulster that came to include about one hundred thousand armed men.
at one stage it seemed that Home Rule may provoke civil war in Ireland (Stewart, 1967; Laffin, 1983).

Why did this situation arise? The previous chapter looked at some of the developments in Irish nationalism, but why did the Protestant community in the North come to identify itself as having a separate interest? And why was this difference seen as significant enough to go to war over? This chapter will examine some of the reasons for the growth of this alternative imagined community in Ireland and then go on to look at the record of the post-partition states.

One of the most widespread explanations for the above questions is that provided by traditional nationalists (e.g. Boyd, 1969). This view would suggest that the 1798 United Irish rebellion displayed the unity of Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter in the cause of the Irish nation. After the defeat of the rebellion the British decided to consolidate their hold on the country by favouring one section of the population thus creating internal divisions: they opted to support the descendants of the Protestant planters in the north who thereafter remained as an effective 'British garrison' in Ireland. Protestant opposition to nationalism was fostered by sectarian demagogues who provoked sectarian riots throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, particularly in Belfast. While most of Ireland was maintained in poverty and stripped of its wealth, the North was enriched by industrial investment. This process heightened the differences within Ireland and again worked to reinforce sectarianism.

An examination of the actual historical record, particularly in the areas of culture, economy and politics, indicates this picture
to be somewhat simplistic.

Culture:

As stated in the previous chapter, the Protestant planters in the north of Ireland differed from most other groups that entered Ireland in that they did not assimilate to any great extent with the native population. Undoubtedly one of the reasons for this was the importance of religion in the political world of the day. As mentioned in chapter 2, even after Roman Catholicism ceased to be viewed as a serious threat in eighteenth century Britain, the Protestant population in Ireland, or at least their leaders, did not share this opinion.

Although the United Irishmen are much vaunted in the nationalist tradition, their support for the Catholic peasantry, the 'men of no property', was more circumscribed than is often thought: as described earlier, one of the leaders, Wolfe Tone, shared many of the attitudes towards Catholicism as his pro-British contemporaries. It is also important to note that the United Irishmen comprised only a small subset of the Protestant population. Indeed, the main centre of enlightenment republicanism in Ireland, Belfast, did not rise at all during 1798 (Joy, 1974).

At the same time as Tone and his compatriots were attempting to organize Ireland's 'French revolution' another subset of the Northern Protestants established an Orange Order, an explicitly Protestant defence force. This was originally based in rural Ulster although lodges quickly established themselves throughout most of Ireland. By the middle of 1798 Orange lodges were established in all but
three of the western-most counties in Ireland, although only five counties had more than twenty lodges (Tyrone - 64; Armagh - 78; Down - 45; Cavan - 32; Dublin - 38); and of these five all but Dublin were in Ulster (Edwards, 1973). The Order helped put down the peasant revolt in Wexford and remained throughout the nineteenth century as a potential organizational core for Irish Protestant interests. The history of the Order indicates that it was no mere plaything of British politicians and thus an element of the 'British garrison' thesis (Gray, 1972). While an MP, O'Connell carried out a campaign against the Order and succeeded in having it banned at one time: a parliamentary investigation showed the Order to have infiltrated many facets of British life, including the army and some parts of the aristocracy, and it was feared it might subvert legal authority.

What was most important about the Order was that it existed: at different times it attracted more or less support within its target community; while at times it received support from sections of British society it was never totally subservient to those interests and could go its own way if necessary. While the Order existed it could serve to unite the various sections of Protestant society under a common banner and a common cause. The raison d'être of the Order was essentially sectarian so that times of support for it highlighted the increasing religio-political divide in Ireland.

Economy:

Economic differences between Ulster and the rest of Ireland were evident from an early stage. Initially they were most marked by a different system of land management: while the Penal Laws and
absentee landlordism had encouraged increased subdivision of land in rural Ireland and helped impoverish the country, in Ulster a system known as 'Ulster custom' allowed the tenant more security of tenure and rewarded improvements to land holdings. This had two main results: firstly, it meant that Ulster suffered less instability in rural areas and hence less banditry and lawlessness than the rest of Ireland. This in itself had important consequences: in Ireland as a whole capital tended to flow out of the country and the extent of political instability due to rural unrest discouraged the return of capital for the investment necessary for industrialization. In Ulster the situation differed in that less money left the province and greater political stability created a better environment for capital investment. Thus steam-engines were introduced into Belfast in 1806 but did not arrive in Dublin until 1833. By 1850 there was 2,646 horsepower of steam in Ireland but 6/7ths of this was involved in Ulster industry.

The particular form that industrialization took was influenced by other factors: in 1685 Louis XIV had revoked the Edict of Nantes and persecuted French Huguenot Protestants. Some of these Huguenots came to the Lagan valley near Belfast bringing with them their skill in weaving. This encouraged a cottage industry mainly in cotton. When capital was to be employed in industrial activity it was in mechanized weaving - due to the competition from Lancashire cotton-mills and the availability of flax, it was linen rather than cotton that came to predominate. The rise in the linen industry and its concentration in Ulster can be seen from census data (tables 3.2 and 3.3). As figure 2.3 and table 3.4 also indicate, the existence of an industrialized sector cushioned Ulster, and particularly
Belfast, from the population decline evident in the rest of Ireland.

**TABLE 3.2: PERSONS ENGAGED IN CLASSES OF OCCUPATION (%)**

(1841 and 1861 CENSUS OF IRELAND)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LEINSTER</th>
<th>MUNSTER</th>
<th>ULSTER</th>
<th>CONNACHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1841:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOOD</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLOTHING</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOOD</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLOTHING</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3.3: CLOTHING MANUFACTURE IN ULSTER (1841, 1861 and 1881 CENSUS OF IRELAND) - NUMBERS OF PEOPLE EMPLOYED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1841:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINEN</td>
<td>14996</td>
<td>1551</td>
<td>16547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>57213</td>
<td>8332</td>
<td>65545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINEN</td>
<td>30475</td>
<td>28891</td>
<td>59366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>12834</td>
<td>11767</td>
<td>24601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINEN</td>
<td>28302</td>
<td>48997</td>
<td>77299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>1787</td>
<td>2736</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3.4: REGIONAL INCREASE IN POPULATION IN IRELAND**

(1861 CENSUS OF IRELAND)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1841-1851</th>
<th>1851-1861</th>
<th>1841-1861</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEINSTER</td>
<td>-15.1</td>
<td>-13.4</td>
<td>-26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUNSTER</td>
<td>-22.4</td>
<td>-18.9</td>
<td>-37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULSTER</td>
<td>-15.7</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>-19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONNACHT</td>
<td>-19.8</td>
<td>-11.8</td>
<td>-29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BELFAST)</td>
<td>(+32.1)</td>
<td>(+20.5)</td>
<td>(+59.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This process also had the consequence that a relatively large industrial working-class developed in Ulster. By the turn of the century ship-building had been added to Ulster industry and this encouraged the growth of an engineering sector - while the Irish ship-building sector was still relatively small in 1901, it was almost totally concentrated in Belfast (tables 3.5 and 3.6).

**TABLE 3.5: POPULATION AND CLASS OF OCCUPATION IN ULSTER AS A PERCENTAGE OF IRELAND (1881 and 1901 CENSUS OF IRELAND)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Occupation</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1901</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROFESSIONAL CLASS</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMESTIC CLASS</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMERCIAL CLASS</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRICULTURAL CLASS</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDUSTRIAL CLASS</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEFINITE/NON-PRODUCTIVE</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3.6: PERSONS ENGAGED IN AREAS OF OCCUPATION (1901 CENSUS OF IRELAND)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Occupation</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Ulster</th>
<th>Ulster (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MACHINERY</td>
<td>10830</td>
<td>6088</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIPS &amp; BOATS</td>
<td>6236</td>
<td>5479</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXTILES &amp; FABRICS</td>
<td>109588</td>
<td>91744</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRESS</td>
<td>137804</td>
<td>73623</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What effect did this pattern of industrialization have on Ireland? An economic determinist might argue that since Irish nationalism had its mass base within an essentially agricultural and peasant society, nationalist politics would almost of necessity be
reactionary; by the same token, the existence of an urban proletariat in Ulster, particularly round Belfast, would suggest that here is to be found the spring-board of a progressive socialism - such indeed is largely the argument of the British and Irish Communist Organisation (BICO) (cf. Whyte, 1978). In fact, rather than flocking to a socialist banner (although there were some notable labour disputes in the early years of the twentieth century) the Protestant working-class of Belfast supported the conservative landowners and industrialists who organized the anti-Home Rule agitation from the 1880s onwards.

**Politics:**

Some basic reasons why the Protestant working-class of the north took this political direction are not hard to find. The existence of an alternative cultural framework has already been mentioned although this is hardly a sufficient explanation of itself. The export of native capital and political instability has been mentioned as factors working against Irish industrialization: two other factors were the lack of raw fuel material, particularly coal, and the lack of a market for manufactured goods, the bulk of the population throughout much of the nineteenth century being a poor peasantry. Belfast overcame these problems by orienting its production towards Britain and the Empire rather than the rest of Ireland. (Other Irish cities took the same path but relied generally on the export of agricultural produce rather than manufactured goods - Cork, for example, once was one of the most important butter markets in the British Empire, Donnelly, 1975.) When the question of separation arose then, it was a relatively straightforward matter to convince Protestant workers that their interest lay in a continuation of the
Union, not only for emotional or traditional reasons but also for hard economic reasons. The Unionist leaders could argue successfully that the main constituency of the Irish nationalists was the rural peasantry whose interests would be predominant in an independent Ireland; the only way Ireland could industrialize would be behind protective tariff walls (as indeed was the policy of the small nationalist party called Sinn Fein), but free trade, at least between Britain and Ireland, was essential to the vitality of the Belfast economy. It is noteworthy, for example, that in one account of the argument against Home Rule provided by the Unionist leader, Edward Carson, (Roesenbaum, 1970) three main areas are mentioned: the security of the Empire; the danger of Papal interference in civil liberties; and financial policy. Of the three it is the latter which receives most attention.

With these considerations in mind it is possible to begin to understand the popular appeal of Unionism in the Ulster counties: at an historical level the planted population had always differed from the indigenous population in terms of religion; for years they feared an attempted reversal of the plantation settlement; the Orange Order had provided an institutional framework within which the politics of religion was encouraged; and finally, the differential industrialization of Ireland created a situation where the wealth of Belfast, and to an extent of Ulster, and hence the interests of the Protestant population there generally were oriented towards Britain. Added to this was the unattractive character of Irish nationalism: in particular, as nationalism developed a mass base towards the end of the 19th century the main features of it, Irish language, culture and games, and Roman Catholicism, had little emotional appeal to
This is not to say, of course, that once achieved this situation was permanent: socialism was a growing political force in early 20th century Europe, most dramatically seen in the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia; in Ireland, socialism, or at least militant trade unionism, was seen in Belfast and Dublin and might have provided the basis of an alternative class-based imagined community. It is certainly true that Nationalist politicians tried to make political capital out of the fact that the Unionist movement was led by landowners and industrialists. Carson himself viewed this as serious enough to warrant forming the Ulster Unionist Labour Association (UULA) in 1918 and ensured that three of the four Belfast parliamentary seats were contested by UULA members (Buckland, 1973).

Thus far we have concentrated on the dynamics of unionism in the North of Ireland: the broader Unionist movement also comprised elements in the rest of the country although here unionists formed a scattered minority with a greater class homogeneity than their colleagues in the north. In the final analysis the northern Unionists were prepared to work within the pragmatic dictates of demography and accept as large a partitioned area of Ulster as they could while ensuring a unionist majority. They agreed not only to cut loose the unionists in the southern counties but also, perhaps more controversially, those in Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan, the three Ulster counties where Catholics comprised about 80 percent of the population (table 3.1).

The strength of Unionism relied not only on its ability to unite a popular, if minority, movement in Ireland: of crucial significance for its political impact was its place in British politics. As the
first state to industrialize Britain had been the predominant world power throughout much of the nineteenth century. By the end of the century this position was coming under increased pressure due to competition both from the United States of America and Germany. While British policies sought to deal with these pressures the Boer war in 1899 only served to emphasize what was being described as a need for national regeneration. In this situation British politics underwent a series of realignments as various programmes for national recovery were mooted (Shannon, 1976). One of the more important was Chamberlain's policy of Imperialism which he attempted to incorporate in policy in Salisbury's Conservative administration from 1895 onwards: one example was his idea for an imperial customs union (loosely based on the Prussian Zollverein) to reestablish Britain's predominant position in the world economy.

Since Imperialism was such an important tendency in British politics the Unionists were able to elicit support by arguing that the Liberal government's Home Rule Bill was weakening the Empire by allowing this element of dissolution: the point of the Home Rule Bill was not to create a fully independent Ireland, but the Unionists argued that this was an inevitable consequence of it. Moreover, the government presented the Bill in controversial circumstances: the 1910 general election had been fought on the constitutional right of the House of Lords to veto Finance Bills and in strict terms the Liberal government had lost, in that they no longer had a majority in Parliament. The Liberals were able to stay in government however, if the Irish party gave them support. The price of this support was the commitment to introduce a Home Rule Bill.

The issue on which the general election was fought was resolved
when the veto power of the House of Lords was restricted to three years, this applying to any Bill. When the Liberals then introduced the Home Rule Bill, the Conservatives and Unionists protested that this issue had not been before the electorate so the government had no mandate to proceed with it. When the government persisted, the Unionists and some Conservatives felt no longer obliged to restrict their opposition to legal action since the government itself was acting in an unconstitutional manner.

In fact, the events of the time: the raising of an armed militia in Ulster, the number of Conservative MPs who associated themselves with this action and the 'mutiny' at the Curragh when some British officers declined to move against Ulster, all raised the political stakes in Britain (Laffin, 1983). With the benefit of hindsight the eventual character of the agreement hammered out by Lloyd George can be seen to depend as much on resolving this domestic British crisis as on genuine sympathy with the Unionist case.

The end result was partition when Ireland was divided into a twenty-six county 'Free State' (Saorstat Eireann) and a six-county province. Following the aftermath of the 1916 Rising in Dublin the Irish had cast off the benign nationalism of the Irish party for the militant Republicanism of Sinn Fein and the IRA. A short war of independence was following by Treaty recognizing partition although it was felt by all, except Unionists, that this would be a temporary situation. In the Treaty negotiations the Republicans had attempted to turn the British justification of the First World War, to defend the rights of small nations, back on the British, but found them unwilling to apply the same criterion on themselves as had been applied to the losers of that war. The main difficulty created by this
outcome was the existence of a substantial nationalist minority in Northern Ireland (table 3.7) who by virtue of their aspiration were excluded from the Unionist machine that now dominated political life in the province. 'Normal' politics, north and south, might have been expected to proceed along the 'typical' left-right pattern of most European states - the reality proved to be somewhat different.

**TABLE 3.7: CATHOLIC POPULATION (%) OF NORTHERN IRELAND 1861 TO 1961 (1971 NORTHERN IRELAND CENSUS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The immediate task facing both new parliaments in Ireland, for Northern Ireland also received a measure of 'Home Rule' within the United Kingdom, was consolidation. In the South the main opponents of the state were the diehard Republicans who refused to support the treaty or endorse partition. Initially they were confronted in a short, but bloody, civil war (Younger, 1970); later it was dissidents within the Free State army who had to be confronted. On the plus side the Free State government found ready support from the Catholic Church which bolstered state legitimacy while winning for itself an influential role in state policy (Fanning, 1983).

In the Northern state the opponents were more clearly identified as Catholic nationalists. In the initial post-partition period they
believed partition to be a passing phenomenon and so refused to work within the aegis of the Northern administrative system. This allowed the Unionist government to restructure the parliamentary and local government system to both minimize the extent of nationalist control and polarize politics (Farrell, 1980). A variety of armed part-time police forces were raised and a series of special powers placed in the hands of the regular police. Fortunately for the Unionists the increasing internecine conflict in the South helped relieve pressure on the Northern parliament.

Within the particular framework of Irish politics, Southern politics 'normalized' (or de-militarized) more quickly as a large section of the Republicans defeated in the Civil War abandoned the gun and adopted a parliamentary road. A core of militants remained within the IRA and maintained a sporadic existence for the next forty years while becoming increasingly politically marginal (Bell, 1974; Coogan, 1970). This process was, no doubt, hastened by the success of the parliamentary Republicans. Their party, Fianna Fail, formed the main governmental party in the South up to the last ten years or so; Fianna Fail generally followed a path of economic nationalism until the perceived need for an internationalization of the Irish economy led to a switch of direction in the late 1950s. From this time Eire, as the state became in 1937, tried to gain entry to the European Common Market and encouraged foreign investment in the country.

In the North politics did not so much develop as solidify into a sectarian pattern. As figure 3.1 indicates the relative parliamentary strength of the main Unionist and Nationalist groupings hardly changed. The Unionists had not originally sought their own
Figure 3.1: Northern Ireland Parliamentary Results 1921-1969

- Other
- Nationalist
- Labour
- Unionist
parliament but soon came to view it as the ultimate guarantor of their position. They realized the lack of commitment to Northern Ireland felt by many in Westminster and so attempted to win as much autonomy as possible. In this they were largely successful: the clearest evidence for this was the convention that developed in Westminster of not discussing Northern Ireland affairs, an abrogation of responsibility that allowed British politicians to be caught almost completely unawares when violence broke out in 1968/9. Another hallmark of success was the Northern government's ability to deal with any IRA activity, the most serious being the border campaign of the late 1950s, using only local police and part-time special constabulary (figures 3.2 and 3.3). Northern Ireland's greatest success however came largely by default during the Second World War.

With the importance of the Atlantic convoys the strategic value of Northern Ireland was useful, but was very much highlighted by Eire's neutrality. Despite Churchill's apparent willingness to abandon the unionist cause if Eire entered the war on the side of the Allies (Fisk, 1983), when it was over the British made the first real positive commitment to the Union with the Government of Ireland Act (1949). Despite this, Northern Ireland politics still did not show any change into the 1960s. At this time the Unionist Prime Minister, Terence O'Neill, attempted to restructure Northern Ireland's economy by introducing a measure of planning and, as in the South, encouraging foreign investment. For a period this had the desired effect with industrial production in Northern Ireland outstripping that of Great Britain (table 3.8) despite unemployment remaining consistently higher (tables 3.9a and b); it also had the effect of stopping a series of electoral victories by the Northern Ireland Labour Party (cf. figure 3.1).
Figure 3.2: RUC Personnel 1938-1980 (Government statistics)
Figure 3.3: B-Special Constabulary Personnel (Part-time) 1938-1969 (Government statistics)
### TABLE 3.8: INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND (GOVERNMENT STATISTICS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>NI</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>NI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.9a: REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT (%) IN THE UNITED KINGDOM ON MAY 12 1952 (GOVERNMENT STATISTICS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LONDON &amp; SE</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>MIDLANDS</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>NORTHERN</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASTERN</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>N MIDLANDS</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>SCOTLAND</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHERN</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>E &amp; W RIDINGS</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>WALES</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S WESTERN</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>N WESTERN</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>N IRELAND</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.9b: UNEMPLOYMENT (AVERAGE MONTHLY %) IN GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND (GOVERNMENT STATISTICS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>NI</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>NI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
O'Neill's success was to be short-lived due to pressure from two sides. On the one hand O'Neill faced intra-Unionist critics: as Whyte (1974) shows, most dissent within the the Unionist parliamentary party came from right-wing traditionalists (populists) rather than liberal reformers. When O'Neill applied his new economic policies, pressure from this source increased both because most aid went to foreign (extra-Northern Ireland) companies rather than the indigenous textile and engineering companies and because O'Neill was said to have adopted a 'dictatorial' style of rule, which is to say he consulted economic advisers rather than his parliamentary colleagues (Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, 1979). In time this section of criticism was to organize round a position of extreme Protestant Unionism typified in different measure and at different times by Ian Paisley, Bill Craig (Home Affairs minister until O'Neill sacked him) and the early Ulster Defence Association (UDA), a working-class Protestant paramilitary organization (Boulton, 1973).

On the other hand O'Neill faced pressure for reforms by an increasingly restless Catholic population. The 1944 Butler Education Act had an effect in Northern Ireland similar to that in the rest of the United Kingdom with a huge increase in the university population (figure 3.4). While there is no indication of religious proportions in these figures, comparable figures for entry to teacher-training colleges, where religious segregation was the norm, do suggest that large numbers of Catholics entered third level education for the first time (figure 3.5). This new segment of the Catholic population was unwilling to accommodate to the rurally-based, and often clerically dominated, Nationalist party and increasingly demanded liberal, though not yet nationalist, reforms (Farrell, 1980).
The problem for O'Neill was that both these forces pulled in opposite directions and turned what had begun as a new economic direction into a political, and increasingly sectarian, minefield.

These different political tensions did not so much resolve as collide, with the outbreak of widespread violence from 1969 onwards. When it came, the violence did not involve the eager young intellectuals of Queens University, their heads full of Guevara and Trotsky (if indeed they were), or the backbench Unionist bosses and landowners - the most serious violence occurred in the sprawling working-class ghettos of Derry and Belfast. In Derry it was the Catholics against the police; in Belfast it was Catholic against Protestant (Sunday Times Insight Team, 1972). Unlike previous occasions the violence was both externally more prominent and internally more widespread. The local police force almost disintegrated and without an effective coercive apparatus the Northern Ireland government seemed on the point of collapse. [It was at this point that the British Labour government sent in British troops to attempt to stabilize the situation.] Having made this military commitment the British were almost obliged to make a political commitment to address what was widely perceived to be the cause of breakdown, the well-documented discrimination against the Catholic minority (Barrit and Carter, 1972; Darby, 1976; Whyte, 1983).

The immediate London response was to pressure the Unionist government to introduce and implement reforms. Chichester-Clarke, who had replaced O'Neill as Prime Minister, not only had to deal with this pressure and internal pressure from the Catholics, but also the right-wing within his own party who had campaigned so successfully against O'Neill. It was a balancing act that probably would have
been beyond an experienced, astute and able politician - it was certainly beyond Chichester-Clarke. By the time he resigned the British Army had taken effective control of security, the Royal Ulster Constabulary was being totally reorganized by an imported English Chief Constable, the part-time Special Constabulary had been disbanded and the IRA had re-emerged to begin a new offensive in 1971.

The re-emergence of the IRA was different to previous campaigns in that this time they did not set the location of their action. This time the IRA found its main base of support in the urban ghettos and it was from these areas that much of the recruitment took place (Farrell, 1980). Previous campaigns had been organized from Dublin and centred in the countryside, with many of the volunteers coming from Eire (Bell, 1974; Cronin, 1980). In 1969-71 the tide of events allied with the split in 'Official' and 'Provisional' wings in 1969/70 shifted the locus to Belfast and Derry and, initially at least, the IRA responded to situations rather than created them. Even the offensive campaign was organized to relieve pressure on the 'no-go' areas by spreading the army across the entire province. Hamfisted security measures, such as the introduction of internment, only worked to increase support for the IRA despite the growing brutality of their bombing campaign.

A crucial turning-point came in January 1972 with the killings of 'Bloody Sunday'. The reaction to the killing of unarmed civilians by the army lead to a reassessment by the British government. Up to this point they had tried to contain the IRA by using the Army, and attempted to restore order through existing administrative structures. The reaction to the Bloody Sunday killings needed to be placated, and the Stormont parliament presented itself as a convenient
scapegoat—it was abolished. The image now presented to the world was that the slate had been wiped clean and the British could now set about solving this atavistic religious conflict.

The strategy was two-pronged: on the one hand the Army would try to contain the IRA, and if talks with the IRA leaders would help to buy time then well and good; the second prong was to try to produce some new administrative structures in Northern Ireland which most people would support. If the Unionists could be persuaded, or cajoled, into sharing power with the constitutional nationalists, then the IRA would be isolated and soon cease to be a threat. The strategy had a lot going for it: slowly but surely the Social Democratic and Labour party (SDLP), now the main Catholic party in Northern Ireland, and the new Unionist leader, Brian Faulkner, moved towards an agreement, and talks with the IRA produced a series of ceasefires. The IRA believed the British were on the verge of withdrawal and so declared each new year 'the year of victory'. The picture was almost complete, but one piece of the jigsaw remained unsteady: Faulkner's ability to convince his own constituency to go along. In the event it was the fragmentation of Unionist politics allied with the contradictions of the compromise that ended this British strategy.

The fragmentation of the Unionist monolith had occurred on two levels. The intra-unionist opposition to Faulkner was not confined to the disgruntled mutterings of Unionist MPs but had actually centred round two figures who provided an organizational centre to this opposition: Paisley and Craig. Paisley had formed a Protestant Unionist party, later to be renamed the Democratic Unionist party, which provided an important focus for Unionist dissent. More
important was Craig's Vanguard organization. Initially a pressure group within the Unionist party, Vanguard had reformed itself separately by 1973. To wield influence it needed support, and support came from a hitherto non-existent force in Protestant politics: the working-class.

The IRA were not the only ones to think they were winning, many Protestants thought they were winning as well (Nelson, 1976). In many Protestant areas in Belfast vigilante groups had sprung up. The UDA provided a centralized coordination mechanism for these disparate groups, and proved to be the shock-troops of the Vanguard movement. The Protestant working-class in Northern Ireland had traditionally allowed their political direction to come from the Unionist party. With their new organization there was no immediate desire to inaugurate an independent political line so they looked to Craig and/or Paisley for leadership. A short power battle between the two ended with Craig achieving temporary political control over the UDA, and with that control Craig began a series of demonstrations frighteningly similar to SA rallies in pre-war Germany. Craig's demand was that Stormont should stay, but it didn't. Many felt that Vanguard's response, what appeared to be a token two-day strike, proved that the loyalist extremists had shot their bolt and failed to make any impact. It appears in retrospect that Vanguard were the only ones to realize the potential strength revealed by that short stoppage (Fisk, 1975).

Another source of speculation at the time concerned the 'Protestant backlash': when would it come, and what form would it take? Most people seemed to expect large-scale assaults on Catholic areas as had occurred in 1969. While this speculation continued,
the backlash had already begun with the rising body-count of 'motiveless murders'. Armed sections of the UDA attacked the only targets available to them: known Republicans or, if they could not be found, randomly picked Catholics. The sectarian geography of Northern Ireland made this relatively straightforward. Some Republicans replied in kind so that for a time tit-for-tat sectarian assassinations were the predominant feature of the troubles (Dillon and Lehane, 1973).

By the time the power-sharing executive was established, loyalist opposition to Faulkner's deal was headed by a triumvirate of Craig, Paisley and Harry West, the latter now leader of a Unionist party that had rejected Faulkner (Rose, 1976). Faulkner had reformed his forces as the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (UPNI) and continued doggedly along the road he had chosen. This compromise agreement involving Faulkner's UPNI, the SDLP and the moderate Alliance party might have worked: it certainly seemed to be alienating the IRA. There was one fatal contradiction in it however, and this was symbolized by the Council of Ireland, a never-established inter-parliamentary council for all Ireland. The SDLP had insisted on this 'Irish dimension' to any agreement and some members of the party told their supporters that it would be the mechanism to lead Northern Ireland into a united Ireland. Faulkner, on the other hand, told his supporters that the Council of Ireland was a meaningless talking-shop and whatever else it would do, it definitely would not lead to a united Ireland. To many Protestants it was clear that someone was lying.

Even this growing disenchantment among Protestants may not have hardened until the little legitimacy the executive had was torn away
in the general election called by the Heath government to break the miners' strike. The loyalist triumvirate, remodelled as the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC), won eleven of the twelve Northern Ireland seats. Within a few months a stoppage organized by the Ulster Workers' Council had brought the province to a standstill and forced the resignation of the executive. The second British strategy had come to nothing.

After the fall of the executive British strategy changed again. The attempt to find agreement among the politicians was deprioritized and the main focus changed to that of defeating the IRA. Time was bought by announcing the establishment of a constitutional convention to give the politicians one last chance (Rose, 1976). Few expected it to achieve anything and it duly lived up to expectations. Another extended truce was agreed with the IRA during which the Army collected valuable intelligence information. Largely oblivious to what was going on the IRA clung to the belief in the imminent announcement of an announcement of an intention to withdraw on the part of the British. By the time they realized what was going on it was almost too late for them. By the end of 1976 the IRA was practically a defeated organization but for two developments.

By 1977 young IRA militants, gaolied in the early years of the troubles, were being released. The prison had always proved to be an important source of ideas to Republicans in the past. Released prisoners had always injected new ideas and directions into the movement after defeats, but this time the campaign was still going on when many of them came out (Bell, 1974) - it is noteworthy, for example, that almost the entire Northern leadership of Sinn Fein spent some time in gaol in the early 70s. In 1977 the IRA
reorganized from the traditional brigade structure to a cellular structure, more impervious to intelligence leaks and more suited to the furtherance of a long guerilla war. The nature of IRA targets changed as well: random bombings of 'economic' targets practically ceased and attacks on individual members of the security forces increased. To their own members, and their base of support, it was easier to justify such attacks as the war against British imperialism.

The second factor was the political element in the military strategy of the British. This involved an attempt to isolate the IRA at the political level by creating an impression that Northern Ireland was returning to normality, and that the IRA were little more than gangsters. 'Normalisation' involved an increased role for the refashioned RUC and the locally recruited Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR); the British army were largely confined to nationalist areas with the result that for many people in Northern Ireland the Army ceased to be a regular sight (table 3.10). 'Criminalisation' was highlighted by the withdrawal of 'special category status' for prisoners convicted of terrorist offences and the building of 'real' prisons to house those convicted. This was also the era of the 'godfather' and 'racketeering'.

TABLE 3.10: STRENGTH OF SECURITY FORCES (BOYLE, HADDEN AND HILLYARD, 1980).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>16500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7500</td>
<td>8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-SPECIALS</td>
<td>8500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUC</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUC (RESERVE)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>4500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14500</td>
<td>31000</td>
<td>31500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(BOYLE, K., HADDEN, T. and HILLYARD, P.; 'TEN YEARS ON IN NORTHERN IRELAND - THE LEGAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE', COBDEN TRUST).
The first factor described above, i.e. the reorganization of the IRA, helped that organization to stay in existence; the second factor worked to increase support for the IRA. The problem with 'normalization' was that it worked only outside the nationalist areas while a groundswell of anger and resentment was building up inside these areas. The main problem with 'criminalization' was that it provided a focus for campaigns that could attract humanitarian support from those who would not otherwise have aligned themselves at all closely with the IRA. The campaign for special status was a spark and it burst into flames with the death of ten Republican hunger-strikers in 1981. The results of this are recent enough to require only brief mention: Sinn Fein have established a strong and growing political base despite, rather than instead of, the military campaign; the SDLP have banked all on the report of the 'Forum for a new Ireland' despite the rather lukewarm response to it from the British government; the Democratic Unionist party and the Official Unionist party, having achieved almost parity in electoral support, now vie to reproduce the most vitriolic anti-Sinn Fein rhetoric; and finally the UDA, despite much publicity a few years ago for their Independent Ulster proposals, appear to have sunk into political oblivion. The election results since 1969 (figure 3.6) in fact mask the degree of intracommunity competition that has taken place - there is no longer one unionist and one nationalist party. The problem with this situation is to make life harder for any group suggesting compromise: intracommunity political pluralism in Northern Ireland seems to lead to intercommunity polarization.

The statistics of the conflict make grim reading but show some interesting trends (Roche, 1985). Firstly, the absolute level of
violence has declined since 1976 (table 3.11a).

Roche, D. 'Patterns of Violence in N.Ireland in 1984', Fortnight No.218.

In part this is probably due to the increased ability of the security forces to deal with paramilitary groups. Other factors responsible for this decline are the decreased activity by Loyalist paramilitary groups and a change in tactics by Nationalist paramilitary groups, particularly the IRA. It is noteworthy that while Nationalist groups are responsible for over 50% of all deaths, Loyalist groups are responsible for the most civilian deaths (table 3.11b); this table also indicates that most Nationalist paramilitary deaths have been caused by other Nationalist paramilitaries and most Loyalist paramilitary deaths have been caused by Loyalist paramilitaries.
TABLE 3.11b: NUMBER OF DEATHS BY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY
AND CATEGORY OF VICTIM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY RESPONSIBLE</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY FORCES</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAT. PARAMILITARY</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOY. PARAMILITARY</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVILIANS</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRISON OFFICERS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>1352</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>2419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AGENCY RESPONSIBLE:
1 = SECURITY FORCES
2 = NATIONALIST PARAMILITARIES
3 = LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES
4 = OTHER AND UNIDENTIFIED

Roche, D. (1985) 'Patterns of Violence in N.Ireland in 1984'.
Fortnight No.218.

By 1984 most violence came from Nationalist groups: Roche shows that
this is a definite trend over the last few years and adds that most
of this activity comes specifically from the IRA (as opposed to
other Nationalist groups such as the Irish National Liberation Army,
INLA) (table 3.11c).

In his analysis of trends in the violence Roche argues that
while the absolute level of violence has declined the rate of deaths
per incident has increased (table 3.11d), so that while the number
of incidents has gone down, each incident now is more likely to result
in death. Roche argues that the level of IRA activity has remained
fairly constant since 1977 but that the 'efficiency' of this activity
has increased. The rate of injuries to violent incidents has also
increased in recent years suggesting to Roche that the level of
TABLE 3.11c: NUMBER OF DEATHS BY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY AND CATEGORY
OF VICTIM (1984 ONLY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY RESPONSIBLE</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY FORCES</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAT. PARAMILITARY</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOY. PARAMILITARY</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVILIANS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRISON OFFICERS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AGENCY RESPONSIBLE: 1 = SECURITY FORCES
                      2 = NATIONALIST PARAMILITARIES
                      3 = LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES
                      4 = OTHER AND UNIDENTIFIED

TABLE 3.11d: INDEX OF DEATH AND INJURIES PER VIOLENT INCIDENT
(1971 = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEX OF DEATHS/INC.</th>
<th>INDEX OF INJURIES/INC.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>88.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>179.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>177.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>123.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>106.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>156.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>129.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>132.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>257.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>221.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>241.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
public disorder has increased. Roche also shows how the security forces seem to have placed greater reliance on covert action as a way of dealing with paramilitary (specifically IRA) activity. Thus, despite the absolute figures, Roche is forced to conclude that "This does not add up to the comforting picture of declining violence, greater social stability and the success of a policy of 'containment' which a superficial interpretation or presentation of the statistics would permit".

Whyte (1981) asked: "Why is the Northern Ireland problem so intractable?". Whyte argued that psychological factors seemed to play an important part in a situation where there exists a strong emotional attachment to what sometimes appear to be mutually exclusive identities; this seems doubly the case since fifteen years of conflict appear to have reinforced and polarized these identities. The next chapter will examine some of the work carried out by Psychologists on the Northern Ireland conflict and begin to argue for a particular framework within which this thesis is organized.
Chapter 4: Psychology and Northern Ireland

In 1983 Darby edited a book entitled "Northern Ireland: the roots of the conflict" which was intended to convey the results of some research carried out by Social Scientists from Northern Ireland since the conflict had broken out in 1969. Contributions came in the areas of History, Law, Political Science, Economics, Social Anthropology, Education, Geography and Sociology. A notable omission from this list is any contribution from Psychology. Perhaps one reason for this was the fact that Psychologists were relatively late into the academic arena.

Rolston et al (1983) published a bibliography of Social Science research on Northern Ireland. The scope of this bibliography was enormous covering the period from 1945 to 1983; it included not only published papers and books but also as many postgraduate research theses as could be traced. The information they found was categorized under a variety of headings based primarily on the titles of individual pieces of work: it is therefore impossible to categorize the material under disciplinary headings making it difficult to directly assess the contribution of any particular discipline.

Nevertheless it is still possible to gain some indication of the relative extent of Psychological work on the divided society in Northern Ireland. In the section headed "Protestant/Catholic division and Sectarianism" there are just over two hundred and thirty references cited; of these only thirty-one could be described as Psychological in origin. Perhaps more interesting is the date at which this Psychological work was published: figure 4.1 shows the cumulative percentage of all the papers cited in this section by year.
Figure 4.1: Cumulative % of Social Science Papers on 'Protestant/Catholic division and sectarianism' up to 1983.

Figure 4.2: Cumulative % of Psychology Papers on 'Protestant/Catholic division and sectarianism' up to 1983.
of publication. It can be seen that few papers were published before 1969 but that from this date there was a steady output of publications. Figure 4.2 shows a similar graph for the thirty-one Psychological papers: the most notable fact here is that no Psychological papers were published before 1974, none, that is, that were included in this section of the bibliography.

Heskin (1980) examined some possible reasons for this tardiness by Psychologists which he described as puzzling given that many of the problems raised by the conflict (of attitudes, attitude formation and attitude change; of group identity, group allegiance and inter-group conflict; of stereotyping, prejudice and communication) were problems that had engaged the interest of Psychologists throughout the 20th century. Heskin suggested that perhaps local Psychologists were intimidated by their appreciation of the actual complexity of the situation. He dismisses this as unlikely in view both of the fact that local researchers in other disciplines were not affected in the same way, and by the observation that Psychologists in particular do not generally show such restraint in their behaviour.

The second possibility raised by Heskin is that the local Psychologists were discouraged by the "regrettably simple-minded nature" of some of the early work carried out by an American researcher (Fields, 1973; 1977). In the early 1970s this work was controversial enough to lead to Fields' first book being withdrawn and pulped. It would seem that the explanation for this act depends on your attitude to the research itself: those who seem to agree with Fields' conclusions describe the act as a clear case of British censorship (Information on Ireland, circa 1979); to others, including most local Psychologists,
the research was shoddy and error-ridden and should not have been published in the first place. Heskin also criticised other early researchers whose work, being from a Psychiatric perspective, was relevant to Psychology.

To these two possibilities must be added a third, and that is that for whatever reasons, research on the conflict was discouraged within local Psychology departments. This was in fact implied by one ex-Head of Department from Queens University at an informal meeting to discuss conflict-related research.

So far this chapter has pointed to the relatively late entry of local Psychologists to academic discussions on the conflict and to the controversial nature of some of the early psychologically-relevant research. The intention of the chapter is to present a broad indication of the theoretical framework adopted for the present research - the concepts derived from this framework were introduced in chapter 1. Before doing this the chapter will examine some of the early research briefly mentioned above. It will be argued that this early work is important as it set the terms of reference within which much of the later work by local Psychologists was carried out. It will be further argued that one consequence of this has been to de-prioritise theoretical discussion on the contribution that Psychology in general, and Social Psychology in particular, can make to understanding some aspects of the conflict. The chapter will then go on to outline some of the theoretical discussions that took place within European Social Psychology in the 1970s and argue their relevance to the conflict in Northern Ireland.

The early researchers, who tended to be outsiders, were interested in the effects the conflict might have on people living in
Northern Ireland. In particular they were concerned with the effect of the conflict on young children. From a psychiatric approach Fraser (1974) suggested that children in 'normal' situations have to deal with internal conflicts between 'good' and 'bad' generated from the sugerego and id respectively: Fraser argued that one way of dealing with the conflicts was through projection into games - "There must be goodies and baddies, and the goodies must win". In Northern Ireland the problem is that the baddies, the bogeymen, do not just exist in fantasy but are available in the child's own community: the bogeyman to the Protestant child is the Catholic, to the Catholic child the British soldier. The factors which encourage aggressive action towards the bogeyman figure, "fantasies of riddance", include the proximity of the bogeyman, lack of social restraints on aggressive behaviour and modelling on adult behaviour. For the adult, aggressive behaviour is explained by the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard et al, 1939) with the opposite group member perceived as a frustrating agent.

Fraser goes on to suggest that street aggression, the predominant form of aggressive behaviour in the early 1970s, does not appear to have cathartic value: "as a learned behaviour, violence increases and in due course spills out into other areas of a child's life - home and school". Fraser not only details the consequences of the conflict but also suggests how the situation has arisen and what may be done about it. His hypothesis is simply stated: "the trouble in Ulster is not that the Protestants have been unfair to the Catholics, or the Catholics hostile to the Protestants. The problem is that people think in these terms at all". Religious labels provide a basis for a segregated society but are not, for Fraser, the fundamental
cause of the problem: Fraser suggests the problem should be seen in racial terms and hence comparable to other racial conflicts such as that in the United States of America. To Fraser, children need to be taught bigotry so perhaps they can also be taught tolerance: he suggests that integrated education could be an important way of beginning to achieve this, citing optimistic reports of American research as supportive evidence. He suggests, in fact, that total integration from primary-school age upwards would be "the most potent factor in breaking down community barriers and in restoring long-term peace", while continued segregation would mean that "episodes of community strife in Ireland will recur throughout, and possibly beyond, the foreseeable future".

While the efficacy of contact is consigned by Fraser to a longer-term future in Northern Ireland, he goes on to argue the importance of immediate short-term solutions for those children most at risk of psychological disorder as a result of the conflict. On the one hand he suggests a protective zone within which the child is cossetted from all the trauma of violence: "In general, talk, fantasy and preoccupation arising from a frightening event is much more productive of anxiety than the event itself... In our own Child Psychiatry unit, the TV set is turned off at news-time, and this by general consent". On the other hand he proposes therapy for children who do suffer anxiety arguing that even if this is viewed as a mere palliative it can "cushion a patient against the worst effects of his illness" and hence should not be ignored. In his discussion on the stress effects of the conflict Fraser echoes some of the points of another Northern Ireland Psychiatrist (Lyons, 1971) who also accepted that particular people were at risk rather than there being
a danger of societal breakdown. In particular, in riot areas most emotional effects could be described as "normal anxiety" and tended to be short-lived. As such this is in line with psychiatric effects of aerial bombing in the Second World War (Bodman, 1941; Burbury, 1941; Mons, 1941).

At this stage two levels of analysis can be discerned: at an individual level Fraser and Lyons suggest that some, but not a majority, will suffer psychological problems as a consequence of violence; at a social level Fraser is suggesting that violence will remain due to the operation of normal psychological processes in an abnormal situation. For adults the normal psychological process is described by the frustration-aggression hypothesis, while for children it is a mixture of ideas from Freudian psychology and Social Learning theory.

The conclusions of Rona Fields, while sharing some theoretical continuities with Fraser's work, stand in marked contrast primarily due to her combination of individual and social effects (Fields, 1977). Fields argues that not only are children and adults in Northern Ireland suffering severe psychological problems, and she seems to be referring to most, if not all, children and adults, but that these problems are being deliberately induced by a systematic policy of "psychological genocide". She defines this genocide as the "mandated destruction of a group as such, with the sanctions of the social control systems and the objective of 'outlawing' their capacity for perpetuating their own identity". Throughout history, she suggests, this has been accomplished by "massacre in some cases, by intermittent annihilation in other cases, or by a prolonged, sustained subjugation to adversity". In the case of Ireland "it has been accomplished by a combination of these methods". The villain
of the piece is Britain which has for centuries attempted to extirpate the Irish identity. In the current outbreak of violence "as the population accustoms itself to the increasingly stringent measures of law enforcement applied to it, the room for divergent thinking, for non-conformity, dwindles. Authoritarianism is further entrenched by the ubiquitous military presence and by frustration of attempts to participate in government".

The generality of Fields' conclusions and her understanding of Irish history display a timelessness reminiscent of crude nationalism (Anderson, 1984) and attribute a homogeneity of purpose to British policy towards Ireland unsupported by the actual historical record. In some respects this is not surprising given Fields' self-declared sympathy with the Irish cause. While this in itself need not be condemned, it does seem to have seriously affected her conclusions, the generality of which have provided one of the main points of criticism of her work. This is somewhat unfortunate since even when her genocide hypothesis is rejected there still remains some research evidence on individuals, such as that on the treatment of some internees, which raise disturbing questions about aspects of British policy in Northern Ireland (see also McGuffin, 1974) and which have been largely ignored by academic Psychologists. Moreover, it seems that much of the criticism of her work, and that of Fraser, have concentrated on methodological rather than theoretical grounds: the samples are too particular to be representative; better, more appropriate or even just different measuring devices should have been used. It may be more appropriate to examine the theoretical bases of this work.

In the case of Fraser the theoretical framework has been
described: in Fields' work the theoretical framework can be derived from the methodological tools she employs: one of these, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) requires the researcher to show pictures to subjects. The subjects are then asked to generate story-lines from these pictures. The analysis of these story-lines seeks to uncover any unconscious affects in the subjects' thinking: for example, in one of the tests reported in her second book (Fields, 1977) 76 percent of Protestant subjects and 83 percent of Catholic subjects (aged 6-9 years, from Belfast) had "Death-Destruction" endings in their stories, compared to 47 percent and 44 percent of similar subjects from a Dublin sample. Here again some hypotheses from Freudian Psychology are coming into play.

A theoretical critique of this work might have examined the "stipulative statements" (Israel, 1972) behind the theoretical frameworks adopted by these researchers and discussed the applicability of these assumptions to a conflict situation. Alternatively such a critique might have questioned Fields' treatment of individual and social effects as if they were a unitary Psychological phenomenon; or examined the efficacy of the social theory applied by Fraser. Rather than confronting these theoretical issues, much of the research by local Northern Ireland Psychologists presented an alternative set of data which led them to a different set of conclusions and interpretations. Having said this there is a recognition of the importance of these theoretical questions in some of the later research (McWhirter, 1983; Trew, 1983). Moreover, it was suggested above that this early work came to dominate much of the research carried out by local researchers: by this is meant the object of research by local Psychologists which was the effects of
the 'troubles' in general, and the effects on children in particular. This is true not just of the two major publications of local research (Harbison and Harbison, 1980; Harbison, 1983a) but also of work on attitudes (Russell, 1973; Turner et al, 1980), on social awareness (Jahoda and Harrison, 1975; McIvor, 1982; McWhirter, 1981) and on integrated education or contact (Fraser, 1974; Heskin, 1981; Salters, 1981; McWhirter et al, 1984). In this work on contact the latter study is one of the few which actually sets out to assess the impact of contact between Catholic and Protestant young people; this area of research also provides an example of a case where psychological intervention in Northern Ireland, again by Americans, seemed to do harm (Doob and Foltz, 1974a; Doob and Foltz, 1974b; Boehringer et al, 1974; Alevy et al, 1974).

What then were the local researchers saying? It was suggested above that the two main publications of local research are the Harbison volumes (Harbison and Harbison, 1980; Harbison, 1983a). This is true in that they both bring together research findings from a number of different institutions. The former has a more catholic character which can be seen by a look at the four experimental studies described in it: Cairns (1980) described some work on the development of awareness of ethnic cues among young children; McKernan (1980) compared the value system of Catholic and Protestant young people using Rokeach's Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973; see also McKernan and Russell, 1980); Curran et al (1980) examined the propensity for juvenile delinquency in Northern Ireland using the Jessness Inventory; and Mercer and Bunting (1980) examined the motivations behind participation in protest behaviour. Here the concentration is on young people although the range of approaches
is quite wide.

This work also provides a further clue as to why some local researchers were relatively late in examining the Psychological consequences of the conflict: in Cairns' work on the development of ethnic awareness he had to ensure he did not make children aware of differences they were not already aware of. Thus ethical considerations played a part in the early years in encouraging caution; no doubt the damaging intervention mentioned above (Doob and Folts, 1974, etc) helped encourage this attitude. It is also the case that many of the local Psychologists are working from areas outside Social Psychology: there is at least as big a contribution from Developmental Psychologists as Social Psychologists, for example. Over the years, however, the demarcation between the disciplines has broken down: Cairns is a Developmental Psychologist yet one of his most recent contributions (Cairns, 1984) applies Social Identity Theory to the conflict.

The work described in Harbison (1983a) more specifically addresses some of the findings of the early research: again there is a concentration on children, but this time the papers share a generally common interpretation that differs quite markedly with the conclusions of Fraser and Fields. At the specifically individual level, i.e. the cases of young people in Northern Ireland with some degree of disturbance, the evidence suggests that little seems to be caused by conflict-related factors (Blease, 1983; McAuley and Troy, 1983). At the social level there is little evidence that the intergroup conflict has come to dominate children's social evaluations (Cairns, 1983; Trew, 1983) while there is even a suggestion that children are more interested in extra-Northern Ireland politics (Whyte, 1983).
Cairns (1983) goes on to suggest that the feeling of antipathy towards local politics may be so strong that the most able and intelligent young people are leaving the province never to return. Younger children still at school do not show any evidence of attitudinal or behavioural problems and generally achieve high educational attainment (Harbison, 1983b), although this latter conclusion, based on the number of 'A' level passes, ignores the fact that almost twice as many young people in Northern Ireland leave second-level education with no qualifications at all compared to England and Wales (McCormack and Bunting, 1985).

The problem with the contributions to the Harbison (1983a) volume is that they may be shooting a straw man, though not one of their own making: in attempting to rebutt the pessimistic picture provided by Fields and, to a lesser extent, by Fraser, they may have come to an over-optimistic assessment of the psychological impact of the conflict. An alternative viewpoint is provided by Weinreich (1981) and Gallagher (1982) who both suggest that political polarization is a continuing and important aspect of the conflict.

Throughout this discussion so far a distinction has been drawn between individual and social effects: individual effects have been sought in the possibility that living in a society in conflict may cause particular individuals to have psychological or psychiatric problems; social effects are those which suggest or predict outcomes or processes at a wider societal level. Examples of the latter have been described: Fraser suggested that intercommunity violence would remain unless some attempts were made to bring the two racial groups together, for example, integrated education; Fields predicted that without massive rehabilitation efforts the children of Northern
Ireland would become militaristic automatons incapable of participating in their own destiny; Whyte suggested that children in Northern Ireland showed evidence of rejecting the politics of sectarianism; while Cairns suggested that they might leave altogether.

Following from the developments in European Social Psychology mentioned above (Israel and Tajfel, 1972) and the recent upsurge of interest in intergroup behaviour (Kidder and Stewart, 1975; Billig, 1976; Doise, 1978; Zander, 1979; Turner and Giles, 1981; Tajfel, 1982; Brewer and Kramer, 1985) it may be more appropriate to examine the character of the social theory being presented and to ask whether a social theory based on individualistic assumptions should provide the predominant analytical approach to the Northern Ireland conflict. Given that the present work is set within the framework of Social Psychology these points are of particular importance.

The first point to note is the criticisms that have been made of the empiricist assumptions that seem to underly much of the theory and methodology of Social Psychology (Tajfel, 1972; Israel, 1972; Moscovici, 1972). Some of the consequences of this are an over-reliance on experimental studies, the perceived need to measure everything and a theoretical and methodological reductionism. This reductionism, by relying on the necessity of reducing any object of study into its component parts, comes to assume the independent effect of each component and to assume that their incorporation into the whole is only quantitatively different from their existence as independent entities. Thus, for example, groups of people are merely collections of individuals and the psychology of groups can be best understood by first understanding the psychology of individuals.
This approach is perhaps best illustrated by the early attempts to provide a psychological explanation for crowd behaviour or mob behaviour (LeBon, 1896; Allport, 1924). Historically interest in crowd behaviour was high towards the end of the 19th century due to the advent during that century of mass popular protest movements: the defeat of the Absolutist Bourbon regime in France heralded the arrival of 'the people' and popular nationalism on the European political stage and in some ways started the process. Reicher (1984) points out that the response of the establishment to this new political force was "less to understand than to discredit and repress the threat". Thus the social context of crowd behaviour was ignored at two distinct levels: at a descriptive level certain characteristics of the crowd were abstracted from their political context and converted into "generic characteristics of the crowd: violence, irrationality, fickleness, mental inferiority": at a theoretical level individuals in the crowd were said to either lose their individual consciousness and revert to a primitive racial unconscious (LeBon) or to attenuate their individuality (Allport). Reicher argues that by emphasising the primacy of a sovereign individual identity in formulating rational behaviour, both views deny any socially meaningful character to crowd behaviour and deny the link between this behaviour and the social context within which it occurs.

One need not look to history to see similar examples: Billig's detailed critique of Social Psychological attempts to explain intergroup behaviour (Billig, 1976) also points out the generality of individualistic assumptions in much social theory. Freud's explanation of group psychology and his attempt to provide a phylogenetic theory of society were both based on the psychological processes previously
described as operating in individuals: the psychical processes described by the Oedipus Complex were said to operate at all three levels with the superego providing the direct link in each case. Similarly, the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard et al, 1939; Miller, 1941; Berkowitz, 1971) and Game theory both described group processes in terms of individual psychology.

Often these approaches involved implicit ideological or political biases. This point has already been illustrated in Reicher's paper above, but Billig provides a further example from a more recent period: during the 1960s it appeared that dissident aggression, from students or blacks in the United States, was described in terms of the frustration-aggression hypothesis while elite conflict, such as that between the superpowers, was described in terms of Game theory. The implicit assumption here is that dissident aggression can best be understood in terms of its irrationality while elite conflict involves rational bargaining strategies. It is also in some ways remarkable that while Psychologists in the United States were examining 'aggression' they tended to focus on street aggression while ignoring, for example, the mass destruction being carried out in Vietnam.

It is not as if group-based social theory or methodology was missing from Social Psychology. Around the time of the Second World War many European Psychologists had moved to the United States and the ideas and approaches they brought with them played a part in ending what had almost been a Behaviourist hegemony in American Social Psychology. The new Gestalt ideas emphasised the importance of viewing concepts as totalities rather than reducing them to their component elements and led to a change in emphasis in research
(Turner and Giles, 1981). Perhaps the best known research from this period was that of Adorno et al (1950) on the Authoritarian Personality, but other relevant work included that of Lewin, on group dynamics, Sherif, on social norms and social conflict, Asch, on person perception and conformity and Festinger, on social comparison and cognitive dissonance. Asch (1951) demonstrated the effects of group pressure on individual judgements thus illustrating that different psychological priorities may be involved in group situations. More important for the present purposes is the work of Sherif which led to Realistic Conflict Theory.

The details of this work are well known so a brief description will suffice: boys were brought to a summer camp where they were split into two groups which competed with each other. Sherif found that in this competitive situation, where only one group could achieve desired goals, unfavourable stereotypes of the outgroup and its members came into use while at the same time ingroup solidarity increased. In time these unfavourable attitudes towards the outgroup became standardized in the ingroup so that little or no contact was sought with outgroup members. Sherif found that at times this intergroup hostility could break out into physical conflict.

Having achieved intergroup conflict Sherif then sought to reduce it. Initially he attempted contact as it had been suggested that contact under the appropriate conditions could reduce prejudice (Allport, 1954). In fact contact only served to provide an opportunity for exchanging invectives. Sherif then turned to superordinate goals, which he described as goals which were desirable to both groups but which could only be achieved through the combined efforts
of both groups: he found that a series of these superordinate goals did reduce intergroup hostility and conflict. Realistic Conflict theory then emphasised the functional interdependence of groups: when groups were in a situation of competitive interdependence then intergroup hostility and its concomitant features would be found; when groups were in a situation of cooperative interdependence then intergroup hostility would reduce. At a wider political level Sherif suggested that cooperative research in medicine or space might act as superordinate goals for the USA and the USSR and hence reduce Cold War tensions.

The value of this work was the recognition that a group of people was not just a collection of individuals, at a psychological level at least, but involved something extra that needed to be considered on its own terms: "if we have here emphasised the imperative need to study social psychological processes within the framework of hard facts of the wider social scene, it was not to deprecate the importance of individual perceptions and judgements, but to direct attention towards ways of study through which their import may be properly assessed" (Sherif, 1966). This work also demonstrated that a genuine group methodology could be employed by Social Psychologists and a group-based social theory could be generated from it. As Billig (1976) and Tajfel (1972) pointed out, mainstream Social Psychology did not follow the directions laid down by Sherif's work but rather returned to the old reductionist and individualistic assumptions called for in the name of scientific purity.

The earlier part of this chapter argued that Psychological work on Northern Ireland, in particular work on the effects of the conflict,
could be divided into individual and social theory. The latter part of the chapter has suggested that within the category of social theory it is possible to discern two levels of approach: social theory may be based on either individualistic or group assumptions. Most Psychological work on the effects of the conflict has not taken this latter categorization into account primarily because most researchers have been content to work within the received tradition of mainstream Psychology. This is also true of the one book which attempts to present a Social Psychological analysis of aspects of the conflict (Heskin, 1981). For example, in rejecting psychopathology as an explanator of terrorism, Heskin cites the obedience research of Milgram (1974) and Zimbardo's prison experiment (1973) to suggest that terrorist groups are "conflict-oriented groups ... designed to elicit from men (and women) the potential for aggression and cruelty which they clearly possess and to supply them with the means of maximising the effect of that cruelty and aggression." He goes on to suggest that the societal norms that usually keep such behaviour in check are superceded by obedience to the authoritarian structures of the terrorist group. Following Billig's discussion on revolution, Heskin's argument seems to rule out the possibility that members of 'terrorist' groups may share some ideological values or beliefs that motivate them to carry out and justify the acts they do.

This is not to say that one approach is necessarily better than the other but that once it is recognised that both levels of social theory exist then it is important to ask questions and seek answers at both levels of analysis. Just as Mainstream Social Psychology has based much of its social theory on individualistic assumptions, so much of the work on the effects of the conflict in Northern Ireland
has adopted, either implicitly or explicitly, social theory based on individualistic assumptions. Thus much of this work has looked for the social consequences of individual effects: it is not that the wrong questions have been asked, but that not all the questions have been asked. The present thesis is an attempt to ask some of these forgotten questions by examining the social consequences of social effects. The next chapter then will examine some of the experimental and theoretical work that developed in European Social Psychology in the 1970s and 1980s and begin to introduce some of the questions that have been asked in the present research.
Chapter 5: Social Identity Theory

In one of his early 'Boys Camp experiments, the Robbers Cave study of 1954, Sherif described one of the observations made in the study to test the boys' evaluation of one another (Sherif, 1956). Before a baseball game between the two groups of boys the experimenters set up a target board for the boys to throw at: the ostensible reason was to make practice more interesting. There were no marks on the front of the board for the boys to judge objectively how close the ball came to the bull's-eye, although the experimenters had wired flashing lights behind the target so they could observe exactly how well each boy had done. They found that the boys consistently overestimated the performances of the most highly regarded members of the group and underestimated the scores of those of low social standing.

Here was a situation then where a categorisation within a group of boys had led to subjective perceptual distortions that served to reinforce the original social categorisation. Although this operated at an individual level the process is analogous to that described by Sherif as operating at an intergroup level. Analogous too is the competitive nature of the task being carried out, thus emphasising Sherif's suggestion that functional interdependence was the crucial element in this behaviour.

Turner (1981) provides a useful restatement of the main conclusions reached by Sherif:

1) when a group of individuals interact in a situation involving common goals and requiring cooperative interdependent behaviour, a definite group structure will emerge;
2) when two groups come into contact in a situation involving incompatible goals such that achievement for one group implies non-achievement for the other, then competitive behaviour over a period of time will result in hostility between the groups. Several consequences also follow in this situation including the use of stereotyped images of the groups, increased intragroup solidarity and over-evaluation of ingroup attributes;

3) when two groups in conflict interact through superordinate goals, then cooperative behaviour towards the goals leads to an improvement in intergroup relations.

As mentioned above, all these main conclusions stress the need for functional interdependence between the groups before intergroup behaviour will be evidenced. Turner then went on to examine some of the work carried out during the 1960s and 1970s relating to this theoretical framework and draws four main conclusions:

(a) cooperative intragroup interaction tends to increase ingroup favouritism;

(b) competitive intergroup interaction tends to increase intragroup cohesiveness and develop in intergroup hostility accompanied by ingroup-outgroup biases;

(c) cooperative intergroup interaction tends to decrease intergroup distance and ingroup-outgroup biases;

(d) when social interaction is minimised and the salience of the ingroup-outgroup division maximised, the different effects of intergroup cooperative and competitive behaviour tends to disappear -
under these conditions, all forms of anticipated and actual intergroup behaviour seems sufficient for ingroup-outgroup biases.

The general conclusion is that while the functional theory seems to be accurate in regard to its predictions about cooperative and competitive intergroup behaviour, it seems to be inaccurate in regard to its conclusions about social interaction in that social interaction seems to be more important for social attitudes than functional interdependence. It appears that a simple categorisation into an ingroup and an outgroup is sufficient to cause intergroup differentiation, even in the absence of cooperative and competitive behaviour. In this respect it is interesting to note that in one of the Sherif studies where the two groups were brought to the summer camp without ever having met and initially kept separate, the accidental discovery of the other group's existence was sufficient on its own to produce intergroup behaviour (Billig, 1976). The important aspect here is that this occurred before competitive interdependent goals were introduced to the situation. This effect of categorisation will now be examined.

Work on perceptual judgements had indicated that the effect of categorisation was that subjects maximised intercategory differences and minimised intracategory differences (Tajfel, 1957, 1959; Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963). In a typical experiment subjects would be shown six lines and asked to estimate the differences between them. In the control condition subjects were presented with simply six lines; in the experimental condition the lines were categorised into two groups, group A and group B. In this experimental condition the effects described above were found in
the estimations made by subjects. While this research had focused on perceptual judgements, Tajfel suggested that it had certain theoretical continuities to the role of categorisation in the ordering of one's social environment, an idea previously mentioned by Allport (1954).

Working on this hypothesis Tajfel et al (1971) attempted to devise a 'minimal group situation' where all the variables normally leading to ingroup favouritism and discrimination against the out-group were removed, i.e. face-to-face interaction, conflict of interests, any previous hostility between the groups and any link between the subjects' responses and their self-interest. The experiment began by dividing the subjects into two groups ostensibly on the basis of their performance on some trivial task, though the division was actually made on a random basis. Subjects were informed which group they belonged to, but the other group members remained anonymous. In isolation from all other subjects each person then had to allocate points, worth money, between two other subjects, whose group membership alone was known. This was achieved by getting subjects to fill in a series of matrices from which the experimenters were able to examine the strategies adopted by the subjects.

They found that a strategy for achieving maximum ingroup profit had a stronger effect than one allocating the maximum profit to both groups combined, i.e. ignoring the intergroup division. More interestingly however was the strong effect of a winning strategy. This strategy involved allocating the ingroup less in absolute terms to achieve maximum difference in favour of the ingroup. Another interesting finding related to the situation
where subjects had to award points to two other members of the ingroup or two members of the outgroup. In this situation allocation to ingroup members was significantly closer to the maximum total point on the matrices. Since giving points to outgroup members did not involve any lessening of allocation to ingroup members, this result also indicates gratuitous discrimination towards the ingroup.

A number of follow-up studies demonstrated that categorisation was the important factor in the minimal group situation: Billig (1973) investigated whether it was normative expectations of the subjects that had produced the results. He allowed subjects, about to do the experiment, to discuss that task with subjects who had previously taken part. If normative expectations were important then the subjects who had an opportunity to discuss the experiment would be likely to show high levels of discrimination; he found that, contrary to the hypothesis, discrimination was reduced for these subjects. Billig and Tajfel (1973) investigated whether inter-individual similarity was the important feature in the obtained result by manipulating categorisation and similarity in a 2x2 design; they found that categorisation was more important in determining the usual results, with discrimination evidenced when the groups were categorised on an explicitly random basis. Tajfel and Billig (1974) investigated whether familiarity with the experimental setting led to the obtained result. They suggested that if subjects felt more familiar with the setting then they might show reduced discrimination. Contrary to the hypothesis, subjects made familiar with the setting showed higher levels of discrimination.
While these results were originally explained as being due to a purely cognitive effect of categorisation, and some researchers continue to present such a perspective (Doise and Sinclair, 1973; Doise, 1978), the main theoretical development has concentrated on the operation of a motivational process. As a cognitive entity, a social category is meaningful to a subject. One of the most important consequences of social categorisation then is to help create and define the individual's own place in society, that is, her social identity. In other words, part of her social identity will be derived from her knowledge of her group membership(s).

Following Festinger (1954) who suggested that individuals have a drive to evaluate themselves in terms of others, Turner (1975) hypothesised that people will seek to achieve a positive social identity through comparison with other groups. Further, these social comparisons will focus on the establishment of psychological distinctiveness between one's own group and other groups. Thus, it is the establishment of social psychological distinctiveness that is seen to be the major outcome of the sequence social categorisation - social identity - social comparison.

Experimental evidence for this suggestion has been forthcoming. Oakes and Turner (1980) pointed out that one aspect of this motivational approach is that minimal group discrimination would increase subjects' self-esteem. It is not clear how the cognitive alternative could suggest this result. They carried out an experiment using the minimal group situation and asked subjects to fill in a number of scales relating to self-esteem after they had completed the matrices. In all three scales were used and the results indicated that significant increases in
levels of self-esteem were found in two of them. The authors concluded that this provided some evidence to support the motivational analysis.

Turner (1978) attempted to provide further support for the motivational analysis by devising a situation where categorisation in the minimal group situation did not produce discrimination. Since an important aspect of the motivational analysis is that social comparisons work to provide psychological distinctiveness between the groups in favour of the ingroup, and lead towards the achievement of a positive social identity, then if that positive evaluation can be achieved without recourse to the group categories, categorisation on its own will be insufficient to produce discrimination. To investigate this, Turner got subjects to fill in two sets of matrices: in one set the allocations were between self and other (SO), the other being from either the ingroup or the outgroup; in the second set of matrices the choices were the usual ones between two others (OO), with the two others being from either the ingroup, outgroup or both.

In the experiment two conditions were used; in the first condition the SO choices were made first and followed by the OO choices, in the second condition the order was reversed. It was hypothesised that all subjects would show some discrimination towards the self in the SO choices, but that discrimination in the OO choices would only occur in the second condition. The reason for this was that subjects in the first condition were able to achieve a positive evaluation without recourse to the group categories. The results showed that this explanation had some validity thus providing some further support for the motivational
analysis. This study also provided some support for the suggestion that discrimination in the minimal group situation was not due to conflict over monetary awards since the same effects were found when abstract points were allocated (see also Commins and Lockwood, 1979).

Having established the theoretical framework the next task is to apply it to the analysis of social situations (Tajfel, 1981). Tajfel makes it clear in his work that social identity is not seen as a static entity - no attempt is made to describe 'what it is', but rather it is dealt with as an intervening causal mechanism of social change. From this perspective, three categories of situations are seen as particularly interesting: a badly defined social situation where individuals have difficulty defining their place, a situation where a 'superior' group finds its position threatened either through impending or already occurring social change, or through some conflict of values inherent in the 'superiority', and finally the situation where an 'inferior' group either comes to question the legitimacy of its 'inferiority', or recognises the feasibility of alternatives to the existing situation, or more usually a combination of these two. In this discussion the terms 'superior' and 'inferior' refer to psychological correlates of dimensions of social differentiation such as discrepancies between groups in status, power, domination, etc.

The dynamic approach to problems of social identity is defended by pointing to the insecure nature of group identities: for an inferior group to hold a secure identity implies a universal and permanent acceptance by that group of their inferior position. While it may be possible that this type of situation prevails in
some social system for long periods of time, there is little to suggest that this will always be the case. For a superior group Tajfel argues that a secure identity is a contradiction if even for the simple reason that the superior position needs to be maintained. Even in the most rigid hierarchical societies a superior group can never stop working at the preservation of its distinctiveness.

In a situation where group membership does not provide positive social identity, a number of different strategies are available to the individuals involved. The simplest available to members of either the superior or the inferior groups is to leave the group, i.e. social mobility. This is essentially an individual response and as such is of little interest when concentrating on intergroup behaviour. Two other reasons make social mobility of little interest here: Firstly, many social situations do not permit social mobility between groups, and secondly, conditions often exist which encourage people to stay in their groups and seek to achieve positive identity through specifically group strategies. Another strategy that individuals may adopt is exit, i.e. leaving the situation where the groups interact altogether.

For superior groups the strategy of most interest here is that leading to new justifications of the status quo. Examples of this are the creation and adoption of ideologies such as the 'white man's burden' or the notion of the 'inherent superiority' of one group over another. This strategy need not necessarily depend on the production of completely new ideologies as certain situations allow for the reproduction of older justifications which are still servicable.
Strategies for the inferior group range on a continuum from assimilation into the superior group to social change in the relations between the groups. Each of these strategies can be illustrated by examples: many immigrants to the United States in the early years of this century explicitly sought to assimilate into American society; a reformist strategy, such as that pursued by the American Civil Rights Movement, sought to change the values of the dimensions of comparison between black and white such that dimensions that previously evoked negative comparisons now evoked positive ones. Many examples of the final strategy mentioned above are possible: this is the case of revolution where an inferior group sets out to radically alter the context of and relationship between the groups. Tajfel also mentions a fourth strategy: the creation of new dimensions by the inferior group such that comparisons on these new dimensions cast the inferior group in a better light. He suggests that this strategy is primarily included for its potential theoretical interest, as providing specific examples of this strategy is problematic.

Two concepts are worth emphasising here: these are the concepts of legitimacy/illegitimacy and stability/instability. Before an inferior group will seek to do something about its negative social identity, the group members must recognise its position to be illegitimate. At the same time, however, a situation may be seen as illegitimate and yet nothing is done about it because the group members do not see any possible alternatives, i.e. the status quo has an appearance of stability.

Some experimental evidence consonant with the foregoing ideas has been provided by Turner and Brown (1978) who manipulated
whether status differences were perceived as secure or insecure by focusing on the legitimacy and stability of those status differences. In the experiment they used Arts and Science students as subjects. The subjects were told that the experiment involved an evaluation of reasoning skills. High/low status was achieved by telling the subjects that either Arts or Science students were better at this task; legitimacy was manipulated by telling subjects that the status difference was not surprising or surprising, reasonable and fair or unreasonable and unfair in terms of their real abilities, and did not or did arise from some handicap or disadvantage for the low status group. Stability was manipulated by the experimenter confiding in subjects that he was either certain or not certain that that particular sample would conform to the usual findings, i.e. that they would reflect the general status differences between the categories.

They found that high status groups tended to discriminate when either a legitimate superiority was threatened or an illegitimate superiority was perceived as stable. In the situation where an illegitimate superiority was also seen as unstable, they tended to stress alternative status dimensions. For low status groups discrimination was evidenced when their inferiority was illegitimate, more so when it was also unstable. They suggest that it is the combination of the perceived illegitimacy and instability that seems most conducive to the rejection of consensual inferiority by low status groups and it is perhaps this that underlies the rapid growth of ethnocentrism amongst minority groups in recent years. This is also suggested as being a possible explanation for the fact that it was the more educated blacks who
took part in riots in the United States. It was that group which was more influenced by Black nationalism in the Third World and arguably more likely to perceive that not only was economic discrimination unjust, but also that change was possible.

Social Identity Theory has not been without its critics: it has been suggested, for example, that the Tajfel matrices are not the most appropriate for measuring ingroup bias (Bornstein et al, 1983a, b; Turner, 1983a, b) while others have questioned the concentration on discrimination (Branthwaite et al, 1979; Turner, 1980; Mummendy and Schreiber, 1983). Despite this the basic results of the 'minimal group paradigm' do seem to have a considerable robustness, as evidenced by two recent reviews (Tajfel, 1982; Brewer and Kramer, 1985): the former of these, for example, points to at least thirty studies which "used minimal or near minimal categorisation with diverse populations of Ss, independent variables and dependent measures, and which all show ingroup-favouring bias". It is also true that Social Identity Theory has provided a rich set of hypotheses in a variety of social settings (Tajfel, 1982), including the Northern Ireland conflict (Cairns, 1982), while the theoretical reorientation that led towards it has had a large and beneficial effect on European Social Psychology generally (Tajfel, 1984a, b).

This brief review has concentrated on the basic outlines of Social Identity Theory: the ideas that led to the initial work; the early studies that helped to clarify the basic issues involved; and the second stage of studies that helped refine the hypotheses of the theory. The present interest is not so much in refining particular aspects of Social Identity theory but rather in pursuing
the general nature of social identity. In particular, the present research is interested in the way the theory understands the concept of social identity and what role the theory allocates to social identity in real-life situations. A useful starting point then might be to consider the fundamental role allocated to identity by the theory in group formation. Turner (1984) pointed to three criteria of group formation thought to be important in Social Psychological theory:

(a) the identity criterion - the idea that a collection of people define themselves and are defined as a group; they share some collective perception of themselves as a social entity.

(b) the interdependence criterion - the idea that they should be positively interdependent in some way, in goals, needs, attitudes or mutual attraction; Sherif, for example, argued that cooperative interdependence enhanced social cohesion.

(c) the criterion of social structure - the idea that the social interaction between these individuals ought to be stabilised, organised and regulated by a system of roles and status differentiation, and shared norms and values.

Turner argued that Social Identity Theory indicated the identity criterion to be fundamental while the other two need not be considered so: social cohesion, for example, may follow from rather than precede group formation; in the same way, similarity may be an important basis for group formation due to its role as a cognitive cue to the formation of social categorisations rather than because of its effect on interpersonal attraction. One of the issues raised by this is that whereas Sherif's Realistic
Conflict Theory would suggest that cooperative interdependence reduces intergroup conflict, Social Identity Theory would suggest that a superordinate goal may in fact enhance intergroup behaviour if the superordinate goal threatens the group identities. Brown (1984) presents an experimental study supporting the hypothesis from Social Identity Theory.

With the central focus on identity Gallagher (1982), following Branthwaite and Jones (1975), investigated one aspect of the conflict of identity in Northern Ireland. Gallagher used the methodology of the minimal group paradigm but with real group labels rather than a trivial group categorisation: in that particular case the aspect of identity investigated was religion (Catholic-Protestant). The present study extended this work by looking at aspects relevant to the conflict of identity in Northern Ireland. Three experimental studies were carried out and the next chapter will examine the results of this work.

While the first part of this chapter has concentrated on theoretical discussion, the next part will describe the methodological approach adopted in the present work. This will concentrate specifically on the three experimental studies directly based on Social Identity theory. The general method described below is common to all three studies, with minor variations.

Subjects for the studies were invited to participate in a study on social identity; at the time of recruitment no mention was made of the experimenter's interest in the Northern Ireland conflict. Each volunteer was given an appointment to attend the test centre in the Psychology Department of the Queen's University of Belfast. On arrival at the test centre the subject was handed
a booklet and directed to a table where they read the instructions and completed the booklet, alone and in their own time; normally subjects took about 25 to 30 minutes to complete the booklet. When the subject had finished the purpose of the research was briefly outlined and they were invited to ask any questions they might have. In the first two studies described in Chapter 6 no payment was offered to subjects; in the third and final study each participant was offered a payment of one pound.

**Booklets:**

The booklets given to subjects contained the following sections:

(a) a set of instructions on how to complete the booklet;
(b) a page asking subjects to allocate themselves to one of two described groups;
(c) a series of matrices with which subjects would allocate points to ingroup and outgroup members;
(d) two questions asking subjects to describe how and why they had made the pattern of point allocations they had, or indeed if there had been any pattern to the allocations at all.

Sections (a), (c) and (d) were identical in all three studies. Section (b) contained descriptions of two groups and these group descriptions differed in each study: the particular descriptions used in each study are described in Chapter 6.

In addition to this, studies 2 and 3 included some further questions. The nature of these and the results obtained from them will be outlined in Chapter 7.
In any of the studies it was possible that some subjects may have been unable or unwilling to allocate themselves to either one of the two groups described. When this happened the subject would be given an alternative booklet where the groups were differentiated on the basis of sex; in fact this was very rare. No subject, on discovering the nature of the study, declined to participate.

Points were allocated by the subject choosing a pair of numbers on a series of 2x13 or 2x14 matrices, making one choice per matrix. On any one matrix the points could be going to two ingroup members, two outgroup members or one member of the ingroup and one member of the outgroup. In the instructions the subjects had been told that each participant in the study had been allocated a code number to preserve individual anonymity. Thus the only information the subjects had about those they were allocating points to was their group membership, and it was up to the subjects whether they wished to make use of this information or not. The points were described as abstract entities. They were also told that they were not in a position to allocate points to themselves.

Section (d) had been included to differentiate those subjects for whom the presented group labels appeared to be most salient. Branthwaite and Jones (1975) had used an alternative strategy for this, but it was felt that the present method was more appropriate for Northern Ireland subjects. If a subject answered the questions in this section by describing any strategy that made use of the group labels then it was assumed that the labels were salient for that subject; if a subject reported no use of the presented group labels then it was assumed that those group labels were not salient for that subject (the most frequent occurrence of this was when a
subject reported their allocation strategy to have been totally random).

Matrices:

Three types of matrices were used in the studies, corresponding to types A, B and C in the Branthwaite and Jones (1975) study. Using these matrices allows for the examination of three distinct strategies:

1) Maximum Joint Profit (MJP): subjects maximise total allocations regardless of the group categorisation;
2) Maximum Ingroup Profit (MIP): subjects maximise allocations to ingroup members regardless of the effect on outgroup members;
3) Maximum Difference (MD): subjects allocate points to maximise the difference between ingroup and outgroup members in favour of the former.

A total of 32 matrices were presented to subjects with two matrices per page of the booklet; the order of presentation was randomised. A typical page from a booklet is shown in Appendix 1.

Matrices could be presented in one of four configurations:

(a) points on the top and bottom rows going to ingroup members (I/I);
(b) points on the top and bottom rows going to outgroup members (0/0);
(c) points on the top row going to ingroup members, points on the bottom row going to outgroup members (I/0);
(d) points on the top row going to outgroup members, points on the bottom row going to ingroup members (0/I).
The number of each type of matrix presented and the configurations are:

Type A: 0(a), 0(b), 4(c), 4(d); total = 8
Type B: 2(a), 2(b), 4(c), 4(d); total = 12
Type C: 2(a), 2(b), 4(c), 4(d); total = 12

grand total = 32

The effects for the strategies of each configuration are given in Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 together with an example of each matrix type:

Figure 5.1: Type A Matrix

```
  18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11  9  8  7  6  5
  5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
```

I/O: MJP constant; MIP+MD left-hand side
0/1: MJP constant; MIP+MD right-hand side

Figure 5.2: Type B Matrix

```
 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11  9  8  7
  1  3  5  7  9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
```

I/I: MJP right-hand side
0/0: MJP right-hand side
I/O: MJP right-hand side; MIP+MD left-hand side
0/I: MJP+MIP+MD right-hand side
Figure 5.3: Type C Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>23</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I/I: MJP right-hand side
0/0: MJP right-hand side
I/O: MJP+MIP right-hand side; MD left-hand side
0/I: MJP+MIP+MD right-hand side.

Analysis

Use of the matrices allows for three types of measures to be derived:

1) between group measures;
2) within group measure - ingroup favouritism;
3) within group measure - discrimination against the outgroup.

A detailed discussion of the rationale and techniques of derivation of these measures can be found in Bornstein et al (1983a) and Turner (1983a). A brief account of the derivation of the various measures is given here.

1) Between group measures:

Two measures are used to compare the levels of discriminatory behaviour between the groups. The first measure is derived from the Type A matrices: each point on the matrix is scored from 0 to 13 (I/O) or 13 to 0 (O/I). Thus the maximal value of MIP+MD is 0. A low score on this measure indicates gratuitous discrimination in favour of the ingroup.
The second measure is derived from the 0/0 and I/I matrices and is termed the Ingroup/Outgroup score. Points on the 0/0 matrix are scored from 12 to 0, thus the maximal value of MJP for the outgroup is 0; points on the I/I matrix are scored in a similar fashion so that the maximal value of MJP for the ingroup is also 0. The mean score on the I/I matrices is then subtracted from the mean score on the 0/0 matrices: (0/0) - (I/I). The resultant measure lies on a scale from -12 to +12 with a high positive score indicating gratuitous discrimination in favour of the ingroup.

2) Within group measure: Ingroup Favouritism:

Examination of whether members of either group are displaying Ingroup Favouritism in their point allocations is carried out using the Type B matrices. Initially three scores are derived from the basic matrix:

- \( B(I/0)a \) score 0(MIP+MD) to 12(MJP)
- \( B(I/0)b \) score 12(MIP+MD) to 0(MJP)
- \( B(0/I) \) score 12 to 0(MJP+MIP+MD)

The pull of MJP on MIP+MD is then given by \( B(I/0)a - B(0/I) \); the resultant scale lies from -12 to +12 with the maximal effect of MJP equal to +12.

The pull of MIP+MD on MJP is given by \( B(I/0)b - B(0/I) \); the resultant scale lies from -12 to +12 with the maximal effect of MIP+MD equal to +12.

Any effect of Ingroup Favouritism is then obtained by comparing the scores of (MJP on MIP+MD) and (MIP+MD on MJP): Ingroup Favouritism is found when the latter score is higher.
3) Within group measure: Discrimination Against the Outgroup:

Examination of whether members of either group are displaying Discrimination Against the Outgroup is carried out by using the Type C matrices. Initially three scores are derived from the basic matrix:

- \( C(I/O)a \) score 0(MD) to 12(MJP+MIP)
- \( C(I/O)b \) score 12(MD) to 0(MJP+MIP)
- \( C(0/I) \) score 12 to 0(MJP+MIP+MD)

The pull of MJP+MIP on MD is given by \( C(I/O)a - C(0/I) \); the resultant scale lies from -12 to +12 with the maximal effect of MJP+MIP equal to +12.

The pull of MD on MJP+MIP is given by \( C(I/O)b - C(0/I) \); the resultant scale lies from -12 to +12 with the maximal effect of MD equal to +12.

Any effect of Discrimination Against the Outgroup is obtained by comparing the scores of (MJP+MIP on MD) and (MD on MJP+MIP): Discrimination Against the Outgroup is found when the latter score is higher.

So far then we have examined the basic theoretical background to the experimental studies of the present research and the general method used in those studies. The next chapter will go on to consider the detail of those studies both in terms of the particular aspects of identity considered and the implications of the results.
Chapter 6: Dimensions of Division in Northern Ireland: experimental studies using identity labels

Having outlined the methodology used in the present study in Chapter 5, this chapter will examine the findings of the experimental studies carried out. The chapter will begin by briefly examining what in general this approach may tell us. Following this we will look at the particular aspects of identity investigated in the first two studies and the results of that work. A third study, using a similar method but a slightly different design, will then be described.

Following the description of the methodology in Chapter 5 there are two particular aspects worth emphasising: firstly, real-life group labels are presented to subjects; and secondly, these group labels are presented in a bipolar form putting subjects in a forced-choice situation between two options. This form allows for the investigation of how subjects see their group (identified by the label they have chosen) in relation to a particular out-group (identified by the label they have not chosen), that is, within a particular intergroup context. Branthwaite and Jones (1975) used this method to investigate the way subjects who described themselves as either 'English' or 'Welsh' perceived that intergroup context. They found that the 'Welsh' subjects tended to show ingroup favouritism and discrimination against the out-group while the 'English' subjects did not. In fact, on certain matrices the 'English' subjects displayed favouritism towards the outgroup.

In Social Identity terms these findings may be described thus:
the 'Welsh' subjects, though consciously wishing to be identified as Welsh, were aware of an inequitable relationship between the groups (perhaps in terms of status or prestige) and so compensated by favouring the ingroup and discriminating against the outgroup; in the English-Welsh context to be Welsh provided a negative contribution to social identity even though membership was desirable in itself. For the 'English' subjects no such difficulty existed, that is to say there was no need to create a positive distinctiveness between the groups favouring the ingroup. The fact that there was some evidence of favouritism towards the outgroup would suggest that the 'English' subjects were in some ways sympathetic to the Welsh case. If, on the other hand, 'Welsh'-ness was seen as a threat to the identity of the English group, perhaps through a widely supported militant nationalism, then perhaps the 'English' subjects would also discriminate in favour of the ingroup in order to maintain a legitimate, if threatened, distinctiveness.

It is this situation that may more accurately describe the relations between the majority and minority in Northern Ireland. If this is true then it might be expected that presenting Northern Ireland subjects with a similar task and with group labels relevant to the conflict would produce evidence of ingroup favouritism and discrimination against the outgroup. Gallagher (1982) carried out such a study using religious group labels (Catholic-Protestant) although the pull-scores calculated in that study were not exactly as described in the previous chapter. Tables 6.1a and 6.1b present the pull-scores from the data of that study recalculated (on a scale of -12 to +12) in line with the
present study: table 6.1a presents the pull-scores for all the subjects taking part in the study while table 6.1b presents the pull-scores for those subjects for whom the group labels appeared to be most salient (determined by their response to the question contained at the end of the booklet).

**TABLE 6.1a:** INGROUP FAVOURITISM AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE OUTGROUP FOR ALL SUBJECTS (Calculated from Gallagher, 1982).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INGROUP FAVOURITISM</th>
<th>DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE OUTGROUP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MJP on MIP+MD</td>
<td>MIP+MD on MJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATHOLIC</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sd</td>
<td>1.951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTESTANT</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sd</td>
<td>2.523</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 6.1b:** INGROUP FAVOURITISM AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE OUTGROUP FOR 'SALIENT' SUBJECTS (Calculated from Gallagher, 1982).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INGROUP FAVOURITISM</th>
<th>DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE OUTGROUP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MJP on MIP+MD</td>
<td>MIP+MD on MJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATHOLIC</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sd</td>
<td>1.785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTESTANT</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sd</td>
<td>1.852</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As is clear from Table 6.1a all the results are in the expected direction save that for ingroup favouritism for the Protestant group; however, none of these results reach significance. When only the scores for the subgroup of subjects for whom the group labels appeared to be most salient are considered (Table 6.1b) then the level of ingroup favouritism is significant for both groups (Catholic: \( df=17, p<0.025, \) 1-tailed; Protestant: \( df=17, p<0.10, \) 1-tailed; correlated t-tests) while the level of discrimination against the outgroup is significant for the Protestant group (\( df=17, p<0.10, \) 1-tailed, correlated t-test). Differences between the groups, as measured by Ingroup/Outgroup choices and Type A matrices (Table 6.2) are not significant.

**TABLE 6.2: INGROUP/OUTGROUP AND TYPE A MATRIX SCORES**
(Calculated from Gallagher, 1982)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>INGROUP/OUTGROUP SCORES</th>
<th>TYPE A MATRIX SCORES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>( \bar{X} )</td>
<td>( sd )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATHOLIC</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.490</td>
<td>3.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATH. sal.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.049</td>
<td>3.356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTESTANT</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.599</td>
<td>3.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROT. sal.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.109</td>
<td>3.229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To a certain extent then these results confirm expectations even if significant levels of intergroup behaviour are only found for a subgroup of the overall subject population; this subgroup does comprise a majority of both groups: 64.3 percent of the
Catholic subjects and 69.2 percent of the Protestant subjects.
This focus on religious social identity is clearly justified: anthropological research (Harris, 1972; Burton, 1978), survey data (Rose, 1971) and psychological research (Weinrich, 1981) all point to the importance of religion in Northern Ireland. At the same time the psychological (reviewed by Trew, 1983) and anthropological research (reviewed by Donnan and McFarlane, 1983) which points to areas of activity where religion seems to be less important need not confound the earlier work (or Gallagher, 1982) if a clear differentiation is maintained between interpersonal and intergroup (or private and public) contexts: all the evidence in the latter context seems to highlight the importance of religion.

While religion may be the most public dimension of division in Northern Ireland it is not the only one: in many ways it could be argued that competing national allegiances or political aspirations form more fundamental dimensions of division. The partition of the island in 1921/2 partially satisfied the demands of Irish nationalists for an Independent Irish state while at the same time partially satisfying the demands of Ulster unionists for a continuation of the link with Great Britain. The solution, which created a 26-county Free State in the South and a 6-county province of the United Kingdom in the North, might have worked successfully save for the fact that the Catholic minority in the North (about a third of the population) by and large refused to confer legitimacy on the governmental and administrative structures of the new statelet (Farrell, 1980). It was not until the middle 1960s, for example, that the Nationalist party accepted the role
of 'Official Opposition' in the Northern Parliament. Since then Catholic political support has concentrated behind the Social, Democratic and Labour party (SDLP) which demands an Irish dimension to any new governmental structures in Northern Ireland before it will agree to participate. The more recent upsurge of support for Sinn Fein, despite that party's unequivocal support of the 'armed struggle' for a 32-county Socialist Republic of Ireland, only serves to highlight this political dimension.

The only two major attitude surveys carried out in Northern Ireland also highlight the potential divisiveness of the national dimension: Catholics tend to describe themselves as Irish (76 percent: Rose, 1971; 69 percent: Moxon-Brown, 1983) with a remarkable homogeneity of response across class (Table 6.3).

TABLE 6.3: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND SOCIOECONOMIC CLASS
(adapted from Moxon-Brown, 1983)

PROTESTANTS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL CLASS</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C1</th>
<th>C2</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% British</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Ulster</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CATHOLICS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL CLASS</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C1</th>
<th>C2</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Irish</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Protestants tend to describe themselves as British (39 percent: Rose; 67 percent: Moxon-Brown) or 'Ulster' (32 percent: Rose; 20 percent: Moxon-Brown) although there is not the same degree of
cross-class homogeneity of response (Table 6.3). Few Catholics describe themselves as British (15 percent: Rose; 15 percent: Moxon-Brown) or 'Ulster' (5 percent: Rose; 6 percent: Moxon-Brown) while few Protestants describe themselves as Irish (20 percent: Rose; 8 percent: Moxon-Brown). These figures particularly highlight the potential divisiveness of this dimension since the various labels mentioned need not necessarily be mutually exclusive except in some official sense for, say, passports.

Given this background it was decided to carry out two experimental studies; the first would focus on national allegiance (Irish-British) while the second would focus on political aspiration (Nationalist-Unionist). The procedure adopted for both studies and the method of scoring were as described in Chapter 5. The only differences between the two studies were in the number of subjects who took part and the descriptions of Group A and Group B. In the first study the descriptions were:

Group A: group A members are those who consider themselves to be British.

Group B: group B members are those who consider themselves to be Irish.

Subjects were then asked to indicate which of the two was most important if they had chosen both.

In the second study the descriptions were:

Group A: group A members believe that whatever the future might hold the best future for Northern Ireland lies in the continuation of the Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Group B: group B members believe that whatever the future might hold the best future for Northern Ireland lies in the unification of North and South in an Independent Republic of Ireland.

What expectations might we have for the results of these two studies?

1) in both studies the group labels might be expected to be salient to most subjects;
2) both studies should show evidence of intergroup behaviour; at the very least significant levels of ingroup favouritism, and perhaps discrimination against the outgroup, should be found with those subjects for whom the group labels appear to be most salient. There should be at least similar trends of these in the results of the overall groups;
3) it is unclear what differences there may be between the groups in each study;
4) one caveat is that while the Catholic-Protestant and Nationalist-Unionist categorisations are mutually exclusive the Irish-British categorisation need not be. Therefore:
   4a) subjects in the Irish-British study might show lower levels of intergroup behaviour than either the Catholic-Protestant or the Nationalist-Unionist studies;
   4b) subjects in the Irish-British study who describe themselves as both Irish and British, despite the one they eventually opt for, might be expected to show less evidence of intergroup behaviour than those subjects opting for one identity originally.
Having described the background and hypotheses for these studies we will now look at the results.

**STUDY 1: NATIONAL ALLEGIANCE (IRISH-BRITISH)**

**Subjects:**

Subjects were recruited from the first-year laboratory classes in the Department of Psychology. The sex of subjects was not taken into account. A total of 66 subjects took part in the study: 4 who described themselves as Irish and 1 who described himself as British failed to complete the booklet correctly, therefore these results are derived from the scores of 61 subjects.

**TABLE 6.4: NUMBER OF SUBJECTS ACTING IN TERMS OF THE GROUP LABELS - NATIONAL ALLEGIANCE STUDY.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>+G</th>
<th></th>
<th>-G</th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRISH</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Results:**

Table 6.4 presents the number of subjects who acted in terms of the group labels and those who did not (as determined by their responses to the question at the back of the booklet). This table also details the number of subjects in each of the Irish and British groups. It is clear from this table that the majority of
subjects in both groups acted in terms of the group labels; these labels would therefore appear to be salient to most subjects taking part in the study.

Of those subjects describing themselves as Irish only three were Protestant, the rest Catholic; of those describing themselves as British only two were Catholics, the rest Protestant. All three 'Irish' Protestants and two 'British' Catholics acted in terms of the group labels and their results were included in the statistical analysis.

Of the total number of subjects taking part in the study 21 described themselves as both Irish and British and all but 4 of these 21 finally opted for the British group. The scores of these subjects are examined below.

**TABLE 6.5a: INGROUP FAVOURITISM AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE OUTGROUP FOR NATIONAL ALLEGIANCE STUDY (ALL SUBJECTS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INGROUP FAVOURITISM</th>
<th>DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE OUTGROUP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MJP on MIP+MD</td>
<td>MIP-MD on MJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRISH</td>
<td>N=27</td>
<td>-0.796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X=2.420</td>
<td>4.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>N=34</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X=1.713</td>
<td>4.662</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tables 6.5a and 6.5b present the pull-scores for ingroup favouritism and discrimination against the outgroup; the latter table is the data for the subgroup of subjects who acted in terms of the group labels. Considering the data in Table 6.5a a series of one-tailed correlated t-tests indicated significant levels of ingroup favouritism and discrimination against the outgroup for both groups:

**Ingroup favouritism:**
- British subjects - t=4.589, p<0.000, df=33;
- Irish subjects - t=4.606, p<0.000, df=26;

**Discrimination against the outgroup:**
- British subjects - t=3.026, p<0.005, df=33;
- Irish subjects - t=2.557, p<0.01, df=26.

With significant levels of intergroup behaviour found on the scores of all subjects there is no need to examine the scores of that subgroup of subjects for whom the group labels appeared to be most salient: for these subjects the trends above will only be enhanced. With national allegiance the focus of intergroup
division then, hypotheses 1 and 2 have been supported.

**TABLE 6.6:** INGROUP/OUTGROUP AND TYPE A MATRIX SCORES FOR NATIONAL ALLEGIANCE STUDY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INGROUP/OUTGROUP SCORES</th>
<th>TYPE A MATRIX SCORES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td><strong>( \bar{X} )</strong></td>
<td><strong>sd</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRISH</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR.sal</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1.801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIT.sal</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2.559</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between group scores, as measured by the Ingroup/Outgroup choices and the Type A matrices (Table 6.6), show no significant differences; the raw scores indicate no evidence of any non-significant trend, the Irish subjects showing marginally more discriminatory behaviour on the Ingroup/Outgroup choices while the British subjects show marginally more on the Type A matrices.

Comment on hypothesis 4a, that is, that subjects in the Irish-British study might show lower levels of intergroup behaviour than either the Catholic-Protestant or Nationalist-Unionist studies, will be reserved until the data on political aspirations (Study 2) has been presented. However at this stage a simple comparison between the scores of the overall groups (Tables 6.1a and 6.2 compared to Tables 6.5a and 6.6) does not seem to support the hypothesis.

Finally, hypothesis 4b suggested that subjects who described
themselves as both Irish and British would show less evidence of intergroup behaviour than subjects who only opted for one identity. As mentioned above only 4 subjects who finally opted for the Irish identity originally described themselves as both, so analysis here concentrates on the 17 British subjects who originally described themselves as both British and Irish.

**TABLE 6.7:** PULL SCORES FOR BRITISH SUBJECTS DESCRIBING THEMSELVES AS BOTH BRITISH AND IRISH (1) AND THOSE DESCRIBING THEMSELVES AS BRITISH ONLY (2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJP on MIP+MD</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIP+MD on MJP</td>
<td>3.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJP+MIP on MD</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD on MJP+MIP</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup/Outgroup</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.7 presents the mean pull-scores for these British subjects who described themselves as British and Irish, and the mean scores for those subjects who described themselves as British alone. Although these differences are in the expected direction they do not reach significance for any of the pull-scores.

To summarize then: the results above show that the majority of subjects taking part in the study found the group labels presented to be salient. When the results for all subjects were analysed it was found that significant levels of ingroup favouritism and discrimination against the outgroup were found for both
groups. A simple comparison with the pull-scores calculated from the Gallagher (1982) study, where religious group had been used, suggested that the national allegiance labels overall evoked greater levels of intergroup behaviour. Finally, given the potential non-exclusivity of the Irish and British labels it was suggested that subjects who described themselves as both, whatever the option they finally chose, would show less evidence of intergroup behaviour than those subjects who opted for one identity originally; while a trend was found in this direction it did not reach significance. The implications of these results will be discussed in more detail after the results of the study on political aspirations have been presented.

STUDY 2: POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS (NATIONALIST-UNIONIST).

Subjects:
Subjects were recruited from the first-year laboratory classes in the Department of Psychology. The sex of subjects was not taken into account. A total of 90 subjects took part in the study; 2 who described themselves as Unionist and 1 who described himself as Nationalist failed to complete the booklet correctly, therefore these results are derived from the scores of 87 subjects.
Results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 6.8: NUMBER OF SUBJECTS ACTING IN TERMS OF THE GROUP LABELS - POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS STUDY.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONALIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIONIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.8 presents the number of subjects who acted in terms of the group labels and those who did not. Over the course of all the studies so far there is a discernible trend towards a smaller minority of subjects not acting in terms of the group labels.

Of the 44 Unionist subjects 10 were Catholic, the rest were Protestant: of the 10 'Unionist' Catholics all but 1 acted in terms of the group labels. Of the 43 Nationalist subjects 3 were Protestant, the rest Catholic: all 3 'Nationalist' Protestants acted in terms of the group labels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 6.9a: INGROUP FAVOURITISM AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE OUTGROUP FOR POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS (ALL SUBJECTS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INGROUP FAVOURITISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONALIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIONIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 6.9b: INGROUP FAVOURITISM AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE OUTGROUP FOR POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS STUDY (SALIENT SUBJECTS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INGROUP FAVOURITISM</th>
<th>DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE OUTGROUP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MJP on MIP+MD</td>
<td>MJP+MD on MJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAT.sal</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>5.955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sd 1.645</td>
<td>4.987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN.sal</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>6.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sd 1.826</td>
<td>5.811</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.9a presents the pull-scores for all the subjects in both groups. A series of one-tailed correlated t-tests indicated significant levels of ingroup favouritism and discrimination against the outgroup for both groups:

**Ingroup favouritism:**
- Unionist subjects - \( t = 7.262, p < 0.000, \text{df} = 43; \)
- Nationalist subjects - \( t = 7.275, p < 0.000, \text{df} = 42; \)

**Discrimination against the outgroup:**
- Unionist subjects - \( t = 6.500, p < 0.000, \text{df} = 43; \)
- Nationalist subjects - \( t = 5.675, p < 0.000, \text{df} = 42. \)

The results suggest support for hypothesis 1, that the group labels would be salient to most subjects, and hypothesis 2, that significant levels of intergroup behaviour would be found.

As in the study on national allegiance there were no significant differences between the groups when the pull-scores from the Ingroup/Outgroup choices and the Type A matrices were compared (Table 6.10). It is also not possible to draw any
conclusions about possible trends from these data.

TABLE 6.10: INGROUP/OUTGROUP AND TYPE A MATRIX SCORES FOR POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS STUDY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>INGROUP/OUTGROUP SCORES</th>
<th>TYPE A MATRIX SCORES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONALIST</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAT.sal</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3.643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIONIST</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN.sal</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis 4a had suggested that subjects in the Irish-British study may show lower levels of intergroup behaviour than those in both the Catholic-Protestant and the Nationalist-Unionist studies. Even without statistical analysis this hypothesis has clearly not been supported since the levels of intergroup behaviour in the Irish-British study are higher than those of the Catholic-Protestant study, even though the levels for the Nationalist-Unionist study were higher than both.

To summarize: in this study competing political aspirations have formed the intergroup context within which subjects were asked to make their point allocations. A majority of the subjects acted in terms of the group labels presented and significant levels of ingroup favouritism and discrimination against the outgroup were found. No significant differences were found between the groups.
As expected the levels of intergroup behaviour in this study were higher than those found in the Irish-British study; that this is due to the potential non-exclusivity of the Irish and British labels is, however, unlikely in view of the fact that the levels of intergroup behaviour in the Irish-British study were higher than those of the Catholic-Protestant study.

General Discussion:

Gallagher (1982) had examined the role of religion (Catholic-Protestant) as a 'dimension of division' in Northern Ireland. Subjects were placed in a Catholic-Protestant intergroup situation and given an opportunity to engage in discriminatory behaviour on the basis of these group labels. Some evidence of such intergroup behaviour was found. The present study extended this work by examining the roles of national allegiance (Irish-British) and political aspiration (Nationalist-Unionist) in similar experimental settings. On the basis of available evidence it was suggested that these two 'dimensions of division' would be salient to most subjects and that evidence of intergroup behaviour would be found in both studies. While the dimensions of religion and political aspiration are mutually exclusive, the dimension of national allegiance need not be so; for this reason it was suggested that the level of intergroup behaviour in the study focusing on national allegiance would be lower than those focusing on religion or political aspiration. Finally, it was not thought possible on the basis of existing evidence to predict the extent, or direction, of differences
between the groups; in fact no significant differences between the groups were found.

Whereas in the Gallagher (1982) study on religion significant levels of intergroup behaviour were only found for that subgroup of subjects for whom the group labels appeared to be most salient, in the two studies presented here significant levels of such behaviour were found with the data of all the subjects: as might be expected from this result, the number of subjects who described themselves as acting in terms of the group labels was also higher in these two studies. This would suggest that, in line with expectations, national allegiance and political aspiration do form important and salient 'dimensions of division' in Northern Ireland. It would therefore seem to be overly simplistic to describe the conflict in terms of any one of these dimensions alone. The popular perception of the conflict in Northern Ireland as a religious war is not tenable on this evidence; nor, however, is the view that religion is totally unimportant.

Regarding the relative impact of the different dimensions of division it was felt that with the importance attached to the mutual exclusivity of groups in Social Identity Theory then the national allegiance study would show less evidence of intergroup behaviour than the other two. A simple comparison between the results of Gallagher (1982) and the study on national allegiance indicates this view to be unfounded, as the level of intergroup behaviour is higher in the latter case. One explanation of this may be that the potential non-exclusivity of the national allegiance labels might act to enhance intergroup behaviour; subjects in such a forced-choice situation who have to opt for one
identity alone, when they may have felt attached to both, may decide to deal with the psychological dilemma created by emphasising the distinctiveness of the option chosen. Despite the apparent attraction of this argument, it seems untenable for two reasons: firstly, the results for those British subjects who did actually identify with both labels show a lower level of intergroup behaviour than those who opted for the British identity alone, even if the differences are not significant; secondly, the level of intergroup behaviour found in the political aspiration study was higher than the previous two. If the potential non-exclusivity of the national allegiance labels serves either to reduce or enhance intergroup behaviour then the level of such behaviour in that study would be either lower or higher than when the focus was on religion or political aspiration: in fact the level was higher than in the religion study and lower than in the political aspiration study.

At this point then it would seem that the potential non-exclusivity of the Irish-British identities does not seem to be an important factor, despite the importance attached to it in Social Identity Theory. There still remains the steadily increasing levels of intergroup behaviour evidenced across these three sets of results, so there may be a differential impact for these three dimensions of division. It may be that when religion is the focus of identity then members of both groups feel most secure insofar as there is less motivation to create a distinctiveness between the groups; when political aspirations is the focus of identity then insecurity may be at its peak since there is more evidence of attempts to create this distinctiveness.

Such a conclusion would be premature on the present data due
to the time difference between the studies: the study on religion (Gallagher, 1982) was carried out in the autumn of 1981, while those on national allegiance and political aspiration were carried out in the autumn of 1982 and 1983 respectively. This period coincides with the political rise of Sinn Fein following the end of the Republican hunger-strikes. It may be then that the data indicates an increased polarisation and heightened insecurity in Northern Ireland generally rather than reflecting differences between the different dimensions examined.

It was decided to test these alternative explanations of the data by carrying out a further study where two dimensions of division would be presented. Given that the greatest time lapse and the widest difference between levels of intergroup behaviour existed for the studies on religion and political aspiration, it was decided to use these two dimensions in the study to be described below. If time is the important factor then there should be no difference in the levels of intergroup behaviour found for each dimension; if, on the other hand, the dimensions do have a differential impact then the levels of intergroup behaviour should be higher on one dimension: on the basis of the studies above the Nationalist-Unionist dimension should be the higher of the two.
STUDY 3: RELIGION AND POLITICAL ASPIRATION: 
DIMENSIONS OF DIVISION COMPARED

Subjects:

60 subjects were recruited from the first-year laboratory classes in the Department of Psychology. The sex of subjects was not taken into account. The results from 8 subjects could not be used as they either completed the booklet incorrectly or were not from Northern Ireland.

It had been intended to recruit a further 60 subjects from a non-university environment to widen the population sample in the study. Three separate establishments were approached; two refused permission after examining the general research proposal; the third establishment initially granted permission but this was withdrawn on the day the experimenter arrived to begin testing. In all cases the authorities expressed a fear that the research might provoke sectarian tensions. This was unexpected as all three establishments had permitted their students to be recruited for conflict-related research in recent years. This experience does illustrate, however, some of the difficulties of research in Northern Ireland.

Procedure:

The procedure adopted in this study was virtually identical to that of the first two studies described in this chapter. The only difference was that subjects were given one of two types of booklet: the descriptions of Group A and Group B differed in the two types of booklet, but apart from that the booklets were identical. In one type of booklet the group descriptions were
identical to those used in Study 2 - the group descriptions here focused on political aspiration. In the second type of booklet the group descriptions were:

Group A: group A members are Protestant.
Group B: group B members are Roman Catholic.

Each subject received one type of booklet only. The assignment of a subject to either the religion condition or the political aspiration condition was random.

Results:

TABLE 6.11: NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN EACH CONDITION IN STUDY 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIONIST</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONALIST</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTESTANT</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATHOLIC</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.11 presents the number of subjects who fell into each of the four conditions. Of the 15 Unionist subjects 3 were Catholic, the rest Protestant; of the 12 Nationalist subjects one described herself as 'Christian' and the rest were Catholic.
### TABLE 6.12: INGROUP FAVOURITISM FOR ALL CONDITIONS IN STUDY 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MJP on MIP+MD</th>
<th>MIP+MD on MJP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIONIST</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sd</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONALIST</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sd</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTESTANT</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sd</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATHOLIC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sd</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.12 presents the means and standard deviations for the four conditions for 'MJP on MIP+MD' and 'MIP+MD on MJP': these scores are used to examine any effect of Ingroup Favouritism. A 4x2 (repeated measures) ANOVA (with unequal cell n's) was carried out on the data (cf. Winer, 1972, for details of computation). The summary table is given in Table 6.13.

### TABLE 6.13: ANOVA SUMMARY TABLE (UNWEIGHTED MEANS SOLUTION) FOR INGROUP FAVOURITISM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (conditions)</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>2.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects within groups</td>
<td>592.4</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (measures)</td>
<td>414.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>414.4</td>
<td>36.718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>2.644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B x Subjects within groups</td>
<td>541.8</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As might be expected there is a strong effect of Ingroup Favouritism within the groups (observed $F = 36.718$, $p < 0.00$, $df = 1,48$); there is also a difference between the groups (observed $F = 2.308$, $p < 0.10$, $df = 3,48$) and an interaction (observed $F = 2.644$, $p < 0.10$, $df = 3,48$). The meaning of this can be seen most clearly in Figure 6.1: while the result of Study 2 has been repeated for the political aspirations conditions, there seems to have been a differential impact in the religion conditions with the Catholic subjects displaying high levels of Ingroup Favouritism while the Protestant subjects do not.

**TABLE 6.14: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE OUTGROUP FOR ALL CONDITIONS IN STUDY 3.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MJP+MIP on MD</th>
<th>MD on MJP+MIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIONIST</td>
<td>X = 0.20</td>
<td>MD = 4.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sd = 1.56</td>
<td>sd = 4.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONALIST</td>
<td>X = 0.06</td>
<td>MD = 4.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sd = 0.98</td>
<td>sd = 5.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTESTANT</td>
<td>X = -0.75</td>
<td>MD = 1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sd = 1.87</td>
<td>sd = 2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATHOLIC</td>
<td>X = 0.25</td>
<td>MD = 4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sd = 2.08</td>
<td>sd = 4.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.14 presents the means and standard deviations for the four conditions for 'MJP+MIP on MD' and 'MD on MJP+MIP', the scores used to examine any effect of Discrimination Against the Outgroup. A 4x2 (repeated measure) ANOVA (with unequal cell n's) was carried out on these data. The summary table is given in Table 6.15.
TABLE 6.15: ANOVA SUMMARY TABLE (UNWEIGHTED MEANS SOLUTION) FOR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE OUTGROUP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (conditions)</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>2.502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects within groups</td>
<td>546.8</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (measures)</td>
<td>362.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>362.0</td>
<td>32.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>0.888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B x Subjects within groups</td>
<td>536.8</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a strong effect of Discrimination Against the Outgroup within the groups (observed $F = 32.375$, $p<0.00$, $df = 1,48$) and a difference within the groups (observed $F = 2,502$, $p<0.10$, $df = 3,48$) but no interaction (observed $F = 0.888$, ns.). A similar pattern of result to that found for Ingroup Favouritism has not been repeated for Discrimination Against the Outgroup, but as Figure 6.2 shows there is at least a similar trend in the data: subjects in the Protestant condition are showing lower levels of Discrimination Against the Outgroup than subjects in the other three conditions.

TABLE 6.16: INGROUP/OUTGROUP AND TYPE A MATRIX SCORES FOR ALL CONDITIONS IN STUDY 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INGROUP/OUTGROUP</th>
<th>TYPE A MATRIX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIONIST</td>
<td>$\bar{x}$:2.98</td>
<td>$sd$:3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONALIST</td>
<td>$\bar{x}$:2.96</td>
<td>$sd$:4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTESTANT</td>
<td>$\bar{x}$:1.47</td>
<td>$sd$:1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATHOLIC</td>
<td>$\bar{x}$:1.95</td>
<td>$sd$:3.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 6.1: Mean pull-scores on Ingroup Favouritism

Figure 6.2: Mean pull-scores on Discrimination against the Outgroup
Table 6.16 presents the scores for Ingroup/Outgroup choices and the Type A matrices: these are used to examine between group differences. Two 4x1 ANOVAs (with unequal cell n's) on these scores show no significant effects (Tables 6.17 and 6.18) although the pattern of discriminatory behaviour is consistent for both measures: the Protestant subjects display less discriminatory behaviour than the Catholic subjects, who in turn display less than both the political aspiration conditions (the levels of discriminatory behaviour for both these conditions are practically identical).

**TABLE 6.17: ANOVA SUMMARY TABLE FOR INGROUP/OUTGROUP SCORES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.5277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>599.9</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>619.7</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 6.18: ANOVA SUMMARY TABLE FOR TYPE A MATRIX SCORES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.7168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>282.9</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>313.3</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussion:

This study was carried out to see whether the dimensions of religion and political aspiration had a differential impact on subjects or whether the results obtained in the earlier studies had been more influenced by time. It was suggested that if time was the important factor then the levels of intergroup behaviour should be similar for both dimensions examined in the study. If time is not as important as the impact of particular dimensions then it was suggested that the levels of intergroup behaviour found with the political aspirations dimension should be higher than the levels found for the religion dimension.

In fact the picture that emerges from the results of the study is a little more complex. The level of intergroup behaviour found in this study was high for both groups on the political aspirations dimension (Nationalist/Unionist) but for only the Catholic group on the religion dimension. It would seem that the Catholic subjects in this study have behaved more like the Nationalist subjects of this study (or the Nationalist subjects for 1983 reported in Study 2) than the Catholic subjects of 1981 (Gallagher, 1982); on the other hand the Protestant subjects of this study have behaved more like the Protestant subjects of 1981 (Gallagher, 1982) than the Unionist subjects of this study or Study 2.

It would seem possible to derive two main conclusions from these results: firstly, when the various elements of identity of the minority group in Northern Ireland are considered they do not appear to have a differential impact; it would seem that for this
group the pattern of results described over all the studies in this chapter is more attributable to time than to any other factor. Secondly, when the various elements of identity of the majority group in Northern Ireland are considered it does not appear that time is such an important factor: rather it would seem from the pattern of results described over all the studies in this chapter that for this group the different aspects of their identity themselves have a differential impact. The pattern of results would suggest that for the majority group an intergroup context defined in terms of religion is more secure than one defined in terms of mutually exclusive political aspirations, as in this latter case there is more evidence of a motivation to create a positive distinctiveness between the groups.

Having made these general conclusions it would be appropriate to include an important caveat: the general applicability of these conclusions is limited by the relatively small numbers of subjects involved in the study. That this is due in part to the unwillingness of certain educational institutions in Northern Ireland to permit this research through their doors, an unwillingness that may reflect an attempt to either hide from or ignore the sectarian tensions that exist in the province, may be ironic but it does not solve the problem. Nevertheless, despite the relatively small number of subjects used in this last study, the pattern of the results overall is quite remarkable and does tie in with other evidence.

In the case of the minority group in Northern Ireland the results here would seem to confirm the notion of increased alienation from the state since the end of the Republican
hunger-strike (see, for example, the report of the New Ireland Forum). This alienation is marked most dramatically by the political rise of Sinn Fein but, as will be described later, can also be seen in a hardening of attitudes by the main minority political party, the Social, Democratic and Labour party (SDLP) over the same time period. In terms of Social Identity Theory this polarisation of the minority community may be due to a perception that the legitimacy and/or stability of the status quo has diminished, or that the possibility of 'right-ness' of change in their desired direction has increased. This is indicated in the data both by the levels of intergroup behaviour found and by the similar effects for both minority identity-labels. The former indicates a willingness on the part of the subjects to create a distinctiveness between the groups in favour of the ingroup which itself seems to reaffirm the commitment to and value of the identity espoused. The latter result at least indicates an enhanced willingness to create this distinctiveness and may suggest an essential unity in the various identity labels that define who and what the minority group is.

For the majority community in Northern Ireland the results here suggest that time is less important than a differential impact of the two identity-labels, with the Protestant identity appearing most secure. Perhaps this is because it defines the group within itself and differentiates it from the other group on the island; not only this, it differentiates the groups on a potentially antagonistic criterion. Roman Catholicism and Protestantism are certainly historically antagonistic: perhaps Northern Ireland is one of the places where this remains so. Compare this to the
identity provided by the political aspiration of maintaining the Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Whereas the Protestant identity provides an internal criterion of the group the efficacy of maintaining the Union depends not only on continued support within Northern Ireland but also continuing support from Great Britain: in essence this means that the majority community relies on the continuing support of the British government. An identity provided by this political aspiration then contains not only an internal, intragroup criterion but also an external referent that can be influenced but not controlled. From the imposed reforms of 1969 through the abolition of Stormont in 1972 to the contemporary Anglo-Irish dialogue this is an external referent that may not always be reliable.

Elements of this analysis can be found in Miller's (1978) historical study of Ulster Loyalism. Miller argues that Ulster Loyalists have always owed primary loyalty to themselves: any loyalty to Britain is dependent on a Hobbesian type of social contract where both parties (in this case the Ulster Loyalists and the British government) agree to uphold certain obligations to each other. Hence the proposals for UDI mooted by the Vanguard organisation in the early to middle 1970s (Miller, 1978; Boulton, 1973) were not so much an abberation as one possible way forward consistent with a wider world-view.

While such contractarian ideas may not be explicitly articulated in any general sense, their primary importance may lie in their existence within the wider world-view of the majority community. As such the political aspiration that relates to
these ideas, the maintenance of the Union, may provide one definor of the community (in contradistinction to the alternative aspiration for a united Ireland) the impact of which may be relatively independent of other definors, or identity-labels, such as that provided by religion: actions by the British government may affect the value or security of the 'Unionist' identity while not affecting the value or security of the 'Protestant' identity. This relative independence in the impact of the identity labels seems to be indicated by the results of the study described above.

This discussion has concentrated on the general conclusions that can be derived from these experimental studies. As was mentioned earlier, additional information was sought from subjects in the second and third studies: some of this information relates to the particular notions of security and stability of identity-labels that can be derived from Social Identity Theory. This additional information will be examined in the next chapter which will also summarise the main findings of the experimental work.
Chapter 7: Dimensions of Division in Northern Ireland: Social Perceptions

In outlining the psychological processes described by Social Identity Theory, Tajfel pointed to the key role of two concepts; legitimacy and stability. It was argued that intergroup comparisons, and social action, were most likely to occur when an intergroup context came to be seen as both illegitimate and unstable. When illegitimate the context needed to be altered to some degree or shored up, depending on the position of the group in the overall context; when unstable, the context was seen to be capable of change or in immediate need of reinforcement, again dependent on the position of the group.

While a general survey of the particular confluence of political forces in the middle and late 1960s in Northern Ireland can provide some support for the role of these psychological concepts (see in particular the writings of participants, e.g. Devlin, 1969; McCann, 1980; Farrell, 1980; Nelson, 1975, 1984) how useful are they in understanding the experimental results of the present study. As indicated in the previous chapter, the final two experimental studies included items consonant with this theme. This chapter will examine that data and then go on to outline the other additional information sought from the experimental subjects. Following this the chapter will begin to introduce an alternative methodological track adopted in the present research.
For the purposes of the experimental studies it was decided to concentrate on the perceived instability of the intergroup context. The basic hypothesis would be that as the perceived instability of the status quo increases then intergroup comparisons and social action to enhance the positive distinctiveness of the groups would also increase. For Northern Ireland subjects 'perceived instability' may be considered as operating in two distinct ways; for the majority group, i.e. those that support the status quo, perceived instability may be thought of as either an increased threat to their desired outcome (the maintenance of the union) or as the increased likelihood of an undesirable outcome (a united Ireland); for the minority group instability may be described as the increased likelihood of a desirable alternative to the status quo or as a weakening of the status quo. Undoubtedly for both groups the twin elements are linked.

Working on this relatively straightforward rationale the procedure adopted was to ask subjects to respond to a series of 'instability statements' on a rating scale. The particular rating provided by the subjects on each statement could then be correlated with their matrix pull-scores to assess any causal link between them.

For the 1983 study, where the group labels were defined in terms of political aspiration, three 'instability statements' were provided. Subjects were asked to rate their responses to the statements on a five point scale. The instructions to the subjects and the details of the statements are to be found in the appendices. The first statement concerned the degree of perceived threat to the union between Great Britain and Northern
Ireland; the second to the perceived security of the union; and the third to the perceived likelihood of a united Ireland.

In the 1984 study, where group labels were defined in terms of religion and political aspiration, an additional statement was included: this concerned the perceived determination of the British to stay in Northern Ireland (this statement is also in the appendix). A further innovation of the 1984 study was that subjects' ratings were made on a ten point scale.

Tables 7.1 to 7.4 present the subjects' responses on these 'instability statements'.

**TABLE 7.1: Instability Statement - Union Threatened to Union not Threatened (Scale: 1983: 1 to 5; 1984: 1 to 10)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (1-5)</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>sd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 7.2: Instability Statement - Union Secure to Union Not Secure (Scale: 1983: 1 to 5; 1984: 1 to 10)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (1-5)</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>sd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.87</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 7.3: Instability Statement - United Ireland likely to United Ireland not likely (Scale: 1983: 1 to 5; 1984: 1 to 10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>(\bar{x})</th>
<th>sd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 7.4: Instability Statement - British determined to stay to British determined to leave (Scale: 1984: 1 to 10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>(\bar{x})</th>
<th>sd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An examination of the mean scores suggests that the 'unionist' and 'Protestant' subjects believe the union to be secure and not threatened, a united Ireland to be unlikely and the British to be determined to stay in Northern Ireland. The 'nationalist' and 'Catholic' subjects, on the other hand, believe the union to be insecure, to be threatened and a united Ireland to be likely; these subjects also believe that the British are determined to stay in Northern Ireland, although less so than the 'unionist' and 'Protestant' subjects. It should also be noted that the standard deviations, in most cases, straddle the mid-point of the scales suggesting that some subjects in each experimental group disagree with the overall picture provided.
by the mean scores.

These scores were correlated with the pull-scores for ingroup favouritism (MIP+MD on MJP) and discrimination against the outgroup (MD on MJP+MIP). In both the 1983 and 1984 studies some significant correlations were found, but in fact these were surprisingly few; in the 1983 study the expressed likelihood of a united Ireland was negatively correlated with discrimination against the outgroup (p<0.05) for the 'unionist' subjects - the 'unionist' subjects who believed a united Ireland to be likely tended to show more evidence of discrimination against the outgroup. In the 1984 study 'nationalist' subjects who believed the union to be threatened tended to show more evidence of discrimination against the outgroup (p<0.025).

While it is possible to break down the groups in a variety of ways and in so doing slightly increase the number of significant correlations, the emergent picture from these data is that the notions of an increased instability of the status quo or a heightened insecurity of ingroup identity do not seem to provide a strong explanation for the increased levels of ingroup favouritism or discrimination against the outgroup found in the studies described earlier. This need not, of course, deny the important role attached to such concepts in Social Identity Theory. Rather the data may suggest that those concepts apply at a particular level of generality in intergroup relations. In the case of Northern Ireland such concepts may illuminate some of the psychological processes that aided the move towards widespread social disorder; they may be less useful in charting the particular course of that disorder once it has broken out.
In this regard it is interesting to note an additional finding of the 1982 study. As will be described below, subjects in this study had been asked, in their experimental booklet, to rate seven Northern Ireland political parties in order of preference. Tables 7.5 and 7.6 present the mean scores for ingroup favouritism and discrimination against the outgroup for the overall 'unionist' and 'nationalist' groups and the same information broken down by the first preference choice of the subjects.

**TABLE 7.5:** Ingroup Favouritism and Discrimination against the outgroup - unionist subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Ingroup Favouritism</th>
<th>Discrimination against Outgroup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5.36 (5.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUP</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.06 (5.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.25 (1.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.46 (5.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.12 (3.57)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* OUP = Official Unionist Party; DUP = Democratic Unionist Party; ALL. = Alliance Party; SDLP = Social, Democratic and Labour Party.

**TABLE 7.6:** Ingroup Favouritism and Discrimination against the outgroup - nationalist subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Ingroup Favouritism</th>
<th>Discrimination against Outgroup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5.38 (5.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4.14 (4.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.62 (4.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers'</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.25 (5.40)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* SF = Sinn Fein; Workers' = Workers' Party.
It is clear from these mean scores that higher levels of discriminatory behaviour are found from those subjects who support the more extreme political parties (the Democratic Unionist party and Sinn Fein). This, of course, raises the question as to why people support extreme political parties in the first place.

7.2 Additional information on political perceptions

Subjects in the 1983 and 1984 studies were asked to provide some information relating to Northern Ireland political issues. Firstly they were asked to indicate how interested they were in politics; secondly they were presented with a list of possible sources of political opinion and were asked to indicate which, if any, of these sources they used; finally they were asked a series of questions concerning seven political parties in Northern Ireland. The only difference between the two studies concerned the content of the list of sources of political opinion. All the details of these items are included in the appendices.

7.2.1 Political parties

Tables 7.7 to 7.10 present the information from the subjects on seven political parties in Northern Ireland. Table 7.7 contains the mean rank preference for each of the experimental groups; Table 7.8 indicates the extent to which the subjects felt they knew what each of the parties stood for; Table 7.9
indicates how right-wing or left-wing subjects believed the parties to be; and Table 7.10 indicates how extreme or moderate subjects felt the parties to be.

**TABLE 7.7: Mean ranks of political party preferences**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1983 Study</th>
<th>1984 Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUP</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL.</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILP</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>3.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>6.84</td>
<td>3.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 7.8: Perceived knowledge of political parties policies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1983 Study</th>
<th>1984 Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUP</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL.</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILP</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 7.9: Perceived political orientation: right 1 to 5 left

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUP</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL.</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILP</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>3.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 7.10: Perceived political orientation: extreme 1 to 5 moderate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUP</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL.</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILP</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>3.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>3.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering the party preferences first it can be seen that the unionist groups (1983 and 1984) and the Protestant group (1984 only) consistently placed the Official Unionist party or the Alliance party in the top three positions; for the 1984 groups the Democratic Unionist party also receives a relatively high ranking. The clear unpopularity of Sinn Fein to these subjects should also be noted. Considering the nationalist and the Catholic groups the preferred party here is clearly the SDLP; although there is no clear second preference, this position
is usually filled by either the Workers' party or the Alliance party. It should be noted that the relatively low ranking of Sinn Fein by these experimental groups seems to be due to the range of ranks for this party: it would seem that subjects either give Sinn Fein a very high preference or a very low preference.

The main value of this information lies in what it tells us about the sample of subjects used in these studies: in recent years the level of support for each party at elections has been roughly 30% Official Unionist, 25% Democratic Unionist, 20% SDLP, 10% Sinn Fein and 5% Alliance party - Workers' party and various Labour candidates receive 1 or 2% support. Given the confessional character of Northern Ireland politics most Protestants support the Unionist parties while most Catholics support either the SDLP or Sinn Fein; only the Alliance party makes a direct appeal to and receives significant support from both communities.

If Table 7.7 is considered in the light of this information it would seem that the experimental sample used in these two studies may have had an over-representation of 'moderates'. This is important as the findings of the previous chapter cannot now be explained away by an over-representation of 'extremists' in the sample. This is not to claim, of course, that the experimental sample is fully representative of the Northern Ireland population but rather that, at least in political terms, it is not grossly skewed.

It is most useful to consider the information in Table 7.8 in the light of Tables 7.9 and 7.10. From these latter tables
it can be seen that the experimental subjects consistently describe the 'Catholic' parties as left-wing and the 'Protestant' parties as right-wing; within this Sinn Fein are seen as the most left-wing party while the Democratic Unionists are seen as the most right-wing. These two parties are also seen as the most extreme by the experimental subjects although it should also be noted that the nationalist and Catholic groups see the Official Unionists as extreme while the unionist and Protestant groups see the Workers' party as extreme.

While there is nothing remarkable or new in these findings, Table 7.7 indicates that both Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist party are both ranked high on perceived knowledge; that is to say, the experimental subjects have indicated they feel they have a good idea what these political parties stand for. The only group not to accord with this general picture is the 1984 Catholic group where perceived knowledge is highest for the SDLP and higher for the SDLP, Sinn Fein and the Workers' party than the rest. Apart from this the general picture is that subjects claim to know more about the more extreme parties, whichever 'side' those parties happen to be on. It may be that identifying a political group as extreme is all you need to know about it: if you support that party then perhaps their 'extremism' requires greater commitment on your part, hence your greater knowledge of what the party stands for; if you oppose that party then to know it is extreme marks it as not just wrong but dangerously wrong and a clear enemy - what else do you need to know about them. This finding will be returned to in a later chapter in the light of additional information.
7.2.3 *Political information and interest*

Subjects were asked to indicate how interested they were in obtaining up-to-date information on politics on a five point (1983) or ten point (1984) scale, a high score indicating interest. Table 7.11 presents the mean scores for each of the experimental groups.

**TABLE 7.11:** Interest in Politics - little interest to much interest
(Scale: 1983: 1 to 5; 1984 1 to 10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (1-5)</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>sd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (1-10)</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>sd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most interesting feature of the table is the score for the Protestant (1984) group which is significantly lower (p<0.05) than the other three groups in that study. Since this group was also the one with the lowest pull-scores on the Tajfel matrices (cf. chapter 6) there may be some relationship between interest in politics and the social identity measures. It should be noted, however, that there is no significant correlation between interest in politics and the pull-scores for all the subjects in the 1984 study and that the Protestant (1984) group is not more 'moderate', in terms of political party preference (Table 7.7), than the unionist group in the same study.

Since the subjects were randomly assigned to the experimental
groups the important feature here may be that the question on interest in politics was answered after subjects had completed the matrices: if the suggestion of Chapter 6 is accurate, that is that for the Protestant group the intergroup context was not interpreted as threatening, then perhaps that context did not heighten the issue of politics as might have happened for the other three groups. While this may explain the findings in Table 7.11 the suggestion is tentative and requires more controlled examination. The finding should, however, encourage caution in over-generalising the analysis presented at the end of Chapter 6.

Subjects were also presented with a list of sources of political information, ranging from radio and TV to newspapers to books and meetings, and were asked to indicate which, if any, of the sources they used. Table 7.12 presents the number of sources used by each of the experimental groups (note that the number of sources presented to the 1984 subjects was slightly higher than presented to the 1983 subjects).

TABLE 7.12: Number of media sources used (subject based)
(1983 max = 11; 1984 max = 13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>( \bar{X} )</th>
<th>sd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first point of note on this table is that the Protestant (1984) group reports using the least number of sources; also noteworthy is that the nationalist and Catholic groups consistently report using more sources of political information.

Table 7.13 presents the percentage reported use of each of the sources: the Irish News and News Letter are Belfast morning papers, the former being broadly nationalist in outlook and the latter broadly unionist; the Belfast Telegraph is the only evening paper in Northern Ireland and has the widest circulation in the province; NI political papers referred to those papers produced by political groups in the province; periodicals referred to both Irish and British magazines, for example Magill or New Society. Examination of Table 7.13 indicates the sources of difference found in Table 7.12: nationalist and Catholic subjects, in both studies, make greater use of Eire papers, of NI political papers, of books and of discussions with friends. In addition to this the nationalist and Catholic subjects make greater use of the Irish News while the unionist and Protestant subjects make greater use of the News Letter.

To a certain extent these findings are not unexpected and may reflect the orientation of the groups to the political status quo in Northern Ireland. Since Northern Ireland is 'British' and the main sources of political information are news programmes on British, or British-oriented, television or radio any nationalist who wishes to obtain information from a different perspective has to go to alternative sources: for example, until recently the only way to obtain information on
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) 1984 Study</th>
<th>Unionist</th>
<th>Nationalist</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish News</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eire papers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Letter</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British papers</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belfast Telegraph</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI political papers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodicals</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debates/meetings</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(b) 1983 Study</th>
<th>Unionist</th>
<th>Nationalist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NI newspapers</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eire papers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British papers</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI political papers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodicals</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debates/meetings</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the politics of Sinn Fein was to read their publications since spokesmen were rarely quoted on television or radio - as the 'Real Lives' episode of 1985 indicated such coverage can still be controversial. So, the findings of Tables 7.12 and 7.13 need not suggest that nationalists or Catholics take a more active interest in political information but rather that one's orientation to the political status quo may effect the range of sources of political information used.

7.3 Conclusions

At the end of Chapter 6 an analysis of the role of the different aspects of social identity examined in the experimental studies was presented. This analysis was primarily based on the results of the experimental studies although some supportive evidence was presented. The main point of this analysis was that the different aspects of social identity of the minority in Northern Ireland seemed to share some essential unity while the aspects of social identity of the majority group seemed to have a degree of independence: given the empirical effects found with the Tajfel matrices the suggestion was that for a majority group member the twin elements of identity had a differential psychological impact because they were, to group members, psychologically separable. This was so because they could be described as relying on separable contexts: to focus on Protestant identity was to focus on an intra-Northern Ireland context that was relatively secure while to focus on a pro-union
identity shifted the context to the United Kingdom hence implying a reliance on outside forces. For the minority group, on the other hand, the twin aspects of identity had a similar impact suggesting that to group members they were seen as different identifiers of the same context.

The generality of this analysis was tempered by the relatively low number of subjects involved in the experimental studies, particularly the 1984 study, but having said that some of the evidence from Chapter 7, particularly that concerning the political party preferences of subjects, does not suggest that the experimental subjects were a totally unrepresentative sample.

Perhaps more important for the analysis of Chapter 6 was the role played by the stability or instability associated with the particular intergroup context under examination. This was investigated and the results presented at the start of the present chapter: there was, however, no strong evidence of a link between the pull-scores on the Tajfel matrices and the various 'instability statements' presented to the subjects. Some of the other evidence of this chapter suggests that there may be some link between the political attitudes of the subjects, as represented by their support of the different political groups in Northern Ireland, and their pull-scores on the matrices. What this suggests is that the objectively defined identities and contexts of the experimental studies may be subjectively defined in different ways by ingroup members depending on the particular perspective they bring to the situation.
This seems to suggest an alternative method for examining the role of social identity in the Northern Ireland situation: the experimental studies rely on the presentation of an objectively defined intergroup context to subjects whose reactions to that context are then examined to see if (a) the context is salient to them or not, and (b) if it is salient, what is the nature of their reaction and what conclusions can be drawn from it. The alternative would be to allow subjects themselves to subjectively define the context since the evidence above suggests that this may play an important role.

Given the object of our research what we are talking about here are the political attitudes of people, since these indicate how the conflict is represented or understood, and what these attitudes tell us about the role of social identities. Before doing this it is necessary to examine our theoretical understanding of what 'political attitudes' are as this will have important methodological implications. The next chapter will begin this discussion.
In Chapter 5 the theoretical discussions that led to the development of Social Identity theory were discussed. One of the main points of this discussion was the necessity for a genuinely social theory of intergroup behaviour: the focus of theory and research thus shifted from the individual to the group with the recognition that the latter represented a qualitatively different psychological situation compared to the former. Essentially the same notion can be applied to the realm of ideas or attitudes.

Just as in the mainstream approach to intergroup behaviour, where individualistic theory and methodology is the norm, so too in the study of attitudes an individualistic norm is prevalent. Attitudes are characteristically treated as separable units which can be collected individually and added together to give an overall picture. Thus the attitudes of an individual are derived by presenting that individual with a questionnaire and measuring her response to a number of individual items; the attitudes of a group are the accumulated totals of individual members of that group. The result is either an incoherent mish-mash or a lowest common denominator, with any coherence due to a mathematical rather than a conceptual basis.

In large part this is probably due to the goal of quantification through the method of reductionism that characterised the supposed need for a 'scientific' psychology: the school of behaviourism may no longer hold centre stage, but the spirit of behaviourism continues to cast its shadow. This applies not
just to the area of attitudes, which has up to now been considered in a general sense: traditionally 'attitudes', 'beliefs' and 'values' have all been treated as separate and independent entities in psychological research. The problem here is that the possibility of any coherence between these entities is explicitly ruled out by the initial premises, or stipulative statements, of the researcher.

An alternative to this has been provided by the work of Billig on ideology (Billig, 1975; 1978; 1982). This approach emphasises the social nature of a group ideology; given its social nature, i.e. that it is shared by a social group, then its social function could be described as providing a framework which helps structure the world for that group and provides a guide to social action in the world. This approach also proposes a definite relationship between the object and subject of research: if you concentrate on either one then any possibility of a relationship is ruled out; Billig, on the other hand, argues for a dialectical relationship between a social group and its ideology. Thus, an ideology is created by a group through its social action, but once created that ideology then influences the future social action of the group. People in society subjectively create values and norms which become objectified or reified through institutionalisation (Berger and Luckmann, 1967) - this institutionalisation may occur through a variety of mechanisms such as religion or governmental or political structures. Once these have become objectified they take on the appearance of permanent or immutable facts of the social world; given this 'objective legitimacy' these 'facts of
the social world' then influence and guide the action of society in the future.

Drawing on the work of Marx, Billig adds the important caveat that not all social groups have the same ability to construct their own ideological framework. This follows from the fact that in a social environment some form of institutional structures are required to 'spread the message' both over distance and time and not all groups have access to these structures. Because of this differential access to the mechanisms of ideological transmission it is necessary to introduce the notion of 'false consciousness', that is an ideology that does not accurately reflect the interests of a group. A 'false consciousness' could, for example, emphasise the notion of national unity to deflect attention from internal division, or alternatively emphasise a multiplicity of group divisions to avoid the possibility of a united opposition. Of course, there is no 'objective' criterion upon which a particular ideology can be labelled as a false consciousness.

At the level of practical analysis this notion of ideology could be said to highlight three particular elements: the importance of historically received tradition; the importance of social experience; and the influence of ingroup elites or dominant outgroups. In order to allow for the possibility of revolutionary ideology, from a subordinate group or a subordinate section of an ingroup, it is also necessary to allow for the ideological pluralism of social groups within themselves. Accepting this both avoids the 'group mind' fallacy and allows for the possibility of change within any particular social context.
Ingroup ideological pluralism suggests the existence of ideological subgroups within the wider social group, with the main distinguishing feature of these subgroups being that the ideological frameworks presented by them are 'tighter'. Whereas the ideological framework of the wider social group may be thought of as the consenually shared norms and values of that group, that of the subgroup would have a more particular character: thus the subgroup might present a more particular definition of what the ingroup is; it might present a detailed interpretative account of the ingroup's past; or it might present a detailed strategic programme through which the ingroup should progress towards the future. Almost certainly these elements are usually combined. Examples come readily to mind; racist ideologues require quantitative criteria through which 'racial type' is legally ascribed; nationalist ideologues construct timeless histories of "the nation's past"; marxist ideologues construct the notion of a homogeneous proletariat which then becomes the 'driving force' towards a new, classless society. The subgroups may be political parties, pressure groups or clandestine or semi-clandestine organisations each presenting future goals for the social group of which they are a part and each suggesting its own way of attaining these goals.

It is important to emphasise that these ideological subgroups very often exist within a wider social group rather than constitute a separate outgroup, although they can exist in this latter form. By way of illustration, the ideology of the wider social group may be said to provide flexible boundaries to legitimate action on the part of the ideological subgroup,
where the flexibility of these boundaries could be seen in at least two respects: members of a social group, for example the minority group in Northern Ireland, are prepared to confer legitimacy on the actions of a subgroup, such as the IRA, beyond what they themselves as individuals would be prepared to do: given an appropriate context they are prepared to justify or rationalise particular acts. This only operates up to a point: if the subgroup attempts to stretch the boundaries too far then that action may be seen by the wider social group as not only 'not legitimate' but as 'illegitimate', i.e. no longer capable of justification or rationalisation. A series of such acts over time may cause the subgroup to be effectively expelled from the social group, i.e. cast in the role of a definite outgroup. The second sense is that the boundaries themselves may be flexible over time dependent on the social experience of the wider group: a changing context will allow the subgroup a greater or lesser latitude in its 'justifiable' actions.

There is an additional point here since it may be assumed from the foregoing discussion that the ideological subgroup is a part of, but in some ways independent of, the wider social group. It is important to remember that many subgroups depend on a wider social group not only for support but also for recruits. Because of this the perceived legitimacy or illegitimacy of actions carried out by the subgroup are important not only for the impact they have on group members generally but also for the impact they have on subgroup members. Thus, if the IRA, for example, were to put themselves in the position of a complete outgroup as described above, then not only would it lose support within the minority
community but it would also, in all probability, lose many members as well.

Actual evidence consonant with the above themes can be found in the anthropological study of a minority ghetto in Belfast (Burton, 1975). One issue discussed by Burton was that of 'kneecapping', or punishment shooting, by the IRA. These acts received widespread publicity and provoked general condemnation throughout Northern Ireland: viewed from the perspective of the community under observation those acts could be justified or explained. Many of the people Burton talked with would not have pulled the trigger themselves, but they were prepared to legitimise the act to themselves and to an outsider, if asked. Burton also noted that often these acts would be 'legitimised' by contrasting them with official or state violence: shootings by British soldiers or the discriminatory application of legal process, for example. Burton also reported occasionally observing young men he knew to be associated with paramilitary activity on drinking sprees that might last a couple of days: such sprees were linked with a questioning of the 'rightness' of the activities they were involved with. In this study Burton, using the ideas of Mannheim, was particularly concerned with examining the relationship between a core ideology, provided by Catholicism (especially its moral perogatives), and the particular ideology of Republicanism.

The examples used throughout this discussion have obviously focussed on the particular research interest of the present work, but the points raised do have a more general application. Consider, for example, the British nation as a social group:
immediately class or regional differences mark out a variety of subgroups each with different levels of ideology. The main ideological subgroups, however, are the political parties such as the Conservative or Labour parties and interest or pressure groups such as Trade Unions, single-issue campaigns or financial interests. Each of these will seek to generate levels of support around differing beliefs or values mobilised through attitudes or policies on particular topics. Thus the Conservative party, through its notions of Britishness and tradition, seek to represent 'the nation', while the Labour party, through social-reformism towards predefined goals, seeks to represent a particular class interest which will nevertheless lead to a general benefit.

What unites these ideological subgroups is their relative commitment to a liberal-democratic ideology that is objectified or reified through the institutions of political power which provide the mechanism for changing, or preserving, features of the state. The state itself represents the political context within which the ideological subgroups operate while the institutions of the state generally provide the only legitimate mechanism for changing the state; thus the consensually accepted notion of what constitutes 'the political' in British society provides a stable framework within which political discourse, debate and decision-making can take place. In Britain there are, of course, ideological subgroups that do not share that commitment: fascist and extreme Marxist groups explicitly reject many liberal-democratic notions and often seek to replace them with
alternatives; occasionally, groups such as the Angry Brigade undertake violent campaigns to attempt such change. One of the reasons Britain has managed to retain such a relatively high degree of internal stability lies in the political marginality of such groups; historically the British state has managed to successfully incorporate such political forces as the Labour movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries into the legitimate processes of political action, even when this necessitated institutional change such as the extension of the franchise or the recognition of trade union rights. This contrasts, for example, with nineteenth century Germany where the Labour movement was not so easily incorporated into the state partially explaining why the German SDP was more Marxist oriented than the British Labour party.

This relative stability in Britain also contrasts with the short and unstable history of the province of Northern Ireland, despite the liberal-democratic institutions existing there. An important aspect of the present work is to examine the consequences of this unstable past for the way actors in the situation view themselves, their political opponents and the relationship between them. It should be noted, however, that instability in a state can occur at a variety of levels: while France shares many of the liberal-democratic institutions and ideas of Britain it has been more amenable to such threats as military coups. Undoubtedly this is due, at least in part, to the turbulent history of the French Republics throughout this century (Horne, 1977). In such a context, as in so many Third World states, the military may represent one of the few unbroken
threads in the nation's history.

While the terms of the discussion so far are somewhat unusual in a Social Psychology study they are relatively common within Sociology. Within that latter discipline Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1984) have pointed to three varying approaches to ideology:

1. ideology refers to very specific kinds of beliefs the study of which usually takes the form of investigations of ideological personality or of the social function that ideology performs;
2. ideology refers to beliefs that are in some way distorted or false, as in, for example, Marxist studies of ideology;
3. ideology refers to any set of beliefs irrespective of whether they are true or false, as in the sociology of knowledge.

While the first of these approaches is closest to the traditional social psychological approach to ideology or political attitudes, the present view lies somewhere between conceptions two and three. The present view follows directly from Billig's approach (Billig, 1976) which produces a model of ideology that is simpler than either of these two conceptions as it avoids the ideological presuppositions of both. Two elements are important within this approach: firstly there is the process through which ideology is formed and sustained - this is the dialectical mechanism discussed above; secondly there are specific ideologies - this refers to the particular beliefs, attitudes and values of a social group. While the former refers to a process the latter deals with specific ideological content. To borrow from the writings of Gramsci (1971) these specific ideologies can be
further subdivided into 'organic ideologies' and 'arbitrary ideologies':

One must distinguish... between historically organic ideologies, those, that is, which are necessary to a given structure, and ideologies that are arbitrary, rationalistic, or 'willed'. To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity that is 'psychological'; they 'organise' human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their own position, etc. To the extent that they are arbitrary they only create individual 'movements', polemics and so on... (Gramsci, 1971).

If we consider the example of Britain then, the liberal-democratic ideas referred to may be considered as part of the organic ideology that seems to have a high degree of consensual legitimacy, while conservatism, socialism or marxism are all arbitrary ideologies.

In talking to adherents of any of the arbitrary ideologies it would be possible to see how those individuals understood the particular ideology they had made a commitment to while commonalities across them would indicate elements of the organic ideology that provides the agreed terrain of political discourse. At the same time it is worth noting Billig's differentiation between 'surface' and 'depth' ideology: some political groups may attract members due to the group's position on some particular issue so that those recruits have a relatively hazy or individualised notion of what the group stands for; at the centre, or core, of the group may however be a more particular set of ideas to which recruits are not immediately exposed, yet these ideas may
form the primary basis upon which group policy is formulated - the former of these Billig referred to as the 'surface ideology' while the latter was referred to as the 'depth ideology' (Billig, 1978). In his 1978 book Billig was examining the National Front, a fascist party in Britain, but the differentiation between surface and depth may have a wider importance particularly for groups with a high membership turnover; this would suggest initial attraction followed by disillusionment. Theoretically this work also highlighted some of the problems with the universalism of dispositional explanations of 'ideological thinking' (see also Elms, 1970).

Having broadly discussed the notion of ideology to be used in the present work and, towards the end of the discussion, outlined the particular concepts through which ideology is to be understood how then is the present work to continue. In the interests of detail it was decided to talk to a small number of political activists from a variety of political groups in Northern Ireland. In doing this it was hoped to throw some light on the arbitrary ideologies that influence political ideas and behaviour in Northern Ireland and on the nature of any organic ideology that may exist there. The particular interest of this social psychological study is the relationship between these and social identities in Northern Ireland, but the interview evidence will also be used to describe some aspects of the political context in Northern Ireland and to address some issues of theoretical interest. Before going into the detail of the interview material the next chapter will examine some evidence of a content analysis carried out on a range of
political newspapers from the province. The value of this is that it introduces some general outlines of the political context in Northern Ireland and highlights some of the themes to be involved in the interviews.
Chapter 9: Party Propaganda

During 1983 party political newspapers were purchased from a newsagents in Belfast City centre: selection was thus limited by the actual availability of the newspapers. It was possible over this period to obtain the newspapers of six political organisations in Northern Ireland: these were the Democratic Unionist party (Voice of Ulster), the Ulster Defence Association (Ulster), the Orange Order (Orange Standard), the Ulster Volunteer Force (Combat), the Irish Republican Socialist party (Saoirse/Starry Plough) and Sinn Fein (Republican News). The most notable omissions here are the Official Unionist party and the Social Democratic and Labour party, respectively the main political parties of the majority and minority communities. During the period the Official Unionists did produce one newspaper but no further issues were forthcoming; around the time of the European elections the SDLP produced, and distributed free, six issues of the 'Social Democrat' - this newspaper was paid for by an EEC grant, as John Hume the SDLP leader was seeking re-election to the European Parliament, and was primarily concerned with that election: no further issues have been produced. The one remaining significant political group, the moderate Alliance party, also produces an occasional news-sheet, but this is distributed by party canvassers and is not normally available for sale in shops. It should be added that publicity is not a major problem for these three groups as they normally obtain coverage in the three daily Northern Ireland newspapers - the Belfast Telegraph, the News Letter and the Irish News -
and on radio and television. Of the political groups whose newspapers were examined in this content analysis only the Democratic Unionists receive comparable media coverage.

Almost all political newspapers in Northern Ireland have a somewhat sporadic existence: a recent edition of Fortnight (Fortnight No. 229, December 1985) carried details on over 50 periodicals still thought to be active in 1985, while the Linenhall Library in Belfast holds examples of almost 700 periodical titles published since 1968. Five of the six newspapers analysed in the present work were published 'monthly' in 1983 although none were actually available every month: the exception was Sinn Fein's Republican News which was produced weekly. Table 9.1 presents the details of the number of issues of each paper that were purchased: six issues of each were randomly chosen as the sample to be analysed although with only five issues of Combat produced all were included in the sample.

**TABLE 9.1:** Newspapers in the Content Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Number available</th>
<th>Number in the sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican News</td>
<td>Sinn Fein</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice of Ulster</td>
<td>Democratic Unionists</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster</td>
<td>UDA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange Standard</td>
<td>Orange Order</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saoirse</td>
<td>IRSP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Ulster Volunteers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It should also be noted that the IRSP newspaper covered two titles: ordinarily the IRSP produced Saoirse in Northern Ireland and the Starry Plough in Eire. During 1983 that organisation had many members arrested due to the evidence of 'supergrasses' and so was unable to sustain regular editions of both titles. In the early part of the year Saoirse was available, but towards the latter half of the year only the Starry Plough was produced. The sample included three examples of each paper. It should be noted in passing that the UVF and Sinn Fein also had many members effected by the 'supergrass' system in 1983.

The newspapers in the sample differed in format as well as regularity of production. The Voice of Ulster began the year with a 12-16 page A4 format before changing to a 4-page A3 format; this paper has appeared only occasionally since 1984. In 1983 Ulster used a 16-20 page A5 format; since 1984 this paper changed to A4 and continues to appear almost every month. The Orange Standard uses an 8-page A3 format and continues to appear regularly. Combat used an 8-page A4 format and has not appeared since the last issue of 1983. Saoirse/Starry Plough used a 12-30 page A4 format and has appeared only occasionally since 1984. Finally, Republican News uses a 12-16 page A3 format and continues to appear weekly. Of all the papers only Ulster and Republican News appeared to be available by subscription although it is likely that the Voice of Ulster and the Orange Standard are, or were, available through organisational networks. Sales figures for the papers are, not surprisingly, unavailable although it appears likely that Republican News has
the largest distribution of all the papers in the sample: Fortnight describes it as "far and away the most sophisticated and professional of the Irish propagandist papers".

The content analysis carried out on these papers was not a complex one: the main interest was in the range of issues covered by each of the papers since this will provide an indication of the main public priorities of the organisations. The unit of analysis then was each individual article in the paper: each article was categorised under a number of topic headings and the measure taken was the percentage of space allocated to the various topics. Tables 9.2 to 9.7, which present the results of the analysis, contain the topic headings, the number of articles within each topic heading and the percentage of space allocated to each topic over all the issues in the sample. When photographs were directly linked to an article they were included in the space allocation for that article, otherwise the space for photographs was measured separately. There was no attempt to statistically compare the contents of different newspapers.

In addition to this a few comments are included on the role of sign or symbol in the newspapers analysed. Party political papers are directly involved in ideological discourse in that they attempt to present a particular interpretation of a social world. This interpretation is mainly presented through the text of a paper, but it is reinforced through the use of photographs and, to a lesser extent, graphics (such as cartoons):

"News photos witness to the actuality of the event they represent. Photos of an event carry within them a
meta-message: 'this event really happened and this photo is the proof of it'. Photos of people - even the 'passport' type and size - also support this function of grounding and witnessing: 'this is the man we are talking about, he really exists'. Photos, then, appear as records, in a literal sense, of 'the facts' and speak for themselves" (Hall, 1973).

Obviously comments on this theme are limited since the production quality of the newspapers in the sample vary greatly. Nevertheless this theme does present an additional way of looking at the newspapers other than simply a quantitative examination of their contents.

Voice of Ulster (Democratic Unionist Party)

Table 9.2 presents the details of the content analysis of the DUP newspaper. The Voice of Ulster replaced the Protestant Telegraph which had been produced by Ian Paisley since the early 1970s. The Protestant Telegraph was as much an in-house paper of the Free Presbyterian Church, founded by Paisley in 1951, as a political newspaper. As such large sections of the Protestant Telegraph were devoted to attacks on 'Romanism', that is, the Roman Catholic Church. With the Voice of Ulster there was a deliberate attempt to broaden the range of material covered (the author was told this by a DUP official) and this is reflected in the content analysis with only three articles each on the Roman Catholic Church and on general religious topics. The three major topics in the sample issues were security policy, social and economic issues and Irish nationalists: the six
**TABLE 9.2: Voice of Ulster (Democratic Unionist Party)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>% of space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>banner</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contents</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advertisements</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>notices</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>photographs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>puzzle/quiz</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>book reviews</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>letters</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women's page</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>councillor profiles</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>editorial</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security policy</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security forces</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Unionist party</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nationalists</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eire</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>power-sharing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assembly</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prisons - pro segregation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outsiders and NI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrimination vs Protestants</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religion</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic church</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European parliament</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP conference</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
articles on the European Parliament were regular reports on Paisley's achievements there; one large article was devoted to a report on the DUP annual conference; there were also a series of articles, usually short and usually critical, on the Official Unionist party.

On the issue of security policy the Voice of Ulster continually attacked the British government and the Northern Ireland Office for not pursuing the IRA vigorously enough; at the same time the paper called for the restoration of devolved power to Northern Ireland. The DUP have earned their 'extremist' tag through the type of security policies they advocate such as shooting IRA-men on sight and the restoration of capital punishment.

The economic and social issues covered in the paper range from seeking free TV licenses for pensioners to housing policy and unemployment. This reflects the working-class Protestant support the DUP receives: their main power-base in Belfast, for example, is in East Belfast among the Protestant workforce of Belfast's engineering and shipyard industries. The prominence of these issues also highlights the main difference between the Democratic Unionists and the Official Unionists as the latter tend to adopt Conservative economic and social positions. At various times this emphasis on 'working-class' issues by the DUP has been described as populist and pragmatic or genuinely socialist: in reality it may simply reflect the need to articulate the concerns of their supporters. Before the DUP came into existence the only alternative to the conservative Unionist party for the Protestant working-class was the Northern Ireland Labour party, but support
for that party could always be portrayed as threatening the Union. The DUP provide that safe alternative and, since the essential driving force of the DUP from its origins has been a fundamentalist Protestantism there has been no residue of conservative economic ideas to prevent that articulation. Potentially that creates a tension for the DUP since the articulation of 'working-class' issues may lead to a secularisation of ideology: this was one theme that was pursued in the interviews with DUP members. In the paper itself that tension is defused by a clear concentration on 'Protestant working-class' issues: thus, since the skilled workforce in Northern Ireland is in East Belfast that is where investment should be targeted, and there is active support for government investment; the Northern Ireland Housing Executive is continually criticised for favouring Catholic areas over Protestant; similarly the Fair Employment Agency is accused of promoting Catholic employment and of ignoring discrimination against Protestants. There is also little evidence of a generalised radicalism flowing from these concerns: for example, the patriarchy associated with strict Bible Protestantism is clear in the paper's "Woman's Page" which usually consists of a melange of recipes and 'kitchen hints'.

When considering Irish nationalists the paper concentrates on the Eire government, the SDLP and Sinn Fein and the IRA, the latter two being viewed as synonymous. Indeed, there is often the impression that all the elements of Irish nationalism are viewed as synonymous: an essential unity is provided by their shared aim for a Catholic United Ireland and while the perfidy of the IRA/Sinn Fein is obvious, the SDLP constantly attack the security
forces while Eire shelters the gun-men and provides a safe haven from which they can carry out their operations.

In terms of identity the articulation of an essential 'Protestant-ness' is clear from the Voice of Ulster as, indeed, is a clear sense of 'Ulster-ness': the defence of the Union is paramount, but on clearly defined terms - power must be devolved to Stormont and British ministers should stop interfering, whether that interference takes the form of English Officers in the UDR, undemocratic institutions, such as the FEA or the NIHE, or undemocratic practices, such as power-sharing. The outgroup is also clearly defined as Republicanism in its various guises; unlike the Protestant Telegraph, the idea that Romanism provides the driving force of Republicanism only occasionally surfaces in the Voice of Ulster.

Orange Standard (Orange Order)

Table 9.3 presents the results of the content analysis of the Orange Standard, the monthly newspaper of the Orange Order. It should be noted that advertisements and notices were coded as one category here since the few advertisements that appeared referred to intra-organisational services. This paper differs somewhat from the others analysed here in that the Orange Order is not a homogeneous political organisation. Before the present troubles the Order could be considered in this way and was often considered to be the 'cultural cement' that held cross-class 'unionist family' together (see, for example, Harris, 1972). The Order is
TABLE 9.3: Orange Standard (Orange Order)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>% of space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>banner</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lodge business</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ads and notices</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obituaries</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>letters</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>book review</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>song/poem</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religion</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious politics</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange Order</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security policy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eire</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrimination vs Protestants</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th July</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unionist parties</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traditional values</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outsiders and NI</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative politics</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elections</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security forces</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social issues</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pre '69 Stormont</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
still a significant political organisation in Northern Ireland — it still provides about a third of the delegates to the Unionist Council, the governing body of the Official Unionist party — but with the division of Unionists into the 'Official' and the 'Democratic' varieties the Order no longer speaks with one clear voice.

The leadership of the Orange Order supports the Official Unionist party and this is reflected in the Orange Standard: conservative politics and 'traditional values' are generally espoused, and there is a dearth of articles on economic issues apart from the 'tighten your belt, we're all in this together' variety. Despite this the Order is in a position to occasionally stand above both main Unionist parties to argue the value of Unionist unity. It is also true that the Standard shares some of the concerns of the DUP, as seen in the Voice of Ulster: comparable articles include those complaining that not enough is being done about security, articles critical of the SDLP and the Eire government, articles complaining about outsiders (usually Americans) interfering in Northern Ireland affairs and articles complaining that Protestants are discriminated against in Northern Ireland.

It is clear from Table 9.3 however that the primary function of the Orange Standard is to bring together members of the Orange Order. A full third of the total space in the sample issues was devoted to business in the various lodges of the Order: this could range from the unveiling of new banners to reports of lodge meetings to presentations to long-serving members. There is little overtly political in all this material but there is a strong image of a stable tradition that has existed for many generations and is being
successfully passed on to future generations. The photographs testify to the archetypal Order member: sober, suited and male. In all the sample issues women only appear twice - once as a 'pretty' majorette with one of the marching bands, once as the wife of a Unionist MP.

Religious topics also appear frequently in the paper: this is hardly surprising since the Order is a religious organisation that specifically promotes the Protestant values of civil and religious liberty. Compared to the Voice of Ulster, however, the Orange Standard concentrates almost exclusively on the positive values of Protestantism: specific theological attacks on Roman Catholicism are not entirely absent, but they are less prominent in the Standard.

Ulster (Ulster Defence Association)

At its formation the UDA was a vigilante defence force for the Protestant working class districts of Belfast. The high-point for the organisation was the Ulster Workers' Council strike in 1974 that successfully brought down the power-sharing executive. Up to the middle 1970s the UDA was widely believed to be involved in bombings and shootings, but the organisation caused something of a surprise by producing a proposal for an independent Ulster towards the latter part of the decade.

The move towards politics was accompanied by a withdrawal from paramilitary activity, although as one member told the author "the guns are only holstered", and by a move towards
community politics of a sort. Included in all this was the production of a regular newspaper, Ulster, which has appeared with a regularity second only to Sinn Fein's paper. By 1985 Ulster was still being produced with the quality of the production visibly improving over the years.

Table 9.4 presents the results of the analysis of the six sample issues of the paper. Although many of the topic headings can be compared to the two papers analysed above, there is a marked difference of emphasis in Ulster that reflects the specific working-class origins of the UDA. Given the number of UDA members that are in gaol there was a marked concern in the sample papers with prison related issues such as the segregation of loyalist and republican prisoners, which Ulster supports, and the supergrass system, which Ulster opposes. Some attention is given to security policy in the paper but there is a certain ambivalence on this issue: Ulster clearly opposes the IRA and the INLA, normally described as Republican/Marxist and Marxist respectively, and supports measures taken against them. The dilemma, however, is that legal sanctions against such groups can also be used against loyalist paramilitaries. The dilemma covers such sanctions as capital punishment, internment and the supergrass system: the impression is clear that Ulster would not mind these sanctions if they were selectively applied to republicans (the UDA itself often threatens to execute republicans), but in practice they realise this would not happen.

Another interesting dilemma for Ulster concerns the relationship of the organisation to the mainstream Unionist parties. At its formation the UDA was a particularly interesting
## TABLE 9.4: Ulster (Ulster Defence Association)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>% of space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>notices</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advertisements</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>photographs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>letters</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>book reviews</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>song/poems</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>republicans</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supergrass system</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prison segregation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on the UDA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. McQuade interviews</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>history - early troubles</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>warnings to hoods, etc.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social security</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrimination vs Protestants</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deny Protestants discriminate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support for Independence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security policy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic church</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>history of Hugenots</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>report on elections</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supporters in USA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>call to action</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on unionist politicians</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish-Americans (-)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>miscellaneous articles</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
phenomenon since it represented the first independent Protestant working-class organisation. Initially the UDA was content to allow its political lead to come from established Unionist politicians, but with support for an Independent Ulster the UDA laid down a political path of its own. In a literal sense then the UDA is not a unionist party since it does not explicitly support the Union. Ulster, while occasionally criticising the mainstream Unionist parties, does not display the degree of independence the politics of the paper ought to imply: I can find no instance, for example, when Ulster calls on Protestants not to vote for a Unionist politician. Criticism of Unionist politicians is usually reserved for their inactivity on prison issues rather than their general political orientation.

Related to this are the discussions on the notion of Independence in the paper. The paper attempts to promote a specific Ulster identity (the Union flag rarely, if ever, appears in the paper) in a variety of ways: this includes articles on Ulster's past (on, for example, the Hugenots) and on Ulster's achievements; the paper seeks to deny various accusations levelled against Ulster Protestants, such as discrimination against Catholics, and continually points to overseas supporters for their cause. It is clear, however, that they have not broken away from all the traditional elements of unionist thinking, the ideological residue of the past: consider the article that concluded:

"I still hold dear the concept of independence for Ulster. That's by no means 'Republicanism'. Neither is it rejection of the Queen and Royal Family. But I feel we are an independent people - we are 'different' in many respects - culturally and ethnically from both the Republic of Ireland and England."
While support of independence then seems, on the surface, to mark a break with traditional unionism, one does not have to scratch the surface too hard to find the continuing influence of such ideas.

Having pointed to the self-identity of Ulster-ness, what of the outgroup. As mentioned above, and as can be seen from Table 9.4, republican paramilitary groups form a frequent topic for the paper. Ulster takes a somewhat different view from the papers analysed above however: there is not the same level of anti-Catholicism, or pro-Protestantism, in Ulster. More usually Northern Ireland Catholics are described as misled or intimidated, although even in 1983 the degree of electoral support received by Sinn Fein was visibly straining this notion:

"... if the present climate continues then confrontation must come about sooner or later. Reading the signs, and they are very clear, the Protestants would certainly in the future, have to take steps to safeguard themselves."

Combat (Ulster Volunteer Force)

Combat describes itself as the 'journal of the Ulster Volunteers', but it is generally taken to represent the illegal UVF. While the UDA has its main base of support in Protestant East Belfast, Combat is based in the Shankill district of West Belfast, an area that has a long tradition of support for independent Unionist candidates over those of the mainstream Unionist parties. At the present time the Progressive Unionist party receives popular support in this area, if no-where else,
and features regularly in Combat. The paper is still apparently produced, but no issues have appeared in city centre shops since 1983; indeed only five issues could be obtained for that year, so all were included in the sample.

Table 9.5 presents the details of the analysis of these five issues and it is immediately clear that the paper was dominated by prison issues. In 1983 the UVF suffered greatly because of supergrass witnesses and large sections of all five copies were devoted to this. The language was vitriolic, as in this piece on a UVF supergrass:

"Even the crime of cannibalism which occurs from time to time can be justified when compared alongside the motivation, the lies, the attitude and degrading activities of this murderous witness for the Crown".

And this was from the lead story on the front page! Much space in the paper was devoted to criticising legal measures against terrorism and in criticising Unionist parties for supporting harsher measures. At the same time the British government was criticised for not applying the 'Falklands spirit' to the war against the IRA. The ambivalence, noted above in Ulster, is even starker in Combat: the British government are encouraged to 'smash the IRA', but almost every mention of specific security measures is in an article opposing the application of those measures. The clear impression is that the British government should take one side in the conflict and operate accordingly, while the reason the British government do not do this is explained by a variety of conspiracies emanating from the Foreign Office or Washington. In part this resolves the contradiction noted above; more usually, however, the contradiction is not
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>% of space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>notices</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advertisements</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>photographs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>letters</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>book reviews</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>song/poems</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supergrassess</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prisons</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regular policy statement</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unionist parties</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British government</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social issues</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supporters in USA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outsiders in USA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nationalists</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>law</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster history</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour party (B)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>call to action</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>miscellaneous articles</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
addressed as articles concerned with general security policy are distinct from those discussing particular security policies.

Unlike Ulster there is little discussion of political ideas in Combat and only one article on social issues (housing benefit), which is a little surprising given the location it operates from. There is little doubt on the enemy however: variously described as 'provo scum' or 'rebel trash' the following piece by 'Concerned Loyalist' is not untypical of Combat's view of the enemy:

"We view the PIRA, Troops Out, etc. as vermin. When vermin crawl out of their sewers to pollute the streets, they must be stepped on instantly lest they spread their poisonous germs elsewhere. We give warning to these enemies of Britain that if they venture further out of their ratholes they will be sent back with their tails between their legs".

Republican News (Sinn Fein)

Fully titled An Phoblacht/Republican News, this paper resulted from a merger of Sinn Fein's Southern paper, An Phoblacht, and Northern paper, Republican News, and has been produced weekly since the middle 1970s. The analysis, presented in Table 9.6, illustrates the political change that has come over Sinn Fein since the end of the hunger-strikes, with a large number of articles devoted to economic and social issues. Given the size of Republican News and its regularity, compared to the other papers analysed here, the articles have been categorised not only according to topic but also according to the location of the
TABLE 9.6: An Phoblacht/Republican News (Sinn Fein)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
<th>% of space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>banner</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>notices</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>letters</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>death notices, commemorations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reviews</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advertisements</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>greetings to prisoners</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish lesson</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sport</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>editorial</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burke</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cormac</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>international</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>war news</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>remembering the past</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic, Eire</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social, Eire</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prisons, Eire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF activity, Eire</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>campaigns, Eire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-state, Eire</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prisons, GB</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour party, GB</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal party, GB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black activists, GB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic, NI</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social, NI</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prisons, NI</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF activity, NI</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supergrass, NI</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-state, NI</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loyalists, NI</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA, NI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INLA, NI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF activity, I+other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish language, I+other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP, I+other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP/Forum, I+other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-state, I+other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prisons, I+other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USI, I+other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gay rights, I+other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noraid, I+other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
article: this is because articles on Eire, on Northern Ireland or on Britain are clearly distinguishable in the paper. Some articles referred to Ireland as a whole or were general in character: these have been categorised in Table 9.6 as 'I+other'.

Before discussing the articles it is worth noting some of the other features of the paper: of all those analysed here, Republican News was the only one to include book, television, film, sport and music reviews in every issue. It is also the only paper with regular space devoted to letters and the only one to print letters critical of the organisation that produces it. Also noteworthy is the space devoted to death notices or reports of commemorations: undoubtedly the ideological role of such features is to serve as a constant reminder of the long tradition and sacrifice involved in 'the struggle'. This is also emphasised by the regular feature 'Remembering the Past' (included in the table as an article) which provides snapshots of Republican history.

Included in the table of articles are three regular features in the paper: these are the 'Cormac' cartoon, 'Burke's at the back' and 'War News'. The second of these, written by the now deceased editor in a style similar to the Diary columns of the national newspapers, contained a number of short items that concentrated on reporting criminal offences of police and soldiers, not solely in Ireland, and the occasional suicide by RUC and UDR personnel. Although written in a humorous style, and it is a distinctly 'black' humour, the accumulated effect of these short items is to denigrate the security forces. No explicit contrast is drawn between this information and the
reports of IRA activities in, for example, 'War News', but the implied contrast is very clear - while the police and army are described as crooks and rapists (and reporting criminal proceedings serves to objectify this image) the IRA personnel are 'determined', 'heroic' and 'resilient'. Photographs of armed and uniformed IRA personnel are commonplace in the paper, testifying to their control of certain areas. Frequent articles (categorised here as anti-state) in the body of the paper reinforce the vindictive and brutal image accorded to the police and army with reports of beatings and harassment: such reports are almost always accompanied with photographs, the evidence to reinforce the text which in turn reinforces the overall message.

IRA activity is further legitimised through regular international articles that focus on liberation struggles in other regions: Central America and the Middle East are covered most often, but such articles also feature the Basques and lesser known Asian wars of liberation. Again no explicit connection is drawn between these struggles and the Irish situation, but the enemy is always identified as one or other variety of imperialism: in Ireland it is British imperialism, in Central America and the Middle East it is American imperialism and in Afghanistan it is Soviet imperialism. The ideological message does not need to be explicit since the particular information presented sets its own agenda.

Other points worth noting from the table are that articles on Northern Ireland have most space followed by articles on Eire: this probably reflects the readership of the paper, but may be indicative of the shift, from Dublin to Belfast, of the
leadership of Sinn Fein. In addition to this is the contrasting focus of these articles: most space in Northern Ireland articles is devoted to anti-state topics, social issues (for example, bad housing or welfare rights), Sinn Fein activity or the supergrass trials in that order. Where Eire articles are concerned, however, social and economic issues are clearly predominant: reports of strikes and critical comment on unemployment are very common here. Whereas the state in the North can be attacked by focussing on the wrong-doings of the security forces or the application of repressive laws, in the South it is the capitalist bosses, working hand-in-hand with the (usually corrupt) politicians that form the main target. Once again the implicit connection is through foreign, usually British, imperialism.

Having described above the outgroup, or enemy, it is also worth noting the relative infrequency of articles on the Ulster Protestants: where they are mentioned they are described as 'loyalists' rather than 'Protestants' and articles usually concentrate on the politicians and their alleged sectarianism. There is little differentiation between the different loyalist groups although their different class base is referred to: nevertheless they are seen to be united by a common sectarianism, both in ideas and practice. This, and the relative infrequency of articles on loyalists, may be because Sinn Fein do not identify the loyalists as the main enemy, British imperialism being accorded this role; on the other hand it may be due to a basic inability to understand the Ulster Protestants. This has been pointed to most recently by Bell (1985) and
McDonagh (1985) who describe the twin orthodoxies upon which Irish nationalism, in general, has depended: the notion of the physical integrity of the island of Ireland and the notion of the national integrity of the people who inhabit the island. With these twin orthodoxies then, the Ulster Protestants are usually taken to be errant members of the Irish nation, whatever they themselves might think, while their refusal to accept this fact can be explained by the 'divide and rule' tactics of the British.

The final point of note from the table is the unsurprising evidence of Irish-ness in the paper: every issue contains at least one article in Irish, but perhaps more significant is the space devoted specifically to the language issue and the regular 'Irish Lesson' included every week. The notices in the paper also point to the number of Irish classes organised by Sinn Fein in nationalist areas. Similarly, sport reviews usually, but not exclusively, concentrate on the Gaelic sports of football, handball and hurling. Indeed, the only thing that is surprising about this coverage is that there is not more of it. While the self-identity of Irishness is reasonably clear that of Catholic-ness also exists but in a less overt form. This religious identity is clearest in the death notices where the traditional Irish Catholic icons are called upon to protect the dead warriors: interestingly in recent years this traditional iconography has been matched by quotations from the poetry of Bobby Sands - invocations to 'Mary, Queen of the Gael' now co-exist with the image of the lark as the spirit of freedom, an image described by Sands shortly before his death on
hunger-strike. This iconography is, however, rare in articles; indeed any references to Catholicism usually refer to the Catholic Hierarchy, which in recent years has been more critical of and more criticised by the Republican Movement. There still remains an interesting tension between the moral perogatives of Catholicism and the military practices and apparent political secularisation of the Republican Movement.

Saoirse/Starry Plough (Irish Republican Socialist party)

The IRSP split from the Official Republicans (now the Workers' party) in the 1970s and within a few years had established a militant military wing, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). From the start the IRSP adopted a strong left-wing posture but combined this with a militarism that has been at times more extreme than that of the IRA. In combining both these features the IRSP and INLA are atypical in the Irish Republican tradition and may be more directly compared to continental paramilitary groups such as the Red Army Faction (FRG) or the Brigate Rosse (Italy).

The content analysis of the IRSP paper, presented in Table 9.7, illustrates this with most space devoted to discussions on Marxist theory and the application of these ideas to the Irish situation. Like Republican News, significant space is devoted to economic and social issues in Saoirse, but whereas in the former political ideas are imbedded in the articles, in Saoirse such articles serve to illustrate or reinforce the explicit
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>% of space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>banner</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>graphics/photos</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish lesson</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>notices</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reviews</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>letters</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cartoon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>death notices</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>greetings to prisoners</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armagh/women</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>youth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicky Kelly campaign</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security forces/policy</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marxism/socialism</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abortion</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social/economic</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP/RC Hierarchy/WP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>racism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INLA/IRA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>international</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unionists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supergrassess</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eire</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>analysis</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>miscellaneous articles</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ideological position. The relatively greater space devoted to articles on Eire in Saoirse is probably a consequence of half the issues sampled being the Southern paper of the party but the target of such articles is similar to that of Republican News: this time, however, the politicians are attacked, not so much for being corrupt, but for accommodating the exploitation of Ireland by foreign capital thus expressing a more theoretic-al notion of an Irish comprador elite. The relative comparability with Republican News continues with the articles on Northern Ireland which tend to focus on the misdeeds of the security forces and the operation of unjust laws.

In fact, as can be seen from Tables 9.6 and 9.7, Saoirse and Republican News share many similarities: where they differ is in the absence of any Catholic imagery in the former and its more overt left-wing stance. This latter element has already been referred to as regards the content of articles, but it can also be seen in the symbols adopted by the papers. If there is any single image that evokes the IRA it is the image of the armalite rifle: in itself this is not surprising as the armalite is one of the favourite weapons of the IRA. Neither is the symbolic use of a gun unusual in Republican history: before the present troubles the typical IRA symbol was the 'Tommy-gun', the Thompson sub-machine gun, a large consignment of which the IRA received many years ago from the United States. Its replacement by the armalite reflected that weapons favoured status, and availability, from the mid-1970s onwards. While it is difficult to be accurate, it would not be surprising if the INLA also had more armalites in its armoury than any other
weapon, yet the 'weapon-symbol' used by that organisation is the Kalashnikov assault rifle (AK-47), a Soviet-made weapon that has become the most potent symbol of revolutionary struggles across the world. Added to this, in Saoirse the AK-47 is usually backed by a red star.

Such a comparison may seem simple, but the use of symbols in such contexts is deliberate and ought not to be trivialised. In this case, for example, it seems to suggest that for Sinn Fein Irish nationalism remains the primary driving force of the party's ideology while for the IRSP it is Marxism, or at least a militant socialism, that fulfils that role.

Concluding Comments

This discussion has focussed on the newspapers of six different political groups in Northern Ireland. The intention was not to be exhaustive of Northern Ireland political forces but rather to illustrate certain themes of that politics. If we consider the four newspapers from the loyalist, majority community and the two from the nationalist, minority community separately we find an interesting heterogeneity despite the many points of contact in their political priorities.

In the loyalist newspapers the ingroup identities of 'Protestant', 'British' and 'Ulster' co-existed in various measures: in all of them the 'Protestant' identity served as a basic delimiter of the ingroup, although the attempt by the UDA to reconstruct an Ulster nation containing some, or most (it is
never quite clear), Catholics should be noted. In the Voice of Ulster the 'Protestant' identity was reflected both in the conservative social attitudes of fundamentalist Protestantism and by the way economic issues related quite explicitly to the interests of the Protestant working-class. In the Orange Standard the positive values of Protestantism stood alongside the articulation of an historically secure cultural tradition. The Orange Standard also presented the clearest statement of the 'British' identity, due perhaps to its generalised orientation towards Official Unionist conservatism. This identity was next strongest in Combat, but here this is probably due to the lack of any programmatic discussion beyond defeating the IRA. It should be noted, however, that the commitment to the 'British' identity in the Voice of Ulster and in Ulster is not total: the commitment is to particular institutional features, such as the Royal family, rather than to total integration in the UK polity. While these features identify the ingroup as 'British' the discourse employed attempts to justify the ingroup's right or need for a degree of political independence.

The final point of note here is the identification of the outgroup: typically these newspapers describe the outgroup as if it were a homogeneous entity. This applies whether the particular object of discussion is the political establishment in Eire, the SDLP or the various Republican paramilitary groups, with the homogeneity being most easily identified in their shared aim of a united Ireland. Differences, based on their overt action, are recognised, but the Eire establishment and the SDLP are, at best, described as creating a climate of
opinion within which the paramilitary groups can operate.

It is interesting to note the attempt in Ulster, the UDA's paper, to define a new nationalism based on the province of Ulster: although 'new' this nationalism is presented, like all nationalist ideologies, as having a long historical pedigree. This nationalism attempts to incorporate the Catholics of Northern Ireland and so the paper occasionally attempts to explain away any apparent support for Republican paramilitarism; this is not dissimilar to Irish nationalism's description of Northern Protestants as errant, or misled, members of the Irish nation. As was noted above however, this aspect of Ulster nationalism was weakened by the actual level of electoral support for Sinn Fein.

If we now turn to the two nationalist, minority papers (while recognising that they represent an even more partial account of minority politics than the loyalist papers do of majority politics) the clear ingroup identity is of Irish-ness. This is found not just in the political aspirations argued in the papers (a united Ireland is usually considered as sine qua non for any progressive political development) but also in articles on language and culture: Britain is not just written of as a foreign country but is explicitly assumed to be so. While both papers devote much space to social and economic issues, Saoirse/Starry Plough is more explicitly ideological in its presentation of its explicit marxist politics. Sinn Fein's paper uses a socialist or marxist terminology and analysis without engaging in discussions of the ideology itself.

This lack of discussion of a specific political ideology
in An Phoblacht/Republican News compared to Saoirse/Starry Plough probably reflects the greater importance in the former of the cement of Irish nationalism and the attempt of Sinn Fein to generate a degree of popular support. One consequence of this is the problem of the conflict between Catholic social teaching and the practice of Sinn Fein/IRA, since Catholicism has been for many years an identifying feature of the Irish nation and as such has played an important part in national ideology. An Phoblacht/Republican News contains the iconography of Catholicism, particularly in relation to death, but deals with the problem by focussing criticism on the Catholic Hierarchy rather than establishing a critique of Catholicism per se. The IRSP, on the other hand, has little hesitation in supporting such contentious issues as abortion rights for women.

The main outgroup identified by both papers is 'British Imperialism' rather than the Ulster Protestants. Britain is not just written of as a foreign power but is clearly assumed to be so: the numerous historical articles in An Phoblacht/Republican News emphasise the perfidious role of Britain in Irish affairs and at the same time reinforce the image of the 'historic national struggle' for self-determination. In dealing with the Protestants the simplifying feature of Irish nationalism mentioned above, where the Protestants are considered as errant or misled members of 'the nation', has the virtue of assuming their acquiescence in the future. Discussions of the Protestants in the present emphasise their political and cultural sectarianism thus 'proving' the futility of seeking compromise or reform within Northern Ireland. Unfortunately
there is little indication of how these ascribed roles will be bridged when the future arrives.

This discussion has focussed on the newspapers of six different political groups in Northern Ireland. The intention was not to be exhaustive of Northern Irish political forces, but rather to illustrate certain themes of that politics. The discussion also provides a practical illustration of some of the elements of the notion of ideology adopted in this present study. In contrast to much of the mainstream social psychological discussion of political attitudes, or political thinking, the concentration on the content of political ideas, rather than simply a search for universalistic modes of thinking (see, for example, the content analysis in Billig, 1978), should be noted here. This approach will be extended in the following chapters which report the results of a series of interviews with political activists in Northern Ireland.
Chapter 10: Case Studies in Ideology: Introduction and Context

As has been suggested earlier the consequences of the scientific examination of political attitudes was the use of large, and it was hoped representative, samples of subjects and the use of scientific measuring devices, such as questionnaires, in order that political attitudes might be quantified and hence statistically examined. While this approach means that breadth of information is gained at the expense of depth it may be the most appropriate method if the goal is the discovery of universal principles or laws of political attitudes.

However, the use of ethnographic techniques by Billig (1978) and Elms (1970) has demonstrated the value of depth information obtained from semi-structured interviews with a relatively small number of subjects: both studies involved interviews with members of fascist political organisations, the British National Front and the American John Birch Society respectively. Whereas the classic psychological portrayal of fascists is the rigid, closed thinker of the Authoritarian Personality, both writers noted an apparent lack of authoritarian characteristics in some of their subjects' discourse. Billig attributed this to the difference between the 'surface' and 'depth' of fascist ideology; in other words, to the political context of party membership. This seemed to provide a more plausible account of the discourses of the National Front interviewees than any appeal to personality characteristics.

Drawing on this work it was decided in the present study to complement the experimental studies of identity with a series of
interviews with political activists in Northern Ireland. Whereas the content analysis of the party publications presents a picture of the public concerns and issues of the political parties, interviews with activists will provide an insight to the understandings, motivations and aspirations of individual subjects; the interviews will also allow for an examination of some of the findings of the studies mentioned above; finally, the interviews will also allow some insight into how these activists, who have made a personal political commitment by virtue of their activism, reflect and refract the competing ideologies in Northern Ireland.

Gallagher (1982) used a similar method but with more limited concerns: in that study six political organisations were approached to provide a spokesperson for an interview, the purpose of which was to examine the 'analysis, attitudes and aspirations' of the organisations. Interviews were held with a spokesperson from the Official Unionist party (OUP), the Democratic Unionist party (DUP), the Alliance party, the Social, Democratic and Labour party (SDLP), Sinn Fein (SF) and the Ulster Loyalist Democratic party (ULDP), the latter being associated with the Protestant Ulster Defence Association. The intention was to examine the strategies proposed by these parties to see how far they could be encompassed by Tajfel's Social Identity Theory, which itself proposed a particular set of strategies as being most likely in a situation of intergroup conflict.

Gallagher found that the strategies of all but one of the parties did accord with that hypothesised by Social Identity Theory. The political parties of the minority community (SDLP and SF) were proposing either reform or revolution; those of the
majority community (OUP and DUP) did seek to justify the status quo by re-emphasising old arguments or proposing new ones; finally the Alliance party, the only one to consciously seek and attract support from both sections of the community, did propose a group assimilationist strategy. Only the ULDP did not fit into the hypothesis of Social Identity Theory in that the strategy it proposed, leading eventually to an Independent Ulster, seemed to seek a radical change in the intergroup context while this party was associated with the majority (or superior, in Social Identity terms) group. The integrity of the theoretical hypothesis could be maintained by either of two possibilities: it was suggested that the ULDP may in fact represent another 'inferior' group in the Northern Ireland context, i.e. the Protestant working-class; alternatively the ULDP may be politically marginal and the strategy it proposes relatively unimportant, insofar as it fails to attract any significant degree of political support from its target community. It should be noted that the interview data seemed to confirm the notion of the ideological pluralism of social groups in that various strategic emphases were to be found within the political organisations of both social groups.

As was mentioned above, the purpose of the interviews in the present study was more extensive in that they concerned the accounts of individual subjects rather than the strategies of parties; the interviewees then were not sought to 'represent' their parties but rather to represent the understandings and motivations of committed individuals within a particular political context.

The interviews were all held throughout 1984. Each interview
was tape recorded and a full transcription made available to the interviewee for correction. Interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. The recorded interviews lasted on average one hour and fifteen minutes. The tapes are to be offered to the Oral Archive in the Ulster Folk and Transport Museum, with subjects' anonymity preserved.

Potential interviewees were approached in a variety of ways; initially it was intended to approach public figures, although avoiding the most public political figures, who might then operate as gatekeepers to less public activists. There would always be a problem with this task in that the extreme political circumstances in Northern Ireland often make people suspicious, particularly those who are active in political parties. While this strategy proved successful to a limited extent there was a surprising reticence on the part of some public figures to agree to an interview. Because of this the author began approaching political activists known to him as points of contact to other potential interviewees. Again this has a limited degree of success, at least partially because this latter group were usually aware of, and not necessarily sympathetic towards, the political predilections of the author. This seems to be one situation where an outsider may be more able to break through the wall of suspicion that exists in Northern Ireland.

The parties from which activists agreed to a recorded interview included the Official Unionists (2), the Democratic Unionists (3), the Alliance party (2), the SDLP (1), Sinn Fein (1) and the Workers' Party (1). All the interviewees were male, although this was not intentional, and were based in Belfast. They had
varying degrees of involvement in their respective parties. One of the Official Unionists worked full-time for the party, while the other was engaged in University research work in politics. The three Democratic Unionist interviewees all came from East Belfast, so their accounts necessarily reflect that background; one worked full-time for the party while the other two had employment in Belfast. One of the Alliance interviewees was a full-time politician while the other was completing a University postgraduate course. The SDLP interviewee also worked full-time for his party. The Sinn Fein interviewee, although officially unemployed since his release from gaol in the early 1980s, effectively worked full-time in a Sinn Fein Advice Centre in West Belfast, while the Workers' Party activist combined party work with other employment in South Belfast.

The total number of recorded interviews was ten. In addition to this two Sinn Fein members agreed to talk, but not to be recorded and two discussions were held with activists in the Ulster Defence Association, again without a tape recorder. One SDLP activist agreed to two interview appointments but, for reasons best known to himself, failed to appear on both occasions. The transcripts from the interviews of Gallagher (1982) were also available and relevant, despite the limited intent behind them.

The data available for analysis then included over five hundred pages of transcript. The examination of these data will be considered in four chapters, including the remainder of the present one. This chapter will look at the subjects' descriptions of their party's proposals for solving, or ending, the Northern Ireland conflict. This is included primarily to set the
interviewees' comments in a political context rather than to serve as a definitive statement of party policy in Northern Ireland. It should be noted, for example, that since these interviews were recorded the Northern Ireland Assembly has come and gone and the Anglo-Irish agreement, signed by the British Prime Minister and the Irish Taoiseach at Hillsborough in 1985, has injected a new dynamism into the Northern Ireland political scene; in the same period two referenda in Eire, confirming strong anti-abortion legislation and rejecting the possibility of legal divorce, seem to mark a rising Roman Catholic conservatism in that part of the island.

The next chapter will examine the issue of identity by looking at how the activists view their individual social identity. This will involve an examination of the self descriptions of an Irish identity, a Loyalist/Unionist/Protestant identity and the possibility of a middle way. There is a direct connection between the data of this chapter and the experimental studies described earlier.

While Chapter 11 focuses on the ingroup dimension, Chapter 12 concentrates on perceptions of the outgroup. It is concerned not just with the way activists described their political opponents, but also how they described their opponents' policies and motivations.

Finally Chapter 13 examines some psychological themes beyond the specific context of Northern Ireland. In particular, the interview data is used to assess a variety of conceptual approaches to the social psychology of political attitudes. These include the interplay between categorisation and particularisation in the
expression of belief and the difference between 'moderate' and 'extremist' discourse.

When a direct quote is taken from an interview transcript the interviewee will be identified by a label of the form:

(party) / (year of interview) /identifier

thus a label 'A1/84/C' implies an Alliance party activist, subject C, interviewed in 1984; WP/84/A implies a Workers' Party activist, subject A, interviewed in 1984. The party acronyms used are those used throughout the thesis.

Descriptions of party policy: routes to the future

(a) The Unionists

In 1971, Brian Faulkner, leader of the Unionist party and Prime Minister of the Northern Ireland parliament at Stormont, proposed a system of committees to oversee the work of the ministries. The proposal was designed to allow some input from the Opposition parties, primarily the SDLP, who would hold some Chairmanships on the committees. Although welcomed by some individuals within the SDLP, the proposal was stillborn when the SDLP withdrew from Stormont following the shooting of two Catholics in Derry by the British Army. Stormont itself was prorogued the following year by the Westminster government.

Nevertheless the committee system remained the main Unionist proposal to allow Opposition parties some degree of involvement in government until the late 1970s. The main elaboration of this proposal was in the report of the 1975 Convention, established
after the collapse of the power-sharing experiment in 1974, and this continues to be the main policy proposal of the Democratic Unionists:

What we want is a devolved government in Northern Ireland elected by the people of Northern Ireland and the party or parties capable of obtaining majority support within the popularly elected assembly would form the government and... say who would be in that government... Those who were not elected to government, in other words those who were rejected by the electorate for government - a role certainly has to be found for them, for we have got a divided society. The role that can be found for them is to give them as much influence within the administrative and parliamentary process as it is possible to do in a democracy. In this regard we feel that the Convention Report and the various unique opportunities which it presents for involvement by all representatives - all elected representatives - in the running of the country are along the right lines and indicate that there is a way forward within the terms of democracy.

(DUP/82/A)

There is a tacit acceptance in this position that the Stormont system that prevailed prior to 1969 will not return:

If I could comment on the majority-rule thing though because I feel it has been misrepresented, and perhaps its our own fault because we've never explained the thing fully: by majority-rule we do not mean a return to the old Stormont because Northern Ireland is now made up of a number of minorities - I mean, we are a minority as well: there are lots of things the DUP would like to see in the province that no-one else would and therefore we need some protection of our interests - and when we speak of majority-rule we still say there must be some involvement for all minorities, a meaningful involvement for all
minorities in the governmental process... (W)e would hope that through the committees, you know, 50% Opposition 50% Government, and then the Chairmen of half the committees from the Opposition, that that would ensure that any legislation that is initiated or processed would have to have a significant input and agreement from some of the Opposition parties.

(DUP/84/B)

The Democratic Unionist alternative to power-sharing then has maintained a consistency over time, as has their fundamental opposition to power-sharing itself:

I'm opposed, I think, to a situation that could ever arise where a man or a woman has a right, because he happened to belong to a particular religious persuasion or political party, got into a cabinet position and was then... governing Northern Ireland.

(DUP/84/D)

(Power-sharing)... is an absolute negation of democracy because the whole purpose of holding an election in a democracy... is for the people to decide not only who should be in government, but who should not be in government, and when you and I and everybody else go to the polling booth to vote, we are voting not only for our own persuasion and our own party, but we are voting, just as strongly sometimes, against other parties and persons... You can only have in government those whose presence in government meets with the assent of the majority of the people and no way can you arrange a system of proportionality, or anything else, which really means that you are imposing upon a people a government, or members of a government, which they have specifically rejected at the ballot box.

(DUP/82/A)
The Official Unionist spokesperson interviewed in 1982 preferred to talk in terms of general criteria rather than specific institutions:

...(T)he conflict about national allegiance, there is no panacea to that - you will never please everyone between mutually exclusive aspirations... The solution must lie in the creation of certainty... (P)eople must feel so long as we maintain our present outlook on life that our position within the United Kingdom is secure... You must have measures designed to create certainty in the military sense, that is indispensible. But in addition to that, your political pronouncements that you are determined to uphold the Union, that the political needs of the province, the economic needs of the province, that they are being met: that also engenders the feeling of security and stability.

(OU/82/A)

For institutional arrangements to be acceptable then they have to be in a context where the commitment of the Westminster government to the Union is unequivocal. Power-sharing with Nationalist parties is unacceptable because it does not possess this clarity either because it appears to sanction the possibility of an alternative constitutional arrangement (i.e. a united Ireland) or betrays ambivalence on the part of Westminster:

Each individual should be treated equally in society irrespective of wealth, privilege and poverty, and each man is equal before the eyes of the law: that should be true in terms of political rights as individuals; but no school of thought should be given an in-built political right merely by virtue of the fact that they are opposed to the present constitutional framework of Northern Ireland being part of the United Kingdom. We are saying
that we are opposed to power-sharing, "partnership", whatever other word is used for that generalised and ill-defined political thought of somehow giving special privilege to people who are nationalists because they are nationalists. When we say that it does not mean in any way that we want to prevent any individual, as an individual, enjoying full and equal rights, privileges and, of course, the counter-balance of duties and obligations.

(OUP/82/A)

It is interesting to note in these accounts that while the Official Unionist presents a traditional Liberal concentration on individualism to deny communalist rights to the Roman Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, the Democratic Unionists tend to stress a multiplicity of communal groups:

The Roman Catholic minority, like any minority, like a Presbyterian minority, like a Free Presbyterian minority, like a Baptist minority, like any minority hanging religious labels around their heads, has to be assured within itself that it has its rights guaranteed and that is why I come back to the point that religion is not a passport into government and you cannot just say we will have people in government because they are Catholics, because they are Protestants. They have to be elected to government: but those who are not elected for government, be they Protestants, Catholics, Presbyterians, whatever within each faction, they must have all the safeguards that can reasonably be required to protect themselves.

(DUP/82/A)

Perhaps part of the reason the Unionist spokesperson preferred to talk in terms of broad criteria rather than specific arrangements lies in the internal debate within the party between those who
favour some form of devolved parliament in Northern Ireland and those who favour a greater degree of integration of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom:

I think those who would be most in favour of integration would be those who take a very British-nationalist approach, people who say that Ulster is part of Britain, it has to be a part of the British nation... I think there's certain of those on the devolutionist side who would be perhaps more Ulster-nationalists, who would see the need for a devolved parliament to put forward what they would believe were the policies for Ulster, as distinct from the policies for Britain... I've always been someone who would be firmly behind the view that we would like a devolved parliament eventually, but that we must wait and go stage by stage and in the first stage local government reform. I am not an integrationist by conviction; I don't see integration as a solution... (W)hilst people in the rest of Britain don't really regard Northern Ireland as part of Britain you can't really go to the full integrationist position... (The Labour party and the Tory party) aren't prepared to give us the same rights as they give themselves because we're only Ulstermen.

(OUP/84/B)

I hold it to be a truth that it was never part of the historic Unionist case to seek separate arrangements for the government of Northern Ireland... Whatever the attachment of the community to the structures that existed prior to 1972... the reality is that (those) arrangements for government are gone and can never ever be restored... And it seems to me that that is why our current proposal for administrative devolution should be greatly attractive to the British government because what we are in fact saying is, look there is no consensus and there is never going to be consensus on the creation
of a cabinet in Northern Ireland: the Nationalists won't let us run it on our own because they say we will use it to jackboot the Catholics and keep them in their place; the Unionists won't tolerate Nationalists in the executive, not unreasonably because members of a cabinet whose attachment is to another nation would be using their position... to put it crudely, to subvert the constitutional position of Northern Ireland. If (the British government) were to devolve to Stormont administrative powers over health and social services, planning, development, water services, tourism, transport, education and housing, those are issues which affect the whole community: there is a natural consensus within that limited field of government. You would not be making laws, you would be administering services which are of common interest across the religious and political divide; and I think we would be prepared, as we would have to be, to say that if that were done and there were committees to deal with the specific areas of government, that the jobs could be allocated in proportion to the strengths of the parties elected... I can't understand for the life of me, why, without any prejudice to any of the parties' position on the constitution, it is beyond politicians in Northern Ireland to work together in that less ambitious structure to the common good.

(OUP/84/C)

The main difference between the devolutionists and the integrationists in the Official Unionist party lies in the amount of power they either wish to see, or believe it is possible to achieve, integral to Northern Ireland: the former seek legislative and administrative powers, with guaranteed equal rights for all citizens before the law; the latter seek administrative powers only, along the lines of regional councils in Great Britain. It should also be noted from the above accounts that the differences
between the positions is in large measure, though not exclusively, tactical rather than strategic.

The final group to be considered in the Unionist position is the Ulster Loyalist Democratic party, the political section of the paramilitary Ulster Defence Association (UDA). This is despite the apparent non-, rather than anti-, Unionism of their 1982 spokesperson:

... if we look at Republicanism and Unionism, both have failed and continue to fail. The red, white and blue grass and the green grass - there is a great distance between them and we can't see any prospect in the future of people leaving one to settle in the other... It's like two people who are in quicksand: they can either help each other out calmly and quietly... or they can struggle with each other trying to climb out over the top of the other and both will sink. We either have a future here together, or we don't have a future at all.
(ULDP/82/A)

At that time the ULDP/UDA were proposing Independence as the way forward for Northern Ireland and were themselves trying to popularise a notion of Ulster nationalism. As an initial step they proposed the establishment of a legislative apparatus in Northern Ireland not dissimilar to that pertaining in the United States of America:

Now at the moment most people wish to remain part of the United Kingdom so we'll start on that basis, a written constitution for Ulster within the United Kingdom. Now that would mean that the constitutional arrangement between Ulster and Great Britain would have to be changed. We'll re-negotiate the Act of Union (so) that the initiative to either change or not change the constitution
of Ulster would be vested in the Ulster people through a parliament and not in the Westminster parliament. That within that, a written constitution would mean that the ground rules... would be laid down and ... we could devise and adopt a system of government which would be better suited to the particular needs of the Ulster situation. We believe that there should be a legislature... and instead of having a cabinet system which necessitates the involvement of one party only, we should have an administration and that the head of that administration, the Prime Minister or with actually a Presidential system, that he or she would be directly elected by the people under the proportional representation system.

(ULDP/82/A)

The suggestion then is that the US style checks and balances would protect minorities and amendments to the written constitution, such as a move to Independence or a united Ireland, would be by referendum and require a two-thirds majority. It is clear than in 1982 the ULDP/UDA were not Unionist in the traditional sense of the term.

However, unrecorded discussions with leading figures in the UDA make clear that their position has changed since 1982 (that these discussions could not be recorded by the author should not imply that this information is not public knowledge). In 1984 these leading figures were aware that their ideas on Independence had failed to gain any significant degree of support within Northern Ireland; indeed, they seemed willing to concede that they had gained little enthusiasm for their proposals among the grassroots of their own organisation. This partly seems to be the case because the discussions that lead to the development of these ideas took place within a relatively small coterie of individuals
(less than twenty in all) in the New Ulster Political Research Group (NUPRG). The initial reaction of the leadership to this situation was to approach academics in Northern Ireland to seek advice on how they might better communicate their ideas, but events, specifically the rise in electoral support for Sinn Fein and the Westminster government's re-insistence on power-sharing, changed their priorities. The analysis now adopted took on an increasingly apocalyptical tone: on the one hand they felt sure that Sinn Fein was on the verge of overtaking and replacing the SDLP, on the other hand they felt that the inability of the Westminster government to gain agreement within Northern Ireland would lead Margaret Thatcher to take more seriously the advice of Enoch Powell, who was known to have her ear, and move towards the integration of Northern Ireland more fully into the United Kingdom in the naive (their word) belief this would reduce constitutional uncertainty and defuse the conflict. The latter development, they believed, would only enhance the effect of the former.

The UDA believed that the only possible outcome of these twin processes was a civil war in Northern Ireland: the UDA claimed publically to be preparing men for that civil war. In the event neither prediction was accurate, but the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 has led the UDA to place themselves firmly behind the opposition campaign of the two main Unionist parties. For the moment, as so often in the past, the UDA has acceded to the political leadership of those they once appeared to politically oppose.
(b) The Nationalists:

Like the Democratic Unionists, Sinn Fein's position has remained consistent: in 1982 the Sinn Fein spokesperson argued that the only way forward was towards a thirty-two Socialist Irish Republic which could only be achieved through the violent expulsion of the British from Northern Ireland and the ending of partition:

Our analysis attempts to put... the struggle into the context of the class struggle: ... that the division of the Irish working class as a result of partition and particularly as a result of the sectarian politics in the North over the last two centuries, prevent the working class unity necessary to create the environment in which socialism and a socialist state can be founded. For us therefore the options are very limited. We have to create that environment and to do that we have to get rid of those divisive factors which prevent working class unity. i.e. partition and a six county sectarian state. There are basically two ways that that might be done... Simply because this is a colonial situation, from our point of view, that doesn't automatically mean that armed struggle is the only method. Armed struggle is the method which has been used because it's the method which we believe will succeed. Constitutional politics, given the history of their use in Ireland over the last hundred years, if not longer,... clearly demonstrate that they in effect get nowhere. They may create some minor reforms within the system but they won't create the necessary foundation from which working class unity can be developed and socialism can be established in Ireland.

(SF/82/A)

Sinn Fein rejects any proposal that deviates from this since, they believe, any approach that leaves partition intact will inevitably lead to the restoration of a discriminatory majority rule:
Any solution which is founded on the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, where the six counties continues to exist as a political entity, is unacceptable to us... In the North, in any sort of six county state, the talk of bringing people together... we must be realistic - it just wouldn't happen... If the IRA stopped tomorrow, the war ended tomorrow morning, I think we could say without any fear of contradiction that within five years, if not sooner, the old Stormont regime would be back again and we would have majority rule; that (the) political leaders of the Loyalist community would ensure that within that same period of time, well perhaps ten years, but certainly not longer, the same forms of discrimination, of repression, would exist as existed prior to 1970... All that institutionalised repression would re-emerge in the form of Loyalist repression.

(SF/82/A)

The interviewee in 1984, who was in fact in prison in 1982 and during the whole period of the Republican hunger-strikes, continued to echo these sentiments:

... Socialism: there's nothing alien about it to Republicans or Republicanism. What I would class it as happening is that the proper Republican politics have come to the fore, the politics of James Connolly, people like that... All that we have started to do is to develop that further and bring it out more, whereas in the past (in the Republican movement) the politics seemed to be put to the side and the military struggle was more to the fore; what you have now is that the two compliment one another - there's no point putting the Brits out of Ireland if you're just going to let the Charlie Haugheys and the Garret Fitzgeralds take the power and still be puppets of the Brits: that's useless, it's of no benefit to the Irish people.
... The only message that Britain understands is physical force: people saw it themselves in the Falklands campaign where the justification - people talked about sovereignty, the rights to self-determination of the people in the Falklands - you had total disregard, there's no equation with Ireland, that's another situation - they were wallowing in glory, blood and glory in the Falklands, the Belgrano and all this... So it's obvious to me that if the IRA were to put down their guns, that our task in Sinn Fein would be made even harder, that there's a danger we would be sucked into constitutional politics like other parties, like the Nationalist party, like the Daniel O'Connells years ago... You see, it isn't democracy in the six counties: I mean, the Bobby Sand's election: he was elected; they decided, "we don't like that, so we'll change the rule". They're even talking about changing the rules about abstentionist MPs, which is directed at Republican MPs. Democracy, as long as it works in their favour then it's dead sound...

(SF/84/B)

Sinn Fein, with the addition in the late 1970s of socialism, continue to espouse a fundamental nationalism which perceives peace to lie in a re-unified Irish national state and all the problems of Ireland to lie in British interference. It is worth noting that when SF/84/B refers to self-determination in Ireland he refers to the entire island, and that SF/82/A talks of "sectarian politics in the North over the last two centuries" and not just the sixty years since partition.

The main nationalist party, since its foundation in 1970, is the SDLP and while the general features of its approach have remained consistent over time, the specific details have varied: in more recent years the SDLP analysis has become somewhat more
pessimistic. In 1972, following the closing of Stormont, the SDLP proposed a form of condominium for Northern Ireland involving a degree of shared sovereignty by the British and Eire governments: a local Assembly would be elected in Northern Ireland, by proportional representation, but legislation would have to be approved by two commissioners appointed by the British and Eire governments. A short time later the SDLP proposed power-sharing in Northern Ireland allied with a Council of Ireland involving members of the Northern and Southern parliaments.

To a certain extent this was the arrangement operated temporarily in 1974 in the power-sharing executive, and after its collapse and the failure of the 1975 Convention to agree on power-sharing, this remained the SDLP's main proposal. Their rationale was that:

... the British government has guaranteed the rights of those who have a 'British' identity and ignored, to a large extent, the existence of the Irish identity... they have taken one side... and that has caused problems... I think it would be much easier to solve the problem if Britain were to be neutral on the identity question and (say) that both identities have a right to exist... not guarantee either of them but see both of them emerge feeling that their own identity is accepted and that their rights are protected.

(SDLP/82/A)

British neutrality in this context involves a practical acceptance of the legitimacy of the aspiration to a united Ireland rather than the British government forsaking its aspiration to the maintenance of the Union. In other words the British government may continue to support the basic unionist position but should no
longer guarantee it. The corollary of this is that the 'Irish Dimension' had to be institutionalised in order to legitimise that aspiration:

... if one is prepared to accept that Northern Ireland is part of the problem... (then) part of the solution may be to set up some sort of system in Northern Ireland whereby people can regulate and administer their own lives, to a certain degree, within the context of the whole Anglo-Irish dimension... But I think if you try to solve it entirely within Northern Ireland and say that we're going to have some sort of parliament here... and that's it... (then) I think you're not. You see, that's the crux of the problem of identity since you are not allowing for the fact that a large minority in the North cannot identify with something that is strictly 'Northern Ireland' and strictly 'British', because they are not British, they're Irish.

(SDLP/82/A)

At this stage then an internal agreement to share power had to be protected by an external referent, i.e. the involvement of the British and Eire governments.

Since then the SDLP have maintained this position with the important difference that the main emphasis now lies on the latter, rather than the former, element:

... there's a very profound belief within the party that its not possible to get an internal solution within Northern Ireland; I think that is a view shared by almost everybody within the party... (A)ll the talks achieved nothing - (we) made three different attempts in '73, '75 and '79... and of course '81 (the hunger-strikes) put the cap on it... I think that has killed any hope of an internal solution stone dead, because there is basically no-one to share power with... (We have) become 'greener'
to the extent that (we) realise, I mean, what's the hell's the point in talking to Unionists when you only get insulted... (W)e don't think they are bad people or anything like that, but... they don't have any incentive to change, there is nothing prodding at their back to make them change and historically very few groups throughout history, whether it be white South Africans or Israelis or colons in Algeria, ever give voluntarily and voluntarily agree to sharing power.

(SDLP/84/B)

The most recent posture of the SDLP has been to forget about internal talks but rather try to find some basis of agreement between London and Dublin which would then be institutionalised; in this context the British must agree to discuss sovereignty with the Eire government. If that context can be developed then the Unionists would be forced to negotiate seriously because the old status quo was gone.

In practical terms the SDLP, together with Fine Gael, Fianna Fail and the Labour party, the three main parties in Eire, began by using the New Ireland Forum to outline the constitutional (i.e. non-violent) nationalist position and then tried to encourage an Anglo-Irish (i.e. London-Dublin) agreement. This strategy has had a measure of success in that an Anglo-Irish Accord has been agreed and a Secretariat established. If the Unionists accept this context, or are forced to accept it, the second stage, towards some internal body, can then proceed. It does not appear, however, that too much emphasis is being put on that element for the moment:

There is no holy writ, there is no philosophical belief in our party that (says) there shouldn't be an Assembly of some sort in Stormont - it all depends on what sort of power that Assembly has and how that power is distributed.
and what kind of control it has; but I would say that some sort of local body would be necessary. Personally I believe it's crazy to have situation where we have 566 local councillors here and 78 people in the Assembly: that's far too many for this place.

(SDLP/84/B)

The exact nature of internal institutional arrangements is left in the air for the moment, but in keeping with the new context the SDLP wish to establish the negotiations towards internal structures have to involve more than just the Northern Ireland parties:

Now, if all those parties turned up at Stormont, British government, Irish government, Irish Opposition, possibly British Opposition also (and) all the parties here, that would be great, but not just the parties here because that would be immediately admitting that there was a problem to be solved by the parties here, and so many Secretary's of State have said in the past that it's up to the parties in Northern Ireland to sort out the problem... I think people in Northern Ireland cannot solve their own problem; the SDLP can't solve the problem, the OUP can't solve the problem and they can't solve it together.

(SDLP/84/B)

In fact SDLP/84/B went further to suggest that a context of joint sovereignty could be established in perpetuity without, however, discussing how such an arrangement might be practically organised.
In this third, and final, section the proposals of the Alliance party and the Workers' party will be examined. Although the Alliance party is a unionist party and the Workers' party is a left-wing democratic centralist party, they share two important features: they seek support across the sectarian divide, with different degrees of success, and they are normally considered the main moderate parties in Northern Ireland politics. Apart from the ULDP they also receive less electoral support than any of the parties considered above.

The Alliance party have consistently argued, since its foundation in 1970, for a system of partnership as a way out of the impasse in Northern Ireland: in the Tajfellian sense they adopt an assimilationist strategy. In line with this the Alliance party supported, and played a part in, the 1974 power-sharing executive and have continued to argue in support of this model:

In an attempt to meet the basic fear of the Protestant community we support the right of the people of Northern Ireland to self-determination to decide their own constitutional future; and in an attempt to meet the basic fear of the Catholic community we support the concept of power-sharing, partnership, at all levels of public and governmental life and legislation to entrench that position... Our concept of partnership is based upon what we would call the 'principle of proportionality'. In essence what we are saying is that all those who wish to participate in the government should participate in the government in proportion to their elected strength... (I)t does not give any individual party the right (to
participate), it only gives them the right insofar as they have a democratic and legitimate mandate.

This model differs slightly from that used in 1974 insofar as at that time the Secretary of State invited parties to form a power-sharing executive with the general proviso that the main Catholic party would be involved. This special right of involvement was open to the criticism that the 1974 model institutionalised communal politics: the 'principle of proportionality' is designed to bypass this criticism.

The Alliance goes further to argue that a system of power-sharing or partnership will not only meet basic fears in the community but will also provide a new focus of identity around which people can unite: it is probably this element that highlights the assimilationist nature of the Alliance strategy:

...(I)f you can get a form of government which both sections of the community can identify with, then that can be a vehicle for reconciliation in Northern Ireland and it can be a vehicle for creating a common loyalty between Catholics and Protestants. And most importantly, it would provide something to defend against the gun-men on both sides at the same time, so the community at large would not be exploited but would wish to defend those institutions against the gun-men on both sides; that is why we would argue for devolution: we would see it as the key to uniting the community itself, not just an acceptable form of government, but the key to uniting the community.

Compromise, to the Alliance party, is not just the way to deal with the present conflict but will in itself create a positive
momentum the longer it is allowed to operate. It is not surprising then that individual Alliance members are attracted by the notion of compromise or that they see positive value in both 'traditions' in Northern Ireland:

... to me you had the SDLP-type nationalism, the old style... the unionism... there was no way either side would compromise and there was no way any sort of solution could be arrived at, and I felt that the Alliance party offered that solution or an attempt to get a solution along those lines. To me it actually got the best parts of both solutions in a sense, in that what we say and what we have always said is really that in exchange for Catholics accepting the Union with Britain they would get a full share in power and that their aspirations as regards a united Ireland, and so on, would in some way be reflected.

(A11/84/C)

... I am a British citizen, yes, but to an extent one is schizophrenic - I mean, I am a British citizen but I would often cheer an Irish sports team. I remember being asked that question three different ways and I answered in three different ways: one answer I was British, another I was Irish and another I was an Ulsterman. So one of the things is, yes, to the extent of being a citizen I am British; to the extent that I come from a unionist and Protestant background, yes, I can identify that as being part of my heritage; but I also recognise that because I live in Northern Ireland... I therefore have an Irish influence on me through the country in which I and my forefathers have lived in for so many years, and would identify therefore with Irish folk music, Irish history, Irish heritage and everything like that, and don't see that as exclusively the property of those who would see themselves as totally Gaelic.
In contrast to this the Workers' party proposes an assimilationist strategy aimed at the working class: in other words adopting the Republican notion of "the unity of Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter" within a socialist perspective. Although the Workers' party developed from a split in the IRA and Sinn Fein in 1969/70, it has tended to de-emphasise traditional nationalist elements:

... my own personal philosophy is that the island is unimportant, it's the people who live on the island. My aim or philosophy is geared towards the unity of the working people on that island, and while people are being divided on the type of issues they are being divided on today, namely religious sectarian ones, I would not be in favour of some decision which went above their heads. So therefore, in my book unity, just to create a unitary state, wouldn't solve the problems that exist in Ireland.

(WP/84/A)

In other words, heading for a united Ireland at the moment, even if in the longer term it may be desirable, is not a solution to the basic problem of a divided working class:

... what you're doing is making a majority in the six counties a minority in the island; you wouldn't be changing the forces; you wouldn't be creating any alliances within that island; in fact you'd probably be exacerbating the situation. The problem would still exist.

(WP/84/A)

In the present situation then, the Workers' party argue for a devolved parliament in Northern Ireland with specific safeguards, such as a Bill of Rights, to protect minority rights. The point of this is that a local institution would provide a forum within which 'real' political issues could be debated as opposed to the
political vacuum that is currently said to exist. It is argued that in such a situation a socialist party could win support across the political divide, by highlighting issues of common concern, and at the same time expose the vacuousness and hypocrisy of sectarian politicians:

Well it would be a Stormont and it wouldn't be a Stormont; it would still be in the same shell or building as the previous administration. This goes back to the Civil Rights movement: the campaigns there were basically to reform, to clean the system up: the system was rotten so clean it up. Northern Ireland needs its own administration - it's different from Britain; Britain hasn't got the time to spend looking after the internal affairs, and any other type of answer, constitutional answer, would only jeopardise the lives of countless thousands. We would argue for a devolved government on those grounds, and also that an administration there, a forum there would give room for political debate and the exchanging of attitudes, and to expose hypocrites for what they are, it's a useful thing. But it needs guarantees and we've consistently called for a Bill of Rights and have done so for a long number of years.

(WP/84/A)

An important element of this approach is that while the Workers' party has its roots in the nationalist community, unlike Sinn Fein it does not 'write off' the potential for support within the Protestant community:

We realise that the problems that exist are not conducive to socialist politics, but at the same time we don't sit down and say, "right, at election time this is the constituency we're going to fight - all that area there is Orange (Protestant) so we'll not brother going near it." If that's what we're about then we would have closed up;
so from that point of view, although we recognise that there are very strong problems with sectarianism being the dominant force which divides the workers, because we recognise that it's there doesn't mean that we have to accept it and play by its rules: we're totally opposed to it and we have opposed it on the educational front, the housing front, the jobs front.

... I can see that things are not going to change overnight, the whole constitutional thing in Northern Ireland ...(W)atever happens is going to be gradual... and what I'm prepared to work for is that in years to come there is a socialist party active in Northern Ireland which is capable of being in a position to administer power. 

(WP/84/A)

While these quotes serve to illustrate the political context of the interviews carried out in this research, they also illustrate the gulf that exists between the different political groups in terms of what they are prepared to accept for the future. At the same time the quotes also provide some indications of the identities espoused by the actors in the conflict and of the diverse range of ideological influences that play a part in defining positions. The next three chapters will examine the detail of these identities and influences.
Chapter 11: Case Studies in Ideology - Identities and Perceptions of the Ingroup

Every religion, even Catholicism (indeed Catholicism more than any, precisely because of its efforts to retain a "surface" unity and avoid splintering into national churches and social stratifications), is in reality a multiplicity of distinct and often contradictory religions: there is one Catholicism for the peasants, one for the petit-bourgeois and town workers, one for women, and one for intellectuals which is itself variegated and disconnected. But common sense is influenced not only by the crudest and least elaborated forms of these sundry Catholicisms as they exist today. Previous religions have also had an influence and remain components of common sense to this day, and the same is true of previous forms of present Catholicism - popular heretical movements, scientific superstitions connected with past cults, etc. (Gramsci, 1978)

Here Gramsci was discussing the relationship between popular beliefs, or common sense, and the grand elaborated belief systems, such as that provided by the Roman Catholic Church in his native Italy. More than that, Gramsci was attempting to understand the ideological effect of such elaborated belief systems on popular consciousness. Rather than drawing a complete distinction between the elaborated systems of intellectuals and the, often diffuse and contradictory, beliefs of popular common sense, Gramsci argued that 'to be a Catholic' had a different meaning or significance for different social strata: 'Catholicism' played a part for all these social groups in that it helped provide a partial understanding of their social world and so the
beliefs of 'Catholicism' were interpreted and realised within definite social contexts. In addition to this the 'Catholicism' of different social groups contained elements from pre-Catholic influences that had been reinterpreted within the Catholic ideological milieu, just as the 'official' account of the Roman Catholic Church had itself integrated pre-Christian rituals and practices.

The significance of this for the present work is that ideological labels or identities can hold different particular meanings for different social elements even where the identity acts as a focus for unity: the sense of unity, of an ingroup or an imagined community, is strongest when the belief system acts as an organic ideology in that it influences the categories of thought that go to make up 'common sense', despite not defining common sense in any global sense.

This understanding of ideological labels or identities has a relevance for the Northern Ireland conflict: up to 1969/70 there were two hegemonic orders in Northern Ireland politics, provided by the Unionist party and the Nationalist party. Up to that time both political parties were able to successfully see off challenges within their own constituencies even though they adopted different methods to achieve this: the Unionist party had inherited, from the anti-Home Rule agitations of the early years of this century, a complex organisational structure that held together diverse social fractions of the Protestant community - it was as much a religious and cultural organisation as a political one. In contrast, the Nationalist party was a political party only insofar as its elected representatives deemed it so: it had
few, if any, of the organisational structures normally associated with political parties, meetings were normally held only to select candidates for elections, and often these meetings were chaired by a local priest, a figure of legitimate authority and neutrality particularly among a rural Catholic population.

The outbreak of the current period of violence broke both hegemonies: Unionist politics split into a multitude of organisations while the old Nationalist party disappeared altogether. It is not insignificant that the old politicians, who appeared to be so timeless before 1969, were almost completely swept away by the middle of the 1970s. Increasingly, as the conflict has dragged on, there are alternatives to vote for at elections whereas before Northern Ireland elections were remarkable only for the number of uncontested seats.

In this situation political alternatives may be symptomatic of ideological alternatives, or at least ideological tendencies: as Laclau (1977) has remarked, a period of crisis leads to an:

... exacerbation of all the ideological contradictions and... a dissolution of the dominant ideological discourse. As the function of all ideology is to constitute individuals as subjects, this ideological crisis is necessarily translated into an 'identity crisis' of the social agents... What is important for the present problem is that one of the possible ways of resolving the crisis for the new hegemonic class or fraction is to deny all interpellations but one, develop all the logical implications of this one interpellation and transform it into a critique of the existing system, and at the same time, into a principle of reconstruction of the entire ideological domain.
In other words, a period of crisis disturbs a previously stable context and brings to the fore the contradictions and problems that had previously been ignored and ignorable. One way out of the crisis, Laclau argues, is through the articulation of a new interpellation, or sense of being or identity, to replace the old one that failed.

With this in mind, the degree of political pluralism current in Northern Ireland may be indicative of a range of interpellations or identities in contest. Consider, for example, these alternative descriptions of what Loyalism in Northern Ireland means to some of the Protestant interviewees of the present study:

Loyalism is loyalty to the Ulster people and everything else is secondary. Unionism is based on the concept that the Union comes first and everything else is secondary. We're saying the Ulster people come first and we have to be in a position where the Ulster people can initiate a change or non-change in their future and they should decide the relationship with Great Britain and Eire.

(ULDP/82/A)

Loyalty is not to a British government because British parliaments and British Prime Ministers and British governments change every couple of years. Our loyalty is to something much more static and something much more stable. One's loyalty is to the Queen, the Monarchy and the constitutional arrangements which provide for that and from which she draws her authority... If you said you were loyal to parliament that would mean you were saying that parliament can make no mistakes. Well the people of Northern Ireland would have been lost... because parliament does make mistakes, and if they accepted that blind nonsense they would be in an 'all Ireland' today since parliament legislated in 1912, 1913 and 1914 for an 'all Ireland'.

(DUP/82/A)
Well, I think our chief loyalty lies to our own position in Northern Ireland. Obviously if that loyalty enables us to be loyal to the parliament and to the Crown then albeit, you know, we're happy enough with that situation, but there is no way in which our loyalty extends to supporting any of those institutions if they threaten our own position.

(DUP/84/B)

Well, I do describe myself as a Loyalist - I believe in being loyal to her Majesty the Queen, the Crown, the Crown represented by Westminster, and hopefully a devolved parliament in Stormont; I would be loyal to them. I would be loyal to the Union Jack, because it is the flag of my country, not, you know, being subjected to a 'two-flag' variant which Jim Prior would love to have; but being a loyalist you have to be loyal to what is government, government also means the legal system, the judiciary and government itself.

(DUP/84/C)

... I'm in favour of the parliamentary system and the Monarchy... I do feel an identity, though, that is not an 'English' identity, and I think that's not uncommon (throughout the UK)... but still I'm a member of the United Kingdom and wish to maintain my loyalty to the United Kingdom.

(DUP/84/D)

The ULDP interviewee presents a notion of Loyalism entirely consistent with that group's adherence to an Independent Ulster and their belief in the existence of a separate Ulster nation. Further than that he suggests that the only legitimate arbiter of Ulster's future is the Ulster people. It will be recalled from the previous chapter that the ULDP/UDA plan for the future
implied virtual legislative and administrative 'independence' for the province within the United Kingdom, at least in the short term.

In contrast, DUP/84/D, a middle-aged, married man with no political ambitions beyond 'doing something' for Northern Ireland, presents what might be described as a traditional Unionist position: loyalty to the parliamentary system and the Monarchy of the United Kingdom. In so doing he is not unlike the three OUP interviewees:

We positively want to be part of the United Kingdom, not in the negative sense that we fear a united Ireland, but for the positive reason that we do have a feeling of belonging; we feel we are identified by a common ethnic background;... we feel united in terms of our common history; we feel united in terms of our economy and economic history.

(OUP/82/A)

The whole upbringing and everything was that Ulster was part of Britain: you switch on television and you watch the BBC; at school you had singing lessons from London where you sang about the 'Lincolnshire poacher', you know, just the whole culture. And now, I suppose, I can articulate it more: you can think up economic and religious reasons, the whole works. Say on religion, in my Church I was a member of the Boys' Brigade, so on enrolment Sunday the colours were flown and carried into Church, which is the Union Jack and the Boys' Brigade colour - all those symbols of being British... Northern Ireland can't be taken out of the United Kingdom and yet Northern Ireland Unionists retain their Britishness.

(OUP/82/B)
...One joins the Unionist party because one believes that the Union is best for all the people of Northern Ireland - I mean, I'm more than ever convinced that the parliament in London is the best guarantor of the liberties and the freedoms of all sections of the community, regardless of religion or political affiliation in Northern Ireland.

(DUP/84/C)

There is a clear sense of Britishness, or support for and adherence to British institutions, in these accounts. As was implied in the experimental studies of the present work however, Britishness may be but one, albeit important, identity for the majority community in Northern Ireland. This is clear from the ULDP position, whatever its apparent political marginality, but it can also be seen in the account of DUP/84/B, a DUP councillor and party-worker from East Belfast: his commitment to British institutions is obviously conditional on the British government's acceptance of the majority's position in Northern Ireland. Indeed, he described his commitment to the Union as conditional:

... as far as we are concerned we are a Unionist party mainly because we see the Union as the, at present, the only means of defending us against the claims of Southern Ireland which we in no way want to have any part of because of the influence of the Church and other differences. The Union is the bulwark against that. However, if at some stage the Union ceased to be that bulwark, if, for example, the British government were showing quite clearly that they were using their position within the Union to change the status of Northern Ireland, then I suppose in that way we're pragmatic Unionists who would say, "well, this isn't working - let's go for something else".

(DUP/84/B)
It seems that these accounts present a range of positions from 'Britishness' to 'Ulsterness'. It would also seem that the 'Britishness' element is more important in the political thinking of the Official Unionists, indeed Enoch Powell's argument for integration is based on the belief that Northern Ireland is as much a part of the United Kingdom as Yorkshire and so should be treated as such. The ULDP present the other alternative that seeks to claim a separateness for the 'Ulster nation' and the autonomous right of Ulster to determine its future. This position seems to be evident among some of the DUP interviewees who also share a common perception that the British positively seek to withdraw from Northern Ireland as soon as they can: the typical Democratic Unionist disdain for parliament marks a significant difference of emphasis from the Official Unionist 'healthy distrust', this latter being described as 'part of the nature of the United Kingdom' (OUP/84/C).

This difference should not be taken to suggest that the OUP represents a pro-British element in the political thinking of the majority community while the DUP represents a pro-Ulster element. On the one hand almost all the interviewees ascribed loyalty to some institutions of the British polity, in particular the Monarchy - this was mentioned even by the ULDP speaker. At the same time one of the OUP interviewees accepted a degree of diversity within his own party on this issue:

I think those who would be most in favour of integration would be those who take a very 'British nationalist' approach, people who say that Ulster is part of Britain, it has to be part of the British nation and therefore the whole idea of nationhood. And I think there's certain of
those on the devolutionist side who would perhaps be more 'Ulster nationalists', who would see the need for a devolved parliament to put forward what they believe were the policies for Ulster, as distinct from the policies for Britain.

Perhaps a more appropriate way of viewing these two elements is as alternative interpellations or identities that co-exist as ideological forces in majority political thinking: each may have its champions but, despite the apparent contradiction between them, both influence the thinking and behaviour of the two main Unionist or Loyalist parties and, presumably, the wider Unionist or Loyalist community. The difference in emphasis probably marks an important reason for there being two separate parties, but the co-existence of the identities in Unionist ideology provides a basis for individual crossing between the parties, which occurs occasionally, or, perhaps more importantly, provides a basis for unity under appropriate circumstances.

Thus when Miller (1978) describes Unionist ideology as basically contractarian, which emphasises the 'Ulsterness' element, or O'Malley (1983) differentiates Official and Democratic Unionist politics as 'political Unionism' and 'political Protestantism' respectively they only provide a partial view of the ideological terrain: whereas the former seems to provide no basis for Unionist division the latter seems to provide no obvious basis for Unionist unity. Having said that, neither party enjoys the hegemonic position enjoyed by the Unionist party prior to the 1960s, yet it would be rash to describe their differences as irrevocable. The solution to understanding the process may be to
accept a notion of ideology which does not presuppose a tidy logical consistency but which rather identifies the inconsistencies in any particular ideology as an important basis for its dynamism.

There is, of course, an additional element that requires examination: the identity provided by religion. Here again a difference of emphasis can be found in the interviewees' accounts:

Since 1641 there is always the fear: what the Ulster Loyalist sees is (that) the indigenous Irish, Catholic, Gael is going to rise and try and push them into the sea. There is a siege mentality after, you know, a very traumatic century within Ireland from the Ulster Loyalist or Protestant point of view: they say the Home Rule Bills, which created a constitutional uncertainty and the uncertainty of British intent... then we had the 1912-14 Ulster crisis which increased the uncertainty... the upheaval of the First World War in general... then the uncertainty of Home Rule again. (After) partition the minority community, through their representatives adopting an abstentionist policy, has made the Ulster Protestant and Ulster Loyalist very defensive... We look to the South and see a country which had an eleven per cent Protestant population in 1926 reduced to less than three per cent. It is a Catholic country for a Catholic people.

(ULDP/82/A)

Catholics are not excluded from joining (the DUP); the aims and objectives of the party are set out quite clearly in the constitution and the literature that we put out for promotional reasons. Catholics may feel they wouldn't be welcome in the party - I don't think that's true actually... but I think the image of the party and the fact that it contains an awful lot of people who would probably be
regarded as hard-line Protestants does put Catholics off ... Really I think the problem has been the kind of religious image the party has had in the past, where it was seen to be identified with Free Presbyterianism ... and I'd be the first to admit that Catholics mightn't feel they'd be welcome within the party; and maybe some people would say "yes, we don't want Catholics in the party".

(DUP/84/B)

I'm not a Church-goer. I think when Ian Paisley says that his objective is to preserve and maintain in the North an essentially Protestant way of life, there is no doubt that he strikes a chord throughout the Protestant community ... and I could say, in the same simplistic terms, that I wish to see preserved an essentially Protestant way of life; I would differ from Paisley when it comes to defining the essentially Protestant way of life, because for me the Protestant way of life is about liberty, is about freedom of the individual, is about freedom from priestly or clerical interference ... (It is) not as a means to imposing upon society a strict, narrow dogma.

(OUP/84/B)

Whereas before we were dealing with two identity labels, with apparent differences between them, here we are dealing with a single identity label which nevertheless evokes a different significance for each interviewee: for the ULDP interviewee the label 'Protestant' differentiates the Ulster community from those on the rest of the island and is one mark of the separate nationhood of the Northern community; the DUP interviewee practically apologises for the Fundamentalist Protestantism so often identified with that party; and the OUP interviewee presents an almost secular image of the label by focusing on the positive political
principles to be derived from Protestantism. Although 'not a Church-goer' OUP/84/B is a member of the Orange Order, an explicitly religious organisation designed to preserve and defend the Protestant religion. OUP/84/B clearly sees no contradiction in this and indeed there is no contradiction when his meaning of the label 'Protestant' is clear.

When outsiders look at Northern Ireland Protestants in general, and Paisley and the Democratic Unionists in particular, they tend to perhaps overstate the importance of fundamentalism in Protestant ideology; Paisley's Protestant Telegraph furnishes many examples of such anti-Roman Catholicism, such as that cited by O'Malley (1983):

Romanism is more a government than a worship - a vast and complicated secular organisation including, under the style and externals of a devotional system, all the elements of a civil polity - a crowned political head, a statute book of political institutes called Canon Law, a magistracy of various ranks, decked in canonicals but drilled in diplomacy, and an indivisible police bearing the title of Jesuits or the followers of Jesus but in reality the followers of a set of maxims so well calculated to bring both subjects and civil rulers under the sway of the Pope, that at one period or another almost every state in Europe has been obliged to banish from its territories this army of conspirators against the independence of sovereigns and the civil and religious liberty of subjects.

(Protestant Telegraph, 24/11/81)

At different times Paisley has described the European Economic Community as a Vatican-inspired attempt to re-form the Holy Roman Empire and pointed to the election of a Polish Pope as evidence
of the collusion between the two main forces for evil in the modern world, Romanism and Communism. Such notions are clearly not unimportant: Paisley's Free Presbyterian Church is probably the fastest growing Protestant Church in Northern Ireland - between 1970 and 1984 the Free Presbyterians spent £1,843,200 building 26 new churches while the mainstream Presbyterian Church spent £1,340,000 building 14 new churches (Belfast Telegraph, 19/4/84).

The primary source of Paisley's fundamentalism lies in his literal use of the Bible, with the Book of Revelations influencing many of his contemporary political interpretations. The 'whore of Babylon' or the 'scarlet woman' of Revelations is identified by Paisley as the Pope, the anti-Christ sent by the devil to destroy the true believers:

Both Romanism and Communism have absorbed the basic elements of pagan philosophy to bolster up their false and anti-God systems. Rome deployed and developed pagan ritual within the framework of counterfeit Christianity. Communism, prior to the French Revolution adopted the pagan and pantheistic doctrine of creation. The resulting formula came to be known as dialectical materialism.

(Protestant Telegraph, 3/8/68)

It is even possible to find more extreme fundamentalist positions in Northern Ireland: a recent pamphlet ('One Law, One Land, One Throne', 1986) published with no attributed authorship but presenting the arguments of Tara, the Irish variant of the 'British Israelites', uses the Book of Revelations to suggest that British Protestants are a lost tribe of Israel directly descended from those groups described in the Old Testament.
They use rather odd evidence to bolster this attempt to enhance the legitimacy of the 'Ulster Protestant struggle':

The conflict in Ulster is not only a temporal attack on British Sovereignty, but also a spiritual attack against the Protestant character of the British throne and the Christian witness in Ireland. It is part of Satan's attack against God in the coming prophetic battle for world sovereignty at Armageddon... The children of Israel were cast out of their land for idolatry, and Baal-ism was one of their chief idolatries. The name of the god Baal was attached to places and cities in Palestine... In the 'isles' in Ireland we find Baal-y-gowan, Baal-y-nahinch, Baal-y-castle, Baal-y-moni and Baal-y-con-el and others. Hence, proof of the Israelitish origin of the early settlers... The Hebrew word for covenant is Beriyth... The Hebrew name for man is iysh, or ish. In English the ending '-ish' means 'of or belonging to'... In original Hebrew language vowels were not used. The omission of the vowel 'e' from berith, and the retention of 'I' to preserve the 'y' sound, gives the anglicized word for covenant. The Hebrews, however, never pronounced their 'h'... Consequently, the word for 'covenant man' or 'covenant people' is 'Brit-ish'... In Genesis 21:12 God told Abraham, 'In Isaac shall thy seed be called'... The Israelites are called 'the house of Isaac'. They were descended from Isaac, and are therefore Isaac's sons. Drop the 'I' from 'Isaac', (as vowels were not used in Hebrew) and we are given 'Saac's sons', or in a shortened manner, 'Saxons'. (sic)

To that extent the role played by the Book of Revelations for coteries within the Ulster Protestant community may be seen to compare with that played by the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion' for contemporary Fascist coteries (Billig, 1978): while the latter is a forgery, the former is written in such allegorical language
as to permit creative interpretation.

However, just as anti-semitism does not describe the entirety of contemporary Fascist ideology so a crude anti-Catholicism does not describe the full ideological significance of the identity label 'Protestant':

I would see my Christian beliefs influencing my own personal motivations for getting involved (in politics), which is basically not only to serve the country and the community but (also) to serve individuals... I wouldn't see my religion as in any way anti-Rome.

(OUP/84/B)

To the Official Unionist interviewees, religion either was important in that it provided a number of moral guidelines or principles on such aspects as the right to individual conscience or the rights and liberties of individuals, or in an historical sense only:

Religion is certainly one of the most fundamental aspects of an individual's life, depending on how committed they are to their religious beliefs. A religious belief, because it stretches beyond this world into the next world, is therefore something with more binding force than other groups and individual might join. Therefore religion is certainly a major identifying factor in the label that people would use, but in terms of (the) political conflict I think really that the difficulty has arisen out of the fact that there is a very substantial overlap between a religious grouping and a political philosophy... I think, as of now, that the (religious) divisions tend to overlap with political divisions (but) the two are not directly related; people are not directly arguing about religion. If you go out and see a riot there's no great religious issue being debated there -
it's a political division that's making them go out and do that.

Indeed, one of the DUP interviewees also played down the importance of fundamentalism within the party in favour of the party's position on social issues:

... everyone thinks that the typical DUP-man is a wee Christian that runs to the Free Presbyterian Church every Sunday - a lot of people in the DUP are religiously minded, and that's why the DUP have a moral thing in their manifesto, but it's not just one denomination; I myself am a Methodist... I attend my Church, maybe once a month, but I'm not a fanatic. When I did join (the DUP) I said to myself, "these are going to be Bible-thumpers and they're going to push the Bible down my throat"; no-one has ever brought religion into it; most people just take it for granted that people who are involved agree with the manifesto, agree with the moral issues, but even within that we have had people within the party objecting to it... and that is why I honestly think that the DUP has grown in the last decade: through their social issues and, I must admit, through their moral issues, because a lot of people come along to me and they say, "look, I don't agree with you about Sunday-closing, but at least you're keeping these homosexuals off the streets", and there is people gives them credence because of it.

What this account points to is less a deep-rooted fundamentalism than a deep-rooted moral and social conservatism which may be influenced by religious beliefs even though those beliefs do not extend to all aspects of social behaviour. It also points to the influence of class in Unionist politics: whereas for the Official Unionists the value of Protestantism seem to be linked
to individualism and a specifically Conservative politics, the DUP have found their main bases of support among rural communities and in the large working-class area of East Belfast: two of the interviewees (DUP/84/C and DUP/84/D) joined the DUP specifically because of the party's activism on working-class issues. As was mentioned in the analysis of the DUP paper however, there has been no generalisation from Protestant labourism towards secular socialist politics:

With the Democratic Unionist party one of the keys to success has been that through hard constituency work it has shown it cares for its people and that has stood it in good stead and that, I suppose has won it a degree of support. Working-class support - I don't like using terms like that - but yes, our working-class support is well established. But at the same time we have very strong support in the farming community and middle class areas, if you want to talk in class terms.

(DUP/82/A)

... being in the party I can see why they're so much involved (in social issues): it's because they're so much of a, without being 'leftist', there's socialist tendencies, they're out fighting for the bread and butter issues - as do the Official Unionists - but the DUP to me has always been a party that's fighting for the ordinary working-class man, and that attracted me a lot... Someone actually said to me, "oh the DUP is the left-wing of the Protestant politics"; well, Ghandi was more left-wing than the DUP is, but I would say they were radical socialist rather than (left-wing)... Yes, to a certain extent I would call myself a socialist, but I believe that if a man goes out and does a fair day's work he should get a fair day's pay, and I believe that for too long the Official Unionists were, sort of, like the capitalists of Northern Ireland. (DUP/84/C)
What all this suggests is that there is a genuine 'politics of Protestantism' that has a general influence on Unionist politics; in practice that politics of Protestantism has a variety of tendencies only some of which are specifically anti-Roman Catholic. Hickey (1984) has described what might be considered as the more general influence of Protestant ideas in that it encourages a suspicion, and sometimes fear, of the Roman Catholic Church because of that Church's public disavowal of political involvement and its actual influence in the politics of Southern Ireland. The decline of the Protestant population in Eire, the Church's willingness to extend rites to dead IRA members and the occasional priest who expresses Republican sympathies all compound this perception and, undoubtedly, strengthen the validity of 'Protestant' way of viewing developments. As with the influences from Britishness and Ulsterness, failure to recognise the variety of influences within this politics of Protestantism can lead to two analytical confusions: on the one hand the existence of extreme fundamentalism can, and has, led to the conclusion that the Protestant community are simply bigoted, motivated only by a rabid and irrational anti-Catholicism; alternately, because such extreme notions can be shown to lack generality then it may be assumed that Protestantism has little influence on Unionist politics. The accounts above seem to suggest that Protestantism does have ideological effects on Unionist politics, but not a simple unitary effect.

Protestantism helps place the social group in the world by differentiating them from those on the rest of the island; to some it provides a cultural link with Britain while to others it
signifies a mission by identifying a force of evil directed at Ulster's doors. At times it might enhance the need and justification for the Union while at other times it highlights the importance of Ulstermen controlling Ulster's affairs. The plurality of meanings in the present allows for a range of futures to be pursued; the outcome of this ideological contestation, if indeed there ever is a single outcome, will be determined by the context within which the majority community find themselves.

Many of the sources of identity, such as nation and religion, re-occur when considering the interviewees from the minority community as does evidence of the contest for meaning or significance. The label consensually used to describe the community was 'nationalist' and all the interviewees assigned a particular importance to viewing the situation in a specifically Irish nationalist context:

Basically there are two identities in Northern Ireland: there are the million Unionists or Protestants, however you like to describe them, who consider themselves as British, or who say they consider themselves as British; then there are those, the half million who feel themselves to be Irish and therefore who don't want to be ruled from England or have any association with Britain; they would tend to look to the island of Ireland as being their country whereas the other section would look to Britain or the UK.

(NDLP/82/A)

Nationalism is important to the extent that I can recognise, living in the South (of Ireland) for ten years, I can recognise that for a lot of people the North was as far away as Timbuktoo, somewhere like that, but I do believe that the South has a crippled national psyche, as the
North has: while the two are not integrated there is actually a strong need to have both of them integrated together. I believe in the concept that intermingling of traditions and notions and ideas would make for an immensely stronger place; I believe that partition; I think that partition of any place is a very bad thing, bad idea. Almost any other solution should have been tried other than that, because it cuts people off.

(SDLP/84/B)

... We have to bear in mind that the people in the North, not just the Protestants but also the Catholics, and people in the South, have lost their Irish culture; they are still Irish and they still have aspects of it: they're not totally Anglicised yet, but they have lost a lot, and they've lost a lot because, as Connolly rightly said, British imperialism needed to destroy the Irish identity and that involved destroying the Irish culture and the Irish language. You're not going to, in any united Ireland situation, reverse that situation overnight. All that will happen is that the Irish language and Irish culture will be given greater room for manoeuvre than it has at the moment; that it would be encouraged much more than it is at the moment. But it wouldn't be foisted on people, it wouldn't be forced on people. I think that people have got to be given, have got to be given the choice. The problem is at the moment they don't have a choice: they either speak English or they don't speak at all.

(SF/82/A)

Nationalism is probably the greatest driving force in Ireland. Through the centuries different people, individuals, different groups, different parties have attempted to harness nationalism for their own ends, but they've never brought it to its rightful conclusion which is the establishment of a Socialist Republican
Ireland in which nationalism plays a big part: we don't see any contradiction, although there are internationalists who criticise nationalism and the very nationalist outlook of Republicans. The SDLP harnesses nationalism, when it suits... Fianna Fail, Fine Gael... used nationalism... We with our political development here in Sinn Fein, we have harnessed the forces of nationalism, of the sort of, the very Irish, the pro-Irish sentiment in Ireland, which leads to an anti-British sentiment; but we're not saying it should be a blind opposition to Britain - that's wrong, that's dangerous... it leads to a kind of fanaticism that's dangerous and gets out of control; but we can harness peoples' nationalist feelings, their nationalist aspirations, build up a political force on that and bring it to what we see as its rightful conclusion.

(SF/84/B)

All agree that the minority community is a nationalist community, that part of the problem lies in damage to the integrity of the nation caused by the partition of the national territory and that the solution lies in dealing with that damage. Anderson (1983) has argued that the core elements of a nationalist ideology lie in the history of the nation; Anderson also points out that this is also one of the great paradoxes of nationalism in general, in that the objective modernity of nations to the historian contrasts with their subjective antiquity to nationalists. The core elements of the national history provides one aspect of difference to be found among Northern Irish nationalist; the other main difference lies in the route to restoring the integrity of the nation:

The over-riding (principle) from my point of view is that there must be no truck at all with violence, violence
between Irish people - that principle is inviolate: it just destroys and sullies and creates far more problems... Politics is really about making change acceptable to people; it has to be bored into people, even by a 'dripping tap' technique, that change must come about and that if it doesn't come about in a peaceful manner then it will come about in a violent manner, but it will bring far more evils with it because it has been brought about in a violent manner... There are two nationalist traditions: there is the physical force one and there is the more, the mass action one. I mean, the struggle between Sinn Fein and ourselves, it's not a lot different from O'Connell and the Young Irelanders (1840s), from Parnell and the Fenians (1870s); but that thread you can trace, all the way back to people like O'Connell, Parnell, that would be a tradition I would identify with, even though in history they have been bad-mouthed and criticised; you know, there is a discernible core of philosophy that they have, that it is better by agitation to get things, rather than force.

(SDLP/84/B)

There are basically two ways (towards a united Ireland): one is the use of constitutional politics, the other is the use of armed struggle. Simply because this is a colonial struggle from our point of view, that doesn't automatically mean that armed struggle is the only method. Armed struggle is the method which has been used because it's the method which we believe will succeed. Constitutional politics, given the history of their use in Ireland over the last hundred years, if not longer, but certainly the last hundred years, I think clearly demonstrates that they in effect get no-where. They may create some minor reforms within the system but they won't create the necessary foundation from which working-class unity can be developed and socialism can be established in Ireland.

(SF/82/A)
While the SDLP interviewee traces his nationalism through those Irish historical figures who attempted to win change through peaceful agitation, the Sinn Fein interviewee points to the insurrectionist groups in Ireland's history. It should be noted here that 'constitutional nationalism' need not imply acceptance of the existing legal framework: Parnell used extra-legal pressure and the SDLP has often withdrawn from or boycotted legally constituted parliaments - 'constitutional' methods in Irish nationalism only mean the disavowal of direct violence.

One of the main tensions to arise from these alternative nationalisms lies in the significance attached to the period from 1916 onwards: the 1916 insurrection only won popular support retrospectively and the Irish Free State was only established after an Independence War from 1918 to 1921. Sinn Feiners are quick to point out that it was violence which established the degree of Irish independence that already exists and conclude from this that 'constitutional' criticisms of the present violence, from the SDLP and the Southern parties, is hypocritical:

I think there's a problem for any nationalist looking back on the period from 1918 to '21, but they can argue that they did have a mandate; and I do believe things fundamentally changed, for anybody who was contemplating physical force, by the setting up of a separate Irish State. Also, I think that when somebody is dead they are dead, and I have no patience at all with appeals to the shades of dead generations; that sort of stuff just leaves me cold, I don't think it means anything. I think that the people who really count are the people who are here and now and when a person dies that is his
contribution to politics finished. So the kind of mysticism and the disregard of the views of the people of the present day; I don't see how any physical force person, any who would be in Sinn Fein, can really reconcile a position of antagonism to; I mean, some of them don't even recognise that Dail Eireann, that 80% of the people vote for Dail Eireann, therefore it must have a legitimacy.

So the apparent solution to the dilemma caused by the nature of the nation's history is to deny the relevance of the tradition. Meanwhile Sinn Feiners, in some ways like the ULDP/UDA speaker who began to explain Protestant fears of a united Ireland by referring to 1641, compress history so that events over hundreds of years have a direct bearing on the strategy and tactics of the present. This particular dilemma is perhaps even more acute for the Eire State itself: on the one hand opposing the current activities of the IRA while on the other attempting to reconcile this with the violent birth of the State. The solution adopted by the State appears to have been twofold: firstly, attempting to play down the significance of the violent nationalists (among all the statues to national heroes in the main street of Dublin there is only one, that of Cu Chulainn, to the memory of violent men); secondly, the development of a romantic image of those who fought, with the ardour of the past nationalists set in specifically Catholic terms. Thus the events of 1916 are personalised in the character of the poet and writer Patrick Pearse who, on occasion, described the Rising in messianic terms, the 'blood sacrifice' that would do for the nation what the crucifixion
and resurrection did for Christianity. Despite the fact that crude nationalism has become increasingly less important in Eire since the 1960s, more so since Eire joined the EEC, this tension between alternative accounts of the nation's history continues. Because the IRA can place itself within the nation's history it can claim a degree of acceptance in Ireland not accorded to modern West European terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction (Federal Republic of Germany) or the Brigate Rosse (Italy).

One development that might work against that is the increasing politicisation of the Sinn Fein, throughout the 1970s, towards socialism. In contrast to the Sinn Fein interviewees above who almost take the goal of a socialist united Ireland for granted, compare this extract from an interview with Seamus Twomey, one time Chief of Staff of the IRA, reported in the Crane Bag, volume 1, number 2 (1977):

Q. It is often claimed that your movement is only a facade for much larger international revolutionary movements who are always happy to support unrest of any kind wherever they find it. What would you say to this?

A. I'd say "rubbish", number one. We get most of our support from the Irish people themselves in exile. International socialism or anything of that sort - no. There are no foreign interests whatsoever of any kind. At heart I am a socialist. I always was a socialist. I have been involved in setting up trade unions and so forth. But at the same time I am a right winger. Some of my greatest comrades in the movement would have very left-wing socialist tendencies. Now propaganda would try to explain that for these reasons
we were divided in our ranks. This is another method of trying to conquer by dividing and by spreading confusion among the rank and file of the movement. In fact it is complete rat rubbish.

The move of Sinn Fein towards a socialist politics has taken it away from a religious nationalism, although it is important to note that this new identity is firmly placed within the nationalist tradition:

The Republican Movement was purely a military organisation until in the early 70s, right up to the middle 70s when there were changes beginning to develop. I see nothing any way alien about... people talk about "going left" or "socialism"... when you say "left-wing" it's a dirty name, it's portrayed as a dirty name in western circles, but say, socialism, there's nothing alien about that to Republicans or Republicanism. What I would class it as happening is that proper Republican politics have come to the fore, the politics of James Connolly, people like that; going back even further, the socialism, in crude forms, of Fintan Lalor; there are other individuals throughout Irish history, Larkin as well, people like that there. All that we started to do is to develop that further and bring it out more, whereas in the past the politics seemed to be put to one side and the military struggle was more to the fore, and what you have now is that the two compliment each other.

(SF/84B)

The roots of this political nationalism most probably lie in the length and source of the present conflict: previous IRA campaigns relied heavily on rural operations by 'flying columns' with a substantial proportion of the volunteers coming from the South of Ireland; in contrast the present conflict is deeply rooted in
Northern Ireland, particularly in the sprawling urban ghettos from which the IRA, and Sinn Fein, now draws its support. Just as DUP activists in East Belfast display a type of socialism or labourism, even if for no other reason than to reflect the concerns and needs of the working-class population there, so too Sinn Fein must reflect the needs and concerns of the working class from which it seeks political support. The length of the present conflict is important because a generation of Republicans have now served time in gaol and returned with the new ideas that took root in the 1970s when it became increasingly clear that the IRA were not going to win a quick military victory - it is not insignificant that practically the entire Northern leadership of the present Sinn Fein served some time in gaol in the early 1970s.

However, as described above, this political direction is still firmly within a nationalist ethos which provides the main unifying force in the movement: unemployment, bad housing, social injustice and women's rights might all be issues raised by Sinn Fein, but these are also problems that will not be finally resolved until a thirty-two county socialist Republic is formed. Hence the politicisation of Sinn Fein should not lead to the conclusion that, as an organisation, it is moving away from violence. There is a recurring theme in the Sinn Fein interviews that in the final analysis British governments only understand and respond to violence (i.e. it works) and that Northern Ireland is not a democratic state because of partition (i.e. there is no alternative that will work).

That 'politics' remains a lower priority than a basic
nationalism is made even clearer in the following account:

I know many people who support the Republican position yet who go out and vote for the SDLP... (If we do badly at the polls) it may well be used, but at the end of the day it won't effect; at the end of the day you see, it may well be a nice propaganda argument that (the British government) will be able to use in Britain and America, but in terms - and this is where the Brits have always made their mistakes, like in criminalisation and elsewhere - in terms of the nationalist community they've fooled nobody. You know, the wee woman who's gone out and voted for the SDLP guy, and whose house is still being used by the IRA, she knows and the (IRA) knows that there is no hassle there at all. It's just that at the moment people, people have fallen into a rut. Nationalists, and Loyalists, vote in a sectarian pattern of voting, and you're not going to break them out of that overnight, and you're certainly not going to break them away from the SDLP because they see the SDLP as the main nationalist voice of the nationalist people.

(SF/82/A)

Unlike 'normal' political parties then, Sinn Fein is able to rationalise a poor electoral showing, because 'they know' that they have support in the areas; any electoral support gained enhances the military struggle, from this perspective, and it is clearly the former that remains dominant.

Traditionally the religion of Roman Catholicism has played an important role in the image presented by Irish nationalism. Undoubtedly this played a role in differentiating Ireland from 'Protestant' Britain and helped reinforce a notion of Irish separateness. In the 'official' nationalism of Eire the role of religion was reinforced by the influence of the Catholic Church
and by such aspects as the personification of the 1916 Rising in Pearce. In the north too Catholicism had an important influence: the central role of priests in the old Nationalist party has already been mentioned, but it also motivated hard-line Republicans such as the former Chief-of-Staff of the IRA, Sean MacStiofain:

By the close of the year Manus and I had adapted ourselves fairly well to our circumstances. We were deep in our correspondence courses and were both studying bookkeeping...

We had kept to the decision we had agreed on during one of our first walks together in the exercise yard. We had determined that we would not waste a minute of our time at the Scrubs, and we would make no plans about escape until we knew if we were going to be left there or moved somewhere else. It takes months and sometimes years to learn the routines and geography and organise a break from a place like that, as some of the successful escapers told us afterwards...

Throughout our years of imprisonment we were also sustained by our belief in God and in the practice of our religion, which I have always found to be a great consolation any time I have been in a tight spot. On Saturday mornings we were taken out from the mailbag shop and across to the small Catholic chapel. There we would have benediction, followed by confession for anyone who wanted to go. On Sundays we would have Mass at about half-past ten. From 1953 to 1956, if we went to Communion it meant that we got no breakfast, so we went only every second week.

(MacStiofain, 1975)

Despite this background all the interviewees in the study from the SDLP and Sinn Fein played down the importance of religion. For the SDLP interviewees this involved denying that the party
was the mouthpiece of the Catholic Hierarchy. One of the interviewees denied that the SDLP supported the social policies of the Church:

... it depends what you mean as being Catholic social policy. I'm not aware that there is Catholic social policy as such, I'm only aware of SDLP social policy and it reflects the concern of people in the party on the social issues.

(SDLP/82/A)

but when faced with a particular example, the Chilver proposals to merge the confessional teacher-training colleges in Belfast, she supported the existence of voluntary schools on the basis of tradition:

Our attitude to Chilver is that we would support the retention of the voluntary principle, we have always done that. We think that the voluntary schools ought to be supported, and to that extent we would be opposed to any attempts by Chilver to amalgamate the voluntary schools against the wishes of the trustees or the people. If there was full agreement from the trustees and the representatives, whatever representatives there are of the Catholic community, then certainly that would be okay, but voluntary schools have been a feature of Northern Ireland and I think people have a right to have voluntary schools and to protect (them).

(SDLP/82/A)

The other SDLP interviewee was less sanguine in his attitude and while denying any organisational links he accepted that there were times when the SDLP appeared to be too close to the Church, particularly on the issue of integrated education:
Well, I can tell you that I have talked to two priests, no bishops; I mean, there is just no contact between (us). There is a wary circling round of each other: for example, at the time of Cardinal O'Fiach’s remarks I got into trouble for making some, for some nasty remarks about the Cardinal: I thought the Cardinal was wrong - this is a personal viewpoint now - other members of the party thought I was wrong; but there is no contact and I think that kind of idea, that there is some kind of masonic, some sort of quasi-influence over us, is wrong... It struck me, living in the South, that they seemed to adopt the Catholic Church attitude (on integrated schools) very quickly, again this is purely personal. At the same time I understand that the formal position of the party is that integrated education would be a good thing, but that given the present ghettoisation of the community that it just wouldn't work: if you integrated a school on the Shankill Road or on the Falls Road you will still get all Catholic or all Protestants at it. But certainly, it did strike me at the time that they did adopt a position that was quite close to the Catholic Church fairly quickly. At the same time the strongest occupational group in the party is that of teachers: I don't know whether that's true for all parties, but certainly in the SDLP, and there's a fair amount of unanimity of the great suspicion they had about the State sector, that they would be discriminated against, that in fact they would rather stay within a voluntary system than in a state system - there is no great hankering among teachers in the party to get in under the umbrella of the state.

(SDLP/84/B)

So while the SDLP interviewees seek to deny a fundamental Catholic influence on their politics, because they wish to deny their politics as sectarian, there is an influence due to the context. Much the same can be concluded from the Sinn Fein
interviewees although here the issue is framed slightly differently: rather than a political voice of the Church, Sinn Fein finds itself often in political opposition to the Church:

... the Republican Movement and the Catholic Church have been at loggerheads since Republicanism as a philosophy first came into Ireland. Those people who become Republicans, and I mean Republicanism in the sense where they accept the Republican philosophy of separatism, secularism, socialism, and are not simply nationalists who call themselves Republicans. Those Republicans, those real Republicans inevitably find themselves drifting away from Catholicism because the two, in terms of what the Catholic Church dogma is in Ireland, they are not compatible. As you say, many Republicans, many people who support the struggle, are Catholics. There are people within Sinn Fein, within the Movement today who are not, who are Protestants. They are few and far between. I think that the label 'Catholics' can sometimes misrepresent the situation; it's much clearer if you recognise that Republicans find their base of support within the nationalist community, within a community which has a nationalist, as opposed to a Catholic, identity. It's true that nationalism and Catholicism have overlapped over the years, but they are separate. You don't have to be a Catholic to be a nationalist and you don't have to be a nationalist to be a Catholic.

(SF/82/A)

Despite these words however, the interview was briefly interrupted later by a phone call finalising arrangements for the baptism of the interviewee's child: Republicans, it would appear, may drift away from the Church, but not the faith.

In the years after the hunger-strikes the exchange of political vitriol between Sinn Fein and the Catholic Hierarchy
became more marked. An interesting effect of this was found in the interview with SF/84/B: when the question of the Catholic influence on the Republican Movement was raised this interviewee interpreted the question quite differently:

The vast majority of Republicans are Catholics or have been brought up Catholics so (while) the Republican Movement, Sinn Fein, has been portrayed as being anti-Church, anti-God, now we are careful to make the distinction in any condemnation: it's a condemnation of the Hierarchy, it's not a condemnation of the Catholic faith, because many of the men and women who make the attacks on the Catholic Hierarchy are themselves practising Catholics, so they're not going to attack the Catholic religion. It's a very important thing for the people in these areas too; taking it in my own family background where my mother and father are staunch Republicans, but they're also staunch Catholics who are totally opposed to (Bishop) Cahal Daly's statements and his teachings because they take offence at it because they support Sinn Fein, they support the Republican Movement, and for Cahal Daly to attack that is an attack on them. So there's no question of the Republican Movement saying that Catholicism is alien or bad, it's not.

(SF/84/B)

Both interpretations of the question illustrate the organic importance of Catholicism to the Republican Movement since many members and supporters come from, and adhere to, the Catholic faith. 'Secularism' in this context seems to involve the denial of the leading role of the clergy, as a fundamental Catholicism might imply, rather than a genuinely secular critique of religion as such. Such critiques as are presented focus on, what is perceived to be, a conservative Hierarchy.
These accounts illustrate how the SDLP and SF interviewees described their politics as nationalist and socialist, with an influence of Catholicism. The significance attached to these identity labels varied quite considerably and seemed to revolve around a contested meaning of nationalism: the meaning attached to socialism by interviewees was heavily related to their strategic routes towards solving the conflict, i.e. a violent route emphasising societal transformation or a peaceful route emphasising social justice; Catholicism was of contextual rather than theological significance.

This examination of self-identities in Northern Ireland has concentrated on the primary identities of the majority and minority communities. In doing this the chapter has concentrated on the interviews from unionist and nationalist activists: the Alliance party and the Workers' party propose new identities and as such their accounts are more relevant in the following chapter. Taking Gramsci's notion of ideology as a starting point, the chapter has examined the significance and meaning attached to the various identity labels current in Northern Ireland and illustrated the problems posed by a simplistic attribution of unitary meaning to any individual identity label. It would appear that no single unionist or nationalist ideology exists but that rather there is, at the present time, a contest for meaning, not only between but within political groupings. An awareness of the complexities of this process of contestation seems to throw some light on the strategic possibilities of certain futures: for example, an independent Ulster state seems
more likely to result from a retreat to a 'Protestant laager' than a move towards reconciliation; Sinn Fein's involvement in electoral activity seems less a move away from violence than a subtle addition to the armoury. In other words, this detailed examination of the meaning of identity labels has provided some insight to the motivations of the political groups in Northern Ireland. The next chapter will examine the necessary corollary to images of the self by examining images of the other.
Chapter 12: Case Studies in Ideology - 
Identities and Perceptions of the Outgroup

The barbarians come out at night. Before darkness falls the last goat must be brought in, the gates barred, a watch set in every lookout to call the hours. All night, it is said, the barbarians prowl about bent on murder and rapine. Children in their dreams see the shutters part and fierce barbarian faces leer through. "The barbarians are here!" the children scream, and cannot be comforted. Clothing disappears from washing-lines, food from larders, however tightly locked. The barbarians have dug a tunnel under the walls, people say; they come and go as they please, take what they like; no one is safe any longer. The farmers still till the fields, but they go out in bands, never singly. They work without heart; the barbarians are only waiting for the crops to be established, they say, before they flood the fields again.

(from, Waiting for the Barbarians, by J.M. Coetzee)

Paranoia induced by a sense of siege, as described in Coetzee's novel, has often been attributed to the conflicting groups in Northern Ireland. This examination of the perception of outgroups may help to confirm this picture, but first of all it is worth considering who are the outgroups. One might focus on the religious groups to suggest that 'the Catholics' serve as the outgroup for 'the Protestants' and vice-versa. However, as the previous chapter outlined, self-identities display a complexity not encompassed by a single identity label; it might follow from this that the outgroups relevant to any particular individual activist range beyond his or her religious or political counterparts. It should be clear from the account already presented that
the British government forms an important outgroup for more than Republicans; the Eire government seems to be an outgroup for Republicans as well as Unionists; it is also conceivable that political opponents within 'the ingroup' form political 'outgroups', especially in a context of ingroup political heterogeneity. All these aspects were raised in the interviews and what is perhaps of most interest is the way in which the activists described these different categories of 'outgroup'.

It might be useful to begin with those activists who, in their own words, "stand outside the two tribes"; one might imagine that they should present the most dispassionate perception of both sides given that they are committed to neither and are prepared to recognise legitimate fears on both sides:

We define the problem as one of dual fears in both sections of the community... We would argue that a basic fear of the Protestant section of the community is that they will be coerced into a united Ireland against their will and the basic fear of the Catholic community is that they have been denied a basic quality of esteem for their culture and traditions and they have been doomed to a second class citizenship.

(A11/82/A)

... The problem is that both camps try and solve the problem by giving self-determination to their own group and forgetting that by doing that they are denying it to another group... (A)t some point if you wish to create a stable society in Northern Ireland there has to be a recognition of the rights of the two traditions inside Northern Ireland; if it comes sooner, less people will die. If people continue to insist that their tradition has to win, then more people will die.

(A11/84/B)
This does not imply that the Alliance activists were uncritical of certain aspects raised by the other parties: one interviewee, for example, dismissed the notion that the Protestant religion was under direct attack in Eire:

Well I don't think the Unionists are justified in that view; I think it's quite clear from... although they may give all this propaganda about how Protestants are badly done by in the Republic, I think that's just rubbish. I don't think their fears are justified at all, in that respect.

(A11/84/C)

The Alliance interviewees did accept that the majority community did have a legitimate identity that conferred certain rights, and while partition in 1921/2 may have been drawn to create an artificial majority, as nationalists claim, this does not justify ignoring their rights at the present time:

Well, the point I would make is this; go and look at the clauses in the United Nations; go and look at the system in International Law; go and look at the drawings of the lines on the borders through Europe which happened all round the time of 1918, 1919, and you will find that lines were drawn on maps to give local national groups their rights of self-determination inside particular states. It happened through the whole creation of the Slav states. All that sort of stuff was all done on the same basis. And what nationalists refuse to accept is that the unionists do not... they do not accept unionists as being, if you like, a separate tribe, a separate nation; they deride the unionists to the extent that they make remarks like, "why is it that you cannot stand up on your own; why is it that you have to borrow your culture from Britain"; in fact they don't say "from Britain", they say
"from England". The point is that in fact the culture of the Ulster unionist is a different culture; it's the culture of the people who were planted, etc, and how they've grown up, etc, in this area; and that's why I say they consider themselves British, but they don't consider themselves either English, Scottish or Welsh, and I don't see why they have any less right to be called a nation in the same way as the Scots, the Welsh and the English are; and the Irish are.

(A11/84/B)

At the same time the 'dual vision' of the Alliance activists is such that they can recognise both that the legitimacy of partition and the Union does not justify Unionist domination or a governmental structure that allows such domination and that such a system will encourage at least ambivalence in the minority community towards those who violently oppose the state:

... there is another way you can measure legitimacy and that is you can say that for a state to be legitimate, the vast majority - I'm talking about ninety-something-or-other percent - must accept the institutions of the state as being theirs: that is not the case (in Northern Ireland). So, in a strict legal sense, yes it is true that the state is legitimate but there is this moral problem and that is why the division in Irish politics is not the division between those who support violence and those who reject violence - that is why the division is between those who see themselves as nationalists and those who see themselves as unionists. The unionists, by failing to get those nationalists who reject violence, by offering something to them, throw them into the hands of those who support violence and give Adams his mandate, or what he claims is his mandate, from the people of West Belfast... (Catholics) are ambivalent (towards violence)
because they see the institutions which that violence is attacking as not being theirs and therefore they do not see the need to come out and defend those institutions. The difference in the Irish Republic is that they will come out and defend those institutions because they are their institutions; and it's this point about being excluded, this point about being rejected, this point about not having a say in the running of the state for sixty years that causes the division on the basis of nationalism and unionism, not on the basis of pro-violence and anti-violence, pro-democracy and anti-democracy.

(A11/84/B)

Because both sides to the conflict have a case to offer, compromise and negotiation are the keywords of the Alliance approach: the Unionist parties are criticised for not being prepared to give enough; the SDLP are criticised for seeking too much, particularly in regard to their 'Irish Dimension'. The Alliance interviewees were all firm on the idea that there had to be consensual rules through which politics was organised: paramilitary groups, because of their espousal of violence, excluded themselves from a place at the negotiating table.

What comes through most strongly in the Alliance accounts is a preparedness to listen to, and recognise value in, the cases of both sides to the conflict; their problem, of course, is that few seem to listen to them.
Unionist views of nationalists:

Two of the Official Unionists, in their accounts of nationalist politics, expressed a number of common themes: they felt that the SDLP were trying to force Unionists into a united Ireland; that the IRA/Sinn Fein were using more direct methods towards the same end; and that the SDLP had a place in democratic structures in Northern Ireland, but not one conferring special privileges:

... in the final analysis the Anglo-Irish talks can't deliver anything; it cannot force Unionists into a united Ireland, regardless of what the SDLP say... We'll give the SDLP their proper place, but we will not share power in an executive with the SDLP or with any Republican party... Both (the SDLP and Sinn Fein) are working to break up the Union; the SDLP may have different means but they climb to power on the backs of the provos by saying "if you don't put us into government, it's the provos are the alternative". They've suddenly discovered that the provos are more of an alternative to their own community than they themselves believed... I think with the Sinn Fein vote there is a clear fact that there was support there which has been mobilised. As to how Unionists can do anything to lessen that, and this great word "alienation" that's in current vogue: what does it mean in practical reality, in practical politics that wasn't there before? You know, nationalists voted for Sinn Fein candidates, voted for IRA prisoners in the 1950s, the 1920s again... You could not save the SDLP by bringing them into government and by accepting the Anglo-Irish talks... Our problem is that to save the SDLP, in a sense Unionists must dig their own graves because we would be only preparing for a united Ireland in the future... It's the logical consequence of power-sharing and Anglo-Irish
talks, Anglo-Irish relations. That's the SDLP's aim - they've never made any secret about that... They say that the British government should put pressure on Unionists to accept this: that isn't "by consent". I think again it's the problem of the Forum: it talks a lot about the consent of Unionists, but if the Unionists don't want it, government must force them and take action... The SDLP have clearly used the provos in their own way, as a scare for the British government: you know, "accept us or you'll have these boys"; so their own position, whilst they may condemn violence and oppose it, violence is a very convenient tool for them to use in political argument.

Well I'm frightened about what's happening to the SDLP. They're clearly, in terms of their basic analysis now, they're not far away from Sinn Fein: that the North is a failed political entity and that the North is irreformable. They appear, for the moment, to say that there are no internal arrangements which they would be prepared to help work. I suspect that will alter, that the New Ireland Forum will succeed in its purpose of winning the European election for John Hume, that he will be in a somewhat different position after that because Dublin isn't able to deliver a united Ireland and the New Ireland Forum cannot deliver a united Ireland and if the SDLP wants a political future then the SDLP will be driven, eventually, back to a point of considering what arrangements they can come to with their fellow Protestant citizens, their Unionist fellow citizens, that is to the benefit of their people. The alternative is extinction, because the alternative is to be brushed aside by Sinn Fein because the Catholic community, if that is all they are given by way of a choice, will chose surely the real thing and not the pale shadow... I believe that John Hume
and Seamus Mallon do not like the murder of UDR men, do not like the murder of their Protestant neighbours, that that is not the type of society that they actually wish to live in or preside over and at the end of the day, a spark of common decency maybe drives me to conclude that it must surely be better to have to deal with John Hume than to have to deal with Gerry Adams... The British presence in Ireland is the majority who live in this country, who, of their own volition, wish to remain citizens of the United Kingdom. The war against the British is the war against the majority community in Northern Ireland... (Is it a war against Protestants?) I'm not sure what the answer to that is... I don't like to fall into the trap of assuming that Protestants are all unionists and Catholics are all nationalists, but there is no doubt that the Protestants in the border counties are the unionists and they're being bumped off - they're killing off Protestants and unionists at one and the same time. I don't know quite what the proper way would be to answer that. There is no doubt whatever that the IRA has decided that the Protestants of the North are irreformable and must be beaten into submission... If (the SDLP) want a role in some structure in Northern Ireland, which is a fair role and on a par with everybody else, then we are offering it, the role is there for them; but we are certainly against arranging our political affairs to accommodate a party which has excluded itself from the political process and which devotes its time and energies to sitting with political parties in another country plotting our downfall.

(OUP/84/C)

Perhaps most interesting here is the perceived homogeneity in nationalist politics: even where the belief is expressed that the SDLP really do not want to see a society brought into being through violence (OUP/84/C), there is clearly a lingering doubt
in the speaker's mind. It would seem that the common goal of a united Ireland is sufficient to mark a basic homogeneity; there appears to be no understanding here that the SDLP view of a united Ireland differs quite considerably from that of Sinn Fein.

Perhaps not surprisingly this perception of homogeneity was also found in the accounts of the Democratic Unionist interviewees:

I think at the moment the majority of Unionists are asking themselves "what is the difference?" because both the SDLP and Sinn Fein are engaging in the same kind of obstructive, non-constitutional politics and it is a boycott that is designed to bring down the Stormont Assembly which very clearly the majority of the people want, and indeed I would submit that even many Catholics see some virtue and some value in it, but because they are competing with Sinn Fein the SDLP are adopting the same line. Also, I think some of their spokesmen don't help the situation either - you've got the... I suppose like every party the SDLP is a coalition and on the one hand you have extreme Republican views, that could perhaps be accommodated within Sinn Fein, and on the other hand you have extremely moderate views that would perhaps be accommodated within the Alliance party.

Well if we are to believe what we see on television, as far as the SDLP are concerned they totally reject the armalite rifle as a solution, whereas Sinn Fein believe in the armalite rifle as a solution and refuse to condemn what is called "the armed struggle". As far as the final objectives are concerned, I think the Forum report really confirmed, if anyone needed confirming, that there is no real difference in the final objectives. That does not mean that someone like a member of the SDLP could not, in my opinion, play a part in constitutional arrangements,
but I would find it extremely difficult, I feel, to work on any sort of committee with someone who was a member of Sinn Fein knowing, from what we read and what we see on television and what we hear the senior members of the party saying, that they do not believe I should be here and that a "Brits Out" policy does not only include the British army but includes me as a British subject.

(DUP/84/D)

Whereas OUP/84/B did not agree that power-sharing with the SDLP would help negate support for Sinn Fein on the basis that it would mean giving up too much, one of the DUP interviewees disagreed with the basic premise:

If you look at the period when there was power-sharing, at that stage the IRA seemed to gather momentum and certainly their campaign gathered momentum; some might say that that was simply a reaction to bring down something which they feared might work in the long term, but certainly there was no evidence of a slackening off of support towards the IRA.

(DUP/84/B)

Added to this is a curiously contradictory response to the recent electoral support for Sinn Fein: one the one hand the interviewees seem to deny that the conflict is deepening and suggest, as OUP/84/B above, that Sinn Fein's support probably always existed; on the other hand the extent of that support reinforces suspicion of the minority:

I wonder if Sinn Fein had been prepared to stand for election before the hunger-strike whether or not they would have got that support; I think that support was always there. Coming as it did after the hunger-strike and they then stood for elections, they could claim it was
the hunger-strike that gave it to them - I don't think it was really, I think they'd have got it anyway... I don't think we are happy to see any big increase in support for a party that quite openly supports and explains away the things that the IRA are doing; in fact it's very sad that that kind of support is gathering up. We just regard it as a fact of life really, and if it's there it indicates that a sizeable part of the Catholic community must sympathise in some way and to some degree with the IRA campaign which is directed at the Protestant community.

(DUP/84/B)

I find it difficult to understand that when Bobby Sands, the hunger-striker, died, thirty-odd thousand people supported him, a man who stood for violence; I found it difficult to understand why, in the last Council election a hundred-odd thousand people supported Sinn Fein; I found it difficult to understand why, in areas that are regarded as being perhaps affluent areas, and I live in an area which is semi-detached housing (and has both sections of the community represented in it), I find it difficult when they open the election boxes, because I've been to a count, and I see, basically my neighbours, who have failed to register their vote but have written slogans of one sort or another across it... My initial reaction is, because a man is a Roman Catholic or a woman is a Roman Catholic, that doesn't mean they are a bad person; but why should a hundred-odd thousand of them vote for such a party?

(DUP/84/D)

... okay, the majority of Catholics now probably don't support the men of violence, but if you have a large percentage of them supporting the men of violence, what faith have the Protestants in them? I mean, if you were going along the Newtownards Road and you see a Catholic, you say "does he support Sinn Fein, is he for violence,
is she for violence?", you know, there's that doubt in
your mind that probably one in four Catholics support
these men of violence and are quite willing to go and
give their name, you know their one, two, three on the
ballot for them and support them. I myself couldn't
bring myself to say they're only doing it because of
this, that and the other - the thing is, these guys have
come out and said "victory to the IRA", and all this.

(DUP/84/C)

It would seem that for these interviewees the electoral support
gained by Sinn Fein has a discernible affect in the majority
community, the ingroup; they do not appear to see it as evidence
of any affect in the minority community, the outgroup. This in-
ability to see any political dynamic in the minority outgroup
or to understand the conflict from the point of view of the
minority is further evidenced by the attitude to the original
civil rights campaign and to the effect of hard security
measures:

Okay, we've heard it said that for fifty years the
Official Unionists kept the Catholics down, but from my
view, from joining (the DUP) I've sat and thought about
it a lot, for fifty years the Official Unionists kept the
working-class down and not just the Catholics because, if
you were a Protestant and you had a house, you got a vote;
if you were a Protestant and didn't have a house, you
didn't get a vote, just the same as a Catholic. I laugh
at all these Catholics running round and saying "for
fifty years we didn't have a vote", because it was the
same for the Protestants. I could take you out now round
the corner to see typical Protestant housing, and yet the
Catholics are the same; it's just that they have a better
propaganda than we have, you know.

(DUP/84/C)
There's always a danger that you will make martyrs out of people. I don't honestly, it's a theory that's been put forward time and time again: the same was said about the hunger-strikers when they went on hunger-strike - I honestly doubt whether many people remember much past Bobby Sands; now you may get some hardened Republicans who could rhyme the names off, I know I couldn't remember the names and I reckon I'm fairly well informed, and I couldn't remember any names after Bobby Sands; and I think that for a lot of Catholics that is also the case.

But while there is the danger that if you do execute by either capital punishment or taking a more hardline shoot-on-sight policy, while there is a danger that you may well make martyrs of people I think that is a risk you have got to take if you're wanting to root out the problem. Internment without trial was something we never supported... we would rather see that things were done within the due process of the law, but once people have been convicted and have been shown to be involved in this that they're taken permanently out of circulation so that they don't get involved again.

(DUP/84/B)

Going further than this, two of the DUP interviewees suggested that the 'nationalist' minority was not, in fact, nationalist:

I would stick my neck out and say that the majority of Catholics didn't want a united Ireland; I would say that the support for Sinn Fein is mainly because of their IRA activities and the fact that, you know, these are the guys that are out on the streets supporting the men of violence... on the other hand you have the element that are going to support them because they're getting work done for them, you know, the constituency work done... A majority of Catholics want nothing to do with the South, they've seen it, they've been down South... I know for a fact that in 1973, that we had a lot of trouble up here,
a lot of women from the Short Strand... all got on their buses and they flew away down to the Free State, as we called it then - they were all back within a fortnight because they got no dole money, they got no family allowance, they were living from hand to mouth; at least up here they were getting their money... (I) don't care what your politics are, you go where you're better off.

(DUP/84/C)

... I understand that in the last Border Poll, and I wasn't here when it took place, that quite a number of boxes that should have come out saying 'no' to the Border actually suggested that there were some Roman Catholics in favour of the link with Great Britain.

(DUP/84/D)

Such accounts can best be understood as evidence of 'categorical thinking': unlike the Alliance interviewees the Unionists view the context from within a fixed framework. This framework solidifies their perceptions of nationalist politics to the extent that at worst they see no difference between the various nationalist political groups while at best any differences are hazy and unclear; they cannot perceive any legitimate motivation within nationalism, focusing rather on examples of perfidy; and they do not perceive any dynamic in nationalist politics.

Nationalist views of unionists:

To a certain extent the same type of categorical thinking can be found in the accounts of the nationalist interviewees.
The basis for it here lies in the traditional nationalist view that (a) Northern Protestants are members of the Irish nation, whether they realise it or not, and (b) their current opposition to a united Ireland lies in the Machiavellian pursuits of Britain and an indigenous sectarian leadership. This view is most clearly expressed by the Sinn Fein interviewees:

Their fears (of a united Ireland) are fears which have been held for two centuries. It's a colonial, it's a colonist fear that they usurp the land, they usurped the jobs, they usurped the position of the nationalist people in Ireland and that in a united Ireland the nationalist people would take it back... And that's a fear that Paisley and the Official Unionists and others play on. It's what has brought Paisley to the position of predominance that he has today, that a united Ireland would be a 'Rome-ruled' Ireland, that in effect the boot, which they for so long put into the nationalist population in the North, would be put on the other foot and they would find themselves in that sort of situation... I think it's inevitable that aspects (of the Protestant) cultural background will die out (in a united Ireland). The Orange Order and Orange marches will probably die out because Orangeism is a racist philosophy based on the supremacy of one culture or one identity or one community over another. Without that privileged position, without that racist situation being able to be maintained, because of the six county state having being dissolved, Orangeism would become an anachronism within Ireland and would become, if anything, the local Orange Hall would be a place to go for a drink on a Saturday night, that would be the limit of it.

(SF/82/A)

You see, it's very hard to accept that (the Protestants) have a separate culture; you find that things like Country and Western music seems to be the trend, because I find
that those people are at a loss for a culture - there's no English culture because it's a bastard race made up of Saxons, Normans, everybody; there's no sort of traditional, pure race like where you have the one Irish culture; you haven't got that in England. In Cornwall you have your own thing, the Morris dancers, and you have all these different parts of England, probably things I don't even know about. So there's no sort of single inherent Orange culture; their culture, their background is tied up as much with ours. The whole thing where sectarian divisions were created, I mean, it's just like apartheid in a way, only there's no colour bar, so class distinction is made through religion, to maintain the power or whatever.

(SF/84/B)

There is evident confusion in this latter attempt to identify an Ulster cultural identity: it is either English, insofar as there is an English cultural identity, or it is Irish: the possibility of an indigenous culture does not seem to be considered. Interestingly, just as the ULDP interviewee from 1982 described an affinity between Ulster Protestants and Catholics, when they met outside Northern Ireland, so this Sinn Fein interviewee believed there was a common understanding once the malign influence of sectarian politicians was removed: not surprisingly he draws a different political conclusion:

I don't believe there will be a civil war (in a united Ireland).... I believe we can, in the coming years, win over the confidence of people in the Protestant Loyalist communities. I think one of the ways we'll do it, I mean, I meet people from those communities on a very informal basis, say you just run into people, usually outside of Belfast, you're away on holiday or something and you run
into people and you get talking and you discover, they discover, "he's a Catholic, he's a Protestant, what's the crack here", and you get talking and they see you're not a monster, you're not a bogey; now you're talking about people who mostly aren't involved in politics on that side of things, where they aren't blinded by sectarian bigotry. Anyway, I believe we will win over their confidence enough for them to say, "well, we'll give it a chance".

(SF/84/B)

The SDLP interviewee in 1982 held a similar benign nationalist opinion of the majority community:

I think that one of the main reasons they are afraid (of a united Ireland) is that they have been indoctrinated over the years. People like Ian Paisley have a vested interest in maintaining division because they thrive on division and fear and they have portrayed the South, and it's been the same over a number of years, the bogey-man was always the Prime Minister in the South. I have to say that there was a reciprocation: they always obliged by coming out with hard-line statements and that didn't help, but basically they feel that the South is a Catholic Republic that is going to suck them up and oppress them and take away their jobs in the way that the minority here has been discriminated against, and I think that is a real fear with them. I accept that they have that fear, I'm not saying that it's not there, but I think that their own leaders have, on many occasions, nurtured those fears for their own reasons.

(SDLP/82/A)

The same speaker felt sure that a situation of power-sharing would lead to a united Ireland in a short time because those irrational fears would be overcome by the experience of sharing power with nationalists. By contrast the SDLP interviewee in
1984 seemed to express a post-New Ireland Forum attitude: the Forum report expressed what the Irish identity was all about; it was not up to the majority community to describe their identity; once positions were clear then an accommodation had to be sought between the identities, giving each equal weight:

Well, as you know in the Forum Report, it tries to define the symbols and identity of what it is to be British and it recognises the absolute total legitimacy of being British; if these people feel British, they have a perfect right to feel British; we accept their sincerity and their credentials at feeling British: all we are saying is people also have a perfect right to be Irish, but, if these symbols of Britishness are defined, whether or not it's loyalty to the Royal Family, or the right to watch British media programmes or whatever, or to carrying British passports, whatever it is, those rights can be fully protected and guaranteed. What we're saying is that they shouldn't, ipso facto, because other people have a different identity, and identity is quite a hard thing to define, that those people should be put upon. But certainly, they are British, although I think that a lot of the Britishness is probably conditional Britishness.

(SDLP/84/B)

At the same time this SDLP interviewee dismissed majority fears of the South and the role of the Catholic Church in such episodes as the abortion referendum:

I think they certainly have every right to be afraid of what the IRA is doing, and of course the IRA is mainly a Northern phenomenon; their fears of what the Southern parties are, of what the Southern populous would do to them are absolutely and wildly exaggerated... When in the South eighty percent of the people go to Mass I think you're going to have a strong influence on values. What
I'm saying is, I must say I didn't see any great arm-twisting going on by the Catholic Church... because they go to Mass, because they pick up Catholic papers and they read them, their views are influenced, but I mean, nobody came out to them and said "you must vote this way" - they were advised that it might be better to vote that way, but they certainly weren't forced to do it.

(SDLP/84/B)

But then it is this insidious influence that many Protestants in Northern Ireland find so distasteful (Hickey, 1984).

When asked about differences between the two main Unionist parties, most of the nationalist interviewees discerned an essential unity: any differences identified tended to be played down:

None at all. There are underlying differences in that Paisley's appeal is more to the Protestant working class and to the sort of lower-middle class section and the leadership of the DUP is based on the, from that, those strata of the Protestant society.

(SF/82/A)

Well, they're all lumped together - the main big difference would be that Paisley wants the power, he wants to be the 'man in the middle', Molyneaux wants to be it. The different debates and discussions in their own parties, they're even split among themselves over such things as devolution and direct rule and all this crack; they can't even agree on that within their own parties; but the main big difference I think, is who wants to get power for themselves, who is the biggest party, who speaks for the most... The best thing from their point of view would be one big party, one united front, which they can't get because of personality clashes, because of the personal desire for power.

(SF/84/B)
I don't see any difference at all between the Official Unionists and the Democratic Unionists. I think the DUP, through Ian Paisley, speaks with a bigger voice and a louder voice, and perhaps a more effective voice in view of his demagoguery; but I think some people view Ian Paisley as the problem in Northern Ireland and if only someone would, you know, get rid of him, to put it in Northern Ireland terms, that would solve the problem. But Paisley is not the problem; the problem is Paisleyism or Unionism, and at the root of it you will find that basic to the whole thinking of Paisley and McCusker or Molyneaux is that we must retain control over the whole of Northern Ireland.

(SDLP/83/A)

... I believe that, instinctively, unionists are more socially and economically conservative than the non-unionists, because they have less cause to be radical in their viewpoint; I would imagine that if there was some new overall settlement, not a united Ireland which isn't on in the traditional sense of a united Ireland, I would believe that they would remain as some sort of definable bloc; I don't think they would break up into all sorts of elements... (Their differences) are mainly class differences, and I suppose the Official Unionists tend to be more deliberate and considered in their viewpoint, less visceral than the Democratic Unionists; also there are individuals in the Official Unionist party that I can perceive as being sympathetic individuals - not sympathetic to our point of view, but people you could identify with as human beings.

(SDLP/84/B)

To conclude this section then, the accounts above appear to show some evidence of categorical thinking when the target of
perception is the outgroup. The relative simplicities involved in these judgements stand in marked contrast to the complex mix of ingroup identities examined in the previous chapter and illustrate the gulf that lies between the communities. It is not so much that these political activists disagree with the views of their opponents but rather that they hold a relatively simple understanding of what those views are; this understanding seems to be determined more by the framework through which the ingroup is identified: 'they' are wrong because 'we' are right; 'we' are right because 'they' are wrong. This happy circularity is even sometimes maintained by an apparent belief that the political representatives of 'the other side' somehow or other do not 'represent' what 'they' actually believe.

At least two consequences can be seen to flow from this: on the one hand there is no understanding of the political dynamic of either community: the rise of the DUP can be explained away by the personality of Paisley, or the lack of personality in the Official Unionists; electoral support for Sinn Fein is recent because Sinn Fein have only recently taken part in elections - the support was always there anyway. On the other hand there does not appear to be any awareness that 'the other side' might interpret events differently: thus Sinn Fein would argue that the IRA does not carry out any sectarian attacks - all, or most, actions are carried out against members of the security forces, the armed services of the Crown; to the majority community however, the IRA campaign is directed against them - to the IRA, RUC and UDR members are 'soft targets', to the majority they are
'Protestant targets'. It is disingenuous for the SDLP to suggest that in the Anglo-Irish dialogue the Eire government speaks for the nationalists while the British government speaks for the unionists; it is equally disingenuous for the unionists to proclaim the virtue of 'British democracy', meaning a 'first past the post system', when the main question of any election is the size of the unionist majority - demography determines this to be the only possible majority.

It is not that these interpretations from either side are necessarily wrong - varying degrees of 'evidence' can be provided for all of them and any analysis of the conflict would need to consider them - but rather that they are often assumed by the actors in the conflict to be the only possible interpretations. It is perhaps not surprising then that the interviewees were able to present a more detailed account of the politics of the ingroup, the dynamics of political competition within the community: after all, the SDLP and Sinn Fein compete for nationalist votes and the Official and Democratic Unionists compete for unionist votes so that competition is within, rather than between, the two communities, as if two separate electorates existed. Psychologically it would seem that two electorates, or two 'imagined communities', do indeed exist.
Billig (1985) has argued that cognitive Social Psychology contains two contrasting views of prejudice:

According to one conception, the ways in which prejudiced people think are fundamentally different from the ways tolerant people think. On the other hand, there is a view which denies this distinction; instead of seeing prejudice as a distinct style of thinking, it claims that all thought involves prejudice.

The former view has been heavily influenced by the work of Adorno et al (1950) on the 'Authoritarian Personality' which argued that the content of prejudiced thinking was correlated with a form of thinking characterised by 'intolerance of ambiguity, adherence to rigid categorisation, etc'. Despite, or perhaps because of, the original intent of this work to investigate the psychological basis of fascism, many of the critiques of the Authoritarian Personality have focused on a supposed political bias in that work rather than on the notions of authoritarian and tolerant modes of thought; thus, it is said, the mode or form of thought of the authoritarian extends beyond potential fascists. In particular this allowed for the identification of an underlying similarity between marxism and fascism despite the wide differences in the content of these ideologies (Billig, 1984).

The alternative conception, that all thought involves prejudice, is based on the idea that all thinking necessarily involves categorisation as the only way 'to structure and give coherence to our general knowledge about people and the social
world' (cited in Billig, 1985). Billig argues that this conception can be found in the work on Social Identity theory, described earlier in this thesis.

The data from the interviews of the present study may help to investigate this area and the alternative approach presented by Billig. Indeed, the basic notion of categorical thinking was identified as important in the previous chapter looking at perceptions of the outgroup. It is also possible to find particular examples of rigid or intolerant thinking in the discourse of the interviewees, especially those from the more extreme political groups in Northern Ireland:

The problem in Northern Ireland is that a violent minority within Northern Ireland refuse to accept that the constitutional destiny of Northern Ireland has been settled and settled democratically by the people of Northern Ireland and that violent minority have taken it upon themselves to seek, by bombs and bullets to obtain what they cannot obtain by the ballot and to bomb and bludgeon the population of Northern Ireland into an all-Ireland state into which they have no desire to go.

(DUP/82/A)

Here the Democratic Unionist interviewee presents a view of the basic problem in Northern Ireland in very uncertain terms. In a similar vein another of the Democratic Unionist interviewees described his view of the motivation behind the IRA campaign; when asked what he thought of the IRA's claim that their campaign was directed against the 'British presence in Ireland' rather than the Protestants of Northern Ireland, he replied:

I think they're lying. I think it's very clear if you look at the very vulnerable areas around the border, for
world' (cited in Billig, 1985). Billig argues that this conception can be found in the work on Social Identity theory, described earlier in this thesis.

The data from the interviews of the present study may help to investigate this area and the alternative approach presented by Billig. Indeed, the basic notion of categorical thinking was identified as important in the previous chapter looking at perceptions of the outgroup. It is also possible to find particular examples of rigid or intolerant thinking in the discourse of the interviewees, especially those from the more extreme political groups in Northern Ireland:

The problem in Northern Ireland is that a violent minority within Northern Ireland refuse to accept that the constitutional destiny of Northern Ireland has been settled and settled democratically by the people of Northern Ireland and that violent minority have taken it upon themselves to seek, by bombs and bullets to obtain what they cannot obtain by the ballot and to bomb and bludgeon the population of Northern Ireland into an all-Ireland state into which they have no desire to go.

(DUP/82/A)

Here the Democratic Unionist interviewee presents a view of the basic problem in Northern Ireland in very uncertain terms. In a similar vein another of the Democratic Unionist interviewees described his view of the motivation behind the IRA campaign; when asked what he thought of the IRA's claim that their campaign was directed against the 'British presence in Ireland' rather than the Protestants of Northern Ireland, he replied:

I think they're lying. I think it's very clear if you look at the very vulnerable areas around the border, for
constitutional process, it must accept the existence of Northern Ireland. Because the SDLP is a 'nationalist' party it cannot therefore be considered 'constitutional'; and if the SDLP is not 'constitutional', it cannot claim a right to involvement in the government of Northern Ireland. Qed.

A similar form of thinking can be found in the interview with one of the Sinn Fein activists. In answer to the question, why do the British stay in Northern Ireland? the following range of explanations were offered:

Oh, there are many factors involved in that... One is the obvious economic interest they have in the North, but more than that... the Brits have a fantastic amount of investment in the twenty-six counties also... Another is the military view, in terms of NATO. The Brits have always had a paranoia about Ireland being the backdoor into Britain, whether it was Henry II or Elizabeth I or whatever... Another reason for their wanting to remain was the fact that the Loyalist establishment in the North is intermarried and interlinked with the British establishment... Another factor... was the danger that whichever party attempted to pull out of the North the other party would automatically use it as a big stick to hit them over the head with... Another factor is the amount of investment from Irish investors in Britain... (T)hey would be concerned that that money, in the event of Republicans or Republican socialist-minded people coming to power, that money would obviously be put into Ireland and not into Britain.

(SF/82/A)

Underlying this range of explanations is the view that most, if not all, the problems in Northern Ireland can be placed at the door of Britain. From this the British presence can be
categorically considered 'a bad thing' and must be based on some malevolent or self-seeking intent. The value to the individual of the menu of possibilities is that if any one is empirically invalidated, insofar as any one of the reasons could be thus assessed, he can satisfactorily point to the alternatives to maintain the a priori belief. In the same way the other Sinn Fein interviewee presented the 'armed struggle' as the only method through which any progress could be achieved. It is also worth noting in this account the apparent assumption that Loyalist paramilitaries only exist as another arm of British rule:

From our point of view in Sinn Fein, the armed struggle couldn't stop because the fact that Sinn Fein has the support of the IRA means that Sinn Fein will continue to be a force to be reckoned with by the British because they know; the same way that the British government rely on their armed forces, or the different forces of Loyalism, the active military end of Loyalism, to ensure that they keep some sort of control in Ireland; we realise that for us to continue to be a force to be reckoned with by the Brits, that the armed struggle is essential, it's the only thing; at the end of the day it's the only thing that the Brits will listen to.

(SF/84/B)

The final example of intolerant or rigid thinking comes from an activist in a party normally considered to be 'moderate' in Northern Irish politics, the Workers' Party. The basic model can be maintained however, when it is considered that the Workers' Party is a marxist party. The fact that the 'categorical object' is not a 'class enemy' as such may in fact be taken to reinforce the model: is this an example of a generalised intolerant mode
of thought?

We are ideologically different to Sinn Fein. This sort of cloak of 'socialist respectability' which has come to the fore in this last couple of years I believe is an attempt to convince the loony left in Britain, and some type of fringe left types in Europe, for funds and logistical support... If you look at the Seamus Twomeys or the O'Bradaighs, they were very much right-wing nationalists. It's harder to say that Adams and Morrison are also right-wing nationalists because they tend to disguise it, disguise what they're saying behind this cloak of socialist respectability... I read an interesting thing in the paper about Gerry Adams collecting the plate at Sunday mass, which is very respectable; you know, it's very good to have your MP going round on a Sunday down on his knees now and again; which is something similar to the Jimmy Drumms, the Frankie Cards, who were leading the Provisionals in the late 1960s, who go to Lourdes and pray for peace in Ireland with justice; these are people who are daily communicants.

(WP/84/A)

These examples of categorical or rigid thinking can be contrasted with the more open accounts of the Alliance interviewees. In the first example the interviewee discusses the Democratic Unionist party in an almost analytic fashion: unlike other interviewees he does not characterise the Democratic Unionists as simply a 'Paisley fan-club' but rather identifies potential developments due to the growth of the party's support:

Paisley is the driving force of the DUP and personifies the DUP; he is charismatic and that's particularly important now since most elections are fought on (television). In the EEC elections it was Paisley stood but in the Local Government elections it was the DUP who
stood and they got a bigger vote than Paisley did in the European election; the one fact, I suppose, about that that we should not ignore is that when you achieve such a performance, when you get so many people elected, you are bringing onto the political stage people who will create their own power base... There is this belief, and I'm sure it was true before, that the DUP were a bunch of cretins, but that's not true of the new DUP.

(A11/82/A)

An even clearer example can be found in the Alliance interviewee who suggested that while he currently supported the continuation of the Union between Northern Ireland and Great Britain he was open to persuasion; in other words, he held a particular opinion, but his mind was not closed:

I am quite willing to listen and to be persuaded that it would be in my best interests to change my mind (on a united Ireland) - at the moment I haven't changed my mind. That is what I believe by the position of the guarantee, that the constitutional position is up to the people of Northern Ireland to change their mind. I would argue that in fact for many years no-one even attempted to change my mind; that what they've attempted to do is to try and make sure that it wasn't up to me, me as a citizen of Northern Ireland, that it wasn't my decision; the decision could be made over the top of my head and that the only say that I, or any other individual in Northern Ireland would have, is, you know, whether you lose the football match 3-2 or 5-nil: you lose, but it's the scoreline you negotiate. So yes, I am prepared to say, "yes, convince me"; I do not see any date in the future when I would be convinced, but I am not prepared to say, "no, never".

(A11/84/B)
The final example may, on first sight, appear to indicate a categorical judgement in that the interviewee is condemning the political policies of the UDA as simplistic - this was in the context of a discussion of the politics of the paramilitary groups generally. It should be noted, however, that the interviewee appears to recognise the categorical nature of the judgement he is making, and practically apologises for it! He then goes on to give the general criterion upon which his judgement is based:

I've seen the UDA have reasoned their case and they have entered into political debates in the past; but I think they're simplistic, there's no doubt about that, and I think that they're wrong - whether I should be entitled to say that, I don't know; but the reason why I do oppose them is because they espouse violence and anyone who directly espouses violence cannot be acceptable in a democratic society, especially if they wish to destroy it.

(A11/83/C)

These examples seem to indicate a difference in the form of thinking of 'extreme' and 'moderate' activists along the lines suggested by first conception outlined by Billig: the 'extreme' activists appear to express their beliefs in rigid categories while the 'moderate' activists use a more open form. Other examples from the data break down this straightforward dichotomy however. A common theme expressed by the unionist activists was the importance of 'democracy', by which they essentially meant the primacy of the majority in any decisions concerning the future of Northern Ireland. Their notion of democracy could be described as a rigid majoritarianism. This raises an obvious
dilemma in that it implies that a simple nationalist majority could quite legitimately vote Northern Ireland into a united Ireland; indeed the fear of being 'outbred' occasionally surfaces in unionist discourse. Three of the unionist interviewees were presented with this dilemma and at first they seemed to accept the 'logical conclusion' of the 'rigid category':

... if I was a politician in Northern Ireland, a Loyalist politician or a Unionist politician, whatever you want to call it, I would simply say (to the SDLP), "come along"; taking it from Dr Paisley on Saturday - I was at the party conference - "come along, sit down and see what happens. If you want your united Ireland, work for it". Now don't get me wrong; if the majority of people in Ulster wanted a united Ireland then what right has the unionist people to object?

(DUP/84/C)

We have always said that if the shoe was on the other foot and there was a Republican majority then we would be prepared to abide by that...

(DUP/84/B)

I think the truth of my position is that if this community, of its own free will, chose some new relationship with the Republic, chose of its own free will to distance itself from the United Kingdom, that wouldn't present me, individually, with any great problem, and that's not a typical unionist response. There are unionists who would contend that even if we were a minority we would have the right of self-determination and would resist absorption in some new state. The vital criterion (for me) would be that the community would chose of its own free will...

(OUP/84/C)
However, the 'rigidity' of the category breaks down when the responses are considered in more detail. DUP/84/C went on to suggest that Protestants would probably resist a nationalist majority if it was imposed immediately; if it developed over a period of time, say thirty years, then perhaps it would be accepted. He then added:

... maybe in thirty years time Ireland will be worse economically than what any of us will ever be, and the people of Northern Ireland will want nothing to do with it - I think that's why a majority of Catholics want nothing to do with it.

There are four elements in this account: firstly, he accepts the implications of majoritarianism; secondly, he describes a process through which the new majority might peacefully have its way; thirdly, he suggests that the operation of that process may well cause them to change their mind; and finally, he suggests that at the present a majority of Catholics do not want a united Ireland anyway. Following this he describes the particular instance, cited in the last chapter, where local Catholics from the Short Strand area went South because of trouble in the area, but quickly came back when they missed their dole money. The development of his argument brings him full circle allowing him to maintain intact his majoritarianism and his belief in the border. At the end of the account he introduces a particular example to reinforce the basis of his resolution of the dilemma.

The second Democratic Unionist interviewee quoted above used a much simpler method to achieve the same end. The full quote is:

We have always said that if the shoe was on the other foot and there was a Republican majority then we would be
prepared to abide by that, but what we wouldn't be prepared to have is a situation now where the majority doesn't count, but if at some stage there's a Republican majority, then it should count. I mean, I think that would be totally unfair.

Here he is saying, yes, I believe in majority rule, and yes, I am prepared to live with the implications of this for the future: but if you are prepared to allow a Republican majority to have its way in the future, then you must allow a Unionist majority to have its way in the present. He is not rigidly and simplistically adhering to a definite category but rather, by introducing an important caveat he is arguing a course of action for the present by accepting a hypothetical possibility in the future: the caveat itself is justified by an appeal to the neutral criterion of 'fairness'.

The Official Unionist interviewee cited above also argued himself away from his initial statement. After the statement was made, it was suggested that the opinion was not unlike the policy of the Alliance party, so could he not support that party?

No, because I positively affirm my support for the Union, I want the Union to remain. I was dealing with a remote, very long term (possibility), indeed so remote it's beyond a period we can reasonably allow for or cater for.

So after accepting the implications of his democratic ideals he almost immediately suggests that this possibility is actually unlikely ever to arise. Later in the interview he presented an argument in favour of the integration of Northern Ireland into the United Kingdom polity: the implication of this position is that decisions about Northern Ireland's future would be taken by
the people of the United Kingdom as a whole and not just by the
people of Northern Ireland: this, of course, would further imply
that no a priori significance need be attached to a nationalist
majority in Northern Ireland. When it was suggested that this
conflicted with his earlier expression, the interviewee replied:

No, I mean I think that that's a difficult area and one
can't foresee; I mean I think that the reality would be that
it would depend on the size of the majority, it would
depend on what had proceeded it; I mean, that was a bland,
simple statement of my own personal views: if all things
being equal this community chose to seek a relationship
with Dublin I personally wouldn't be the one to say "let's
man the barricades and fight to the last man to resist it".
But you know, one can't foresee circumstances, it is so
unreal, and it is so unlikely as to not merit any serious
exploration. Because, of course, all the evidence now is
that there is an equalisation of the birth-rate and that
the Protestant, unionist majority will continue for as far
ahead as one can reasonably predict; and it should also be
borne in mind, of course, that many more Catholics in
Northern Ireland would be happy with some form of
Westminster rule than is popularly supposed.

Here again we see a circularity in the development of the argument:
a bold assertion of principle becomes a "bland, simple statement";
a hypothetical event that is unlikely becomes "unreal... as to not
merit any serious exploration"; evidence is proposed to justify
the new assertion, both in terms of the continuity of the present
majority and that many Catholics do not want a united Ireland any-
way. Again there is no strict adherence to a rigid category but
rather a search for arguments, with the use of particular pieces
of evidence as reinforcement, to try to resolve a dilemma that
always existed, but only needed to be dealt with when the inter­viewer pointed it out.

A final example comes from the interview with the Workers' Party activist. In the quote above he presented a highly categorical judgement of Sinn Fein and the IRA, although his use of the particular should also be noted: that Gerry Adams collected 'the plate' at Sunday mass seemed to confirm that even the contemporary leadership of Sinn Fein was 'right-wing Catholic'. This categorical judgement can be contrasted with his discussion on the two main unionist parties and the differences between them:

First of all, it would be too easy to say that the Official Unionists are the old left-overs of the 'fur-coat brigade' and the Democratic Unionists are a working-man's unionist. There is this heavy element of Paisleyism, and sometimes it is hard to say whether the DUP is separated at all from the Free Presbyterian Church... (T)here's a certain amount of jealousy and animosity on the Paisley versus Molyneaux level, but the DUP seem to be attracting a sort of working-man-type of Protestant support which could be, as you said, populist... The Official Unionists, their heavy guns are still entrenched to the landowners... (T)here is still a major difference apart from the personal­ities... Paisley, to give him credit, is a very good orator and he can be a bloody opportunist at times:

I think maybe that in the despair of people in the Loyalist ghettos, at times of maybe spectacular events, the Bradford incident, perhaps maybe he can articulate a deep rooted feeling of frustration better than 'dreary, old Molyneaux' can: maybe there's a deeper significance in other things, but perhaps that's the first that comes to mind.

Here the interviewee avoids a simplistic categorisation of the
unionist parties but rather seeks to understand the differences between them; at the same time he tries to understand the genuine feelings that might motivate Protestants to support such an apparent extremist as Paisley. The contrast with his judgement on Sinn Fein is clear.

These examples seem to deny the universality of categorisation and ambiguity in, respectively, intolerant and tolerant modes of thought. In passing, the use of 'the particular' in these examples also seems to deny the generality of a categorical mode of thought, as suggested by the second conception described by Billig. Indeed, the quote cited above of All/84/C ("I've seen the UDA have reasoned their case and they have entered into political debates in the past; but I think they're simplistic..." etc.) might be considered as an example of categorical thinking justified by an appeal to an external particular criterion.

The alternative proposed by Billig, mentioned very briefly above, reconceptualises the problem by rejecting the concentration on the form or mode of thinking. Rather he suggests that individual subjects may use categorical and particular forms of thought in their discourse; in other words, individual discourse can exhibit a 'fluidity of form'. Billig describes the process thus: in considering two stimuli a prejudiced thinker may concentrate on some attribute, salient to the prejudice, which appears to distinguish between these stimuli, such as skin colour. Following from this, other attributes that may, on the face of it, appear to be shared by the two stimuli are redefined or reinterpreted so that they 'become' different and maintain the categorical distinction.
The point is that the authoritarian, far from using global, unsophisticated categories, will be seeking to make distinctions in order to defend a categorical usage: in this way the prejudice will be defended by subtle - if not ridiculously subtle - particularisations.

(Billig, 1985)

Thus there is no necessary correlation between form and prejudice: particularisation, as well as categorisation, can be used in the service of prejudice; in the same way categorisation, as well as particularisation, can be used in the service of tolerance. Billig suggests that both prejudiced and tolerant subjects will use an essentially similar process in elaborating their beliefs: he suggests the similarity lies in the use of 'pet theories' which attempt to explain or expand upon expressed beliefs. These 'pet theories' are most clearly found when individual subjects are confronted with the contradictions or inconsistencies in their expressed beliefs; in contradistinction to those who suggest that individuals strive towards consistency, Billig argues that inconsistency only has to be dealt with when it is actually pointed out: in that context the individual might introduce some caveat to the belief, present some 'pet theory' to explain the apparent inconsistency or simply try to deny the inconsistency.

The examples from the interviews above seem to bear out both the co-existence of categorisation and particularisation in discourse and the notion and role of 'pet theories'.

While arguing that social psychologists 'should attempt to distinguish between prejudiced and tolerant thought, in order to prevent the topic of tolerance slipping from the agenda by default',
Billig suggests that this can no longer be achieved by a search for universal principles based on form:  

... it may be more effective to distinguish between prejudice and tolerance on the basis of content. Instead of looking for a 'momentous discovery', which can predict content on the basis of form, it might be simpler to examine common beliefs about social groups and categorise them as prejudiced, tolerant and neutral on the basis of their content, (just as attribution theorists distinguish between personal and situational explanations of social events on the basis of the content, not structure, of those explanations).  

(Billig, 1985)  

Billig argues that the process involved in the expression of beliefs is akin to Rhetoric where rhetorical theory, following Protagoras's maxim that 'there were two sides to every question', suggests that social reality is inherently ambiguous; in other words, social reality can be interpreted or categorised in different ways: this notion appears to have clear theoretical continuities with the process of 'contestation for meaning' described in the previous two chapters. Billig and Cochrane, 1983 (cited in Billig, 1985) used discussion groups of British working-class adolescents to examine the complexities of prejudiced and tolerant arguments and found that tolerant and intolerant themes were used, often by the same individuals:  

The discussions would frequently go full circle, as those starting with racist themes ended with the tolerant ones and vice versa. No opinions would be changed in the simple sense, and if the discussions were unresolvable, this is because they reflected the unresolved contrary tendencies reflected in the thoughts of the participants. Contradictions need not be threatening, but can be defused by the syntactical
devices of formulating the special cases for general rules or by proposing general rules for special cases.

(Billig, 1985)

The interplay of categorisations and particularisations can then be seen as the use of rhetorical devices to try to interpret or understand an inherently ambiguous social reality. The balance between tolerant and intolerant themes in the accounts of these adolescents was not equally balanced or unchanging however, but shifted in favour of the intolerant themes of racism as mass unemployment in Britain grew. There is a link then between the content of expressed beliefs and the social context within which those beliefs are being elaborated. It is this link that is of most interest in the present study as the interviewees here could be described as belonging to the 'minority of professional ideologists' who 'make it their business to produce... a one-sided estimate'.

If we examine the way some of the interviewees of the present study discussed the historical influence on their beliefs we can see that although the emphasis is different, the thematic points hold true:

Constitutional politics, given the history of their use in Ireland over the last hundred years if not longer...
I think clearly demonstrate that they in effect get nowhere.

(SF/82/A)

... if the IRA were to put down their guns... our task in Sinn Fein would be made even harder... there's a danger that we would be sucked into constitutional politics like other parties, like the Nationalist party, like the Daniel O'Connells years ago.

(SF/84/B)
Since 1641 there is always this fear; what the Ulster Loyalist sees is (that) the indigenous Catholic Gael is going to rise and try to push them into the sea. There is a siege mentality after, you know, a very, very, very traumatic century within Ireland, from the Ulster Loyalist or Protestant point of view.

... looking back on our own history, especially around the 12th (of July), people in Northern Ireland are astounded that the people in England, which is part of the Union, don't have the same regard for our history as we do, and you know, regard them almost as ignoramuses because they don't know anything about that.

The concern of the Republican and Loyalist activists with history can be seen as a rhetorical device to justify policies or positions in the present, rather than as evidence of some irrational andativistic fixation with the past. Similarly the three unionist activists, quoted above, who were questioned about their majoritarianism, used a variety of rhetorical devices to get out of the dilemma posed: one introduced a caveat to the principle; one produced the 'pet theory' that 'Catholics would not want a united Ireland anyway'; and the third began by denying any basis to the dilemma and then produced a similar 'pet theory' to maintain the original, if much watered down, principle.

The importance of context can be illustrated by the comments of the Workers' Party activist on the two main unionist parties, quoted earlier and continued below:

I'm sure it's depressing for the Official Unionists to see the rise of Paisleyism. I think perhaps because Paisley
seems to; Paisley, to give him credit, is a very good orator and he can be a bloody opportunist at times; I think maybe that in the despair of people in the Loyalist ghettos, at times of maybe spectacular events, the Bradford incident, perhaps he can articulate a deep-rooted feeling of frustration better than dreary old Molyneaux can; maybe there's a deeper significance in other things, but perhaps that's the first thing that comes to mind. (Paisley) is a phenomenon, (the) mixture of this religious-politico business is; I think he is a sincere person, that's the unfortunate thing about it - if he was trying to deceive people all the time he would have met his match before; I think he honestly believes what he's about.

(WP/84/A)

This thoughtful and reasoned attempt to understand the dynamics of unionist politics stands in marked contrast to the same speaker's vitriolic and aggressive language when describing the IRA and Sinn Fein (cited earlier). Whereas the earlier comments might have been taken as evidence of a categorical approach, this is clearly not the case with these later comments on the unionists. The resolution of the difference most probably lies in the political context of the Workers' Party itself: as it is a non-sectarian party it is perhaps not surprising that one of its members should try to understand unionist politics by looking for class influences rather than simply dismissing them as wrong; on the other hand, there has been intense conflict between the Workers' Party and Sinn Fein, or perhaps more accurately between their armed sections, particularly in the early and middle 1970s. At the time the conflict occasionally took the form of gun battles in the ghetto areas. In recent years such direct aggression is less usual,
at least partly because of the relatively low level of support the Workers' Party now receives. The memory of this remains however, and the mutual antipathy between the groups is, if anything, enhanced by Sinn Fein's move to the left.

The role of context can also be observed in the examples of the previous chapter, which examined perceptions of the outgroup. Whereas the perceptions of the outgroup seemed to reflect an oversimplification resulting from crude categorisation, the interviewees tended to be more specific in their criticisms of their immediate political opponents, i.e. those within their own community: thus the Sinn Fein interviewees attacked the SDLP for being conservative, not seeking fundamental change, collaborating with the British and seeking power for its own sake; conversely the SDLP interviewees dismissed Sinn Fein support as shallow and emotional, accused the IRA of fuelling sectarianism and of terrorising the nationalist community. On the unionist side the Democratic Unionists derided the Official Unionists for their splits over devolution and integration while the Official Unionists pointed to the intolerance and narrow-mindedness of the Democratic Unionists and the excessive centralisation of power and decision-making in that party. While the interviewees tried to 'score political points' when discussing their ingroup opponents, they tended to homogenate the outgroup and operate on the a priori assumption that 'they' were wrong. So, for example, the Sinn Fein interviewees would argue their own party to be 'better' for nationalists or a 'more true' nationalist party than the SDLP; since the criterion of 'goodness' or 'correctness' is a basic nationalism, the unionists ipso facto were wrong. This reflects
the dual polity in Northern Ireland where elections are not so much between the communities as increasingly within them. Neither the nationalist nor the unionist parties overtly seek political support from 'the other side'; there is no time, they are too busy defending the cause and seeking the ends for their own side. It is as if the two communities were as oil and water: when shaken vigorously they may mix, but rather than blend they inexorably drift apart.

There remains of course the Alliance party who explicitly seek to unite the communities. If the political discourse of the unionists and nationalists reflects their ingroup judgemental criterion, what is the context of moderate discourse when the moderates espouse no ingroup bar the non-sectarian one they are trying to create. Examination of the Alliance interviewees' accounts would seem to suggest that while the unionists and nationalists adopt 'ends' as their criterion, the Alliance activists promote 'method'. A good example of this is the criterion they set for the right to participate in negotiations:

I don't think you can be genuinely part of the democratic process on the one hand, and try to bomb it to bits on the other. Remember, what we are saying is that we are giving everybody the right to be involved in politics provided they obtain significant electoral strength. I think the answer to your question is let the Provisionals and the UDA, let anybody fight elections and let's see for whom they speak. And I think the answer will be straightforward - they will speak for nothing but a small section of the community. You see, if you were to give any of those organisations a right at the conference table, you are undermining the bona fide political representatives of that section of the community. It would be ridiculous to
have the Provisionals at the table when the SDLP would get five or six times the amount of votes that they would, and I think that that would be a very dangerous precedent both in terms of democracy and in a Northern Ireland type of situation. Why should you let a minority dictate just because they chose to use violence. The role of government in any civilised society should be to unite the democrats and isolate the gunmen and indeed, ensure that they are answerable to the law in the society.

(A11/82/A)

I think it is the principle of (power-sharing) that is important rather than the specific mechanics, and we have particular proposals about the mechanics, but it's the principle that the representatives of the minority and the majority, of the nationalist and the unionist traditions have the right to participate in whatever level of government is there - that is the particular principle that is important... Any group that is prepared to recognise the existence and the institutions, and renounces violence, would be able to participate. Quite obviously Sinn Fein would not be prepared to do that. So to that extent they would exclude themselves. If they made a decision on that then they would be able to be included.

(A11/84/B)

... I take the view that anyone who espouses violence should not be acceptable - now, they may well be voted in, and the view that I would take about people of that nature being elected representatives: they can get where they want; the electorate can let them, can vote them into places - I'll not vote them out of places or anything like that; they're entitled to go where they will, but certainly, I take the view that anyone who offers violence or who wants to completely destroy the state as they do - I think that the SDLP are totally different in that respect, and the
argument related earlier as to why the unionists should allow them into government is different in that there's a direct; violence is being used as a policy to destroy the state and to kill people. I don't think that's acceptable and I don't think we should talk with them because I don't think that they are any more than gun-men, most of them.

(A11/84/C)

Clearly any attempt to distinguish 'moderate' and 'extremist' discourse on the basis of form would founder on the categorical judgements of the above accounts. The contextual significance of these categorical judgements is that they do not appeal to specific ingroup ends but rather to independent criterion by which legitimacy or rights are to be assessed. This concept of independent criterion or rules is found in other examples from the Alliance accounts. One interviewee, for example, emphasised that the law had to be rigorously enforced, particularly on the law-enforcers themselves: in answer to the Sinn Fein argument that the British Army is 'the paramilitary wing of the Westminster government' he replied:

Yes, I was waiting for you to say that. Well, you know, there is the difficulty there, taking the attitude we do to the state and the government and the security forces: we wish to see an independent police structure to investigate complaints, we wish to see that anybody who transgresses the law is brought under the full weight of the law...

(A11/84/C)

and then discussed his worries that this was not happening in a particular case where a nationalist had died after being struck by a plastic bullet, in circumstances where the police officer firing the plastic bullet appeared to transgress the specific guidelines
governing their use. The Alliance activist worried that this incident seemed to 'break the rules', and hence needed to be investigated on that basis; a Sinn Fein activist might consider it, and the assumed cover-up, as further evidence of police repression; while a unionist activist might either defend the police officer on the basis of the need for tough security measures or attribute blame to the victim.

Another example of the independent criterion can be found from the Alliance activist who, while accepting that partition in 1921/2 could be considered, on the general principles of democracy, to have been illegitimate because it was done to create an artificial majority, argues that this cannot be used to justify violence in the present:

Well, the point I would make to that is: go and look at the clauses in the United Nations, go and look at the system in International Law, go and look at the drawings of the lines on the borders through Europe which happened all round the time of 1918, 1919, and you will find that lines were drawn on maps to give local national groups their rights of self-determination inside particular states. It happened through the whole creation of the Slav states. All that sort of stuff was done on exactly the same basis.

(A11/84/B)

This is not to say, of course, that the unionist and nationalist activists did not try to represent their positions in terms of general principles but rather that those principles were more specifically tied to a particular commitment to an a priori position relating to ingroup ends within the Northern Ireland context. It was noteworthy, for example, that when unionist
interviewees were asked to describe the general principles underlying their political beliefs they tended to begin by describing Northern Ireland related principles, while the Alliance interviewees tended to begin by describing extra-Northern Ireland principles. In the same way the ingroup specificity of the former, and the use of rhetorical devices, were clearest when the 'general' principles were subjected to closer examination during the interviews. The examples above concerning 'majoritarianism' illustrate this theme. So too does the account of the Democratic Unionist who, after advocating very strong security measures, such as capital punishment and a 'shoot-on-sight' policy towards terrorists, opposed the 'supergrass' system: it transpired that he had a couple of friends charged on 'supergrass' evidence at the time. Later, when he was asked if the tough security measures should be equally applied to Loyalist, as well as Republican, paramilitaries, the ingroup specificity again emerged:

Loyalist paramilitaries: okay, you do have a few hotheads who go round, you know, 'kick a fenian a day' sort of attitude, which as I said at the start of the interview, many people have; but I don't think the Loyalist paramilitaries have ever been into violence - okay, you've got tit-for-tat murders, but in many cases what you find is that people committing those murders have had relatives murdered, and it's basically a revenge thing. Okay, you'd a lot of murders (at) the time of the 'Shankill Butchers', but the men in the 'Shankill Butchers', they were killing Catholics because Protestants were getting killed, do you know what I mean? I think the reason for that is that most Protestants are law-abiding; okay, you've got the gangster element, you've a gangster element in every society... Here in Northern Ireland you've got a gangster
element which is involved in paramilitary activities, but you've also got that in the IRA; and the IRA, they are more, how could you put it, 'unlawful'.

(DUP/84/C)

Here the individual is almost arguing with himself to try to maintain the integrity of his overall position; he does not try to deny that Loyalist paramilitaries break the law, but he wishes to distinguish between them and the IRA and at the same time support a strong legal framework to deal with terrorism. His resolution attempts to differentiate on the basis of motivation: the IRA break the law because they are unlawful, Loyalist paramilitaries break the law because they are provoked; ipso facto, the former are 'more wrong'. From the other side, a Sinn Fein activist would argue that a state of war exists in Northern Ireland, and in that war policemen and soldiers are legitimate targets of the IRA; in contrast, the Loyalist paramilitaries kill Catholics, therefore their motivation is sectarian and this, of course, is what nationalists know loyalist politics to be all about anyway.

This chapter has examined the bearing of the interview data on some important psychological themes of interest beyond the specific example of Northern Ireland. Following the work of Billig, the evidence points to the importance of content and context in the psychological understanding of the discourse of political beliefs. The further implications of the evidence will be presented in the next and final chapter, which will also briefly summarise the main areas of this thesis.
This study has attempted to provide a better understanding of the role that psychological variables play in maintaining the continuing conflict in Northern Ireland. The study began by looking at the importance of historical 'symbols' in Ireland and beyond. It was suggested that while these historical symbols often displayed an empirical fragility, to concentrate on this fragility neglected their psychological importance in social identity. An examination of the historical background to the conflict sought to chart the development of opposing identities in Ireland while a series of experimental studies, based on the work of Social Identity Theory, looked at the inter-relationship of identity-polarities in the contemporary situation. Following the work of Billig on a social psychological concept of ideology, the study also reported the results of an examination of competing political ideologies: this involved a simple content analysis of some party political publications and the qualitative evidence gained from a series of interviews with political activists.

The study then is presented in three broad areas, each providing a different perspective on the basic problem. The three perspectives are united in their common focus on the role of identity and it is hoped that the conclusions to be derived from the work will be of some significance beyond the particular context of Northern Ireland. While each of the three levels of analysis has its weaknesses, it was hoped that the combination of each would provide an overall strength to the study.

This chapter aims to briefly summarise the main findings of
the study and in so doing to suggest the implications of those findings for our understanding of the conflict. While the study does not attempt to present a 'solution' to the conflict, it may point to some of the facets of the conflict which any proposed solution will have to deal with.

The historical analysis sought to explore some of the dynamics of sectarianism in Ireland. Original sources were employed to attempt to portray the structural features of that development. Crucial to this was the material basis upon which identities developed and coalesced over time. This suggested that despite the non-sectarian discourse of those behind the 1798 Rebellion, which itself can only be properly understood in the wider context of Enlightenment Europe, there never appeared to be a homogeneous, and hence non-sectarian, imagined community in the island of Ireland. While religious and cultural features seemed sufficient to mark a basic differentiation between the descendants of the Protestant settlers in the North and the indigenous Catholic population, material conditions, particularly in the system of land tenure, would only have served to reinforce this difference. Crucial to this was the essential orientation of both populations towards the controlling power: while the settlers sought to defend or extend, the indigenous population sought to change. That the only mass campaign before the latter part of the nineteenth century sought to organise the Catholic peasantry for Catholic emancipation illustrates this.

Insofar as an Irish nationalism can be thought to exist before the Act of Union of 1801, its societal location was in the professional, intellectual and landed ranks of the Protestant
population. After the Act of Union the influence of this social bloc dissipated: their power had been based in the Irish parliament, but their demographic weakness led to the shift of the locus of 'Protestant' interest to the North as the demographic potential of the Catholic mass in the rest of the country began to be realised. It does not appear, however, that the majority population adopted the stance of an imagined community until Irish nationalism was developed with a mass base towards the latter part of the century. That this mass base was established amongst the rural peasantry meant that the Irish nationalist movement adopted a set of priorities that held little appeal in the increasingly industrialised north of the country. In seeking to articulate the immediate priorities of its rural supporters and to develop a more coherent sense of unity of purpose, the nationalist movement was able to draw upon an already existing stock of cultural and religious elements that differentiated 'the Irish nation' from the 'foreign landlord oppressors'. However, this 'stock of symbols' also emphasised the north-south divide. As Irish nationalism became increasingly Catholic and rediscovered the cultural tradition of the Gael, so the Protestant industrial proletariat in the North could find cause with their landowners and industrialists in the common identity of the Protestant religion and Orange culture.

The importance of the industrialisation of the North cannot be over-stressed. Belfast had participated in Britain's Industrial Revolution and expanded whereas the rest of Ireland declined. While the Irish nationalists could point to Britain as the source of all Ireland's ailments, in the North in general, and in Belfast
particularly, the link to Imperial markets was crucial. There was no material benefit for the Northern Protestants in an Irish state and there was little emotional appeal in a Catholic nationalism; in contrast the material benefit of continued association with Britain was obvious and could easily translate into an affective appeal. The state of British politics in the twenty or thirty years around the turn of the century provided the basis for an articulation of this affective appeal in an eulogistic imperialism. The cross-class social bloc that comprised unionism should not then be dismissed as effective 'false consciousness'.

The institutionalisation of these identities in two partitioned states on the same island might have stabilised but for the presence of a significant nationalist minority in the North, ostensibly Protestant, state. In one respect Northern Ireland politics did stabilise, though not in a comparable way to the liberal-democratic states of Western Europe. The concretisation of Northern Irish politics into two hegemonic social blocs, one nationalist one unionist, allied with the sporadic activities of violent republicans, led some observers to hypothesise an ativistic pugilism as the only necessary conceptualisation of that strange polity.

Up to 1969 the two social blocs maintained their hegemonic influence with the continuation of the opposing orientations of 'defence' and 'change'; whereas before these orientations were seen as developing from differential systems of land tenure, now they revolved around the question of the Union and the future of the partitioned Northern state. The institutionalisation of neglect of responsibility by the Westminster parliament, dressed
up in the polite clothes of tradition and convention, ensured little external disturbance to this state of affairs. It possibly also provided the basis for a unionism, or perhaps more accurately a tendency within unionism, that looked not to the Union as such but to the institutions within Northern Ireland as the primary focus of 'defence'.

After 1969 in a sense everything changed and nothing changed: the hegemonic blocs fractured, but the break was not so much with the global sectarian political framework, apart perhaps from the appearance of a small politics of moderation, as with the old parties and politicians that epitomised that previous state of affairs. With their involvement now forced, successive British governments attempted to impose a reformist solution while the conflict appeared to spiral downwards, without as yet, it should be added, reaching the unrestrained depths of the Algerian War of Independence or the contemporary Lebanese conflict. The post 1969 period evidenced an intense political pluralism which, despite settling to a degree, appears likely to remain for the foreseeable future.

One consequence of this pluralism may have been to broaden the basic delimiters of the conflict. A previous experimental study based on a modified form of Tajfel's minimal group paradigm (Gallagher, 1982) had pointed to the importance of a religious polarity in social judgements. The present study extended this work by examining the alternative polarities of nation and politics and these too seemed to have their affect. That affect, however, appeared to be differential for the groups in the conflict: while the minority identity labels of Catholic, Irish and nationalist
appeared to show a synonymity, the equivalents for the majority community, Protestant, British and unionist, appeared to have a differential impact. It may be that the synonymity of the minority identity-labels, when reduced to the label, may reflect an essential Irishness the goal of which is an independent all-Ireland state, despite the variety of forms that all-Ireland state might take.

The differential impact of majority identity-labels, on the other hand, may point to the alternative future orientations within the broad spectrum of unionist ideology. While an intra-Northern Ireland identity may be the most secure, in that it points to the essential unity of the ingroup, an identity that sets the group within the broader context of the United Kingdom threatens because it limits or reduces the autonomy of the ingroup.

Despite the clear methodological criticisms that can be levelled at the experimental studies, this portrayal of the dynamics of identity in Northern Ireland seemed to be confirmed by the evidence of the interviews. The minority activists did not so much question nationalism as propose competing meanings to nationalism. Their construction of the nationalist tradition was linked to their orientations in the present and extended in their alternative accounts of the nation's future; history provides the site of contestation in that they claim the rights of inheritance and the right to the future. The majority activists do not propose alternative accounts of a future but alternative futures; furthermore there is no apparent necessary attachment of these alternatives to party. Again the site of contestation is the historical tradition of the group, focusing particularly on the degree of
autonomy accorded to the identity of the group.

It would be perhaps not unfair to add that the quantitative assessment of the experimental studies, despite finding some confirmation in the qualitative data of the interviews, stands in stark contrast to the insights of that qualitative information. Without going into the relative merits of breadth versus depth, it may be that the experimental conceptualisation of social identity as a uni-dimensional polarity imposes an excessive simplification of a complex social context. Not only does this study point to the multiplicity of identity polarities that seem to be relevant to subjects, but it also illustrates the shallowness of 'identity-as-label': a label, in a polarity, may identify or represent an identity, but it says nothing about the significance or meaning attached to that identity, nor does it appear to include the possibility of differential significance or meaning. The interview data, and to an extent the content analysis of party political newspapers, would go further to suggest that the label or representation of identity is, in fact, a focus of 'contest for meaning'. That the discourse through which this is articulated can be conceptualised as a rhetorical process seems to emphasise the notion of contest for meaning. Neither is this contest solely located in the present but ranges over the past and lays guidelines for the future. Here too we see the importance of historical symbols: they may represent an attempt to make the past real by defining it in easily understood images, even though the significance of, or meaning attached to, those images is itself a focus of debate. This process concerns the construction of a framework through which the group identifies itself and relevant others;
the framework might be considered to contain the competing arbitrary elements which lie rooted in a common organic ideology. Billig's original attempt to describe a social psychological notion of ideology (Billig, 1976) is important in that it identified the basic theoretical elements through which this qualitative data might be analysed; the analysis itself has built upon and added to that framework.

The ingroup and outgroup perceptions of the nationalist and unionist activists point, in their specific debates, to the arbitrary elements, but they suggest that insofar as an organic ideology exists, it is linked to particular ingroup ends: in other words, there does not appear to be a shared organic linkage between the groups. Political debate, in the democratic sense, only exists within the group, not between the groups: Sinn Fein and the SDLP target their alternatives to the nationalist community; Official and Democratic Unionists target their alternatives to the unionist community. There is no appeal to the outgroup because the outgroup is homogenised as the barrier to or disturber of the desired future. In its disloyalty or its false consciousness the outgroup is politically peripheral: it is there to be overcome, because of or despite itself; there is no sense that the outgroup is there to be won, or indeed could ever be won in the present context.

The contrast is seen in the accounts of the moderate activists: while the nationalist and unionist activists set criteria based on ingroup priorities, the moderate discourse establishes criteria that appear to be external to the context, an organic framework that does not belong to one side but to all, a framework that
espouses method rather than end. By establishing rules or norms by which behaviour is judged and proposals assessed, this framework also establishes a syntax through which a future can be built. In the moderate discourse of Northern Ireland only the broad parameters of harmony describe the future: the particular route is less important than the criteria which any successful route must meet. In the nationalist and unionist discourse the future is ascribed: it is victory - for the ingroup, even if this victory is not always defined as being over the outgroup in Northern Ireland.

Why should this be the case? Viewed on its own terms Northern Ireland appears as an aberration, an atypical or abnormal society. However, this perception implies an unstated concept of the 'normal', save that 'normal' political behaviour is not characterised by extremes of violence. At the emergence of the liberal state the key elements to be introduced were the sovereignty of 'the people' (increasingly developed into the concept of 'the nation') and the idea that the state was characterised by its institutional apparatus rather than the person of a monarch. The concept of 'civil society' was developed to define that group of people who exercised the rights and privileges of free citizens and who voted for, or were involved in, the representative structures of the state. Many of the political debates up until the early years of the present century can be considered as contesting the boundaries of civil society, specifically seeking to enhance the representative character of the state by defining membership of civil society in terms of adulthood rather than property. Full adult suffrage marked the reformist outcome of
this debate (Marxism developed in a different direction by developing a critique of the concept of civil society itself) and from this point the state, in Western Europe, became increasingly interventionist in its orientation towards society. The 'right-left' axis, around which typical liberal-democratic politics is organised, orientated itself around the issue of legitimate or appropriate state practice and the nature of the state-society relationship. For this to develop in a stable context required the establishment of guidelines for appropriate political behaviour: in some places these guidelines are codified in a written constitution, in others they rely on convention and tradition. These guidelines can also be more diffuse or implicit, such as Weber's notion that state legitimacy relies on the acceptance by society of the state as the only legitimate source of violence. What is most important for the present study is that this system of guidelines, explicit and implicit, forms a set of criteria through which legitimate public behaviour is assessed; in Gramscian terms it is the generally accepted beliefs or assumptions that make up the organic ideology upon which arbitrary ideologies compete. This analysis should not be taken to suggest that the guidelines are necessarily fixed or permanent, once established. The guidelines or symbols of that framework are constructed by a social process; that that process involves a contest for meaning leaves open the possibilities of reproduction, redefinition or replacement of any or all of the particular elements of that framework over time. Nevertheless, at any particular time this set of criteria appears to stand above society, 'belonging to' society as a whole rather than particular groups in society.
This simplified, though hopefully not over-simplified, portrayal can be seen to link in with the moderate discourse in Northern Ireland: in that sense moderation in Northern Ireland can be considered as the acceptance of the liberal-democratic norms that seem to typify Western societies. In contrast nationalist and unionist discourse, by laying down ingroup criteria, stand outside the typical liberal-democratic model. If this is true then it suggests that the current conflict goes much deeper than simply a lack of agreement over governmental structures; rather it suggests a much more basic lack of a 'syntax of politics' through which discussion and agreement can operate. Unionists oppose power-sharing for the manifest reason that it is simply a route to a united Ireland, irrespective of what the participants to the system say; nationalists oppose any solution that precludes, in one form or another, an all-Ireland context since this will 'inevitably' lead to a return to unionist domination; the ingroup criteria define the motivations and goals of the outgroup in a way the outgroup cannot redefine since the contestation for meaning is within the group rather than within Northern Irish society; the debate, while proposing various identities for the ingroup, places the outgroup in a fixed, antagonistic and domination-seeking position. Taunts across the sectarian divide of being undemocratic do not cause embarrassment or require defence in Northern Ireland, as they might in 'normal' liberal-democratic societies; the 'undemocratic' nature of 'the other side' appears to be taken for granted.

It may be then that any attempted solution to the conflict that relies simply on a new institutional framework seems likely
to fail unless it is also accompanied by an attempt to construct a consensual syntax of political behaviour. Indeed it is possible that any internal institutional solution, such as power-sharing, which involves the operation of power may only serve to reproduce the fundamental division described above. Such comments must be seen to be speculative, but it may be of some value to suggest the practical implications of the main conclusion of this study.

There seem to be four major alternatives to the power-sharing proposal: (1) integration of Northern Ireland into the British polity might work in the appropriate direction if the British political parties engage themselves in Northern Ireland. In time this might reorientate Northern Irish politics around the 'normal' left-right axis. If this were to work it would only be in the longer-term, and it is open to question whether it would survive the short-term upheaval it would undoubtedly create in the nationalist community as it would probably imply closing the option of a United Ireland. (2) Independence seems more likely to represent a retreat to an Ulster Protestant laager than an attempt to construct a neutral context; as such it would involve, at best, repartition and population shift, a physical separation of the, at present, psychologically separated communities. The population shift would follow from the fact that the largest concentration of Catholics in Northern Ireland lies in Belfast. (3) Some form of united Ireland might lead, with the removal of 'the border' from politics, to the construction of a non-sectarian political context but, as with route 1 above, any positive effects would appear only in the longer term; this would require the new context surviving short-term upheaval from the Protestant community. (4) Finally,
a policy of 'doing nothing', as in an indefinite 'direct rule', might lead to some degree of stability: the analysis above would suggest, however, that any such stability would be paper-thin and liable to collapse because the basic problem would remain intact.

The picture then is entirely negative: the dynamic seems to be provided by a generalised ingroup perception that the outgroup seeks the goal of domination. The division in society, the apparent existence in fact, of a dual society, is deep rooted and cannot be dismissed as representing irrationalism (and hence safely ignored) or as due to some form or other of false consciousness (and hence easily overcome at some future point). In such a situation the most likely outcome seems to be a continuing state of crisis, or victory for one side or the other. The state of affairs since the Anglo-Irish agreement only seems to confirm this depressing conclusion: while this agreement might be described as an attempt to reintegrate the SDLP into day-to-day politics while marginalising Sinn Fein and not directly threatening the Union, it has not been so interpreted by the unionist community. In fact it has provoked a sense of crisis in that community to the extent that the various alternative tendencies described above are increasingly articulated on the public stage: thus some Official Unionists have presented the argument for integration as a way out of the agreement; conversely some Official and Democratic Unionists are pointing to 'British betrayal' and the route to independence as the way forward. What is important in these debates is that they are not new, but rather they represent the articulation of already existing tendencies in a context of perceived crisis, and that perception of crisis is determined by an assessment of the
Anglo-Irish agreement which is based on ingroup criteria.

The role played by psychological variables in the conflict seems to be most important insofar as they help maintain or reproduce the basis of the conflict: that basis is described as being more fundamental than a simple disagreement over mechanisms of government, but rather involves a lack of a shared social grammar within which alternative routes to the future might be debated - it is almost as if the two communities spoke different languages, or attached quite different meanings to individual words, but failed to realise this fact. Any peaceful solution to the conflict may stand or fall on its ability to address this fundamental issue. The psychological variables emphasised include a particular social conceptualisation of identity and a process through which that identity is constructed: the notion of 'contestation for meaning' has been adopted to describe this process and it appears to hold theoretical continuities with the rhetorical approach described by Billig.

The social nature of political beliefs or ideologies is crucial here, and while the importance of 'the social' has gained important ground in Social Psychology in recent years, often the theoretical and methodological parameters through which it is addressed appear to remain rooted in empiricist reductionism. Israel and Tajfel (1972) pointed to the influence of the political upheavals of the 1960s on this re-emphasis of 'the social' in Social Psychology; the same upheavals influenced Sociology where the effect was to open an on-going theoretical debate on the nature and operation of ideology. Unfortunately there appears to have been little discussion across the disciplines: this is particularly
surprising given that one of the fundamental issues in the Sociological debate concerns the notion of 'subjectivity', or how ideology relates to individual subjects (Beechey and Donald, 1985). This would seem to be an area of special relevance to Social Psychology. At the risk of stepping outside Social Psychology, this study has sought to draw upon the wider corpus of Social Science; in the attempt to integrate some of the theory and method of that wider body of knowledge it is hoped that the particular role of psychological variables in the Northern Ireland conflict has been better illustrated. It is also hoped that the insight provided by the methodological agenda adopted in this study might prove useful in the examination of other intergroup conflicts.
References


Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI). Education Facsimiles 121-140 '18th Century Emigration'.

Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI). Education Facsimiles 141-160, 'The Volunteers, 1778-84'.

Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI). Education Facsimiles 221-240, 'Ireland After the Glorious Revolution'.


Tara (?) (1986). 'One Law, One Land, One Throne', Belfast.


Whyte, J.H. (1981). 'Why is the Northern Ireland Problem so Intractable', paper delivered at the Queens University of Belfast.


Please do not write your name anywhere on this booklet
Instructions to subjects - please read these carefully.

There are two parts to this experiment. In the first part all the subjects taking part will be divided into two groups, group A or group B.

When you are told which of the two groups you belong to, your task will be to award points to members of your group and members of the other group. You award points by using a series of matrices such as the example below:

example:

These numbers are points for:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>01</th>
<th>03</th>
<th>05</th>
<th>07</th>
<th>09</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>23</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

You award points by choosing a pair of numbers from the matrix, one number from the top row and one from the bottom row. In the example above if you choose the pair marked 'a' you would be awarding 3 points to member 46 of your group and 4 points to member 68 of the other group; if you choose the pair marked 'b' you would be awarding 11 points to member 46 of your group and 12 points to member 68 of the other group, etc. You only choose one pair from each matrix ("a", "b" and "c" are separate choices - when awarding points on your booklet you make only one choice per matrix).

Below each matrix you will see the following:

example:

Please fill in below details of the pair you have just chosen:

amount

points for member 46 of your **group**

points for member 68 of the other **group**

This is just a check for the experimenter; when you choose the pair of points you wish to award just fill the pair in the appropriate spaces. Thus, if you circled the pair marked 'a' on the matrix example you would write 3 for the "points for member 46 of your group" and 4 for the "points for member 68 of the other group".
You will have noticed that subjects in the experiment have been identified by code-numbers ("member 46 of your group"; "member 68 of the other group"). The reason for this is so that you do not know the actual person you are awarding points to, only whether they are a member of your group or the other group. Every subject taking part in the experiment has been allotted a code number, including you. It is important to note, however, that your individual code-number does not appear in your booklet, thus you are not able to award points to yourself. Any points you individually receive during the course of this experiment will be awarded by all the others taking part.

To summarize the instructions then:

1. make one choice only per matrix;
2. make a choice by circling a pair of numbers;
3. write the points you award into the space provided below the matrix;
4. remember, you will not be awarding points to yourself;
5. the only information you have on which to base your choice is the group membership of the subjects you are awarding points to.

Do not take too much time over any one matrix. The instructions are a little complex but you will find it easier when you have gone through a few matrices. If you do find you have any problems then please call the experimenter.

NB: there are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers, nor is there any 'correct' way to award points. You should make your choices in any way you like its completely up to you.
As stated on the previous page there are two groups in this experiment
Group A and Group B. Could you please read the descriptions of
Group A members and Group B members below:

Group A:
Group A members are Protestants

Group B:
Group B members are Roman Catholics

Having read the descriptions could you now please indicate below which
group you belong to:

I am a member of: Group A Group B (please circle as appropriate)

Before turning over the page and beginning the booklet could you please
fill in the details below:

What age are you?
What part of Northern Ireland are you from? town:
What faculty are you in? county:

Now please turn over the page and begin the booklet.
As stated on the previous page there are two groups in this experiment. Group A and Group B. Could you please read the descriptions of Group A members and Group B members below:

Group A:
Group A members are Protestants

Group B:
Group B members are Roman Catholics

Having read the descriptions could you now please indicate below which group you belong to:

I am a member of: Group A Group B (please circle as appropriate)

Before turning over the page and beginning the booklet could you please fill in the details below:

What age are you? 
What part of Northern Ireland are you from? 
What faculty are you in? 

Now please turn over the page and begin the booklet.
As stated on the previous page there are two groups in this experiment, Group A and Group B. Could you please read the descriptions of Group A members and Group B members below:

GROUP A

Group A members believe that whatever the future might hold the best future for Northern Ireland lies in the continuation of the Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

GROUP B

Group B members believe that whatever the future might hold the best future for Northern Ireland lies in the unification of North and South in an Independent Republic of Ireland.

Having read these descriptions could you now please indicate below which group you belong to:

I am a member of Group A B (please circle appropriate label)

Before turning over the page and beginning the booklet could you please fill in the details below:

are you? MALE/FEMALE
what age are you? 
what part of Northern Ireland are you from? (town) (county)
are you a Protestant? YES/NO
if no, are you a Roman Catholic? YES/NO

Now please turn over the page and begin the booklet
As stated on the previous page there are two groups in this experiment, Group A and Group B. Could you please read the descriptions of Group A members and Group B members below:

Group A
Group A members are MALE

Group B
Group B members are FEMALE

Having read the descriptions could you now please indicate below which group you belong to:

I am a member of Group  A  B  (please circle as appropriate)

Before turning over the page and beginning the booklet could you please fill in the details below:

what age are you? ___________________________
what part of Northern Ireland are you from? town: ___________________________
county: ___________________________
are you a Protestant? Yes/No
if no, are you a Roman Catholic? Yes/No

Now please turn over the page and begin the booklet
These numbers are points for:

member 38 of your group 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  
member 45 of your group 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25

Please fill in below details of the pair you have just chosen:

points for member 38 of your group  
points for member 45 of your group

These numbers are points for:

member 56 of the other group 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
member 42 of your group 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29

Please fill in below details of the pair you have just chosen:

points for member 56 of the other group  
points for member 42 of your group
These numbers are points for:

member 42 of your group  23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11
member 69 of the other group  05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29

Please fill in below details of the pair you have just chosen:

points for member 42 of your group  
points for member 69 of the other group  

These numbers are points for:

member 32 of your group  18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05
member 50 of the other group  05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Please fill in below details of the pair you have just chosen:

points for member 32 of your group  
points for member 50 of the other group  

These numbers are points for:

member 69 of the other group 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
member 33 of your group 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25

Please fill in below details of the pair you have just chosen:

points for member 69 of the other group
points for member 33 of your group

These numbers are points for:

member 52 of the other group 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11
member 51 of the other group 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29

Please fill in below details of the pair you have just chosen:

points for member 52 of the other group
points for member 51 of the other group
The second part of the booklet asks a few questions which you should answer as accurately as possible. But before turning over the page to begin these questions could you please give some details to the questions below:

1. Please briefly describe the strategy you used, if any, in deciding how to allocate points between the members of the two groups:

2. Could you briefly outline some of the reasons why you awarded points in the way you did:
Could you please answer the questions below. Once again there are no right or wrong answers; we are just interested in what you think. All subjects should answer all questions.

Q1 Some people believe that the Union between Northern Ireland and Great Britain is threatened at the present time while others think it is not. Please indicate on the scale below what you think:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union very threatened</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Q2 Some people believe that the Union between Northern Ireland and Great Britain is secure while others think it is insecure. Please indicate on the scale below what you think:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union very secure</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Q3 Some people believe that a United Ireland is very likely to occur in the foreseeable future while others believe a United Ireland to be very unlikely. Please indicate on the scale below what you think:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United Ireland very likely</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Could you please answer the questions below. Once again there are no right or wrong answers, we are just interested in what you think. All subjects should answer all questions.

Q1. Some people believe that the Union between Northern Ireland and Great Britain is threatened at the present time while others think it is not. Please indicate on the scale below what you think:

Union very threatened 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Union not at all threatened

Q2. Some people believe that the British are determined to leave Northern Ireland while others think they are determined to stay. Please indicate on the scale below what you think:

British determined to stay in NI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 British determined to leave NI

Q3. Some people believe that the Union between Northern Ireland and Great Britain is secure while others think it is insecure. Please indicate on the scale below what you think:

Union very secure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Union very insecure

Q4. Some people believe that a United Ireland is very likely to occur in the foreseeable future while others believe a United Ireland to be very unlikely. Please indicate on the scale below what you think:

United Ireland very likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 United Ireland very unlikely
How interested are you in obtaining up-to-date information about politics?

not at all interested 1 2 3 4 5 very interested

(please rate your answer on this scale by circling the appropriate number)

Which of the following sources do you use regularly to obtain information on politics? (Circle YES or NO for each source)

YES/NO Northern Ireland newspapers (eg. Irish News, Newsletter, Belfast Telegraph)

YES/NO Eire newspapers (eg Irish Times, Independent Press)

YES/NO British newspapers (eg Guardian, Daily Mirror, Sun, etc)

YES/NO Television (news and documentaries)

YES/NO Radio (news and documentaries)

YES/NO Northern Ireland political newspapers (eg Republican News, Voices of Ulster)

YES/NO periodicals (eg New Society, Magill Newsweek)

YES/NO books about politics

YES/NO political debates or meetings

YES/NO discussions with family

YES/NO discussions with friends
How interested are you in obtaining up-to-date information about politics?

not at all interested 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very interested
(please rate you answer on this scale by circling the appropriate number)

Which of the following sources do you use regularly to obtain information on politics? (Circle YES or NO for each source)

YES/NO Irish News
YES/NO Eire newspapers (eg Irish Times, Press, Independent, etc)
YES/NO News Letter
YES/NO British newspapers (eg Guardian, Daily Mirror, Sun, etc)
YES/NO Belfast Telegraph
YES/NO Television (news and documentaries)
YES/NO Radio (news and documentaries)
YES/NO Northern Ireland political newspapers (eg Republican News, Voice of Ulster, etc)
YES/NO Periodicals (New Society, Magill, Newsweek, etc)
YES/NO Books about politics
YES/NO Political debates or meetings
YES/NO Discussions with family
YES/NO Discussions with friends
The next few pages ask some questions about some of the main political parties in Northern Ireland.

On this first page we are concerned with the knowledge or understanding people have of what the different political parties stand for. On the list below could you please rate each of the parties on a scale of 1 to 5. A rating of 1 would indicate that you feel you understand what that particular political party stands for, while a rating of 5 would indicate that you feel you do not really understand what that party stands for. (Please give a rating for every political party on the list.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unionist party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Unionist party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn Fein</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI Labour party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social, Democratic and Labour party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers' party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On this page we are concerned with how 'right-wing' or 'left-wing' you feel each of the political parties are. On the list below could you please rate each of the parties on a scale 1 to 5. A rating of 1 would indicate that you feel that particular political party is very 'right-wing', while a rating of 5 would indicate that you feel that party is very 'left-wing'. (Please give a rating for every political party on the list.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Right wing</th>
<th>Left wing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers' party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI Labour party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unionist party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social, Democratic and Labour party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Unionist party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn Fein</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On this page we are concerned with how 'extreme' or 'moderate' you feel each of the political parties are. Once again on the list below could you please rate all the parties on a scale of 1 to 5. A rating of 1 would indicate that you feel that particular party to be very 'extreme' while a rating of 5 would indicate that you feel that party is very 'moderate'. (Please give a rating for every political party on the list.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>extreme</th>
<th>moderate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers' party</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Unionist party</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unionist party</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance party</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social, Democratic and Labour party</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn Fein</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI Labour party</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On this page we are concerned with your actual preferences in regard to the named political parties. Could you please rank the parties on the list in your order of preference, with a rank of 1 to the political party that comes closest to your own views, a rank of 2 to the party next closest to your views, right down to a rank of 7 for the party you disagree with the most. Please rank all the parties on the list.

☐ Alliance party
☐ Social, Democratic and Labour party
☐ Workers' party
☐ Sinn Fein
☐ Official Unionist party
☐ Democratic Unionist party
☐ NI Labour party

That concludes the second part and, you'll be glad to hear, the booklet. When you have finished could you please return the completed booklet to the experimenter.

Thank you very much for your cooperation, and thank you for your time.
DOUGLAS HURD, Britain's new direct-ruler in the North, flew into Belfast this week with a promise of no change in Britain's policy of violence.

Like the six arrogant British viceroys before him, Hurd finds nothing incongruous in admitting, at the same time, little familiarity or understanding of what is going on.

Commenting on the appointment of political lightweight Douglas Hurd, Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams MP said:

"It is a telling indication of how low Ireland is on Margaret Thatcher's list of priorities.

"Like Prior who 'put his political reputation on the line' in a vain effort to impose a British settlement, Hurd comes here as an apologist for British violence, to take responsibility for a corrupt administration dependent on British guns for its existence.

"Like Prior, whose failure personifies the failure of British rule in Ireland, Hurd faces an impossible task.

"Sinn Fein has no doubt that he will, in due course, face the same ignominious fate as his predecessors."
'COVERT ACTION' THREAT

WARNING OF POSSIBLE RETRIBUTIVE ACTION

WE NOTED THAT YOUR REACTION TO THE IRA ATROCITY AT BRIGHTON ON 12. OCT. '84 AMOUNTED TO VIRTUAL SUPPORT FOR THE DIABOLICAL ACT. CONSEQUENTLY YOU ARE NOW IN THE POSITION OF A HOSTAGE AND PERMANENTLY AT RISK FROM OUR SPECIAL UNITS IN THE EVENT OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE INLA. THESE SPECIAL UNITS ARE ORGANISING INEXPlicable ACCIDENTS AND CARRYING OUT MIND-BENDING ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT.

THESE COVERT ACTIVITIES WILL SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE OF IRELAND WITH A PROGRESSIVELY RAVAGING EFFECT UNTIL THE IRA AND INLA CEASE TO OPERATE.

THE EX-SERVICEMEN OF CLUB NEMESIS.
3. NOV. '84.

Contents: ETHIOPIA
DHSS RIPP-OFF
SINN FEIN AND FHEIS
HERE TO STAY!

contents:

AFTER THE FORUM—PAGE 6&7

INLA OPERATIONS—PAGE 3.

WOMEN AND THE STRUGGLE—PAGE 9&10.

DISTILLERS STRIKE—PAGE 11.
JUNE, 1983

SUPPORT
SEPARATION
FOR
LOYALIST PRISONERS
A BRITISH POLITICAL TRIAL

From the onset of the present phase of what are loosely termed 'the troubles' in Ireland, the whole island has been subjected to all the pressures of modern psychological and judicial warfare on top of the less complex military activities. The pressures inside Northern Ireland have been infinitely more severe than those in Eire for the simple reason that the cockpit of the struggle rests here.

As in Vietnam, the pressures, both political and military, are applied from the outside. Not just from the Republic of Ireland but from London, Washington and other areas. It is the pressure from London within the Foreign Office and the influence of government upon the judicial system that dominates.

The 11th April revealed the extent of government involvement in what will now be referred to as the "Bennett Case". British Government representatives will of course emphatically deny any responsibility and casually refer the matter as one for the Director of Public Prosecutions. They will then try and tell the nation that in this part of the United Kingdom the D.P.P. has autonomy in deciding that a person or persons shall have immunity from prosecution for the most heinous crimes. Even the crime of cannibalism which occurs from time to time can be justified when compared alongside the motivation, the lies, the attitude and degrading activities of this murderous witness for the Crown.

In British law there has always been a constant reference to convictions in cases where there is evidence beyond all shadow of doubt. Seldom have there been such long shadows cast across any case as in this one. Yet the die was cast and cast in such a way that the most able of barristers did not have and never could have had any influence. The impact of that state of affairs will no doubt be felt in any future cases where defendants would be well advised to play cards in the dock and ignore the rigged proceedings.

The outstanding question of all remains unanswered . . . If all or even part of Bennett's evidence was true, why would the British Government go out of their way on such a stony road to attempt to crush the only militant resistance to British withdrawal from N. Ireland? Or have they calculated that this action bolstered up by a few repeat performances will pave the way to a better understanding between Westminster and Dublin as they move together on the road to a 'New Ireland'. A 'New Ireland' plagued by even more murder and mayhem than anything witnessed over the past thirteen years.

Our assessment at this stage is that the only damage done through the introduction of this grossly criminal Crown witness is the damage done to the process of law itself and problems for those who attempt to see it through. If the political overseers had only rejected the doubtful services offered by Bennett, then the future political situation in N. Ireland may have improved.

McIVOR

The Journal of the Ulster Volunteers
Housing Executive Biased Against Protestants

East Belfast MP Peter Robinson has levelled a discrimination charge against the Housing Executive and accused its chairman, Mr. Charles Brett, of being "feeble" in his excuse for its position.

The D.U.P. Deputy leader told a Party meeting in East Belfast that on several occasions over the past three years he has quoted statistics to show the extent of discrimination in housing against Protestants in Belfast, and never once has these figures been seriously challenged.

In 1980 he had shown that although there were about 1,000 more families on the waiting list in East Belfast than in the west of the city, the Executive was building considerably more houses in the western areas.

The next year, said Mr. Robinson, he had shown that almost £13 million had been spent in Republican areas by the Executive compared with £7.4 million in Protestant areas.

Mr. Robinson said his charges still stood. The Executive, he said, had discriminated against Protestants and Mr. Brett had failed to show that the statistics were not indicative of that discrimination.

"His feeble excuse that the very significant difference in put-back in Republican and Protestant areas can be attributed to factors such as availability of extra land shows that Mr. Brett has either not considered his reply carefully or is not aware that many acres of land have been left undeveloped in Protestant areas or used as buffer zones between Protestant and Roman Catholic areas instead of being utilised for housing."

When less serious charges of discrimination against Roman Catholics were made in the past in housing matters, the full weight and concern of authority was diverted towards immediate action. Now rather than deal with these charges the N.I.H.E. attempts to hide or justify the facts while the Department and its Minister remain silent.

The Assembly must direct its attention to this gross inequality and investigate the organisation that allows this to happen.

CONTENTS

5 Census Revelations
8-11 The Stormont Scene
14 'Ulster Woman'
16 Vatican Politics


UNIONIST LEADER HONOURED

The appointment of W. Bro. James H. Molyneaux, J.P., M.P., as a Privy Councillor, has given great satisfaction to his hosts of supporters in the Ulster Unionist Party, and in the Orange and Royal Black Institutions. He is the first Ulster Unionist leader to receive such an honour since Sir James Craig, later Lord Craigavon.

Following the announcement W. Bro. Molyneaux explained that the main advantage of the honour would be allowed to hear classified information. Other Northern Ireland Cabinet Ministers and leading politicians have been Northern Ireland Privy Councillors.

There have been times in the past when I have been asked to sit in on briefings which involved security, but I have felt unable to do so because much of the information was classified," he said.

"I do not know the security chiefs would have gone ahead with the meetings but I felt it was not right because I was not under oath. Now I am." W. Bro. Molyneaux said the position would give better access to the "inner circles of the nation" and her said he would be able to liaise with security chiefs in the Province and in Great Britain.

His appointment, he said, was in "recognition of the unspectacular, sloggy work" of the party's Westminster team. Our team is continuously engaged in work at Westminster which not only includes work with the Northern Ireland Ministers. In fact, since the election I feel the party's influence has been strengthened." W. Bro. Molyneaux claimed that with a team of 11 the party had more influence in the House than the SDP or the Liberal Party. This, he claimed, was highlighted by the number of Unionist MPs who had spoken in the House over the fortnight prior to his appointment.

Sir Knight James H. Molyneaux, Imperial Grand Master.

Life is so pleasant in Long Kesh!

Mr. Harold McCusker, member of Parliament for Upper Bann, who voted for the return of capital punishment in the debate at Westminster on July 13, made a stirring speech when he was in support of the ultimate penalty when he was the main speaker at the Twelfth of July demonstration in Richill.

"I am sick and tired year on year denouncing firm action from the Government and Security Forces only to be disappointed," he said; "We condemned the RUC for the resolve action it took against known terrorist murderers towards the end of last year. If their success had continued here we would be no necessity for the present debate on capital punishment.

COWARDICE OF THE TERRORIST

"I am sure like me you could not (if it wasn't such a serious matter) at some of the arguments put forward by the opponents of hanging. They say it would only encourage more martyrs, that brave terrorists would not be deterred. The hallmark of the terrorist is cowardice, not courage; they kill when they can hook in the back, when they can shoot in the rear, when they can shoot in the dark, when they can shoot in the ambush.

"Yes! The value of human life must be restored in this Province — the life of innocent law-abiding citizens. Society must again show that it places a higher value on the life of one who sustains its existence, than those who seek to destroy it.

"What is the present punishment? A prison sentence in one of the most modern prisons in Europe, single level, centrally heated, playing fields, recreational facilities, workshops and classrooms. Ample opportunities for association, no prison clothes and colour television shows; sustained by thoughts of release as a result of victory, parole or amnesty.

PRISON IS NO DETERRENT

"There are millions of old age pensioners imprisoned more severely in this country as a consequence of their poverty, frailty or environment. Thousands will die this coming winter from hypothermia — no one will die of cold in the Maze. Thousands will die of malnutrition — no one will die of hunger in the Maze (unless they choose to). Thousands will die because of a lack of adequate medical treatment — no one will die because of that in the Maze. Prison is no deterrent.

"That is why I will vote for the return of Capital Punishment to-morrow evening. I do not fear the consequences, if there are any. We have faced them before and will do so with the same fortitude in the future. The first responsibility of action of heroes but of a coward."

Continued on page 6

Held Over

A number of reports have arrived after date of publication in the August issue. These will appear next month.

Presentation of 50 Year Jewel

The officers and members of Christians Crusaders L.O.L. 1339 had a very pleasant duty to perform on the 12th morning when Wot. Bro. Alexander Andrews, P.M., was presented with a 50 year jewel.


The Andrews family from Shankill Road hold a unique position in the lodge with three generations in membership — father, son and grandson.

The Grand Master, W. Bro. W. Martin Smyth, B.D., M.P., Grand Master of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, speaking at Eden­erry, on July 12 said that after fourteen years of terrorism the people of Ulster have shown overwhelmingly their determination that terrorism will not win.

Terrorism Will Not Win

Rev. W. Martin Smyth, B.D., M.P., Grand Master of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, speaking at Eden­erry, on July 12 said that after fourteen years of terrorism the people of Ulster have shown overwhelmingly their determination that terrorism will not win. Tragically, he said, govern­ments have occasionally given them the impression they might. That is one reason, irrespective of the claims to the contrary whether for a Westminster or Stormont regime, why the structure of government is not in the final analysis the Loyalists' defence.

"We have, already, proclaimed our faith in the Sovereign Lord. We must repent and seek His love and obedience. He is the raiser up and sustainer of life. A people whose God is the Lord will not fear whatever man may seek to do unto them. A resolute God, playing a very active part in the Senior and Junior Orders.

Continued on page 5