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Analysis of the effect of alternative agri-environmental policy instruments on production performance and nitrogen surplus of representative dairy farms

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2 Analysis of the effect of alternative agri-environmental policy instruments on production
3 performance and nitrogen surplus of representative dairy farms
4

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20 **Abstract**

21 Nitrogen (N) surplus is an important environmental problem on the island of Ireland (Northern Ireland
22 and the Republic of Ireland), and the dairy sector has been identified as contributing more to this
23 problem compared to other agricultural sectors. As a result, there has been increased demand for
24 efficient policy measures to improve the economic and environmental performance of dairy farms in
25 the region. In this study, we employed the positive mathematical programming (PMP) optimization
26 modelling framework to simulate the economic and environmental impact of two alternative agri-
27 environmental policy instruments on different dairy farm types. Specifically, the study considers the
28 effects of N surplus tax and agri-environmental nutrient application standard on the production
29 performance and N surplus of representative dairy farms using scenario analyses. The results of the
30 analyses showed that the effects of the agri-environmental policy instruments vary across the two
31 countries and clusters of dairy farms, resulting in clear differential effects on farm structure and N
32 surpluses. The study concluded that in situations where the nutrient surplus is already high, as with
33 the large farms' clusters in this study, the use of manure application standards will be more effective
34 in limiting nutrient surplus to soils compared to the use of nutrient surplus tax.

35 **Keywords:** Nitrogen surplus; Mathematical programming; Cluster analysis; Dairy farms; Agri-
36 environmental policy
37

38 **1.0 Introduction**

39 The dairy sector compared to other agricultural sectors, contributes significantly to the agri-
40 cultural economy on the island of Ireland which comprises Northern Ireland and the Republic of
41 Ireland (DAFM, 2017; DAERA, 2017a). Consequently, the abolition of the milk quota system¹ in
42 2015, has been seen as a good development in terms of expansion of the dairy sector. However, the

¹ The milk quota system was originally introduced in 1984, as a measure to limit public expenditure on the sector, and to stabilise milk prices and the agricultural income of dairy farmers. This was done by controlling supply of raw milk among member states through quota allocation in which each member states were given a reference quantity and consequently, each producer within a state was in turn given individual reference quantity (Donnellan and Hennessy, 2015).

43 policy change has resulted in dramatic structural change in the dairy sector which raises some concern
44 from the perspective of the environment. This is because increased dairy herd sizes have the tendency
45 to result in excess nutrients from manure to the soil thereby increasing the risk of damage to water
46 quality. Nitrogen (N) surplus is already a significant environmental issue on the island of Ireland
47 (Adenuga *et al*, 2018a; Buckley *et al*, 2016). Further intensification of dairy farms which has histor-
48 ically contributed more to N surplus in the region will therefore put more pressure on the environment.

49 Already, more than 50 per cent of river water bodies in Northern Ireland and the Republic of
50 Ireland have been classified as ‘moderate’ or ‘poor’ quality and agriculture accounts for more than
51 20 per cent of the incidence of water pollution (Kleinman *et al.*, 2015; Cave and McKibbin, 2016;
52 EPA, 2017; DAERA, 2017b). In fact, the quality of surface waters has remained relatively static in
53 the last few years and the objective of the water framework directives to achieve a 13 per cent im-
54 provement in surface water standards between 2010 and 2015 has not been achieved (EPA, 2017).

55 The inability to meet the water quality target has been attributed in large part to diffuse nutrient
56 run-off from agriculture and domestic wastewater discharge (EPA, 2017). It is worth highlighting that,
57 before the abolition of the milk quota system in 2015, various policies have been formulated at the
58 local, national and EU level as part of the common agricultural policies (CAP) to ensure good water
59 quality and environmental protection. The most prominent of these policies is the Nitrates Directive,
60 which was designed and adopted by the European Commission in 1991 – (Council Directive of 12
61 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from
62 agricultural sources (91/676/EEC)), to reduce nitrate pollution of water resources resulting from
63 agriculture (European Communities, 2000). It is focused mainly on the management of livestock
64 manures and chemical N fertilisers, by setting limits on the amount of livestock manure applied to
65 the land each year. Specifically, it stipulates that “the amount of livestock manure applied in any
66 year to land on a holding, together with that deposited to land by livestock, cannot exceed an amount
67 containing 170kg N per hectare”. It also sets limits on the application of inorganic N fertilizer.
68 However, it is possible that land application of up to 250kg N/ha/year from grazing livestock manure

69 under certain conditions may be used, if derogation² is sought by an individual farmer and granted by
70 the appropriate authority (European Communities, 2000). Other policies of note are the Water
71 Framework Directive (WFD), which seeks to implement new hydrological plans leading to a ‘good
72 ecological status of water bodies and the current CAP in which, subsidies to farmers are conditional
73 on the fulfilment of a set of environmental requirements (Matthews, 2013). While these policies may
74 have contributed to limiting the damage of nutrient surpluses on the environment and on water quality,
75 it is clear that further environmental policies might be required at the national level to control nutrient
76 surpluses from dairy production in the post milk quota era. This is particularly important given the
77 acknowledgement in the literature that the usual voluntary system of managing nutrient surpluses in
78 dairy farms and consequently promote water quality improvement have not provided the desired
79 results (Doole *et al.*, 2013; Bewsell and Brown, 2011; Adenuga *et al.*, 2020).

80 The objective of this study is to analyse the effect of alternative agri-environmental policy
81 instruments on production performance and N surplus of different dairy farm types on the island of
82 Ireland. To achieve this objective, this study considers two agri-environmental policy instruments
83 using scenario analyses. First, the study considers the effects of an empirically estimated N surplus
84 tax as an economic instrument to internalise N surplus in dairy farms. The application of taxes on
85 nutrient surplus, which encompasses both inputs, organic manure application and chemical fertilizer,
86 rather than nutrient inputs alone, has been determined in the literature to be a better environmental
87 policy to reduce nutrient surplus (Becker and Kleinhanss, 1995). This is because a levy on fertilizer
88 for example might lead to a reduction in the volume of fertilizer usage but will consequently lead to
89 an increase in the use of manure, which leads to an increase in nutrient surplus (Becker and Kleinhanss,
90 1995). Secondly, the study considers an agri-environmental nutrient application standard in which
91 derogation is abolished, such that all dairy farms are required to limit their manure N application to
92 not more than 170 Kg N per hectare.

² Derogation is an EU policy (Commission Decision 2011/128/EU) which permit an increase in the amount of grazing livestock manure that may be applied to land from 170kg N/ha/year up to a limit of 250kg N/ha/year, for intensive grassland farms which meet certain criteria.

93 This study contributes to the existing literature in two specific ways. First, the study provides
94 the first attempt to analyse the impact of two alternative agri-environmental policy instruments on the
95 production performance and N surplus in different dairy farm types on the island of Ireland using
96 mathematical programming technique. Secondly, unlike previous studies, the value of the N surplus
97 tax incorporated into the optimization model has been empirically estimated rather than making a
98 blank assumption (Adenuga *et al.*, 2019).

99 The remaining sections of this paper are organised as follows: In section 2, we describe the
100 methodology and empirical specification of the model, based on positive mathematical programming
101 (PMP). The results of the scenario analyses are reported and discussed in section 3 while section 4
102 concludes the paper with relevant policy recommendations.

103 **2.0 Methodology**

104 The existence of heterogeneity and differences in aggregation level among dairy farms alongside
105 varying farm objectives implies that responses to policy changes may vary by farm typology. Hence,
106 this study analysis was carried out in two stages. In the first stage, the K-means non-hierarchical
107 iterative clustering technique was employed to categorise dairy farms into three different farm types
108 of relatively homogeneous units for each region of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In
109 the second stage, the positive mathematical programming (PMP) modelling technique was used to
110 analyse the impact of two alternative agri-environmental policy instruments on dairy farms in the post
111 milk quota era. The methodology involved setting alternative policy scenarios with a base scenario
112 that is used as a reference point for counterfactual analysis.

113 **2.1 Representative farm types and cluster analysis**

114 Disaggregation of farms into different typologies allows for the simulation of varying
115 responses of farms to policy changes with respect to the observed sources of heterogeneities (Mark
116 and Huber, 2017; Moghaddasi, *et al.*, 2009). However, in classifying farms into different typologies,
117 it is essential that the relevant parameters are taken into consideration, as this has the tendency of
118 influencing the interpretation of observed effects of policy changes. On this basis, the K-means cluster

119 analysis has been employed in this study to categorise the dairy farms into different farm types of
120 relatively homogeneous units with respect to their utilisation of production resources, physical size
121 and economic status. The K-means clustering is a non-hierarchical iterative procedure that partitions
122 observations into k groups by minimizing Euclidean distances between them (Tan *et al.*, 2005).

123 Unlike the hierarchical cluster analysis, the K-means cluster analysis provides the opportunity
124 to pre-determine the final number of clusters needed. The units to be clustered are continually
125 arranged, such that they are clustered in a way that they are as similar as possible within cluster and
126 as different as possible between clusters. The resulting groups identified by this analytical technique
127 represent groups of farms characterized by a similarity in terms of important variables. The three
128 variables considered and used for cluster analysis are milk yield, utilised agricultural area and herd
129 size. The variables are selected based on their importance in driving differences in the profitability
130 and pollution characteristics among individual dairy farms. Also, unlike monetary variables that could
131 change very significantly between years they are relatively stable with respect to the specialised dairy
132 farms and also fit well to the objective of this study in explaining the effect of the policy change on
133 different dairy farm types. Data was obtained from the Teagasc National Farm Survey (NFS) and
134 Farm Business Survey (FBS) with cluster analysis conducted for a sample of 112 and 74 dairy farms
135 for the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland respectively. The method of aggregation conforms
136 to Day, (1963) aggregation criteria which maintained that aggregation bias is minimised when
137 grouping is done on the basis of technological homogeneity, managerial ability, production level and
138 institutional proportionality. A similar methodology has been employed by Shrestha *et al.* (2014);
139 Shrestha *et al.* (2015); Groeneveld *et al.* (2016).

140 **2.2 Positive mathematical programming model**

141 The Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) as employed in this study is a comparative
142 static farm level model that maximises an objective value of a total gross margin function with the
143 restriction that economic, technical, environmental, spatial and policy constraints are respected. It
144 was formalized by Howitt (1995) to overcome the problem of overspecialisation associated with

145 linear programming (LP) models and was first introduced to the literature in the late 1980s (Howitt
 146 1995, Paris and Arfini, 1995; Paris and Howitt 1998). Although the structure of the PMP specification
 147 takes the form of a mathematical programming model, the main objective of the methodology is to
 148 formulate policy recommendations. The model is able to overcome the defects of other mathematical
 149 programming models by allowing for the incorporation of *a priori* information from econometric
 150 models (Howitt, 1995). Another important advantage of the PMP model over the traditional
 151 optimization model is that it is able to calibrate the model exactly to observed values of production
 152 output and factor usage with minimal datasets. The PMP model, once calibrated can be used for policy
 153 formulation as a predictive tool to investigate farmer behaviour under different conditions.

154 The calibration of the PMP model is usually in three phases: the first phase is the differential
 155 costs recovering phase, followed by the estimation of the non-linear cost function and, finally, the
 156 calibration by using a non-constrained production model with non-linear objective function (Howitt,
 157 1995; Arfini *et al.*, 2005). In the first phase, a linear programming problem is solved with the sole
 158 purpose of obtaining an accurate and consistent measures of the marginal cost associated with the
 159 vector of observed level of activities. Given the LP problem expressed in equation (1)

160 $Maximize \Pi = X_d p_y - X_d p_c$

161 Subject to

162 $AX_d \leq b$ [λ_l] (structural constraint)

163 $X_d \leq X_d^* + \varepsilon$ [λ_d] (calibration constraint) (1)

164 $X_d > 0$ (non – negativity assumption)

165 Where Π is the objective function to be maximised over a vector of decision variables X_d ,
 166 while p_y and p_c are the marginal revenue and direct variable cost of the production process
 167 respectively. A is the matrix of technical coefficients involving the limiting input levels. Parameter b
 168 is the vector of production or policy constraints and X_d^* is the vector of observed activity levels. The
 169 production constraints refers to the restriction arising from the initial land endowment for the
 170 individual farm types why the policy constraints refers to restriction arising as a result of the milk

171 quota and nitrate directives policies. In situation where quota is binding, it restricts the amount of
172 milk that can be produced. However, in situation where the milk quota is not binding, milk production
173 is restricted by land and the N balance requirement (Groeneveld et al., 2016). λ_l and λ_d are the vectors
174 of shadow prices associated with the allocable input of the structural constraint and calibration
175 constraints respectively. Shadow prices (λ_d) associated with the calibration constraints not only
176 capture 'unobserved' costs or misspecification in technology, but rather any type of model
177 misspecification. The following model misspecifications are possible: data errors, aggregation bias,
178 and erroneous price expectations (Heckelei, 1997; Howitt, *et al.*, 2012; Paris and Howitt, 1998). The
179 parameter ε is a small number used to decouple the structural and calibration constraints. This is
180 necessary to prevent the model from having degenerate solutions such that during the first stage
181 optimisation, a unique outcome exists for the binding constraints and the partitioned resource matrix.

182 The second stage deals with the reconstruction of the marginal costs function in which the
183 parameters of non-linear production functions are calibrated using data, optimal solutions, and
184 shadow prices from the first stage. The integration of the marginal costs function with respect to the
185 output variables within the admissible domain will produce the desired total variable costs function.
186 These functions combine to form the nonlinear program that produces the base year solution without
187 calibration constraints. The cost function is assumed to be a quadratic function due to its
188 computational simplicity and the fact that there are no strong arguments for other type of functions
189 (Heckelei and Britz, 2005; Heckelei, 2002). The third stage specifies a non-linear programming model
190 using the calibrated functions from the second stage and the base-year data set. The non-linear
191 programming model includes the original constraints except the calibration constraints. The
192 calibrated non-linear programming model is then used for analyses of various agricultural policy
193 scenarios. This is able to reproduce the primal and dual solutions of the first stage LP models (Paris
194 and Arfini 2000).

195

196

197 **2.3 Nitrogen surplus estimation**

198 N surplus was endogenously estimated in the model based on the soil surface balance
199 approach (Eurostat, 2013; Adenuga et al, 2018b). The measure takes into consideration the differences
200 in the production management systems across the dairy farm types. It is estimated as the difference
201 between total N input into the soil and total N output from the soil. N inputs is estimated from
202 chemical fertilizer and manure inputs to the soil while N output is obtained from N contained in
203 harvested and grazed grass and crops. The inputs from chemical fertilisers were obtained directly
204 from farm businesses via the Farm Business Survey (FBS) in Northern Ireland and the Teagasc
205 National Farm Survey (NFS) in the Republic of Ireland. The composition and quantities of nutrient
206 in fertiliser applied to land by the farmers are recorded for each dairy farm in the data bases. N inputs
207 from manure in Kg are estimated based on the excretion coefficient for different types of livestock
208 on the farms (Eurostat, 2013; Adenuga *et al*, 2018b). This involves multiplying standard nutrient
209 excretion coefficients which represent annual average nutrient excretion per head of animal by the
210 annual average population of the different types of livestock on the farm. This therefore include both
211 the slurry and manure spread on grassland.

212 **2.4 Data and empirical specification of the model**

213 The study area is the island of Ireland which comprises the Republic of Ireland and Northern
214 Ireland (Figure 1). The data set employed for this study were obtained from two different sources, the
215 Teagasc National Farm Survey (NFS, Republic of Ireland) and the Northern Ireland Farm Business
216 Survey (FBS, Northern Ireland). They represent detailed stratified nationally representative random
217 samples of farms surveyed annually. Variables captured in both data sources are directly comparable,
218 given that they are both collected as part of the EU Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN)
219 requirements. Data used for analysis was averaged over a six-year period of 2009 to 2014 to correct
220 for occasional events.




Figure 1: Map of the study area; inset is the map of the United Kingdom
Source: Author's compilation

221

222 The objective function of the PMP model maximizes gross margin, which also gives an
 223 indication of the change in farm income resulting from changes in agricultural policy. The gross
 224 margin is estimated as the difference between total revenue and total variable costs for the farm type.
 225 The N surplus serve as the agri-environmental policy variables and its level give an indication of
 226 potential leaching to soils and ground water. Important activities were, milk production, purchase and
 227 feeding of concentrates feed, grazing by dairy cows, manure application, purchase and application of
 228 synthetic fertilizers etc.

229 **2.5 Scenarios**

230 Three scenarios have been explored in this study. They include the scenario in which milk
 231 quota is abolished (S1), and two alternative agri-environmental policy instruments scenarios (S2 and
 232 S3) in which, in addition to milk quota being abolished, policies are put in place to limit the nutrient
 233 losses to the soils.

234 The S1 scenario seeks to determine the impact of the milk quota abolition on different farm
 235 types, by comparing the scenario to the base simulation in which milk quota remain in place as a

236 constraint to milk production. The base simulation reflects the economic, structural and
237 environmental situation of the farm before milk quota was abolished in 2015.

238 The S2 and S3 scenarios are compared to the S1 scenario to show the impact of the alternative
239 agri-environmental policy instruments, making use of the with-and-without principle. In the S2
240 scenario, in addition to milk quota abolition, it is envisaged that future dairy production policy will
241 include the enforcement of a tax regime on farms producing gross N surplus beyond a specific
242 threshold. Two different thresholds have been selected for this study based on the literature (Helming,
243 1998). These are 170Kg N/ha (scenario S2a) and 100Kg N/ha (scenario S2b). Although there is no
244 universally defined level of gross N surplus that meets the European legislation leaching limit of 50
245 mg/litre placed on the levels of nitrate allowable in drinking water, the use of two different thresholds
246 will give a broader view of the likely impact of the N surplus taxation policy. It is also important to
247 note that the relationship between N surplus and the actual leaching of nitrate is not direct as it
248 depends on a range of other biophysical geological and climatic conditions. It is assumed that dairy
249 farmers are required to keep records of nutrient inputs in chemical fertiliser, purchased feed, and
250 manure, and outputs in grass and plant products from their farms from which N surplus per hectare
251 are estimated. Unlike previous studies, (Ondersteijn *et al.*, 2003), the values of the tax per Kg of N
252 surplus for Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland have been empirically estimated making use
253 of the hyperbolic environmental technology distance function approach. It can be described as the
254 marginal abatement cost for N, with a value of £5.26 (€ 6.2) per Kg for Northern Ireland and €4.02
255 per Kg for the Republic of Ireland (Adenuga *et al.*, 2019). It should be noted that the tax is applied
256 only to the amount of N surplus above the threshold. If a farm type produces N surplus below the
257 threshold, then the farm is not taxed. In scenario 3, it is envisaged that derogation is abolished and
258 the amount of N from animal manure is limited to the non-derogation limit of 170 Kg N per hectare
259 for the Republic of Ireland

260 Labour and capital are assumed not to be constraining factors in the model. Farms can rent
261 land only up to a maximum of 20 hectares at a cost and prices are exogenous in the model. The limit

262 to the amount of land a dairy farmer can rent represents an estimate obtained from the NFS data based
263 on the average hectares of land that farmers have rented in the past. The relatively small value reflects
264 the limitation in farmers' access to land in the study area. Dairy production is therefore constrained
265 by land availability and dairy quota in the model. The model is run for the average farm for each
266 cluster and shows how each farm will react to the policy changes in a post quota period. Sensitivity
267 analysis was conducted with respect to the effect of changes in milk price on the model outcome. The
268 model was written in the General Algebraic Modelling Systems (GAMS) programming language and
269 was solved using the non-linear solver CONOPT3. A detailed specification of the model is presented
270 in appendix A.

271 **3.0 Results and discussion**

272 **3.1 Farm types characteristics**


273 A summary of the main production characteristics of the farm clusters in Northern Ireland and
274 the Republic of Ireland is presented in Table 1. Based on the results of the cluster analysis, six farm
275 types can be distinguished with three clusters each for the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.
276 The main descriptive statistics for each cluster are shown in Table 1. They represent the average
277 values for all farms in a given cluster. The box plots in Figures 2 to 4 shows the distributions of all
278 the clusters in respect of the variables used for the cluster analysis to provide a compact view of where
279 the data are centred and how they are distributed over the range of each of the variables. The boxes
280 show medians and quartiles as customary and the added lines are the means of the variables. The
281 graph shows that the milk yield variable tends to completely distinguish between the three clusters in
282 each of the region. The results of a oneway ANOVA analysis conducted for each of the variables
283 shows that on the overall, there exist a statistically significant difference between the three groups in
284 each of the regions with respect to the variables used for cluster analysis.
285
286
287
288

Table 1: Summary of structural characteristics of the farm clusters in the island of Ireland

Variables	Republic of Ireland Clusters			Northern Ireland Clusters		
	1 (N=31)	2 (N=57)	3 (N=24)	4 (N=24)	5 (N=36)	6 (N=14)
Grazed grass (kg DM/ha)	7103.1	7231.5	7070.3	6088.0	5531.5	5124.5
Stocking density (LU/ha)	1.96	2.02	2.24	2.03	2.07	2.46
Concentrates (Kg/cow)	836.0	910.5	1416.6	2001.3	2644.3	3790.8
Dairy herd size(numbers)	53.4	63.4	92.6	64.4	94.9	185.8
UAA (ha)	43.8	51.9	70.7	61.3	74.3	116.3
Milk yield (litres/cow)	4119.4	5216.7	6638.6	5155.1	6395.4	8048.4
Chemical N input (Kg N/ha)	139.9	172.2	215.8	134.6	144.0	175.7
Livestock manure N input (Kg N/ha)	141.4	151.7	176.2	149.6	169.4	225.0

289

290 **Figure 2: Box plots showing the distribution clusters in respect of the milk yield variable**



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
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
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298 **Figure 3: Box plots showing the distribution clusters in respect of the UAA variable**



299

300 **Figure 4: Box plots showing the distribution clusters in respect of the herd size variable**



301

302 The majority of the farms fall into cluster 2 and cluster 5 for the Republic of Ireland and
303 Northern Ireland respectively. The farms in these clusters make up about 50 per cent of the total farm
304 population, while farms in cluster 3 and cluster 6 have the lowest percentage of farms in both coun-
305 tries. The cluster 2 and cluster 5 dairy farms can be described as the medium sized farms with an
306 average herd size of 63 dairy cows for the Republic of Ireland and 95 dairy cows for Northern Ireland.
307 On the average, farms in cluster 1 and cluster 4 are the smallest, while farms in cluster 3 and cluster
308 6 are the largest in terms of herd size and land area. Also, in both countries, farms in cluster 3 and
309 cluster 6 have higher yield per dairy cow but they also have higher concentrate inputs per dairy cow.

310 Generally, dairy farm clusters in Northern Ireland are larger than their respective counterparts in the
311 Republic of Ireland. In terms of nutrient inputs from chemical fertilizer and manure, farms in cluster
312 3 and 6 are found to have higher N inputs compared to the other clusters. Inputs from chemical ferti-
313 lizer are generally higher in the Republic of Ireland compared to Northern Ireland. This may be con-
314 nected to the fact that dairy farms in the Republic of Ireland are more pasture based compared to
315 Northern Ireland and hence the application of more chemical fertilizers. It can be observed in Table
316 1 that grass grazed per hectare is generally higher in Republic of Ireland compared to Northern Ireland.
317 The stocking density exceeds 2 LU/ha for all three clusters in Northern Ireland and for clusters 2 and
318 3 for the Republic of Ireland. Farms in cluster 3 and 6 have the highest stocking density in both
319 countries respectively. Manure nutrient inputs per hectare is also found to be higher in Northern Ire-
320 land's clusters compared to the corresponding clusters in the Republic of Ireland with the average
321 manure N input exceeding 200 Kg N per hectare in cluster 6 for Northern Ireland.

322 **3.2 Results of Scenario Analyses**

323 The results of simulating alternative policy scenarios from the PMP model are presented in
324 Tables 2 and 3 for the Republic of Ireland and Tables 4 and 5 for Northern Ireland respectively. The
325 results show that the effects of the milk quota abolition and the suggested environmental policies vary
326 across the two countries and clusters of dairy farms, resulting in clear differential effects on farm
327 structure, gross margin and N surplus. In all three clusters in the Republic of Ireland, an increase in
328 herd size can be observed as a result of the milk quota abolition in the S1 scenario. However, the
329 percentage increase is higher for farms in cluster 3 which also becomes more intensive compared to
330 the other two clusters. This might be connected to the fact that farms in cluster 3 are the larger farm
331 types with higher initial endowment of land and are more commercialised compared to the small sized
332 farms with higher production costs per dairy cow. Groeneveld *et al* (2016) also found similar result
333 in their study in which they stated that smaller farms are less likely to become big and very intensive
334 as a result of milk quota abolition because of higher maintenance costs and relatively lower milk
335 production per cow. The increase in herd size of all clusters results from the fact that milk quota was

336 binding in the Republic of Ireland prior to its abolition in 2015. This result is in line with that of
 337 previous studies in which it was found that the abolition of the milk quota system will lead to increase
 338 in the size of dairy farms (Sharma *et al.*, 2018; Groeneveld *et al.*, 2016; Boysen *et al.*, 2015; Dillon,
 339 2011; Huettel and Jongeneel, 2011; Louhichi *et al.*, 2010; Klootwijk *et al.*, 2016) and actual data for
 340 2016 which shows an increase in average herd size relative to 2013 (CSO, 2016). More extensive
 341 comparison of the model results and the actual 2016 data is provided in appendix B.

342 An increase in gross margin for all three clusters in the Republic of Ireland can also be
 343 observed. However, the percentage increase is higher for the larger dairy farms, ranging from about
 344 3% for the cluster 1 dairy farms to about 30% for the cluster 3 dairy farms. The percentage increase
 345 in gross margin for the cluster 2 dairy farms is about 19%. The ability of the larger farms to take
 346 advantage of economies of scale may have contributed to the higher percentage increase on gross
 347 margin. Similar results were obtained by Groeneveld *et al.*, (2016) for dairy farms in the Netherlands.
 348 In the model, the dairy farms in the Republic of Ireland, are able to rent extra land up to 20ha at a
 349 cost to expand their dairy herd size. In the S1 scenario, all three clusters in the region are able to rent
 350 the extra land at their disposal to take maximum advantage of the milk quota abolition. This result is
 351 line with that obtained by Koeijer *et al.*, (2014) in which they found that the abolition of the milk
 352 quota system is likely to lead to increase in the demand for land which might consequently result in
 353 a higher price for land.

Table 2: Effects of policy changes on farm structure and gross margin in cluster 1 and 2 (RoI)

Variables	Cluster 1					Cluster 2				
	Base	S1	S2a	S2b	S3	Base	S1	S2a	S2b	S3
Herd size	53.4	70.1	70.9	71.0	71.4	63.4	84.2	84.9	69.9	84.4
Stocking density (cow/ha)	1.22	1.10	1.25	1.62	1.12	1.22	1.17	1.27	1.34	1.18
Gross margin (€)	30638	31716	34250	38386	32291	52326	62650	65327	57564	62819
Ext. land(ha)	0	20	13.19	0	20	0	20	13.2	0	20
N surplus (Kg/ha)	98.2	88.6	100.5	130.9	90.3	141.5	135.9	151.4	156.3	136.2

Table 3: Effects of policy changes on farm structure and gross margin in cluster 3 (RoI)

Variables	Base	S1	S2a	S2b	S3
Herd size	92.6	131.3	111.6	88.6	129.7
Stocking density (cow/ha)	1.31	1.45	1.23	1.02	1.43
Gross margin (€)	94195	122224	104908	85701	120765
Ext. land(ha)	0	20	20	16.63	20
N surplus (Kg/ha)	207.28	229.68	195.24	160.93	226.77

354 Base = situation before milk quota is abolished; S1 = milk quota abolition; S2a= tax on N surplus
355 with 170Kg N/ha threshold; S2b = tax on N surplus with 100Kg N/ha threshold; S3 = N from animal
356 manure is limited to 170 Kg N/ha

Table 4: Effects of policy changes on farm structure and gross margin in cluster 4 and 5 (NI)

Variables	Cluster 4					Cluster 5				
	Base	S1	S2a	S2b	S3	Base	S1	S2a	S2b	S3
Herd size	64.5	64.5	56.6	53.6	67.8	95.0	95.0	87.9	76.4	97.1
Stocking density (cow/ha)	1.05	1.05	0.92	0.874	1.106	1.28	1.28	1.19	1.029	1.307
Gross margin (€)	46654	46654	40931	38759	49047	92966	92966	86112	74790	94974
Ext. land(ha)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N surplus (Kg/ha)	132.2	132.2	116.2	110.1	139.3	161.5	161.5	149.7	130.0	165.1

Table 5: Effects of policy changes on farm structure and gross margin in cluster 6 (NI)

Variables	Base	S1	S2a	S2b	S3
Herd size	183.9	183.9	164.8	150.9	108.8
Stocking density (cow/ha)	1.60	1.60	1.42	1.298	0.935
Gross margin (€)	199414	199414	178691	163656	117907
Ext. land(ha)	0	0	0	0	0
N surplus (Kg/ha)	239.39	239.39	212.44	194.57	140.18

357 Base = situation before milk quota is abolished; S1 = milk quota abolition; S2a= tax on N surplus
358 with 170Kg N/ha threshold; S2b = tax on N surplus with 100Kg N/ha threshold; S3 = N from animal
359 manure is limited to 170 Kg N/ha
360

361 There is no change in herd size and consequently gross margin for all the clusters of dairy
362 farms in Northern Ireland in the S1 scenario. This is because, the dairy production system in the
363 country was not constrained by quota before its abolition in 2015. It benefited from the flexibility in
364 the management of the UK quota system which gives it access to the single market for milk quota
365 within the constituent countries of the UK. No additional land was therefore required for expansion,
366 such that the extra land is 0 for all the scenarios

367 In terms of N surplus per hectare, the abolition of the milk quota system in the S1 scenario
368 will lead to an increase in N surplus per hectare for farms in cluster 3 compared to the base level in
369 the Republic of Ireland. For the dairy farms in cluster 1 and 2, the fact that they were able to rent
370 extra land such that a lower stocking density (number of cows per hectare) is maintained resulted in
371 the N surplus being relatively lower compared to the base scenario. This result implies that access to
372 land will play a vital role in limiting N surplus from dairy production in the post milk quota era.

373 In the scenario 2 analysis, farms producing N surplus above a specific threshold (Scenario S2a
374 (170 Kg N/ ha) and scenario S2b (100Kg N/ha) in the S1 scenario are taxed. For the Republic of
375 Ireland, only dairy farms in cluster 3 had N surplus above 170 Kg N/ha, while farms in cluster 2 had
376 N surplus above 100 Kg N/ha and cluster 1 farms had N surplus of less than 100 Kg N/ha. However,
377 for Northern Ireland, all 3 dairy farms clusters have N surplus above 100 Kg/ ha and only farms in
378 cluster 6 have N surplus above 170 Kg/ha (Tables 2 -5).

379 Compared to the S1scenario, an application of the tax policy in scenario 2a resulted in a de-
380 crease in the herd size for all clusters in Northern Ireland. Although it was not expected that the herd
381 size for clusters 4 and 5 should fall below the S1scenario given that they did not exceed the threshold
382 in the S1 scenario, the slight decrease in herd size may have resulted from the need to be more careful,
383 given that the N surplus in these two clusters was already on the high side. For the Republic of
384 Ireland, only farms in cluster 3 are affected for the N surplus tax policy when the threshold was 170Kg
385 N/ha. There is relatively no change in the herd size of farms in cluster 1 and 2 for the Republic of

386 Ireland. This is understandable given that farms in these clusters produces N surplus that is far less
387 than the considered threshold.

388 In the case of the S2b scenario in which the threshold is reduced to 100Kg N/ha, a decrease
389 in herd size can be observed for the dairy farms in clusters 2 and 3 for the Republic of Ireland, with
390 a higher decrease in herd size observed for dairy farms in cluster 3 at 17.7% and 20.6% respectively
391 compared to scenario 2a. For Northern Ireland, there is a decrease in herd size for all three farm
392 clusters just like in scenario 2a.

393 Relative to the S1 scenario, the tax on gross N surplus resulted in a decrease in gross margin
394 for all clusters in Northern Ireland. However, this also leads to a decrease in N surplus compared to
395 the S1 scenario with higher decrease in the S2b scenario compared to the S2a scenario. This result is
396 similar to that obtained by Helming (1998). For the Republic of Ireland, dairy farms in cluster 3
397 experienced the same effect of reduction in gross margin and N surplus just like farms in in Northern
398 Ireland with respect to scenario 2a and 2b. However, for clusters 1 and 2 a relative increase in N
399 surplus can be observed with increase in gross margin also observed for cluster 1. The implication of
400 this is that, a nutrient surplus taxation policy in the Republic of Ireland will result in a reduction in N
401 surplus and gross margin mainly for the large farms, while the smaller dairy farms are more likely to
402 increase the intensity of their dairy production given that they still have more room before they reach
403 the threshold, beyond which they would be taxed. This result is in line with that obtained by Huettel,
404 and Jongeneel, (2011) in which they assert that the abolishment of the milk quota regime is likely to
405 affect the future dairy farm size evolution.

406 In the S3 scenario, results from the Republic of Ireland model shows no significant effect
407 relative to the S1 scenario. This may have resulted from the fact that manure N input in the Republic
408 of Ireland clusters are less than 170 Kg N/ha, except for the cluster 3 dairy farms which is higher. A
409 slight decrease in herd size and N surplus can therefore be observed in the cluster 3 dairy farms
410 compared to the S1 scenario.

411 The results of the S3 scenario analysis for Northern Ireland showed a significant decrease in
412 the herd size of the cluster 6 dairy farms, while clusters 4 and 5 remain relatively the same when
413 compared to the S1 scenario. A significant decrease in N surplus relative to the S1 scenario can also
414 be observed for the dairy farms in cluster 6 for Northern Ireland. The strict manure policy also resulted
415 in lower gross margin for farms in cluster 3 and 6 respectively in both countries. The result of this
416 scenario is similar to that obtained by Helming and Peerlings (2002) in which they found that the
417 abolition of derogation will lead to decrease in the number of milking cows.

418 Comparing the results in scenarios S2a to S2b, it can be inferred, that the effect of the taxation
419 policy will depend to a large extent on the threshold of the nutrient surplus and access of the dairy
420 farmers to land. With access to land, the dairy farms can increase herd size without increasing N
421 surplus by renting more land and reducing the livestock density. This, however, will also depend on
422 the price of land. The choice between nutrient surplus taxation policy and application of environmen-
423 tal standards for the control of environmental pressure on land will on the other hand depend on the
424 existing level of nutrient surplus and the dairy production system. In situations where the nutrient
425 surplus is already high, as with the large farm's clusters in this study, the use of manure application
426 standards will be more effective in limiting nutrient surplus to soils. This is because, the large farms
427 being highly commercialised do not significantly reduce their N surplus under the nutrient surplus
428 tax scenario as long as they continue to make profit. This, however, also depends on the amount of
429 the tax and the nutrient surplus threshold. Similar result was also obtained by Ramilan et al. (2010)
430 in which they found, that environmental standards are more cost-effective than taxes applied to nitrate
431 emissions. With the application of environmental standards rather than increasing intensity of pro-
432 duction, the farms will have to purchase or rent additional land to be able to meet the nutrient standard
433 requirement. This result is comparable to that obtained by Hellegers (1996) in which they found that
434 the amount of tax and the level of the tax-free nutrient surplus influences the impact of the nutrient
435 surplus taxation policy. Why we are confident that our model results are valid in the light of the model
436 justification presented in appendix B, it must be pointed out that this may be only in the short run.

437 This is because the model is a relatively simple model focusing only on some important economic
 438 and production variables and assuming that the price of dairy production inputs and outputs are fixed.
 439 This is however not usually the case in the long run where for example, the price of milk is volatile
 440 such that it changes significantly over time. When this occurs, it could affect the validity of the results.

441 3.3 Sensitivity analysis

442 The price of milk is a significant factor in the assessment of the effect of agricultural policy
 443 changes on dairy production activities. It is assumed that the expansion of the dairy sector might
 444 results in a fall in the price of milk. As a result, sensitivity analysis was conducted by reducing the
 445 price of milk by 10%. This is based on the information from literature and current data on changes in
 446 milk price (Teagasc 2018). All other prices relating to production costs were however kept constant.
 447 It is important to note that these prices might also change in the long run and adjustments to price
 448 changes is not always instantaneous. The result of the sensitivity analysis is presented in Tables 6 and
 449 7 for the Republic of Ireland and Tables 8 and 9 for Northern Ireland for clusters 1 to 3 and 4 to 5
 450 respectively. A fall in the price of milk by 10% under the sensitivity analysis resulted in small increase
 451 in herd size compared to the main analysis. Moreover, unlike before, there is a fall in gross margin,
 452 following the abolition of milk quota. This result is in line with the current reality in which a decline
 453 in milk price has resulted in a fall in gross margin in spite of increase in dairy production output
 454 (Teagasc, 2018). Nevertheless, the conclusion regarding taxation policies (S2a and S2b) and environ-
 455 mental standards still holds.

456 **Table 6: Effects of policy changes with 10% price reduction in Cluster 1 and 2 (RoI)**

Variables	Cluster 1					Cluster 2				
	Base	S1	S2a	S2b	S3	Base	S1	S2a	S2b	S3
Herd size	53.4	57.7	57.7	55.4	60.2	63.4	71.5	71.5	67.8	72.3
Stocking density (cow/ha)	1.22	1.25	1.319	1.27	1.32	1.22	1.32	1.38	1.31	1.29
Gross margin (€)	30638	24006	24737	24980	24981	52326	44882	45621	37107	44743
Ext. land(ha)	0	2.30	0	0	1.65	0	2.29	0	0	4.32
N surplus(Kg/ha)	98.2	100.9	106.4	102.1	107.0	141.5	153.0	159.9	151.6	149.2

457 **Table 7: Effects of policy changes with 10% price reduction in Cluster 3 (RoI)**

Variables	Base	S1	S2a	S2b	S3
Herd size	92.6	111.82	91.4	85.9	109.9
Stocking density (cow/ha)	1.31	1.23	1.145	1.22	1.21
Gross margin (€)	94195	78506	68783	66051	77317
Ext. land(ha)	0	20	9.15	0	20.00
N surplus (Kg/ha)	207.3	195.6	181.6	192.8	192.3

458 **Table 8: Effects of policy changes with 10% price reduction in Cluster 4 and 5 (NI)**

Variables	Cluster 4					Cluster 5				
	Base	S1	S2a	S2b	S3	Base	S1	S2a	S2b	S3
Herd size	64.5	53.7	45.8	42.8	56.5	95.0	79.6	72.6	60.9	81.4
Stocking density (cow/ha)	1.05	0.89	0.78	0.70	0.92	1.28	1.07	0.98	0.82	1.10
Gross margin (€)	46654	30940	26382	24652	32547	92966	63145	57585	48402	64630
Ext. land(ha)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N surplus (Kg/ha)	132.2	110.3	94.1	87.9	116.1	161.5	135.3	123.4	103.7	138.5

459 **Table 9: Effects of policy changes with 10% price reduction in Cluster 6 (NI)**

Variables	Base	S1	S2a	S2b	S3
Herd size	183.9	153.5	134.4	120.5	90.8
Stocking density (cow/ha)	1.60	1.32	1.16	1.04	0.781
Gross margin (€)	199414	132209	115746	103802	78220
Ext. land(ha)	0	0	0	0	
N surplus (Kg/ha)	239.4	197.9	173.2	155.4	117.1

460 Base = situation before milk quota is abolished; S1 = milk quota abolition; S2a = tax on N surplus
 461 with 170Kg N/ha threshold; S2b = tax on N surplus with 100Kg N/ha threshold; S3 = N from animal
 462 manure is limited to 170 Kg N/ha
 463

464 An analysis was also performed in which the farms cannot rent additional land when milk
465 quota is abolished for the Republic of Ireland. In this case, it was found that only farms in cluster 3
466 and 6 increases in herd size by about 16% which is less than the increase of about 30% when the dairy
467 farmers were able to rent additional land. Farms in cluster 2 and 5 remain relatively the same, while
468 farms in cluster 1 and 4 reduced in herd size by about 20%. The reduction in herd size for farms in
469 cluster 1 and 4 must have resulted from the fact that, when land becomes a constraint, it becomes
470 more expensive. In that case, only the most profitable farms, (which in this case are the large farms
471 due to being able to take advantage of economies of scale) are more likely to have access to additional
472 land for dairy production while the smaller farms may shrink in size or exit production completely
473 due to competition from the more profitable farms, higher costs of production or a drop in the price
474 of milk. What this imply is that, in situations were no land is available for farmers to rent, the larger
475 farms are more likely to take up land from the smaller farms to be able to expand. This implies that
476 the abolition of the milk quota system without access of the dairy farms to more land will see the
477 large farm sizes getting bigger by taking land from the smaller farm sizes. However, access to land
478 even at a cost means that all the farm type's increases in sizes with the abolition of the milk quota
479 system

480 **4.0 Conclusion**

481 In this paper a positive mathematical programming (PMP) optimization modelling framework
482 is employed to simulate the effect of alternative agri-environmental policy instruments on the
483 structure and nutrient surpluses of different dairy farm types post milk quota abolition. The dairy farm
484 types can be broadly described as small, medium and large farms types. Three scenarios were
485 considered and analysed to achieve the study objectives. In the first scenario, it was assumed that
486 milk quota is abolished with all other conditions remaining the same. In the second scenario, in
487 addition to milk quota being abolished, dairy farm types producing N surplus beyond a certain
488 threshold are taxed. In the third scenario, alongside milk quota abolition, a limit was set on the

489 maximum N in manure that can be applied to land in line with the nitrates directive assuming that
490 derogation is abolished.

491 The results of the analyses showed varying effects on the different farm types and across both
492 countries. In specific terms, the abolition of the milk quota system will result in the expansion of the
493 dairy sector in the Republic of Ireland where milk quota was binding prior to its abolition in 2015 but
494 not in Northern Ireland where milk quota was not binding. The level of expansion of the dairy herds
495 in the Republic of Ireland was higher for the large farm types compared to the smaller farm types.
496 The abolition of the milk quota system was also found to result in an increase in N surplus per hectare
497 in the large farm types in the Republic of Ireland despite access to extra land due to an increase in
498 dairy farming intensity.

499 In terms of impact on gross margin, the abolition of the milk quota abolition lead to an increase
500 in gross margin. The percentage increase in gross margin was also found to be higher for the large
501 farm types compared to the smaller farm types. However, a reduction in price of milk by about 10%
502 resulted in a fall in gross margin relative to the base scenario in all farm types.

503 Based on the two environmental policy scenarios simulated, it was shown that the choice of a
504 tax on N surplus or the enforcements of application standard as a form of environmental policy
505 instruments on the island of Ireland will depend on the level of N surplus. The clusters of farm types
506 exhibited different responses to the policy changes in both countries. The impact of the policy options
507 was more pronounced in the large farm types with higher N surplus compared to the smaller farm
508 types. The application of N surplus tax resulted in a decrease in herd size and gross margin for the
509 large farm types. The effect was relatively little for the smaller farm types.

510 From the results, it can be concluded that land and environmental constraints are likely to be
511 critical factors in the expansion of the dairy sector in the post milk quota era. A limited access to land
512 for example will lead to greater intensification of the dairy farms which might consequently result in
513 excess nutrient surplus going into the soil. To take full advantage of the abolition of the milk quota

514 system especially in the Republic of Ireland, policy makers should therefore focus on increasing dairy
515 farmers' access to land.

516 As noted earlier it is important to stress that some level of care is necessary in the interpretation
517 of these results. Firstly, the model is a rather simple comparative static PMP model. In reality, farmers
518 respond to changes in policy in a dynamic way. However, modelling the dynamic behaviour of the
519 farmers will require additional technical-economic relationships and information that might be
520 difficult to access. Also, in the model, farm gross margin was simultaneously optimised on the
521 assumption of optimal allocation of dairy production inputs and outputs across farm types. However,
522 the assumption of profit maximization may not always be the goal of all farmers (for example, other
523 objectives may include minimization of labour use and ensuring minimal environmental impact in
524 dairy production). It is nevertheless in line with economic theory which is necessary to predict
525 economic behaviour of the different farm types. It should also be acknowledged that in the real world,
526 access to land will not be as simple as has been assumed in this study and is in fact a real limitation
527 to the expansion of the dairy sector. This is because access to land is usually influenced by other
528 factors such as other agricultural activities and the quality of the accessible land available.
529 Additionally, this study was based on representative farm types such that the effect of wide ranging
530 heterogeneity that may exist between individual farms production characteristics are not fully
531 considered.

532 In spite of the aforementioned limitations of this study, the results of the analyses using the
533 PMP modelling approach contributes to the existing literature by providing empirical evidence on the
534 on the economic and environmental effects of alternative environmental policy instruments in dairy
535 farms. This will be useful in limiting excess nutrient surplus to the soil in the post milk quota era.

536 Further research in line with this study can be carried out to include other agricultural sectors
537 such as the beef and arable sectors, which will provide an empirical evidence of the impact of the
538 policy changes on other agricultural sectors on the island of Ireland. Such studies could also include
539 looking at the effects of adjustments in the use of production inputs or farming management practices

540 such as reducing the amount of protein in concentrates or the transfer of surplus manure especially
541 from the large dairy farms with higher manure nutrient inputs to the smaller farms where they can
542 still be utilised.

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718 Appendix A: Empirical specification of the PMP model

719
720 The empirical specifications of the model are presented in equations A1 to A19.

722 First Phase of the PMP Model

$$723 \quad \text{aximize } \Pi = \sum_d \sum_k X_d p_{dk} y_{dk} - \sum_d \sum_i X_d \omega_{di} p_i - \sum_d \sum_n F_{dn} p_n - \sum_d M_d h_d - \sum_d C_d j_d$$

$$724 \quad - \sum_d L_d v_d \quad (A1)$$

725 Where the indices d, k, I, and n represent sets

726
727 Π = the objective function value

728 X_d = vector of dairy activities d

729 p_{dk} = the price per unit for output k for dairy activity d

730 y_{dk} = the yield of output k for dairy activity d

731 ω_{di} = input i per unit of activity d

- 732 p_i = accounting costs per unit of input i ,
- 733 F_{dn} = amount of chemical fertilizer n used
- 734 p_n = Price of chemical fertilizer n
- 735 M_d = volume of manure for each dairy activity d
- 736 h_d = price of spreading manure
- 737 C_d = volume of concentrates for each dairy activity
- 738 j_d = price of concentrates for each dairy activity
- 739 L_d = ha of extra land after milk quota is abolished
- 740 v_d = price of extra land for each dairy activity

741

742 Equation (A1) is the linear objective function in which the variable costs are described as a

743 linear function of prices and quantities. The first element on the right-hand side of equation represents

744 the revenue from dairy production activities, that is, revenue from the sales of milk, and calves. The

745 second element is the total variable costs excluding the costs of chemical fertilizer, the cost of

746 spreading manure and the costs of concentrates. The third element is the cost of chemical fertilizer

747 and the fourth element is the cost of spreading manure. The fifth element is the cost of concentrates,

748 while the sixth element is the cost of renting extra land. Labour and capital are assumed not to be

749 constraining factors in the model and farms can rent land up to a maximum of 20 hectares at a cost.

750 The 20 hectares land size is chosen based on the historical data on land area rented by dairy farms in

751 the study area.

752 The objective function is subject to the following inequality constraints

753

754
$$\sum_d \delta_{dl} X_d \leq \sum_d T_d \quad [\lambda_l] \quad (A2)$$

755

756
$$T_d \leq B_d + L_d \quad (A3)$$

757

758
$$L_d \leq a \quad (A4)$$

759

760 The expression in equation (A2) represents the land constraint where δ_{dl} is the use of land per dairy

761 activities in hectare per head. T_d is the total land available per dairy cow activity represented in

762 equation (A3). L_d is the hectares of land rented while B_d is the initial land available per dairy cow
 763 activity and a in equation (A4) is the maximum amount of land that can be rented. The maximum
 764 amount of land that can be rented was obtained from the average of the historical data used for
 765 analysis. λ_l is the shadow price of land which represents the increase in the objective function if the
 766 land variable is made less restrictive. The shadow values resulting from the land constraint is
 767 comparable to the land rental values and are determined simultaneously with other parameters in the
 768 first phase of the model.

$$769 \quad \sum_d \delta_{dq} X_d \leq b_q \quad [\lambda_q] \quad (A5)$$

770 Equation (A5) represents the dairy quota constraint where δ_{dq} is the dairy quota use per dairy cow
 771 activity. b_q represents the dairy quota availability while λ_q is the shadow price of milk quota. It
 772 should be emphasized that quota was not a constraint for Northern Ireland and as such was binding
 773 only for the Republic of Ireland model.

$$774 \quad \phi_{dn} X_d - F_{dn} \leq 0 \quad (A6)$$

775 The expression in equation (A6) represents the chemical fertilizer application balance where ϕ_{dn} is
 776 the application of chemical fertiliser n per dairy cow activity in Kg per head.

$$777 \quad \psi_d X_d - M_d \leq 0 \quad (A7)$$

778 The expression in equation (A7) represents the manure balance where ψ_d is the manure input in m³
 779 per dairy cow activity and M_d is the volume of manure from each dairy activity.

$$780 \quad \gamma_n \psi_d X_d - A_{dn} \leq 0 \quad (A8)$$

781 The expression in equation (A8) is the manure nutrient balance where A_{dn} is the nutrient from manure
 782 variable in Kg and γ_n is the manure conversion ratio per dairy activity, in kg per m³.

$$783 \quad \sum_d \sum_n \gamma_n \psi_d X_d - \sum_d \sum_n \rho_{dn} X_d \leq 0 \quad (A9)$$

784 The expression in equation (A9) represents the constraints from the nitrate directive. In the model,
 785 derogation is allowed as N from manure cannot exceed 250Kg N per hectare. The first expression is

786 the nutrient from animal manure for each dairy production activity measured in Kg while the second
 787 expression represents the maximum allowable nutrient from manure. ρ_{dn} is the manure limit in Kg
 788 per head of dairy production activity.

$$789 \quad \theta_d X_d - C_d \leq 0 \quad (A10)$$

790 Equation (A10) represents the concentrates balance where θ_d is the concentrates per dairy livestock
 791 unit measured in terms of energy from concentrates in Feed Unit for Lactation (UFL) per head for
 792 each dairy production activity

$$793 \quad \Omega_d X_d - E_d \leq 0 \quad (A11)$$

794 The expression in equation (A11) represents the total energy balance where Ω_d is the total energy
 795 requirement per livestock unit measured in UFL per head for each dairy production activity. 1 kg dry
 796 matter of grass equals 1 unit of feed for lactation (UFL) (McCarthy *et al.*, 2011). Subtracting the
 797 energy input from concentrates (C_d), from the total energy requirement (E_d) gives us the energy
 798 obtained from grass for each of the dairy production activities as presented in equation (A12). The
 799 estimated energy output from grass was found to be comparable to that estimated using the grass
 800 calculator for the Republic of Ireland (McCarthy *et al.*, 2011)

801

802

$$803 \quad E_d - C_d = G_d \quad A12$$

804 To estimate the nutrient output from grass, the energy from grass is converted to Kg dry matter and
 805 multiplied by appropriate coefficients (ξ_n) measured in kg per kg DM. G_d is the nutrient output
 806 from grass measured in unit of feed for lactation (UFL) (equation A13).

$$807 \quad \xi_n G_d = N_{dn} \quad A13$$

808 N_{dn} is the nutrient output from grass measured in Kg.

$$809 \quad A_{dn} + F_{dn} - N_{dn} = S_{dn} \quad A14$$

810 The nutrient surplus per dairy production activity S_{dn} is obtained from expression (A14) by
 811 subtracting the total nutrient input from chemical fertiliser and manure from the nutrient output
 812 from grass

$$813 \quad X_d \leq X_d^* + \epsilon \quad [\lambda_d] \quad A15$$

814 Equation (A15) is the calibration constraint and it forces the program to reproduce base year observed
 815 activity levels by putting upper limits on activity levels based on activity levels in the base period
 816 (Helming *et al.*, 2001). This is undertaken following Howitt (1995), by including a perturbation (ϵ ,
 817 is a very small number) to decouple the resource and calibration constraints. In the equation, λ_d
 818 represents the shadow values of the calibration constraint.

$$819 \quad X_d, F_{dn}, A_{dn}, M_d, C_d G_d, E_d > 0 \quad A16$$

820 The expression in equation (A16) is the non-negativity constraint which ensures that no negative
 821 activity level is observed.

822 Second phase of the PMP

823 In the second stage of the PMP model, the shadow values of the calibration constraints are
 824 used to construct non-linear variable cost functions excluding costs of chemical fertilizer, cost of
 825 concentrates and cost of spreading manure. To overcome the problem of underdetermination of the
 826 parameters (loss of degree of freedom) of the PMP methodology, in this study, prior information about
 827 supply elasticities has been adopted to calculate the parameters of the dairy model costs functions for
 828 Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. An approximate price elasticity estimate of 1 obtained
 829 from Kostov, (2008) was used in the analysis based on the fact that dairy production activities are
 830 expected to become more commercially orientated and price responsive in the post milk quota
 831 abolition era. The shadow values from the first stage calibration constraints are combined with the
 832 average production costs to calibrate the quadratic costs function in the model. The slope of the
 833 marginal costs curve for the dairy production activities is presented in equation (A17)

$$834 \quad \beta_{di} = \frac{\lambda_d + \omega_{di} p_i}{\eta_d X_d^*} \quad A17$$

835 The intercept coefficient of the marginal costs function (α_d) is specified in equation (A18) as

$$836 \quad \alpha_{di} = \frac{(\lambda_d + \omega_{di} p_i) \cdot (\eta_d - 1)}{\eta_d} \quad A18$$

837 Where η_d equals *a priori* supply elasticity of dairy production activity.

838 **Third phase of the PMP**

839 In the third phase of the PMP, the linear cost expressions in equation (A1) (second element
840 in the equation) is replaced by the quadratic costs functions (equations A19) using equations A17
841 and A18. The calibration constraints in the first phase (equation A15) are removed. In addition, a
842 new element to analyse effect of the application of an envisaged nutrient surplus tax policy is also
843 included.

$$844 \quad ax \Pi = \sum_d \sum_k X_d p_{dk} y_{dk} - \sum_d \sum_i (\alpha_{di} + 0.5 \beta_{di} X_d) X_d - \sum_d \sum_n F_{dn} p_n - \sum_d M_d h_d - \sum_d C_d j_d$$

$$845 \quad - \sum_d L_d v_d - \sum_d Z_d r_d \quad A19$$


846 Where Z_d is the N surplus above threshold for which the farmer is taxed, r_d is the levy on N
847 surplus in monetary unit per Kg. The model was written in GAMS programming language and was
848 solved using the non-linear solver CONOPT3. The methodology involved setting alternative policy
849 scenarios with a base scenario that is used as a reference point for counterfactual analysis. For the
850 purpose of allowing for independent simulations based on the decision-making behaviour of the dairy
851 farmers in each country and clusters, each, country has been modelled separately. An HMRC
852 Exchange rate of £1 to €1.178 was used in converting Northern Ireland's Pounds (£) to euros (€).

853 **Appendix B: Model Justification**

854 The initial analysis for this study was done prior to milk quota abolition in 2015. So, as part
855 of the model validation we compared the model results with actual data for the year 2016 post milk
856 quota abolition using data obtained from the Teagasc National Farm Survey (NFS, Republic of Ireland)
857 and the Northern Ireland Farm Business Survey (FBS, Northern Ireland). We used the methodology
858 described in section 2.1 to conduct a cluster analysis for a sample of 314 and 101 dairy farms for the
859 Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland respectively. The box plots in Figures B1 to B3 shows the
860 distributions of all the clusters. The same variables of milk yield, herd size and utilized agricultural
861


862 area were used for the cluster analysis. The results show that the clusters are comparable to the clus-
863 ters used for the model analysis.

864 **Figure B1: Box plots showing the distribution clusters in respect of the milk yield variable (2016)**



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866 **Figure B2: Box plots showing the distribution clusters in respect of the UAA variable (2016)**



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
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876 **Figure B3: Box plots showing the distribution clusters in respect of the herd size variable (2016)**



877

878 We estimated the N balance using the methodology described in section 2.3 on the 2016 data
 879 and compared the results to the model results. The results of the analyses are presented in Tables B1
 880 and B2. A graphical representation of the results is also provided in Figures B4 to B6. The analysis
 881 showed that to a large extent, our model correctly predicted the effect of the abolition of the milk
 882 quota system on herd size, gross margin and N balance. For example, just as the model results, there
 883 is increase in heard size for all clusters in the Republic of Ireland whereas, it remains relatively the
 884 same for Northern Ireland. A 2016 HMRC Exchange rate of £1 to €1.3 was used in converting North-
 885 ern Ireland’s Pounds (£) to euros (€).

886

887

888 Table B1: Comparison of model results for S1 scenario to actual 2016 data for clusters 1, 2 and 3

Variables	Cluster 1			Cluster 2			Cluster 3		
	Base (N=31)	Model	2016 (N=85)	Base (N=57)	Model	2016 (N=155)	Base (N=24)	Model	2016 (N=74)
Herd size	53.4	70.1	64.93	63.4	84.2	86.61	92.6	131.3	102.75
Stocking density (cow/ha)	1.22	1.10	1.22	1.22	1.17	1.29	1.31	1.45	1.47
Gross margin (€)	30638	31716	43904	52326	62650	79514	94195	122224	109432
N surplus (Kg/ha)	98.2	88.6	96.1	141.5	135.9	165.15	207.28	229.68	215.41


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890 Table B2: Comparison of model results for S1 scenario to actual 2016 data for clusters 4, 5 and 6

	Cluster 4			Cluster 5			Cluster 6		
Variables	Base (N=24)	Model(S1)	2016 (N=23)	Base (N=36)	Model (S1)	2016 (N=51)	Base (N=14)	Model (S1)	2016 (N=27)
Herd size	64.5	64.5	68.6	95.0	95.0	96.42	183.9	183.9	168.22
Stocking density (cow/ha)	1.05	1.05	1.03	1.28	1.28	1.20	1.60	1.60	1.50
Gross margin (€)	46654	46654	37099	92966	92966	92412	199414	199414	216251
N surplus (Kg/ha)	132.2	132.2	113.91	161.5	161.5	153.82	239.39	239.39	246.42

891

892 Figure B4: Comparison of model herd size to actual 2016 data for S1 scenario analysis




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897 Figure B5: Comparison of model gross margin (€) to actual 2016 data for S1 scenario analysis




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Figure B6: Comparison of N balance (Kg/ha) to actual 2016 data for S1 scenario analysis



901

902